essentially different from the design argument. The reason given for
this has been that the design argument is based on the analogy or
supposed analogy between the works of nature and the products of human
art. In this argument, we are told, we infer from the likeness which
certain natural objects bear to artificial objects that there must be
a likeness in their causes. We know, it is said, that only intelligent
beings frame such structures as houses, ships, and watches, and seeing
that there is in the mechanism of the heavens, the circulation of the
blood, and the construction of the eye, arrangements and adjustments
of a similar kind, we conclude that they also must have been framed
by an intelligent being, who must be as much greater than man as the
works of nature are greater than the works of art, for causes are
proportional to their effects. Now this may be the design argument
as some have presented it who had no particular wish to criticise it
severely, and it certainly is the way in which Hume and Kant wished
it to be presented; but it has no claim whatever to be considered the
only proper form of the argument, and is, in fact, a very bad form of
it. It is true that there is an analogy between the works of nature
and the works of art, and that on the strength of this analogy the two
classes of works, and also their causes, may be compared, but not true
that the design argument when correctly stated either rests on such
analogy or implies such comparison. The analogy and comparison may be
drawn into, and, as it were, incorporated with the design argument,
but that is rather as a means of illustration than as a condition of
inference. When we infer from an examination of their construction
that the eye and the ear have been designed by an intelligent being,
we are no more dependent on our knowledge that a watch or a telescope
has been designed by an intelligent being than we are dependent on
our knowledge of the eye and ear being the products of intelligence
when we infer that the watch and the telescope are the products of
intelligence. There is an inference in both cases, and an inference
of precisely the same nature in both cases. It is as direct and
independent when the transition is to God from His works as when to
our fellow-men from their works. We are greatly mistaken if we suppose
that we have an immediate knowledge of the intelligence of the beings
who make watches, houses, and ships; we only know that the beings who
make these things are intelligent because such things could not be made
without intelligence: in a word, we only know our fellow-creatures to
be intelligent beings because they utter and arrange sounds so as to
convey a meaning, execute movements which tend to an end, and construct
machines. We have no more a direct perception or a personal experience
of the intelligence of our fellow-men than we have of the intelligence
of God. The mind which has given origin to the order and adjustments
of the universe is not more absolutely inaccessible to sense and
self-consciousness than the mind which gives origin to the order and
adjustments of a watch. It is therefore impossible that our knowledge
of the former should be dependent on our knowledge of the latter. In
both cases the knowledge is inferential,--in both cases it is dependent
on the immediate consciousness of intelligence in ourselves,--but the
inference is in the former case neither longer nor less legitimate than
in the latter. We deny, then, that there is any truth in the statement
that the design argument rests on the analogy between the works of
nature and the products of art It rests directly on the character
of the works of nature as displaying order and adjustment. It is
essentially identical with the argument which we have expounded.
It is not less objectionable to speak of the argument from order and
adaptation as being an argument from final causes than to speak of it
as being an argument from design, unless the different significations
of final cause be distinguished, and those which are irrelevant and
illegitimate be excluded. For the expression "final cause" has various
significations which are indeed intimately related, yet which cannot
be employed indifferently without leading to utter confusion. These
significations may be distributed into two classes. Each class contains
three significations, and every signification of the first class has
a signification of the second class to correspond to it. In fact,
the significations of the first class are simply so many aspects of
order or adaptation, and those of the second class so many aspects of
design or intention; the former are order and adaptation viewed with
reference to the intrinsic, the extrinsic, and the ultimate ends of
things, and the latter are design and intention viewed with reference
to the same three ends. Final cause sometimes means the intrinsic
end of what is orderly and adjusted, the realisation of the nature
of anything which is considered as a whole, a complex of order and
adjustment. The combined stability and movement of the solar system
is in this sense the final cause of the arrangements by which that
result is secured. Sight is in this sense the final cause of the eye,
because in sight the true nature of the eye manifests itself. Then,
final cause sometimes means not the intrinsic but the extrinsic end of
what is orderly and adjusted; not merely the realisation of the nature
of anything, but its relationship to other things, its adaptations to
their requirements, its uses; not merely the end of an arrangement
regarded as a self-contained or completed whole, but the end or
ends which it serves as a system surrounded by, connected with, and
included in other systems. It is impossible to admit final cause in
the sense of intrinsic end and to deny it in that of extrinsic end;
for the universe is not a mere aggregate of systems placed alongside
of one another, but otherwise unconnected--it is itself a system
composed of an infinity of systems within systems. Nothing in nature
stands alone; nothing lives to itself nor dies to itself. What is a
whole with reference to something smaller than itself, is a part with
reference to something larger than itself. The eye is a whole with
reference to its own cords, lenses, fluids, and membranes, but it is a
part with reference to the body; sight is therefore not more certainly
its end than the uses of sight How can a man admit final cause to be
involved in the relationship between his stomach and bodily life, but
deny it to be involved in the relationship between his stomach and the
vegetable and animal substances with which he satisfies its cravings?
Clearly the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic ends is a
narrow one, and exists not so much in the nature of things as in our
way of looking at things. We have but to elevate and extend our own
view, and what was before an extrinsic end is thereby changed into an
intrinsic end. Admit, in fact, final cause anywhere, and you must admit
it everywhere; admit anything to have an end, and you must admit all
things to have an end; for the world is a grand and wondrous unity
in which all objects depend on and serve one another, and all forces
contribute to the attainment of a single comprehensive issue. Once
accept the principle of finality, and there is no consistent stopping
short of the conviction of Aristotle, that on it hang the whole heavens
and earth.
It is only when the word final cause is used in one or other of these
two senses that we can with any propriety speak of reasoning from
final causes to the existence of God. And these are just the senses
in which the expression is now least used. Final cause is generally
employed at present to signify design. It means, not the arrangement
of causes and effects into systematic unities, the parts of which have
definite relations to one another and a common issue, or the adaptation
of these unities to support and serve one another, but purpose or
intention in the Divine Mind with respect to such arrangement or
adaptation. This sense of the word is so obviously general enough to
refer both to intrinsic and extrinsic ends that it would be unnecessary
to direct attention to the fact, were it not that we are much more
apt to fall into error regarding extrinsic than intrinsic ends, and
consequently, regarding the intention or purpose which refers to them.
A thing has just one intrinsic end--namely, the single conspicuous
and all-comprehensive function or issue in virtue of which we can
regard it as being a whole or unity, and as possessed of a certain
relative independence or completeness. There is thus comparatively
little possibility of error in determining what the intrinsic end is
in a given instance, and comparatively little danger of presumption
in affirming it to have been the end contemplated by the Divine
Mind. There is no doubt, for example, that the eye is an instrument
constructed in a way calculated to attain the intrinsic end--sight; and
there can be no presumption in affirming that God must have had that
end in view in the construction of the eye. If there be a God, and if
He have had anything to do with the making of the eye, He must have
designed that His creatures should see with their eyes. It is different
with extrinsic ends. A thing has never merely one extrinsic end; it
has always a multitude of extrinsic ends, for it is always related to
a multitude of other things. If we would speak of the extrinsic end
of a thing we must mean thereby the whole of its adaptations to other
things, the entire circle of its external relationships, the sum of
its uses. But men have always shown themselves prone in judging of the
extrinsic ends of things to single out some particular adaptation or
use, or at least a few adaptations or uses, and to ignore or exclude
all others. And especially have they shown themselves prone to judge
of things merely from their relationship and utility to themselves, as
if their happiness was the chief if not sole end of all things. This
is, of course, an utterly erroneous method of judging, and necessarily
leads to ridiculous thoughts about things, and to irreverent thoughts
about God's designs in the creation of things. "It can," as Hegel tells
us, "truly profit neither religion nor science, if, after considering
the vine with reference to the well-known uses which it confers upon
man, we proceed to consider the cork-tree with reference to the corks
which are cut from its bark to serve as stoppers for wine-bottles."
When we affirm, then, that final causes in the sense of intrinsic ends
are in things, we affirm merely that things are systematic unities, the
parts of which are definitely related to one another and co-ordinated
to a common issue; and when we affirm that final causes in the sense
of extrinsic ends are in things, we affirm merely that things are not
isolated and independent systems, but systems definitely related to
other systems, and so adjusted as to be parts or components of higher
systems, and means to issues more comprehensive than their own. We
cannot affirm that final causes in the sense of designs are in things;
they can only exist in a mind. What do we mean when we hold that final
causes in this sense truly are in the Divine Mind, and with reference
equally to intrinsic and extrinsic ends? Merely that such order and
adjustment as may actually be seen in things and between things--seen
with the naked eye it may be, or only to be seen through the telescope
or microscope--or which, if they cannot be seen, yet can by scientific
induction be proved to be in and between things,--that that order and
adjustment which actually exist, were intended or designed by God to
exist. Of course every theist who sees evidences of God's existence in
the harmonies of nature, must necessarily rise to final causes in this
sense from final causes in the other senses which have been indicated;
he must pass from material arrangements to the Divine Intelligence
which he believes to be manifested by them. And there can be no shadow
of presumption in any theist searching for final causes--Divine
designs--in this sense and to this extent. What Descartes and others
have said against doing so, on the ground that it is arrogant for a man
to suppose he can investigate the ends contemplated by the Deity--can
penetrate into the counsels of Divine Wisdom--has manifestly no force
or relevancy, so long as all that is maintained is that the order
which actually exists was meant to exist. The doubt or denial of that
is irreverent. To admit the existence of God, and yet to refuse to
acknowledge that He purposed and planned the adaptations and harmonies
in nature, is surely as presumptuous as it is inconsistent. To assume
that God is ignorant of the constitution and character of the universe,
and has had no share in the contrivance and management of it, is to
degrade Him to the level of the dream-and-dread-begotten gods of
Democritus and Epicurus. Better not to think of God at all, than to
think of Him in such a way.
The final cause of a thing, however, may mean, and with reference
both to adjustment and design, neither its intrinsic nor extrinsic,
but its ultimate end. It may mean, not merely that a thing is and
was intended to be the mechanism or organism which science analyses
and explains, and to stand in the relationships and fulfil the uses
which science traces, but also that it will have, and was intended to
have, a destination in the far future. We may ask, What is the goal
towards which creation moves? What will be the fate of the earth? In
what directions are vegetable and animal life developing? What is the
chief end of man? Whither is history tending? What is the ideal of
truth which science has before it, and which it hopes to realise? of
beauty, which art has before it? of goodness, which virtue has before
it? And although to most if not all of these questions probably no
very definite and certain answer can be given, to deny that they can
in any measure be answered, to pronounce all speculation regarding
ultimate ends as wholly vain, would justly be deemed the expression of
a rash and thoughtless dogmatism. Science claims not only to explain
the past but to foretell the future. The power of prevision possessed
by a science is the best criterion of its rank among the sciences when
rank is determined by certitude. And most significant is the boldness
with which some of the sciences have of late begun to forecast the
future. Thus, with reference to the end of the world, the spirit of
prophecy, which until very recently was almost confined to the most
noted religious visionaries, is now poured largely out upon our most
distinguished physicists. This we regard as a most significant and
hopeful circumstance, and trust that ere long the prophets of science
will be far less discordant and conflicting in their predictions even
of the remotest issues than they must be admitted to be at present.
While speculation as to final causes in the sense of ultimate ends is,
within certain limits, as legitimate as it is natural, its results are
undoubtedly far too meagre and uncertain to allow of our reasoning from
them to the existence or wisdom of God. We must prove that there is a
Divine Intelligence from what we actually perceive in things, and not
from what we can conjecture as to the final destinies of things. In
fact, until we have ascertained that there is a Divine Intelligence,
and in some measure what are the principles on which that Intelligence
proceeds, our chance of reaching truth through speculation as to the
ultimate ends of things is, in all probability, exceedingly small. It
is on no hazardous speculations of this kind that we would rest an
argument for the Divine existence, although questions have been raised
as to the Divine character and government which will, at a later stage
of the discussion, involve us to some extent in the consideration of
ultimate ends.
When final cause is employed to signify design in any reference,
be it to intrinsic, extrinsic, or ultimate ends, I have nothing to
object to Bacon and Descartes's condemnation of it as illegitimate
and unprofitable in science. I know of no science, physical or moral,
in which, while thus understood, it can be of the slightest use as
a principle of scientific discovery. It is as much out of place in
the world of organic as of inorganic nature. It is quite incorrect
to say that although it does not lead to the discovery of new truths
in strictly physical science, it does so in physiology for example,
or in psychology, or in ethics. It is only when it means merely the
inherent order and adjustment of things--not when it means designs
and purposes regarding them--that the search after it can possibly
lead to scientific truth, and, when so understood, it leads to truth
in all sciences alike. It was the suggestive principle in Adams and
Leverrier's discovery of the planet Neptune from certain unexplained
perturbations of the planet Uranus, quite as much as in Harvey's
discovery of the circulation of the blood from the observation of
certain unexplained valves at the outlet of the veins and the rise
of the arteries. It is involved in the very nature of the inductive
process, and is only confirmed and enlarged by the progress of
inductive research. It stands in no opposition to the principle of
efficient causes, and is in no degree disproved by the discovery of
such causes. Assertions to the effect that it has gradually been driven
by the advance of knowledge from the simpler sciences into those which
are complex and difficult,--that it is being expelled even out of
biology and sociology--and that it always draws its confirmation, not
from phenomena which have been explained, but from phenomena which
await explanation,--are often made, but they rest almost exclusively
on the wishes of those who make them. They have no real historical
basis.[29]
[29] See Appendix XXI.
LECTURE VI.
OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER EXAMINED.
I.
The universe is a system which comprehends countless subordinate
systems. It is full of combinations of parts which constitute
wholes, and of means which conspire to ends. The natural and obvious
explanation of the order and adjustments which it thus presents is that
they are due to a mind or intelligence. And this is the only rational
explanation of them. Mind can alone account for order and adjustment,
for the co-ordination of parts into a whole, or the adaptation of
means to an end. If we refer them to anything else, the reference is
essentially contrary to reason, essentially irrational. It may seem at
the first superficial glance as if there were a variety of hypotheses
as to the origin of the order we everywhere see around us, all equally
or nearly equally credible; but adequate reflection cannot fail to
convince us that they must be reduced to a single alternative--to two
antagonistic theories. Our only choice is between reason and unreason,
between a sufficient and an insufficient cause, between, we may even
say, a cause and no cause. This will be brought out by an examination
of the various hypotheses which have been suggested by those who are
unwilling to admit that the order of the world originated in mind. They
try their best to suggest some other alternative than that which I have
said is inevitable; but every suggestion they make only raises the
alternative which they would avoid--mind or chance, reason or unreason,
a sufficient explanation or an absurd one. Before proceeding to
establish this, however, it may be necessary to remark on some direct
objections which have been taken to the design argument,--objections
which might be valid, although no explanation of order could be given
or were even attempted.
The inference which the theist requires to draw from the existence of
order in the universe is merely the existence of an intelligence who
produced that order. It follows that it is an unfair objection to his
argument to urge, as has often been urged, that it does not directly
and of itself prove God to be the creator of the universe, but only the
former of it--not the author of matter, but only of the collocations of
matter. This objection, which men even like Hume and Kant and J. S.
Mill, have thought worth employing, is simply that the argument does
not prove more than it professes to prove. It does not pretend to make
all other reasoning for the Divine existence superfluous. It is no
condition of its validity that it should stand alone; that it should
contribute nothing to other arguments and receive nothing from them.
The objection is thus entirely irrelevant. It may be a wise caution
to those who would trust exclusively to it, and neglect or depreciate
other arguments. It is no objection to its legitimacy.
It is remarkable, too, that those who have urged this objection
have never felt that before employing it they were bound to satisfy
themselves and to prove to others that order is a mere surface or
superficial thing--outside of matter, superimposed on it. If order
be something inherently and intrinsically in matter--be of its very
essence--belong to what is ultimate in it; if matter and its form be
inseparable,--then the author of its order must have been also the
author of itself; and all that this objection shows us is, that those
who have employed it have had mistaken notions about the nature of
matter. Now, as I have already had to indicate, modern science seems
rapidly perfecting the proof of this. The order in the heavens, and in
the most complicated animal organisms, appears to be not more wonderful
than the order in the ultimate atoms of which they are composed. The
balance of evidence is in favour of the view that order extends as far
and penetrates as deep as matter itself does. The human intellect is
daily learning that it is foolish to fancy that there is anywhere in
matter a sphere in which the Divine Wisdom does not manifest itself in
and through order.
There is still another remark to be made on the objection under
consideration. The immediate inference from the order of the universe
is to an intelligent former of the universe, not to a creator. But
this does not preclude the raising of the question, Is it reasonable
to believe the former of the world merely its former? Must not its
former be also its creator? On the contrary, the inference that the
order of the world must be the result of intelligent agency ought
to suggest this question to every serious and reflective mind, and
it should even contribute something to its answer. The order of the
universe must have originated with intelligence. What is implied in
this admission? Clearly that the order of the universe cannot have
originated with matter,--that matter is unintelligent, and cannot
account either for intelligence or the effects of intelligence. But
if so, the intelligence which formed the universe must be an eternal
intelligence. The supposition that matter is eternal must in this case
be supplemented by the admission that mind is eternal. In other words,
the affirmation that the former of the world is merely its former--the
denial that its former is also its creator--means dualism, the belief
in two distinct eternal existences,--an eternal mind and eternal
matter. Whoever is not prepared to accept this hypothesis must abandon
the affirmation and denial from which it necessarily follows. And who
can, after due deliberation, accept it? The law of parsimony of causes
absolutely forbids our assuming, for the explanation of anything, more
causes than are necessary to account for it. It forbids, therefore,
our belief in an eternal matter and an eternal mind, unless we can
show reason for holding that one of them alone is not a sufficient
cause of the universe. Now those who grant the inference from order
to intelligence, themselves admit that matter is not a sufficient
First Cause of the universe as it actually exists. Do they find any
person admitting that mind would be an insufficient First Cause? Do
they themselves see any way of showing its insufficiency? Do they not
even perceive that it would be foolish and hopeless to try to show
that an eternal mind could not create a material universe, and that
all they could show would be, the here quite irrelevant truth, that
the human mind is ignorant of the manner in which this could be done?
If the answers to these questions are what I believe they must be, it
must also be acknowledged that the former of the universe can only be
rationally thought of as also its creator.