the moment had arrived, when every friend of religion and social order
should be found at his post. The importance of the struggle--the
violence of parties--the false line of policy adopted by most
governments--the errors and delusions too prevalent even among many of
the defenders of legitimacy, rendered the warning voice of an
enlightened mediator more necessary than ever. In conjunction with his
illustrious friend, Adam Mueller, and some of the Redemptorists--a most
able, amiable, and exemplary body of ecclesiastics at Vienna--he
established in 1820, a religious and political journal, entitled
"Concordia." In a series of articles, entitled "Characteristics of the
age," and which contain a most masterly sketch of the political state
and prospects of the principal European countries, Schlegel has given a
fuller exposition of his political principles, than in any other of his
writings which have come under my notice. The extreme interest and
importance of the matters discussed in these articles, and still more,
the light they throw on very many passages in the following translation,
have induced me to lay before the reader a rapid analysis of such parts
as embody the author's political system. I shall therefore now proceed
to this task, premising that in this analysis I shall occasionally
interweave a remark of my own, to illustrate the author's views.--
There are five essential and eternal corporations in human society--the
family--the church--the state--the guild--and the school.
I. The family is the smallest and simplest corporation--the ground-work
of all the others;--and on its right constitution and moral development
depend, as we shall presently see, the freedom, prosperity, and
enlightenment of the state, the guild, and the school.
II. With respect to the church, its constitution under the primitive
revelation was purely domestic; religious instruction and the
solemnization of religious offices, being intrusted to the heads of
families and tribes. In the Mosaic law, the Almighty founded a _public_
ministry in the synagogue, which was an admirable type of the future
constitution of the Christian church. Unlike the local and temporary
synagogue, the Christian church is perpetual and universal--but like the
synagogue, it hath a public ministry. "This church, to use Schlegel's
own words, is that great and divine corporation which embraces all other
social relations, protects them under its vault, crowns them with
dignity, and lovingly imparts to them the power of a peculiar
consecration. The church is not a mere substitute formed to supply or
repair the deficiencies of the other social institutes and corporations;
but is itself a free, peculiar, independent corporation, pervading all
states, and in its object exalted far above them--an union and society
with God, from whom it immediately derives its sustaining power."[12]
III. Between these two corporations the family--that deep, solid
foundation of the social edifice below--and the church, that high,
expansive and illumined vault above--stands the state. Schlegel defines
the state, "a corporation armed for the maintenance of peace." "Its
existence," says he, "is bound up with all the other corporations; it
lives and moves in them; they are its natural organs; and as soon as the
state, whether with despotic or anarchical views, attempts to impede the
natural functions of these organs, to disturb or derange their peculiar
sphere of action, it impairs its own vital powers, and prepares the way
sooner or later for its own destruction."
IV. There are two intermediate corporations--the guild, which stands
between the family and the state; and the school, which stands between
the church and the state. By the guild, Schlegel understands "every
species of traffic, industry and commerce, bound together in every part
of the world by the common tie of money." The object of this corporation
is the advancement of the material interests of the family; interests
which it is the bounden duty of the state to protect and promote.
V. By the school, the author signifies the "whole intellectual culture
of mankind--not merely the existing republic of letters, but all the
tradition of science from the remotest ages to the present times." This
corporation, I should say, has for its object the glorification of the
church, the utility of the state, and the intellectual activity of the
family, or rather its individual members.
But among these primary corporations, it is the state which forms the
immediate object of the author's inquiries. I shall now proceed to lay
before the reader the several characteristics which, according to the
author, distinguish the Christian state, or the state animated with the
spirit of Christianity.
Sec.Sec. I. _The Christian state is without slaves, and honours the sanctity
of the nuptial tie._
Christianity first mitigated, and then abolished slavery. Slavery is
incompatible with the spirit of Christianity, not only on account of the
maltreatment, injuries, and oppression to which it subjects men; not
only on account of the dangers to which it exposes female virtue; but
chiefly and especially, because the state of slavery is one inconsistent
with the dignity of a being made after the likeness of God. This
complete emancipation of the lower classes from the bonds of servitude
pre-eminently distinguishes the modern Christian states from those of
classical antiquity on the one hand, and those of the primitive
oriental world on the other. In the former, domestic and predial slavery
were carried to the last degree of harshness and severity--in the
latter, especially in India, a totally different form of servitude
existed. There the innocent descendants of those who had been guilty of
certain crimes, or who had contracted unlawful marriages, were doomed to
a state of irremediable oppression, debarred from all civil rights, and
excluded from the very charities of life. The fate of these hapless
beings was even harder than that of the slaves among the ancient Greeks
and Romans. As the exclusion of a whole class from the rights of
citizenship and the offices of religion is incompatible with the
principles of Christian love; so the hereditary transmission of the
sacerdotal dignity is inconsistent with the Christian doctrine, which
inculcates the necessity of a divine call to the priesthood. Hence the
incompatibility which exists between the system of castes and the
Christian religion.
The author shows that the various species of vassalage are clearly
distinguishable from slavery; yet that even these have yielded to the
benign spirit of Christianity. The existence of slavery in the Christian
colonies no wise militates against the principle here laid down: for the
slave-trade has ever been condemned by all Christian nations as wicked
and unjust; and slavery, the introduction of which into the colonies the
church had so strenuously opposed, was afterwards tolerated by her only
as a necessary evil. For, as Schlegel observes with his characteristic
wisdom, "the sudden abolition of an evil that has become an inveterate
habit in society, is mostly attended with danger, and frequently works
another wrong of an opposite kind."[13] But this is one of those
truths, which the giddy, reckless spirit of a spurious philanthropy can
never be made to comprehend.
As the Christian state abhors slavery from its inconsistency with the
dignity of man, so, for the same reason, it guards with jealous
vigilance, the sanctity and inviolability of the nuptial tie. Polygamy
degrades woman from her natural rank in society--destroys the happiness
of private life--poisons the very well-springs of education--and
connected as it too frequently is with a traffic in slaves, plunges the
male sex into irremediable degradation.[14] This practice is supposed to
have originated with the Cainites in the ante-diluvian world; but for
high and prudential reasons, it was tolerated rather than approved under
the Patriarchal dispensation and the Mosaic law. In the ancient Asiatic
monarchies, especially in the period of their decline, this usage
sometimes prevailed to a licentious extent; but in the modern Mahometan
states, where polygamy is indulged in to the most libidinous excess,
this defective constitution of the family has proved one of the greatest
barriers to political and intellectual improvement.
In ancient Greece and Rome, how far superior was the legislation on
marriage! How much more healthful and vigorous was the constitution of
domestic society! What a fine idea do we conceive of the early Romans,
when we read that though the law sanctioned divorce, yet that for the
first five hundred years, no individual took advantage of such a law! In
the corrupt ages of Imperial Rome, divorce, permitted and practised on
the most frivolous pretexts, was productive of more baneful consequences
than Polygamy in its worst form.
Polygamy is proscribed in all Christian states. In the Catholic church,
marriage is raised to the dignity of a sacrament; and divorce is not
permitted, even in the case of adultery. Hereby woman is invested with
the highest degree of dignity, and even influence--the union and
happiness of the family are best secured--and the peace and stability of
the state itself acquire the strongest guarantees. It is well known that
some of the ablest divines of the church of England also uphold in all
cases the indissolubility of the nuptial tie; and the British
legislature, by according divorce only after adultery, and by rendering
the obtaining of it a matter of difficulty and expense, has wisely
opposed limitations to the practice. Yet, as was truly observed some
years ago in parliament, the increase in the number of applications for
divorce, is one among the many signs of the decline of morality in this
country.
The principal Protestant churches regard marriage as a religious
ceremony; and so the general proposition of Schlegel is correct, that
all Christian states recognise the sanctity of the nuptial bond. And
here is one of the main causes of the superior happiness, freedom and
civilisation enjoyed by Christian nations.
Sec.Sec. II. _Christian justice is founded on a system of equity, and the
Christian state has from its constitution, an essentially pacific
tendency._
Schlegel observes that the difference between strict law and equitable
law is the most arduous problem in all jurisprudence. Strict law is an
abstract law, deduced from certain general principles, applied without
the least regard to adventitious circumstances. Equity, on the other
hand, pays due regard to such circumstances, examines into the peculiar
state of things, and the mutual relations of parties; and forms her
decisions not according to the caprice of fancy, or the waywardness of
feeling, but according to the general principles of right, applied to
the variable circumstances and situations of parties.
According to the author's definition, the object of the institution of
the state is the maintenance of internal and external peace. Justice is
the only basis of peace; but _justice is here the means, and not the
end_. If justice were the end for which the state was constituted, then
neither external nor internal peace could ever be procured or
maintained; for the state would then be compelled to wage eternal war
against all who, at home or abroad, were guilty of injustice, and could
never lay down its arms till that injustice were removed.
As peace is essentially the end of that great corporation called the
state; it follows that the justice by which its foreign and domestic
policy must be regulated, is not that strict or absolute justice spoken
of above, but that temperate or conciliatory equity, which is alone
applicable to the concerns of men. The maxim, "a thousand years' wrong
cannot constitute an hour's right," if applied to civil jurisprudence,
would introduce interminable confusion, hardship and misery in the
affairs of private life, and if applied to constitutional and
international law, would lead to perpetual anarchy at home, and to
endless, exterminating war abroad.
The Christian religion, as it comes from God, is eminently social--hence
it abhors the principle of absolute or inexorable right, whether applied
to civil or public law--hence the Christian state, or the state animated
with the spirit of Christianity, is in its tendency essentially pacific.
This pacific policy of the state, however, so far from excluding,
necessarily implies the firm, uncompromising vindication of its rights
and interests, whether at home or abroad; and the repression of evil
doers within, or a just war without, is often the only means of
attaining the object for which the state was constituted--to wit, the
maintenance of peace. On the other hand, the revolutionary state, or
the state where, in opposition to existing rights and interests, new
rights and interests are violently enforced; and where, in subversion of
all established institutions, new institutions, conceived according to
abstract and arbitrary theories, are violently introduced; the
revolutionary state, I say, is, from its nature and origin--no matter
what form it may assume--necessarily driven to a course of iniquitous
policy--to disorganizing tyranny within, and to fierce, relentless
hostility without.
Against the pacific character of the Christian state, the bloody wars of
Charlemagne with the Saxons, the Crusades of a later period, and the
religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are commonly
objected. In the course of the work, to which this memoir is prefixed,
the reader will find these several objections victoriously answered.
Sec. III. _The Christian state recognizes the legal existence of
Corporations, and depends on their organic co-operation._
The author has before shown that the Christian religion, following the
principle of conciliatory equity, recognizes, without reference to their
origin, all existing rights and interests. Hence the Christian religion
can co-exist, and has in fact co-existed, with every form or species of
government. But there are some governments which, from their spirit and
constitution, are more congenial than others to Christianity; and it is
in this sense we speak of the Christian state.
We have already seen that there are five essential and eternal
corporations--the family--the church--the state--the guild, and the
school. These great corporations have each their several and subordinate
institutions or corporations, which are accidental and transitory by
nature, and consequently vary with time, place, and circumstances.
The Christian state is that which best secures and preserves to those
essential corporations, and all their subordinate institutions, their
due sphere of action. Hence our author shows that, under certain
circumstances, and in certain countries, the Republic, whether
democratic or aristocratic, may answer that end as well or even better
than monarchy; and that it is only because, in great empires, monarchy
is best calculated to maintain the free developement and organic
co-operation of corporations, that it may be called, par excellence, the
Christian state. But what form of monarchy is best adapted for this end?
The absolute monarchy[15] is certainly the least: there then remain only
the representative system, and the constitution of the three estates, or
as the Germans call that mode of government, Staende-verfassung. Schlegel
proceeds to examine the respective characteristics of those two forms of
government, and to show the points in which they agree, and in which
they differ. The constitution of estates is the old, legitimate
constitution of the European states, whether republican or monarchical;
but, in too many countries, this noble institution has been undermined
by despotism, or destroyed by revolution. On the other hand, the
representative system is comparatively modern, and, on the continent,
has, amid the great convulsions produced by the French revolution,
sprung out of a defective and superficial imitation of the British
constitution. It is therefore to the latter constitution the author,
when he has occasion to treat of the representative system, principally
directs the attention of his readers.
As to the points of resemblance between this system, and the
states-constitution, both have legislative assemblies--in both,
petitions and remonstrances are addressed to the throne, and in both,
the grant of subsidies rests chiefly with the commons; while to the
enactment of every law, the concurrence of the different branches of the
legislature is essentially requisite. But, in many important
points, these two forms of government totally differ. In the
states-constitution, the crown is invested with more power and dignity.
With more dignity, because to the crown landed estates are annexed; and
the sovereign, instead of being a pensioner on the bounty of his
parliament, is the first independent proprietor:--with more power,
because in the representative system, the King, with the single
exception of choosing an administration, can perform no act without the
sanction of his ministers. Thus in this political system, according to
the author's remark, the substantial power of royalty is vested in the
hands of the ministry.
The next point of difference is that the representative system,
particularly in England, rests too exclusively on the material basis of
property; and that intelligence is there deprived of an adequate share
in the national representation.[16] In the states-constitution, where
the clerical and scientific classes form a separate estate, or distinct
branch of the legislature, intelligence is invested with all the dignity
and glory which human society can confer. The clergy, who are the
representatives of revealed faith, or the fixed and immutable part of
intelligence, correspond to the aristocracy, or the representatives of
fixed property--while the scientific class, representing science, or the
variable and progressive part of intelligence, corresponds to the
Commons, the representatives of moveable property. Hence, Francis
Baader has ingeniously called the clergy the Upper House of
intelligence, and the scientific class, the Lower House.[17]
The last point of difference is that, while in many of the modern
representative systems, municipal corporations are despised and
rejected, they form the very key-stone of the states-constitution. The
Revolutionists, who have had so prominent a share in the formation of
these representative governments, know full well that municipal
corporations form the best security of the rights of the family--the
firmest ramparts of popular freedom. They are thus objects of peculiar
hatred to men who, so far from wishing the commonalty to obtain
stability or cohesion in their constitution, are desirous they should
ever remain a loose, shifting mass of disunited atoms, ready to receive
any form or impress which despotism may impose. Hence the war which at
different times, and in different countries, regal or democratic tyranny
has waged against these admirable institutions. In the English
constitution, on the other hand, which has preserved so many elements of
the old Christian monarchy, the free, municipal institutions have been
carefully maintained. "The true internal strength and greatness of
England, (says Schlegel) consist, as is now almost universally admitted
by profound political observers, far more in the vigour and freedom of
municipal corporations, better preserved in that country than elsewhere,
than in her admired political constitution itself."[18] Defective as
many parts of that constitution appeared to the author, yet on the
whole, he highly valued the vigorously constituted, but temperate and
mitigated, aristocracy of 1688. He knew that the remnants of the old
Christian constitution were better preserved there than in any of the
great continental monarchies:[19] that the British government possessed
elements of stability as well as of freedom, to which those monarchies,
in their existing degeneracy, could in vain pretend; and that the very
peculiarities in the British constitution, to which he most strongly
objected, had their origin in local circumstances, deep-rooted wants,
and remote historical events. That extreme jealousy of regal power which
that constitution betrays--that undue preponderance of property over
intelligence--that political predominance of the aristocracy, which,
though rendered necessary by the excessive depression of royalty and of
the clergy, was certainly calculated to impede the organic development
of the democracy, and thereby to expose the body politic to dangerous
revulsions--in fine, that fierce collision of parties, which that
constitution nurses and encourages--all reveal the fearful struggles by
which it came into life. The imitation of this constitution which, by
bringing back to the European nations the reminiscence of their ancient
freedom, has naturally excited their enthusiastic admiration--the
imitation of that constitution, I say, difficult at all times, has been
rendered in some countries utterly impracticable by the studious
rejection of two of the great hinges on which, for a hundred and fifty
years, it has turned--I mean the predominance of the aristocracy on the
one hand, and the free, municipal organization of the commonalty on the
other. In many of the German states, as the author observes, the
representative system works well; because the legislators have had the
wisdom to connect the new with anterior institutions.
On the whole, what has been said of the Gothic architecture, may be
applied to the old Christian monarchy--it was never brought to
perfection. That lofty ideal of government, which Christianity had
traced to the nations of the middle age--that admirable constitution,
which was a partial reflection of the constitution of the church itself,
and wherein were blended and united the principles of love and
intelligence, stability and activity--in other words, where a paternal
royalty, an enlightened priesthood, a mild aristocracy, a loyal, yet
free-spirited, commonalty controlled, aided, balanced, and defended each
other--that lofty ideal has never been--probably never will be--fully
realized. Yet there are many reasons to suppose that a momentous, and
not very distant, futurity will be charged with realizing, as far as
human infirmity will permit, this ideal conception of the Christian
state.
Such is an outline of the principal features in Schlegel's political
system--a system which I have endeavoured, as far as my feeble powers
permitted, to explain, illustrate, and enforce.