Now, of course, a self-existent cause does not in itself come

completely under the law of causality. That law cannot inform us what

self-existence is. A self-existent cause, however, may be known as

well as any other cause by its effects. The mind may rise to it from

its effects. The principle of causality may lead up to it, although it

does not include within itself the proof of the self-existence of the

cause. It may at the last stage be attached to some other principle

which compels the affirmation of the self-existence of the cause

reached; in other words, the affirmation that the first cause is a

self-existent cause, may be a distinct mental act not necessitated by

the principle of causality itself. It may either be held that this

mental necessity is the reason why we cannot entertain the thought

of an infinite regress of causes, or that the incapacity of the mind

to regard the thought of an infinite regress of causes as other than

self-contradictory, is the explanation of its felt necessitation to

affirm a self-existent cause; in which latter case the principle

of causality really necessitates a belief in the ungenerated and

self-existent. Both of these views are plausible, and which of them is

true is an interesting subject of metaphysical investigation, but it is

one of no practical consequence in the inquiry on which we are engaged.

The principle of causality can lead us up from all things which have

on them the marks of having begun to be, and if we at length come to

something which bears no such marks, be it matter or be it mind, no

man can doubt, or does doubt, that something to be self-existent. This

difficulty about a self-existent cause not being able to be arrived

at by the principle of causality, will be worth attending to by the

theist when it is attended to by any one else,--when any atheist or

any anti-theist of any kind is prepared to deny that the last cause

in the order of knowledge, and the first in the order of existence,

must be a self-existent cause--but not until then; and it is mere

sophistry to represent it as of practical importance. Whenever we come

to an existence which we cannot regard as an effect or thing generated

in time, we, either in consequence of the very nature of the causal

judgment, or of some self-evident condition or conditions of knowledge

necessarily attached thereto, attribute to it self-existence and

eternity. We may dispute as to whether this is done in the one or the

other of these two ways, but that is a merely theoretical question;

that every one does, and must, as a reasonable being, do it, is what

no man disputes, or can dispute,--and this alone is of practical

consequence.

Another admission must be made by every man who reflects carefully

on the nature of causation. To say that the idea of cause can never

demand belief in an uncaused cause, sounds as self-evident; to say

that the idea of cause can find no satisfaction save in the belief of

an uncaused cause, sounds as a paradox; but let a man meditate for a

little with real thoughtfulness on the meaning of these two statements,

and he cannot fail to perceive that the former is an undeniable

falsehood, and the latter an undeniable truth. An uncaused cause, a

first cause, alone answers truly to the idea of a cause. A secondary

cause, in so far as secondary, in so far as caused, is not a cause. I

witness some event--some change. I am compelled as a rational being to

seek its cause. I reach it only to find that this cause was due to a

prior cause. What has happened? The cause from which I have had to go

back has ceased to be a cause; the cause to which I have had to go back

has become the cause of two effects, but it will remain so only if I am

not reasonably bound to seek a cause for _it_. If I am, its causality

must pass over to its explanatory antecedent. We may go back a hundred,

a thousand, a million times, but if the last cause reached be not truly

a first cause, an uncaused cause, the idea of cause in our mind will

be as unsatisfied at the end of our search as at the beginning, and

the whole process of investigation will be aimless and meaningless. A

true cause is one to which the reason not only moves but in which it

rests, and except in a first cause the mind cannot rest. A first cause,

however, is certainly not one which has been itself caused.

We are warranted, then, in looking upon the universe as an event or

effect, and we may be certain that it is not the last link of an

infinite chain of causes and effects, or of any series of causes and

effects, long or short, suspended upon nothing. No chain or series can

be, properly speaking, infinite, or without a first link or term. The

universe has a First Cause. And its First Cause, I must proceed to

remark, reason and observation alike lead us to believe must be one--a

single cause. When one First Cause is sufficient to explain all the

facts, it is contrary to reason to suppose another or several. We must

prove that no one First Cause could account for the universe before

we can be entitled to ascribe it to more causes than one. The First

Cause, we shall further see afterwards, must have attributes which no

two or more beings can be supposed to possess, which one being alone

can possess. Then the character of the effect itself refers us back

to a single cause. A belief in more gods than one not only finds no

support in the universe, but, as the very word universe indicates,

is contradicted by it. For, numerous and diverse as are the objects

in nature, they are so constituted and connected--so dependent on

and related to one another--as to compose a whole which exhibits a

marvellous unity in variety. Everything counteracts or balances or

assists something else, and thus all things proclaim their common

dependence on One Original. Co-ordinate things must all be derivative

and secondary, and all things in nature are co-ordinate parts of a

stupendous system. Each one of us knows, for example, that a few years

ago he was not, and that in a few years hence the place which knows him

now will know him no more; and each one of us has been often taught

by the failure of his plans, and the disappointment of his hopes, and

the vanity of his efforts, that there are stronger forces and more

important interests in the world than his own, and that he is in the

grasp of a Power which he cannot resist--which besets him behind and

before, and hems him in on all sides. When we extend our view, we

perceive that this is as true of others as of ourselves, and that it is

true even, in a measure, of all finite things. No man lives or dies to

himself; no object moves and acts absolutely from and for itself alone.

This reveals a single all-originating, all-pervading, all-sustaining

principle. These manifold mutually dependent existences imply one

independent existence. The limitations assigned to all individual

persons and things point to a Being which limits them all. Particular

causes and secondary movements lead back to "a cause of causes," "a

first mover, itself immovable, yet making all things else to move."

The first cause must be far more truly and properly a cause than any

secondary cause. In fact, as we have already seen, a secondary cause

is not strictly a cause; so far as secondary, it merely transmits to

its consequent what it has received from its antecedent. There may be

a succession of a thousand such causes in a process, yet the first

cause is also the last, and there is, in fact, all through, but one

cause; the others merely convey and communicate its force. A machine,

however numerous its parts and movements, does not create the least

amount of force; on the contrary, the most perfect machine wastes and

absorbs some of the force which is imparted to it. The universe, so far

as subject to mechanical laws, is merely a machine which transmits a

given quantity of force, but which no more creates it than it creates

itself. The author of that force is the one true cause of all physical

phenomena. Life is probably, and mind is certainly, not entirely

explicable on mechanical principles; but neither life nor mind can be

maintained to do more than to determine the direction or application of

the power implanted in them, or rendered accessible to them, through

the working of the first cause. All things must, consequently, "live,

move, and have their being" therein. It is at their end as well as

at their origin; it encompasses them, all round; it penetrates them,

all through. The least things are not merely linked on to it through

intermediate agencies which go back an enormous distance, but are

immediately present to it, and filled to the limit of their faculties

with its power. It is in every ray of sunlight, every breath of wind,

and blade of grass; it is the source and life of all human minds and

hearts. The pantheist errs not so much in what he affirms of it, as in

what he denies to it.

This cause--the cause of causes--must, it is further obvious, be in

possession of a power far beyond the comprehension of our reasons or

imaginations. All other power is derived from its power. All the power

which is distributed and distinguished in secondary causes must be

combined and united in the first cause. Now, think what an enormous

power there is displayed even in this world. In every half-ounce of

coal there is stored up power enough, if properly used, to draw two

tons a mile. How vast, then, the power which God has deposited in the

coal-beds of the world alone! The inhabitants of this little island,

by availing themselves of the natural forces which Providence has

placed at their disposal, annually accomplish more work than could by

any possibility be effected by the inhabitants of the whole earth, if

they exerted merely the power which is in their own bodies, the power

of human bones and muscles. And yet there can be little doubt that,

even in this country, we make no use at all of many natural agents,

and only a wasteful use of any of them. "Weigh the earth on which we

dwell," says an astronomer; "count the millions of its inhabitants

that have come and gone for the last six thousand years; unite their

strength into one arm; and test its power in an effort to move the

earth. It could not stir it a single foot in a thousand years; and yet,

under the omnipotent hand of God, not a minute passes that it does

not fly far more than a thousand miles." The earth, however, is but a

mere atom in the universe. Through the vast abysses of space there are

scattered countless systems, at enormous distances, yet all related;

glorious galaxies of suns, planets, satellites, comets, all sweeping

onwards in their appointed courses. How mighty the arm which impels

and guides the whole! God can do all that, for He continually does it.

How much more He could do than He does, we cannot know. The power of

no true cause, of no free cause, is to be measured by what it does.

It must be adequate to produce its actual effects, but it may be able

to produce countless merely possible effects. It has power over its

powers, and is not necessitated to do all that it is capable of doing.

It is difficult, perhaps, to show that the universe is not infinite. It

is obviously unreasonable and presumptuous to deny that the power of

its Author may be infinite. And yet we find men who do so. For example,

the late Mr John Stuart Mill, for no better reasons than that nature

sometimes drowns men, and burns them, and that childbirth is a painful

process, maintained that God could not possibly be infinite. I shall

not say what I think of the shallowness and self-conceit displayed in

such an argument. What it proves is not the finiteness of God, but the

littleness of a human intellect. The mind of man never shows itself

so small as when it tries to measure the attributes and limit the

greatness of its Creator.

A first cause, we have already seen, must be a free cause. It cannot

have been itself caused. It is absurd to look for it among effects.

But we never get out of the sphere of effects until we enter that of

free agency; until we emerge from the natural into the spiritual;

until we leave matter and reach mind. The first cause must, indeed,

be in--all through--the universe; but it must also be out of the

universe, anterior to, and above the universe. The idea of cause is

a delusion--the search for causes an inexplicable folly--if there be

no first cause, and if that first cause be not a free cause, a Will, a

Spirit, a Person. Those who object to the causation argument, that it

does not take us beyond the world--does not lead us up to a personal

cause of the world--have failed to apprehend what causation signifies.

Secondary causes may not be true causes, and yet reason be trustworthy,

for there is that behind them on which it can fall back; but if

there be no first cause, or if the first cause be not free, reason

is throughout a lie. Reason, if honest and consistent, cannot in its

pursuit of causes stop short of a rational will. That alone answers to

and satisfies its idea of a cause.

The most rapid glance at the universe powerfully confirms the

conclusion that its first cause can only be a Mind, a Reason. The

universe is a universe; that is to say, it is a whole, a unity, a

system. The first cause of it, therefore, in creating and sustaining

it, must comprehend, act on, and guide it as a systematic whole;

must have created all things with reference to each other; and must

continually direct them towards a preconceived goal. The complex and

harmonious constitution of the universe is the expression of a Divine

Idea, of a Creative Reason. This thought brings me to my next argument

and next lecture.[20]

[20] See Appendix XII.

LECTURE V.

THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER.

I.

The prevalence of order in nature has already been referred to as

contributing to prove that the universe is an event, a generated

existence, a something which once began to be. It will now be brought

forward as in itself a manifestation of, and consequently a ground

for believing in, a Supreme Mind. Where order meets us, the natural

and immediate inference is that there is the work of intelligence.

And order meets us everywhere in the universe. It covers and pervades

the universe. It is obvious to the ordinary naked eye, and spreads

far beyond the range of disciplined vision when assisted by all the

instruments and appliances which science and art have been able to

invent. It is conspicuous alike in the architecture of the heavens

and the structure of a feather or a leaf. It goes back through all

the epochs of human history, and all the ages of geological and

astronomical time. It is the common work of all the sciences to

discover and explain the order in the universe. There is no true

science which is not constantly making new and fuller discoveries of

the order in nature,--the order within us and without us; not one

which is not ever increasingly establishing that in order all things

move and have their being. What is maintained by the theist is, that

this order, the proof of which is the grand achievement of science,

universally implies mind; that all relations of order--all laws and

uniformities--are evidences of an intelligent cause.

The order which science finds in nature may be described as either

general or special, although in strictness the difference between them

is only a difference of degree, the former being the more and the

latter the less general, or the former being the less and the latter

the more special. In what may be called general order, that which

strikes us chiefly is regularity; in what may be called special order,

that which chiefly strikes us is adaptation or adjustment. In inorganic

nature general order is the more conspicuous; in organic nature special

order. Astronomy discloses to us relations of number and proportion

so far-reaching that it almost seems as if nature were "a living

arithmetic in its development, a realised geometry in its repose."

Biology, on the other hand, impresses us by showing the delicacy and

subtlety of the adjustment of part to part, of part to whole, and

of whole to surroundings, in the organic world. There is, perhaps,

sufficient difference between these two kinds of order to warrant

their being viewed separately, and as each furnishing the basis of an

argument for the existence of God. The argument from regularity has

sometimes been kept apart from the argument from adjustment. The former

infers the universe to be an effect of mind because it is characterised

by proportion or harmony, which is held to be only explicable by the

operation of mind. The latter draws the same inference because the

universe contains countless complex wholes, of which the parts are

so collocated and combined as to co-operate with one another in the

attainment of certain results; and this, it is contended, implies an

intelligent purpose in the primary cause of these things.

While we may readily admit the distinction to be so far valid, it is

certainly not absolute. Regularity and adjustment are rather different

aspects of order than different kinds of order, and, so far from

excluding each other, they will be found implying each other. It is

obvious that even the most specialised adjustments of organic structure

and activity presuppose the most general and simple uniformities of

purely physical nature. Such cases of adjustment comprehend in fact

many cases of regularity. It is less obvious, but not less true, that

wherever regularity can be traced adjustment will also be found, if the

search be carried far enough. The regularity disclosed by astronomy

depends on adjustment as regards magnitude, weight, distance, &c.,

in the celestial bodies, just as the adjustments brought to light by

biology depend on the general regularity of the course of nature. There

is no law of nature so simple as not to presuppose in every instance

of its action at least two things related to one another in the manner

which is meant when we speak of adjustment. It being thus impossible

to separate regularity from adjustment as regards the phenomena of the

universe, it seems unnecessary to attempt by abstraction to separate

them in the theological argumentation, while giving a rapid general

glance at the phenomena which display them.

The physical universe has, perhaps, no more general characteristic than

this,--its laws are mathematical relations. The law of gravitation,

which rules all masses of matter, great or small, heavy or light,

at all distances, is a definite numerical law. The curves which

the heavenly bodies describe under the influence of that law are

the ellipse, circle, parabola, and hyperbola--or, in other words,

they all belong to the class of curves called conic sections, the

properties of which mathematicians had begun to investigate nearly

twenty centuries before Newton established that whatever was true

of them might be directly transferred to the heavens, since the

planets revolve in ellipses, the satellites of Jupiter in circles,

and the comets in elliptical, parabolic, and hyperbolic orbits. The

law of chemical combination, through which the whole world of matter

has been built up out of a few elements, always admits of precise

numerical expression. So does the law of the correlation of heat and

gravitation. Each colour in the rainbow is due to a certain number of

vibrations in a given time; so is each note in the scale of harmony.

Each crystal is a geometrical construction. The pistils of flowers,

and the feathers in the wings and tails of birds, are all numbered.

If nature had not thus been ruled by numerical laws, the mathematical

sciences might have existed, but they would have had no other use than

to exercise the intellect, whereas they have been the great instruments

of physical investigation. They are the creations of a mental power

which, while occupied in their origination and elaboration, requires

to borrow little, if anything, from matter; and yet, it is only with

their help that the constitution of the material universe has been

displayed, and its laws have been discovered, with that high measure

of success of which physicists are so proud. But they could not have

been applied to the universe at all unless its order had been of the

exact numerical and geometrical kind which has been indicated; unless

masses had attracted each other, and elements combined with each

other, in invariable proportions; unless "the waters had been measured

as if in the hollow of a hand, the heaven meted out as with a span,

the dust of the earth comprehended in a measure, and the mountains

weighed in scales and the hills in a balance." Now it is possible to

deny that things have been thus weighed, measured, and numbered by a

Creative Intelligence, but not that they have been weighed, measured,

and numbered. If we are to give any credit to science, there can be

no doubt about the weights and measures and numbers. This question,

then, is alone left,--Could anything else than intelligence thus weigh,

measure, and number? Could mere matter know the abstrusest properties

of space and time and number, so as to obey them in the wondrous way

it does? Could what has taken so much mathematical knowledge and

research to apprehend, have originated with what was wholly ignorant

of all quantitative relations? Or must not the order of the universe

be due to a mind whose thoughts as to these relations are high above

even those of the profoundest mathematicians, as are the heavens above

the earth? If the universe were created by an intelligence conversant

with quantitative truth, it is easy to understand why it should be

ruled by definitely quantitative laws; but that there should be such

laws in a universe which did not originate in intelligence, is not

only inexplicable but inconceivably improbable. There is not merely in

that case no discoverable reason why there should be any numerically

definite law in nature, but the probability of there being no law

or numerical regularity of any kind is exceedingly great, and of

there being no law-governed universe incalculably great. Apart from

the supposition of a Supreme Intelligence, the chances in favour of

disorder against order, of chaos against cosmos, of the numerically

indefinite and inconstant against the definite and constant, must be

pronounced all but infinite. The belief in a Divine Reason is alone

capable of rendering rational the fact that mathematical truths are

realised in the material world.[21]

[21] See Appendix XIII.

The celestial bodies were among the earliest objects of science, and

before there was any science they stimulated religious thought and

awakened religious feeling. The sun and moon have given rise to so

extraordinary a number of myths that some authors have referred to them

the whole of heathen mythology. There can be little doubt that the

growth of astronomical knowledge contributed greatly to bring about

the transition from polytheism to monotheism, and that so soon as the

heavens were clearly understood to be subject to law, and the countless

bodies which circle in them not to be independent agents but parts or

members of a single mechanical or organic system, the triumph of the

latter was for ever secured. No science, indeed, has hitherto had so

much influence on man's religious beliefs as astronomy, although there

may now appear to be indications that chemistry and biology will rival

it in this respect in the future. And it has been thus influential

chiefly because through its whole history it has been a continuous,

conspicuous, and ever-advancing, ever-expanding demonstration of a

reign of law on the most magnificent scale,--a demonstration begun when

with unassisted vision men first attempted roughly to distribute the

stars into groups or constellations, and far from yet ended when the

same laws of gravitation, light, heat, and chemical combination which

rule on earth have been proved to rule on orbs so distant that their

rays do not reach us in a thousand years. The system of which our earth

is a member is vast, varied, and orderly, the planets and satellites

of which it is composed being so adjusted as regards magnitude and

mass, distance, rate, and plane of direction, &c., that the whole is

stable and secure, while part ministers to part as organ to organ in

an animal body. Our own planet, for example, is so related to the sun

and moon that seed-time and harvest never fail, and the ebb and flow

of the tides never deceive us. And the solar system is but one of

hundreds of millions of systems, some of which are incalculably larger

than it, yet the countless millions of suns and stars thus "profusely

scattered o'er the void immense" are so arranged and distributed in

relation to one another and in accordance with the requirements of the

profoundest mathematics as to secure the safety of one and all, and to

produce everywhere harmony and beauty. Each orb is affecting the orbit

of every other--each is doing what, if unchecked, would destroy itself

and the entire system--but so wondrously is the whole constructed

that these seemingly dangerous disturbances are the very means of

preventing destruction and securing the universal welfare, being due to

reciprocally compensating forces which in given times exactly balance

one another. Is it, I ask, to be held as evidence of the power of

the human mind that it should have been able after many centuries of

combined and continuous exertion to compute with approximate accuracy

the paths and perturbations of the planets which circle round our

sun and the returns of a few comets, but as no evidence even of the

existence of mind in the First Cause of things that the paths and

perturbations of millions on millions of suns and planets and comets

should have been determined with perfect precision for all the ages

past and future of their existence, so that, multitudinous as they

are, each proceeds safely on its destined way, and all united form a

glorious harmony of structure and motion?[22]

[22] See Appendix XIV.

Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876 · 第 7 / 25 段