THE PURSUIT AND THE LESSONS.
Victory was won, yet work was not over. Reserves were called up to
pursue, and guns forded the river in support. Advancing in three
columns the Japanese strove to keep touch with the demoralised foe.
Well forward on the right marched the reserves of the Twelfth Division;
in the centre, on the Pekin road, were the Guards’ reserves, and on
the left, near Antung, were those of the Second Division. On each
flank rode a regiment of cavalry, and lumbering well in the rear came
a field battery. The Russians were retreating toward Feng-hoang-cheng.
Three thousand who had been left at Antung were obliged to retire in a
North-easterly direction as far as Hamatan, where they could reach the
main road. It was the critical position of this detached force that led
to the final disaster. Convinced that the passage of the river would
be attempted near Antung the Russians remained until escape became
difficult. To hold the junction of the roads along which these three
thousand must retire was the duty of the reserves at Hamatan. One
battalion of infantry and two batteries of artillery made a desperate
stand near these heights upon which the Japanese reserves were rapidly
advancing. One company of the Twelfth Division, outstripping their
comrades, seized the high ground in rear of the Russians and cut off
their retreat. And now was waged a combat of heroes. Again and again
the enemy strove to force its passage through the hills. But Captain
Makizawa and his handful of men of the 24th Regiment were resolved to
die rather than allow their enemy to escape. Rifle and gun showered
death upon them, but they held on until the last cartridge was spent,
and only one officer remained alive. Hope was gone, but death remained.
One half of this gallant company had fallen. The remnant fixed bayonets
and prepared to fall in a mad rush upon batteries and battalions. But
help was at hand. The reserves came up in the centre and on the right,
and, without waiting for artillery, charged the position. Led by a
priest with uplifted crucifix some of the Russians made good their
escape. Many of the rearguard fell; the gunners fought to the last, and
then, disabling their guns, raised the white flag. The Japanese fire
ceased, and the surrender was completed.
[Illustration: A Cavalry Regiment crossing the River.]
Twenty-one field guns of the latest pattern and eight machine guns were
among the spoils. One hundred dead Russians attested the gallantry
with which the rearguard had done its duty. Six or seven more guns
were also found in a ravine about four miles from the river where they
had been abandoned when the Russians discovered that their left flank
had been taken in reverse. Eight hundred wounded Russians were
reported to have been carried to Feng-hoang-cheng; the number of slain
was 1,362; and of wounded prisoners 475, making with 138 unwounded
prisoners a casualty list of 1,775. The Japanese losses were remarkably
small considering the nature of the ground and the character of the
attack. Their casualties were returned at 860: five officers and 160
men killed, 29 officers and 666 men wounded. Among the Russians who
died from wounds was General Kastalinsky, who was struck by a shell on
Conical Hill.
The theory has been advanced that the Russians had no intention of
holding the Yalu, and that their purpose was to draw the Japanese into
the mountains of Manchuria. Evidence in support of this theory is hard
to discover. Surely it was not necessary to lose twenty-one field
guns and eight machine guns and to put three thousand men _hors de
combat_ in order to tempt an invading force across a river. There
can, I think, be little doubt that the Russians were confident of their
ability to defend a position of such great natural strength.
The general features of the position reminded me of the Tugela, with
the plain in front, the unfordable river, and the mountains beyond.
According to the testimony of prisoners, the Russians were taken by
surprise by the rapidity and ease with which the Japanese crossed this
network of rivers. Never for a moment did they dream that the passage
would be seriously attempted until four days later. Nor did they
suspect the presence of heavy artillery until the howitzers opened fire
on the 30th of April. There again we have the evidence of prisoners
who declared that they did not credit the report that the Japanese had
brought six-inch howitzers over the roads of Northern Korea.
An assumption of this kind was folly on the part of men who themselves
had carried guns as far South as Anju at a time when the roads were
in a worse condition. Nor could it have escaped their memory that the
Japanese, having command of the sea, were able to land heavy guns
within easy reach of Wiju. The long silence of the Japanese artillery
under severe provocation no doubt tended to confirm the enemy in this
delusion, but on the 30th of April they must have been well aware of
the strength of the artillery South of the Yalu.
The terrible effect of the Japanese fire, both direct and indirect,
may have aided the Russian General to arrive at the determination to
retire his field guns and machine guns, but if that was the reason, why
were they not moved earlier and to a safe distance? Only once in the
action on May 1st was the Russian artillery used, and not more than
half-a-dozen shots were fired before it was silenced. Seeing that the
guns never came into action after the bombardment of the 30th, why were
they not retired into the mountains beyond the possible reach of the
enemy? It is not easy to explain this lack of ordinary precaution on
any other ground than overweening confidence or hopeless confusion and
disorder.
Russian prisoners admitted that six thousand men were defending the
Yalu, and this estimate probably took no account of the three thousand
at Antung and the force on the left of the line. I cannot help thinking
that in the hands of half as many Boers such a position might have
been defended for several days even against so determined and gallant
an enemy as the Japanese. But the Russians displayed little skill in
selecting points of defence, or in constructing earthworks. Their gun
positions were exposed.
The Japanese spoke of the trenches as exceedingly strong. I can only
describe them as primitive and ineffective. The enemy’s weakness in
this respect accounts for the comparatively heavy casualties. A great
proportion of the losses were due to shell fire, against which the
trenches and sungars gave no protection. From the appearance of many
of the slain it was clear that the explosive used in the Japanese
common shell has terrific power. The shells split up into a thousand
fragments, with sharp edges that must have been so many swords hurled
in every direction. In no other shells have I seen so many sharp
pieces: it looked as if the shells not merely broke but laminated. One
conclusion may fairly be drawn from the use that the Japanese made of
common shell--that it is more effective than shrapnel even against
exposed masses of men and guns. The Japanese have learnt this lesson
very thoroughly and make but sparing use of shrapnel, and then only to
supplement the effect of common shell. They have also confirmed our
experience in South Africa that the howitzer is a valuable auxiliary in
the field, and has sufficient mobility so that it need not be tied to
any fixed position.
The fight on the Yalu has been described as a frontal attack with all
its defects. This description appears to me inaccurate. It is true
that the left front was the first to get into close touch with the
enemy on the 1st of May, and that in crossing the Ai-ho it suffered
heavier losses than any other part of the line. But at least twelve
hours before this the flanking movement on the extreme right had
began to develope, and had shaken the confidence of the Russians to
such a degree that they were falling back and had already withdrawn
their guns. The Japanese claim that the trenches on the spur East of
Chiu-lien-cheng were taken by direct assault. From that opinion I take
the liberty to dissent. I was right in front of the position and could
see clearly every movement of the attacking force. It is detracting
nothing from the gallantry of the soldiers who fought so stubbornly
with their backs to the river to say that the position was really taken
in reverse by the left centre. Then only was the attack from the front
pushed home to the point so stoutly defended by the enemy. No praise
can be too great for the Japanese soldiers. On the eve of the battle
they had not slept; they had to march across a great sandy plain and
to ford a river before they could engage the enemy. The victory however
was complete, and was gained at a sacrifice that must be accounted very
small.
[Illustration: A Gun Team in the Water.]
The question naturally arises: Why did not the Russians attempt a
counter attack as soon as the Twelfth Division crossed the river and
was divided from the rest of the army. The Japanese reserves were
at Kurito and the mountainous nature of the country did not favour
rapid concentration toward the East, while the guns could not cover
the extreme right. In 1894 the Chinese descended in great force
from these mountains on the East and inflicted serious loss on the
Japanese. Moreover, there was this in favour of a counter attack--that
the Japanese having crossed the river were compelled to move through
difficult country along a flank at right angles to their original
line of advance. They would consequently have been under very serious
disabilities had they been forced to retire. The Japanese certainly
feared such a counter attack, and made preparations to restore the
balance by holding the Second Division and the reserves in readiness
to drive a wedge into the Russian centre. They had, however, every
confidence in the capacity of the Twelfth Division to hold their own in
the mountains, and that confidence was strengthened by manifest want of
enterprise on the part of the enemy. But the greatest error of all was
the tenacity with which the Russian commander clung to the belief that
the crossing would be attempted in front of Antung. As a consequence
of this conviction the reserves were posted on the right wing at the
back of Antung where they were useless in emergency and it was in
extracting them from this position that the heavy losses in guns and
men were sustained at Hamatan.