CHAPTER IV. -- THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS, B.C. 207.

Quid debeas, O Roma, Neronibus,

Testis Metaurum flumen, et Hasdrubal

Devictus, et pulcher fugatis

Ille dies Latio tenebris,

Qui primus alma risit adorea;

Dirus per urbes Afer ut Italas,

Ceu flamma per taedas, vel Eurus

Per Siculas equitavit undas.--HORATIUS, iv. Od. 4.

"... The consul Nero, who made the unequalled march which

deceived Hannibal, and defeated Hasdrubal, thereby accomplishing

an achievement almost unrivalled in military annals. The first

intelligence of his return, to Hannibal, was the sight of

Hasdrubal's head thrown into his camp. When Hannibal saw this,

he exclaimed with a sigh, that 'Rome would now be the mistress of

the world.' To this victory of Nero's it might be owing that his

imperial namesake reigned at all. But the infamy of the one has

eclipsed the glory of the other. When the name of Nero is heard,

who thinks of the consul! But such are human things."--BYRON.

About midway between Rimini and Ancona a little river falls into the

Adriatic, after traversing one of those districts of Italy, in which

a vain attempt has lately been made to revive, after long centuries of

servitude and shame, the spirit of Italian nationality, and the energy

of free institutions. That stream is still called the Metauro; and

wakens by its name recollections of the resolute daring of ancient

Rome, and of the slaughter that stained its current two thousand and

sixty-three years ago, when the combined consular armies of Livius

and Nero encountered and crushed near its banks the varied hosts which

Hannibal's brother was leading from the Pyrenees, the Rhone, the Alps,

and the Po, to aid the great Carthaginian in his stern struggle to

annihilate the growing might of the Roman Republic, and make the Punic

power supreme over all the nations of the world.

The Roman historian, who termed that struggle the most memorable of all

wars that ever were carried on, [Livy, Lib. xxi. sec. 1.] wrote-in no

spirit of exaggeration. For it is not in ancient but in modern history,

that parallels for its incidents and its heroes are to be found. The

similitude between the contest which Rome maintained against Hannibal,

and that which England was for many years engaged in against Napoleon,

has not passed unobserved by recent historians. "Twice," says Arnold,

[Vol. iii, p. 62. See also Alison--PASSIM.] "has there been witnessed

the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and

institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has been

victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome; for

sixteen years Napoleon Bonaparte strove against England; the efforts of

the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo." One point,

however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been

adequately dwelt on. That is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman

general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English

general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio

and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance,

but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the

scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that

Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly

all the subordinate generals of the enemy, before being opposed to

the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington

restored their countrymen's confidence in arms, when shaken by a series

of reverses. And each of them closed a long and perilous war by a

complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen

veterans of the foe.

Nor is the parallel between them limited to their military characters

and exploits. Scipio, like Wellington, became an important leader of

the aristocratic party among his countrymen, and was exposed to

the unmeasured invectives of the violent section of his political

antagonists. When, early in the last reign, an infuriated mob assaulted

the Duke of Wellington in the streets of the English capital on the

anniversary of Waterloo, England was even more disgraced by that

outrage, than Rome was by the factious accusations which demagogues

brought against Scipio, but which he proudly repelled on the day of

trial, by reminding the assembled people that it was the anniversary

of the battle of Zama. Happily, a wiser and a better spirit has now for

years pervaded all classes of our community; and we shall be spared

the ignominy of having worked out to the end the parallel of national

iugratitude. Scipio died a voluntary exile from the malevolent

turbulence of Rome. Englishmen of all ranks and politics have now long

united in affectionate admiration of our modern Scipio: and even

those who have most widely differed from the Duke on legislative or

administrative questions, forget what they deem the political errors of

that time-honoured head, while they gratefully call to mind the laurels

that have wreathed it.

Scipio at Zama trampled in the dust the power of Carthage; but that

power had been already irreparably shattered in another field, where

neither Scipio nor Hannibal commanded. When the Metaurus witnessed the

defeat and death of Hasdrubal, it witnessed the ruin of the scheme

by which alone Carthage could hope to organise decisive success,--the

scheme of enveloping Rome at once from the north and the south of Italy

by chosen armies, led by two sons of Hamilcar. [See Arnold, vol. iii, p.

387.] That battle was the determining crisis of the contest, not merely

between Rome and Carthage, but between the two great families of the

world, which then made Italy the arena of their oft-renewed contest for

pre-eminence.

The French historian Michelet whose "Histoire Romaine" would have been

invaluable, if the general industry and accuracy of the writer had in

any degree equalled his originality and brilliancy, eloquently remarks:

"It is not without reason that so universal and vivid a remembrance of

the Punic wars has dwelt in the memories of men. They formed no mere

struggle to determine the lot of two cities or two empires; but it was a

strife on the event of which depended the fate of two races of mankind,

whether the dominion of the world should belong to the Indo-Germanic or

to the Semitic family of nations. Bear in mind, that the first of these

comprises, besides the Indians and the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans,

and the Germans. In the other are ranked the Jews and the Arabs, the

Phoenicians and the Carthaginians. On the one side is the genius

of heroism, of art, and legislation: on the other is the spirit of

industry, of commerce, of navigation. The two opposite races have

everywhere come into contact, everywhere into hostility. In the

primitive history of Persia and Chaldea, the heroes are perpetually

engaged in combat with their industrious and perfidious, neighbours.

The struggle is renewed between the Phoenicians and the Greeks on every

coast of the Mediterranean. The Greek supplants the Phoenician in all

his factories, all his colonies in the east: soon will the Roman come,

and do likewise in the west. Alexander did far more against Tyre than

Salmanasar or Nabuchodonosor had done. Not content with crushing her, he

took care that she never should revive: for he founded Alexandria as

her substitute, and changed for ever the track of commerce of the

world. There remained Carthage--the great Carthage, and her mighty

empire,--mighty in a far different degree than Phoenicia's had been.

Rome annihilated it. Then occurred that which has no parallel in

history,--an entire civilisation perished at one blow--vanished, like a

falling star. The 'Periplus' of Hanno, a few coins, a score of lines in

Plautus, and, lo, all that remains of the Carthaginian world!

"Many generations must needs pass away before the struggle between the

two races could be renewed; and the Arabs, that formidable rear-guard of

the Semitic world, dashed forth from their deserts. The conflict between

the two races then became the conflict of two religions. Fortunate was

it that those daring Saracenic cavaliers encountered in the East the

impregnable walls of Constantinople, in the West the chivalrous valour

of Charles Martel and the sword of the Cid. The crusades were the

natural reprisals for the Arab invasions, and form the last epoch of

that great struggle between the two principal families of the human

race."

It is difficult amid the glimmering light supplied by the allusions

of the classical writers to gain a full idea of the character and

institutions of Rome's great rival. But we can perceive how inferior

Carthage was to her competitor in military resources; and how far

less fitted than Rome she was to become the founder of centralized and

centralizing dominion, that should endure for centuries, and fuse into

imperial unity the narrow nationalities of the ancient races that dwelt

around and near the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

Carthage was originally neither the most ancient nor the most powerful

of the numerous colonies which the Phoenicians planted on the coast of

Northern Africa. But her advantageous position, the excellence of her

constitution (of which, though ill-informed as to its details, we know

that it commanded the admiration of Aristotle), and the commercial and

political energy of her citizens, gave her the ascendancy over Hippo,

Utica, Leptis, and her other sister Phoenician cities in those regions;

and she finally seduced them to a condition of dependency, similar to

that which the subject allies of Athens occupied relatively to that once

imperial city. When Tyre and Sidon and the other cities of Phoenicia

itself sank from independent republics into mere vassal states of the

great Asiatic monarchies and obeyed by turns a Babylonian, a Persian,

and a Macedonian master, their power and their traffic rapidly declined;

and Carthage succeeded to the important maritime and commercial

character which they had previously maintained. The Carthaginians did

not seek to compete with the Greeks on the north-eastern shores of the

Mediterranean, or in the three inland seas which are connected with

it; but they maintained an active intercourse with the Phoenicians,

and through them with lower and Central Asia; and they, and they

alone, after the decline and fall of Tyre, navigated the waters of the

Atlantic. They had the monopoly of all the commerce of the world that

was carried on beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. We have yet extant (in

a Greek translation) the narrative of the voyage of Hanno, one of their

admirals, along the western coast of Africa as far as Sierra Leone. And

in the Latin poem of Festus Avienus, frequent references are made to

the records of the voyages of another celebrated Carthaginian admiral,

Himilco, who had explored the north-western coast of Europe. Our own

islands are mentioned by Himilco as the lands of the Hiberni and the

Albioni. It is indeed certain that the Carthaginians frequented the

Cornish coast (as the Phoenicians had done before them) for the purpose

of procuring tin; and there is every reason to believe that they sailed

as far as the coasts of the Baltic for amber. When it is remembered that

the mariner's compass was unknown in those ages, the boldness and skill

of the seamen of Carthage, and the enterprise of her merchants, may be

paralleled with any achievements that the history of modern navigation

and commerce can supply.

In their Atlantic voyages along the African shores, the Carthaginians

followed the double object of trade and colonization. The numerous

settlements that were planted by them along the coast from Morocco to

Senegal, provided for the needy members of the constantly-increasing

population of a great commercial capital; and also strengthened the

influence which Carthage exercised among the tribes of the African

coast. Besides her fleets, her caravans gave her a large and lucrative

trade with the native Africans; nor must we limit our belief of the

extent of the Carthaginian trade with the tribes of Central and Western

Africa, by the narrowness of the commercial intercourse which civilized

nations of modern times have been able to create in those regions.

Although essentially a mercantile and seafaring people, the

Carthaginians by no means neglected agriculture. On the contrary, the

whole of their territory was cultivated like a garden. The fertility of

the soil repaid the skill and toil bestowed on it; and every invader,

from Agathocles to Scipio AEmilianus, was struck with admiration at

the rich pasture-lands carefully irrigated, the abundant harvests,

the luxuriant vineyards, the plantations of fig and olive-trees, the

thriving villages, the populous towns, and the splendid villas of the

wealthy Carthaginians, through which his march lay, as long as he was on

Carthaginian ground.

The Carthaginians abandoned the Aegean and the Pontus to the Greeks,

but they were by no means disposed to relinquish to those rivals the

commerce and the dominion of the coasts of the Mediterranean westward of

Italy. For centuries the Carthaginians strove to make themselves masters

of the islands that lie between Italy and Spain. They acquired the

Balearic islands, where the principal harbour, Port Mahon, still bears

the name of the Carthaginian admiral. They succeeded in reducing the

greater part of Sardinia; but Sicily could never be brought into their

power. They repeatedly invaded that island, and nearly overran it; but

the resistance which was opposed to them by the Syracusans under Gelon,

Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathocles, preserved the island from becoming

Punic, though many of its cities remained under the Carthaginian rule,

until Rome finally settled the question to whom Sicily was to belong, by

conquering it for herself.

With so many elements of success, with almost unbounded wealth with

commercial and maritime activity, with a fertile territory, with a

capital city of almost impregnable strength, with a constitution

that ensured for centuries the blessings of, social order, with an

aristocracy singularly fertile in men of the highest genius, Carthage

yet failed signally and calamitously in her contest for power with Rome.

One of the immediate causes of this may seem to have been the want, of

firmness among her citizens, which made them terminate the first Punic

war by begging peace, sooner than endure any longer the hardships and

burdens caused by a state of warfare, although their antagonists had

suffered far more severely than themselves. Another cause was the spirit

of faction among their leading men, which prevented Hannibal in the

second war from being properly reinforced and supported. But there were

also more general causes why Carthage proved inferior to Rome. These

were her position relatively to the mass of the inhabitants of the

country which she ruled, and her habit of trusting to mercenary armies

in her wars.

Our clearest information as to the different races of men in and about

Carthage is derived from Diodorus Siculus. [Vol. ii. p. 447, Wesseling's

ed.] That historian enumerates four different races: first, he

mentions the Phoenicians who dwelt in Carthage: next, he speaks of the

Liby-Phoenicians; these, he tells us, dwelt in many of the maritime

cities, and were connected by intermarriages with the Phoenicians, which

was the cause of their compound name: thirdly, he mentions the Libyans,

the bulk and the most ancient part of the population, hating the

Carthaginians intensely, on account of the oppressiveness of their

domination: lastly, he names the Numidians, the nomad tribes of the

frontier.

It is evident, from this description, that the native Libyans were a

subject class, without franchise or political rights; and, accordingly,

we find no instance specified in history of a Libyan holding political

office or military command. The half-castes, the Liby-Phoenicians, seem

to have been sometimes sent out as colonists; [See the "Periplus"

of Hanno.] but it may be inferred, from what Diodorus says of their

residence, that they had not the right of the citizenship of Carthage:

and only a solitary case occurs of one of this race being entrusted with

authority, and that, too, not emanating from the home government. This

is the instance of the officer sent by Hannibal to Sicily, after the

fall of Syracuse; whom Polybius [Lib. ix. 22.] calls Myttinus the

Libyan, but whom, from the fuller account in Livy, we find to have been

a Liby-Phoenician [Lib. xxv. 40.] and it is expressly mentioned what

indignation was felt by the Carthaginian commanders in the island that

this half-caste should control their operations.

With respect to the composition of their armies, it is observable that,

though thirsting for extended empire, and though some of the leading men

became generals of the highest order, the Carthaginians, as a people,

were anything but personally warlike. As long as they could hire

mercenaries to fight for them, they had little appetite for the irksome

training, and they grudged the loss of valuable time, which military

service would have entailed on themselves.

As Michelet remarks, "The life of an industrious merchant, of a

Carthaginian, was too precious to be risked, as long as it was possible

to substitute advantageously for it that of a barbarian from Spain or

Gaul. Carthage knew, and could tell to a drachma, what the life of a

man of each nation came to. A Greek was worth more than a Campanian, a

Campanian worth more than a Gaul or a Spaniard. When once this tariff

of blood was correctly made out, Carthage began a war as a mercantile

speculation. She tried to make conquests in the hope of getting new

mines to work, or to open fresh markets for her exports. In one venture

she could afford to spend fifty thousand mercenaries, in another, rather

more. If the returns were good, there was no regret felt for the capital

that had been lavished in the investment; more money got more men, and

all went on well." [Histoire Romaine, vol. ii. p. 40.]

Armies composed of foreign mercenaries have, in all ages, been as

formidable to their employers as to the enemy against whom they were

directed. We know of one occasion (between the first and second Punic

wars) when Carthage was brought to the very brink of destruction by a

revolt of her foreign troops. Other mutinies of the same kind must from

time to time have occurred. Probably one of these was the cause of the

comparative weakness of Carthage at the time of the Athenian expedition

against Syracuse; so different from the energy with which she attacked

Gelon half a century earlier, and Dionysius half a century later. And

even when we consider her armies with reference only to their efficiency

in warfare, we perceive at once the inferiority of such bands of

condottieri, brought together without any common bond of origin,

tactics, or cause, to the legions of Rome, which at the time of the

Punic wars were raised from the very flower of a hardy agricultural

population trained in the strictest discipline, habituated to victory,

and animated by the most resolute patriotism. And this shows also

the transcendency of the genius of Hannibal, which could form such

discordant materials into a compact organized force, and inspire them

with the spirit of patient discipline and loyalty to their chief; so

that they were true to him in his adverse as well as in his prosperous

fortunes; and throughout the chequered series of his campaigns no panic

rout ever disgraced a division under his command; no mutiny, or even

attempt at mutiny, was ever known in his camp; and, finally, after

fifteen years of Italian warfare, his men followed their old leader to

Zama, "with no fear and little hope;" ["We advanced to Waterloo as the

Greeks did to Thermopylae; all of us without fear and most of us without

hope."--SPEECH OF GENERAL FOY.] and there, on that disastrous field,

stood firm around him, his Old Guard, till Scipio's Numidian allies came

up on their flank; when at last, surrounded and overpowered, the veteran

battalions sealed their devotion to their general with their blood.

"But if Hannibal's genius may be likened to the Homeric god, who, in his

hatred to the Trojans, rises from the deep to rally the fainting Greeks,

and to lead them against the enemy, so the calm courage with which

Hector met his more than human adversary in his country's cause, is

no unworthy image of the unyielding magnanimity displayed by the

aristocracy of Rome. As Hannibal utterly eclipses Carthage, so, on the

contrary, Fabius, Marcellus, Claudius Nero, even Scipio himself, are as

nothing when compared to the spirit, and wisdom, and power of Rome. The

senate, which voted its thanks to its political enemy, Varro, after his

disastrous defeat, 'because he had not despaired of the commonwealth,'

and which disdained either to solicit, or to reprove, or to threaten,

or in any way to notice the twelve colonies which had refused their

customary supplies of men for the army, is far more to be honoured than

the conqueror of Zama. This we should the more carefully bear in mind

because our tendency is to admire individual greatness far more than

national; and, as no single Roman will bear comparison to Hannibal, we

are apt to murmur at the event of the contest, and to think that the

victory was awarded to the least worthy of the combatants. On the

contrary, never was the wisdom of God's Providence more manifest than in

the issue of the struggle between Rome and Carthage. It was clearly

for the good of man kind that Hannibal should be conquered: his triumph

would have stopped the progress of the world. For great men can only

act permanently by forming great nations; and no one man, even though

it were Hannibal himself, can in one generation effect such a work. But

where the nation has been merely enkindled for a while by a great man's

spirit, the light passes away with him who communicated it; and the

nation, when he is gone, is like a dead body, to which magic power had,

for a moment, given unnatural life: when the charm has ceased, the body

is cold and stiff as before. He who grieves over the battle of Zama

should carry on his thoughts to a period thirty years later, when

Hannibal must, in the course of nature, have been dead, and consider how

the isolated Phoenician city of Carthage was fitted to receive and to

consolidate the civilization of Greece, or by its laws and institutions

to bind together barbarians of every race and language into an organized

empire, and prepare them for becoming, when that empire was dissolved,

the free members of the commonwealth of Christian Europe." [Arnold, vol.

iii. p. 61. The above is one of the numerous bursts of eloquence that

adorn Arnold's third volume, and cause such deep regret that that volume

should have been the last, and its great and good author have been cut

off with his work thus incomplete.]

It was in the spring of 207 B.C. that Hasdrubal, after skilfully

disentangling himself from the Roman forces in Spain, and, after a march

conducted with great judgment and little loss, through the interior of

Gaul and the passes of the Alps, appeared in the country that now is the

north of Lombardy, at the head of troops which he had partly brought out

of Spain, and partly levied among the Gauls and Ligurians on his way.

At this time Hannibal with his unconquered, and seemingly unconquerable

army, had been eleven years in Italy, executing with strenuous ferocity

the vow of hatred to Rome which had been sworn by him while yet a child

at the bidding of his father, Hamilcar; who, as he boasted, had trained

up his three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago, Like three lion's

whelps, to prey upon the Romans. But Hannibal's latter campaigns had not

been signalised by any such great victories as marked the first years

of his invasion of Italy. The stern spirit of Roman resolution, ever

highest in disaster and danger, had neither bent nor despaired beneath

the merciless blows which "the dire African" dealt her in rapid

succession at Trebia, at Thrasymene, and at Cannae. Her population was

thinned by repeated slaughter in the field; poverty and actual scarcity

wore down the survivors, through the fearful ravages which Hannibal's

cavalry spread through their corn-fields, their pasture-lands, and their

vineyards; many of her allies went over to the invader's side; and new

clouds of foreign war threatened her from Macedonia and Gaul. But Rome

receded not. Rich and poor among her citizens vied with each other in

devotion to their country. The wealthy placed their stores, and all

placed their lives at the state's disposal. And though Hannibal could

not be driven out of Italy, though every year brought its sufferings and

sacrifices, Rome felt that her constancy had not been exerted in vain.

If she was weakened by the continual strife, so was Hannibal also; and

it was clear that the unaided resources of his army were unequal to the

task of her destruction. The single deer-hound could not pull down the

quarry which he had so furiously assailed. Rome not only stood fiercely

at bay, but had pressed back and gored her antagonist, that still,

however, watched her in act to spring. She was weary, and bleeding at

every pore; and there seemed to be little hope of her escape, if the

other hound of old Hamilcar's race should come up in time to aid his

brother in the death-grapple.

Hasdrubal had commanded the Carthaginian armies in Spain for some time,

with varying but generally unpropitious fortune. He had not the full

authority over the Punic forces in that country which his brother and

his father had previously exercised. The faction at Carthage, which was

at feud with his family, succeeded in fettering and interfering with his

power; and other generals were from time to time sent into Spain, whose

errors and misconduct caused the reverses that Hasdrubal met with.

This is expressly attested by the Greek historian Polybius, who was

the intimate friend of the younger Africanus, and drew his information

respecting the second Punic war from the best possible authorities.

Livy gives a long narrative of campaigns between the Roman commanders

in Spain and Hasdrubal, which is so palpably deformed by fictions and

exaggerations as to be hardly deserving of attention. [See the excellent

criticisms of Sir Walter Raleigh on this, in his "History of the World,"

book v. chap. iii. sec. 11.]

It is clear that in the year 208 B.C., at least, Hasdrubal outmanoeuvred

Publius Scipio, who held the command of the Roman forces in Spain; and

whose object was to prevent him from passing the Pyrenees and marching

upon Italy. Scipio expected that Hasdrubal would attempt the nearest

route, along the coast of the Mediterranean; and he therefore carefully

fortified and guarded the passes of the eastern Pyrenees. But Hasdrubal

passed these mountains near their western extremity; and then, with a

considerable force of Spanish infantry, with a small number of African

troops, with some elephants and much treasure, he marched, not directly

towards the coast of the Mediterranean, but in a north-eastern line

towards the centre of Gaul. He halted for the winter in the territory

of the Arverni, the modern Auvergne; and conciliated or purchased the

good-will of the Gauls in that region so far, that he not only found

friendly winter quarters among them, but great numbers of them enlisted

under him, and on the approach of spring marched with him to invade

Italy.

By thus entering Gaul at the south-west, and avoiding its southern

maritime districts, Hasdrubal kept the Romans in complete ignorance of

his precise operations and movements in that country; all that they knew

was that Hasdrubal had baffled Scipio's attempts to detain him in Spain;

that he had crossed the Pyrenees with soldiers, elephants, and money,

and that he was raising fresh forces among the Gauls. The spring was

sure to bring him into Italy; and then would come the real tempest of

the war, when from the north and from the south the two Carthaginian

armies, each under a son of the Thunderbolt, were to gather together

around the seven hills of Rome. [Hamilcar was surnamed Barca, which

means the Thunderbolt. Sultan Bajazet had the similar surname of

Yilderim.]

In this emergency the Romans looked among themselves earnestly and

anxiously for leaders fit to meet the perils of the coming campaign.

The senate recommended the people to elect, as one of their consuls,

Caius Claudius Nero, a patrician of one of the families of the great

Claudian house. Nero had served during the preceding years of the war,

both against Hannibal in Italy, and against Hasdrubal in Spain; but it

is remarkable that the histories, which we possess, record no successes

as having been achieved by him either before or after his great campaign

of the Metaurus. It proves much for the sagacity of the leading men of

the senate, that they recognised in Nero the energy and spirit which

were required at this crisis, and it is equally creditable to the

patriotism of the people, that they followed the advice of the senate by

electing a general who had no showy exploits to recommend him to their

choice.

It was a matter of greater difficulty to find a second consul; the laws

required that one consul should be a plebeian; and the plebeian nobility

had been fearfully thinned by the events of the war. While the senators

anxiously deliberated among themselves what fit colleague for Nero could

be nominated at the coming comitia, and sorrowfully recalled the

names of Marcellus, Gracchus, and other plebeian generals who were no

more--one taciturn and moody old man sat in sullen apathy among the

conscript fathers. This was Marcus Livius, who had been consul in the

gear before the beginning of this war, and had then gained a victory

over the Illyrians. After his consulship he had been impeached before

the people on a charge of peculation and unfair division of the spoils

among his soldiers: the verdict was unjustly given against him, and the

sense of this wrong, and of the indignity thus put upon him, had rankled

unceasingly in the bosom of Livius, so that for eight years after his

trial he had lived in seclusion at his country seat, taking no part in

any affairs of state. Latterly the censors had compelled him to come to

Rome and resume his place in the senate, where he used to sit gloomily

apart, giving only a silent vote. At last an unjust accusation against

one of his near kinsmen made him break silence; and he harangued the

house in words of weight and sense, which drew attention to him, and

taught the senators that a strong spirit dwelt beneath that unimposing

exterior. Now, while they were debating on what noble of a plebeian

house was fit to assume the perilous honours of the consulate, some of

the elder of them looked on Marcus Livius, and remembered that in the

very last triumph which had been celebrated in the streets of Rome this

grim old man had sat in the car of victory; and that he had offered the

last grand thanksgiving sacrifice for the success of the Roman arms

that had bled before Capitoline Jove. There had been no triumphs since

Hannibal came into Italy. [Marcellus had been only allowed an ovation

for the conquest of Syracuse.] The Illyrian campaign of Livius was the

last that had been so honoured; perhaps it might be destined for him now

to renew the long-interrupted series. The senators resolved that Livius

should be put in nomination as consul with Nero; the people were willing

to elect him; the only opposition came from himself. He taunted them

with their inconsistency is honouring a man they had convicted of a base

crime. "If I am innocent," said he, "why did you place such a stain on

me? If I am guilty, why am I more fit for a second consulship than I was

for my first one?" The other senators remonstrated with him urging the

example of the great Camillus, who, after an unjust condemnation on a

similar charge, both served and saved his country. At last Livius ceased

to object; and Caius Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius were chosen consuls

of Rome.

A quarrel had long existed between the two consuls, and the senators

strove to effect a reconciliation between them before the campaign.

Here again Livius for a long time obstinately resisted the wish of his

fellow-senators. He said it was best for the state that he and Nero

should continue to hate one another. Each would do his duty better,

when he knew that he was watched by an enemy in the person of his own

colleague. At last the entreaties of the senators prevailed, and Livius

consented to forego the feud, and to co-operate with Nero in preparing

for the coming struggle.

As soon as the winter snows were thawed, Hasdrubal commenced his march

from Auvergne to the Alps. He experienced none of the difficulties which

his brother had met with from the mountain tribes. Hannibal's army

had been the first body of regular troops that had ever traversed the

regions; and, as wild animals assail a traveller, the natives rose

against it instinctively, in imagined defence of their own habitations,

which they supposed to be the objects of Carthaginian ambition. But

the fame of the war, with which Italy had now been convulsed for eleven

years, had penetrated into the Alpine passes; and the mountaineers

understood that a mighty city, southward of the Alps, was to be attacked

by the troops whom they saw marching among them. They not only opposed

no resistance to the passage of Hasdrubal, but many of them, out of

the love of enterprise and plunder, or allured by the high pay that he

offered, took service with him; and thus he advanced upon Italy with an

army that gathered strength at every league. It is said, also, that some

of the most important engineering works which Hannibal had constructed,

were found by Hasdrubal still in existence, and materially favoured the

speed of his advance. He thus emerged into Italy from the Alpine valleys

much sooner than had been anticipated. Many warriors of the Ligurian

tribes joined him; and, crossing the river Po, he marched down its

southern bank to the city of Placentia, which he wished to secure as a

base for his future operations. Placentia resisted him as bravely as it

had resisted Hannibal eleven years before; and for some time Hasdrubal

was occupied with a fruitless siege before its walls.

Six armies were levied for the defence of Italy when the long-dreaded

approach of Hasdrubal was announced. Seventy thousand Romans served in

the fifteen legions of which, with an equal number of Italian allies,

those armies and the garrisons were composed. Upwards of thirty thousand

more Romans were serving in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. The whole

number of Roman citizens of an age fit for military duty scarcely

exceeded a hundred and thirty thousand. The census taken before the war

had shown a total of two hundred and seventy thousand, which had been

diminished by more than half during twelve years. These numbers are

fearfully emphatic of the extremity to which Rome was reduced, and of

her gigantic efforts in that great agony of her fate. Not merely men,

but money and military stores, were drained to the utmost; and if

the armies of that year should be swept off by a repetition of the

slaughters of Thrasymene and Cannae, all felt that Rome would cease to

exist. Even if the campaign were to be marked by no decisive success on

either side, her ruin seemed certain. In South Italy Hannibal had either

detached Rome's allies from her, or had impoverished them by the ravages

of his army. If Hasdrubal could have done the same in Upper Italy; if

Etruria, Umbria, and Northern Latium had either revolted or been laid

waste, Rome must have sunk beneath sheer starvation; for the hostile

or desolated territory would have yielded no supplies of corn for her

population; and money, to purchase it from abroad, there was none.

Instant victory was a matter of life and death. Three of her six armies

were ordered to the north, but the first of these was required to

overawe the disaffected Etruscans. The second army of the north was

pushed forward, under Porcius, the praetor, to meet and keep in, check

the advanced troops of Hasdrubal; while the third, the grand army of the

north, which was to be under the immediate command of the consul Livius,

who had the chief command in all North Italy, advanced more slowly in

its support. There were similarly three armies in the south, under the

orders of the other consul Claudius Nero.

The lot had decided that Livius was to be opposed to Hasdrubal, and

that Nero should face Hannibal. And "when all was ordered as themselves

thought best, the two consuls went forth of the city; each his several

way. The people of Rome were now quite otherwise affected, than they had

been, when L. AEmilius Paulus and C. Tarentius Varro were sent against

Hannibal. They did no longer take upon them to direct their generals, or

bid them dispatch, and win the victory betimes; but rather they stood

in fear, lest all diligence, wisdom, and valour should prove too little.

For since, few years had passed, wherein some one of their generals

had not been slain; and since it was manifest, that if either of

these present consuls were defeated, or put to the worst, the two

Carthaginians would forthwith join, and make short work with the other:

it seemed a greater happiness than could be expected, that each of them

should return home victor; and come off with honour from such mighty

opposition as he was like to find. With extreme difficulty had Rome held

up her head ever since the battle of Cannae; though it were so, that

Hannibal alone, with little help from Carthage, had continued the war in

Italy. But there was now arrived another son of Amilcar; and one that,

in his present expedition, had seemed a man of more sufficiency than

Hannibal himself. For, whereas in that long and dangerous march through

barbarous nations, over great rivers and mountains, that were thought

unpassable, Hannibal had lost a great part of his army; this Asdrubal,

in the same places, had multiplied his numbers; and gathering the

people that he found in the way, descended from the Alps like a rolling

snow-ball, far greater than he came over the Pyrenees at his first

setting out of Spain. These considerations, and the like, of which fear

presented many unto them, caused the people of Rome to wait upon their

consuls out of the town, like a pensive train of mourners; thinking upon

Marcellus and Crispinus, upon whom, in the like sort, they had given

attendance the last year, but saw neither of them return alive from

a less dangerous war. Particularly old Q. Fabius gave his accustomed

advice to M. Livius, that he should abstain from giving or taking

battle, until he well understood the enemies' condition. But the consul

made him a froward answer, and said, that he would fight the very first

day, for that he thought it long till he should either recover his

honour by victory, or, by seeing the overthrow of his own unjust

citizens, satisfy himself with the joy of a great, though not an

honest revenge. But his meaning was better than his words." [Sir Walter

Raleigh.]

Hannibal at this period occupied with his veteran but much reduced

forces the extreme south of Italy. It had not been expected either by

friend or foe, that Hasdrubal would effect his passage of the Alps so

early in the year as actually occurred. And even when Hannibal learned

that his brother was in Italy, and had advanced as far as Placentia,

he was obliged to pause for further intelligence, before he himself

commenced active operations, as he could not tell whether his brother

might not be invited into Etruria, to aid the party there that was

disaffected to Rome or whether he would march down by the Adriatic Sea.

Hannibal led his troops out of their winter quarters in Bruttium, and

marched northward as far as Canusium. Nero had his head-quarters near

Venusia, with an army which he had increased to forty thousand foot and

two thousand five hundred horse, by incorporating under his own command

some of the legions which had been intended to set under other generals

in the south. There was another Roman army twenty thousand strong, south

of Hannibal, at Tarentum. The strength of that city secured this Roman

force from any attack by Hannibal, and it was a serious matter to march

northward and leave it in his rear, free to act against all his depots

and allies in the friendly part of Italy, which for the last two or

three campaigns had served him for a base of his operations. Moreover,

Nero's army was so strong that Hannibal could not concentrate troops

enough to assume the offensive against it without weakening his

garrisons, and relinquishing, at least for a time, his grasp upon the

southern provinces. To do this before he was certainly informed of his

brother's operations would have been an useless sacrifice; as Nero could

retreat before him upon the other Roman armies near the capital, and

Hannibal knew by experience that a mere advance of his army upon the

walls of Rome would have no effect on the fortunes of the war. In

the hope, probably, of inducing Nero to follow him, and of gaining an

opportunity of outmanoeuvring the Roman consul and attacking him on his

march, Hannibal moved into Lucania, and then back into Apulis;--he

again marched down into Bruttium, and strengthened his army by a levy of

recruits in that district. Nero followed him, but gave him no chance of

assailing him at a disadvantage. Some partial encounters seem to have

taken place; but the consul could not prevent Hannibal's junction

with his Bruttian levies, nor could Hannibal gain an opportunity of

surprising and crushing the consul. Hannibal returned to his former

head-quarters at Canusium, and halted there in expectation of further

tidings of his brother's movements. Nero also resumed his former

position in observation of the Carthaginian army.

[The annalists whom Livy copied, spoke of Nero's gaining repeated

victories over Hannibal, and killing; and taking his men by tens of

thousands. The falsehood of all this is self-evident. If Nero could thus

always beat Hannibal, the Romans would not have been in such an agony

of dread about Hasdrubal, as all writers describe. Indeed, we have the

express testimony of Polybius that such statements as we read in Livy

of Marcellus, Nero, and others gaining victories over Hannibal in Italy,

must be all fabrications of Roman vanity. Polybius states (Lib. xv. sec.

16) that Hannibal was never defeated before the battle of Zama; and in

another passage (Book ix. chap, 3) he mentions that after the defeats

which Hannibal inflicted on the Romans in the early years of the war,

they no longer dared face his army in a pitched battle on a fair field,

and yet they resolutely maintained the war. He rightly explains this by

referring to the superiority of Hannibal's cavalry the arm which gained

him all his victories. By keeping within fortified lines, or close to

the sides of the mountains when Hannibal approached them, the Romans

rendered his cavalry ineffective; and a glance at the geography of Italy

will show how an army can traverse the greater part of that country

without venturing far from the high grounds.]

Meanwhile, Hasdrubal had raised the siege of Placentia, and was

advancing towards Ariminum on the Adriatic, and driving before him the

Roman army under Porcina. Nor when the consul Livius had come up, and

united the second and third armies of the north, could he make head

against the invaders. The Romans still fell back before Hasdrubal,

beyond Ariminum, beyond the Metaurus, and as far as the little town of

Sena, to the southeast of that river. Hasdrubal was not unmindful of the

necessity of acting in concert with his brother. He sent messengers

to Hannibal to announce his own line of march and to propose that they

should unite their armies in South Umbria, and then wheel round against

Rome. Those messengers traversed the greater part of Italy in safety;

but, when close to the object of their mission, were captured by a Roman

detachment; and Hasdrubal's letter, detailing his whole plan of the

campaign, was laid, not in his brother's hands, but in those of the

commander of the Roman armies of the south. Nero saw at once the full

importance of the crisis. The two sons of Hamilcar were now within two

hundred miles of each other, and if Rome were to be saved, the brothers

must never meet alive. Nero instantly ordered seven thousand picked men,

a thousand being cavalry, to hold themselves in readiness for a secret

expedition against one of Hannibal's garrisons; and as soon as night had

set in, he hurried forward on his bold enterprise: but he quickly left

the southern road towards Lucania, and wheeling round, pressed northward

with the utmost rapidity towards Picenum. He had, during the preceding

afternoon, sent messengers to Rome, who were to lay Hasdrubal's letters

before the senate. There was a law forbidding a consul to make war or to

march his army beyond the limits of the province assigned to him; but in

such an emergency Nero did not wait for the permission of the senate to

execute his project, but informed them that he was already on his

march to join Livius against Hasdrubal. He advised them to send the two

legions which formed the home garrison, on to Narnia, so as to defend

that pass of the Flaminian road against Hasdrubal, in case he should

march upon Rome before the consular armies could attack him. They were

to supply the place of those two legions at Rome by a levy EN MASSE in

the city, and by ordering up the reserve legion from Capua. These were

his communications to the senate. He also sent horseman forward along

his line of march, with orders to the local authorities to bring stores

of; provisions and refreshments of every kind to the road-side, and

to have relays of carriages ready for the conveyance of the wearied

soldiers. Such were the precautions which he took for accelerating his

march; and when he had advanced some little distance from his camp, he

briefly informed his soldiers of the real object of their expedition.

He told them that there never was a design more seemingly audacious, and

more really safe. He said he was leading them to a certain victory, for

his colleague had an army large enough to balance the enemy already, so

that THEIR swords would decisively turn the scale. The very rumour

that a fresh consul and a fresh army had come up, when heard on the

battle-field (and he would take care that they should not be heard of

before they were seen and felt) would settle the campaign. They would

have all the credit of the victory, and of having dealt the final

decisive blow, He appealed to the enthusiastic reception which they

already met with on their line of march as a proof and an omen of their

good fortune. [Livy. lib. xxvii. c. 45.] And, indeed, their whole path

was amidst the vows and prayers and praises of their countrymen. The

entire population of the districts through which they passed, flocked

to the road-side to see and bless the deliverers of their country. Food,

drink, and refreshments of every kind were eagerly pressed on their

acceptance. Each peasant thought a favour was conferred on him, if one

of Nero's chosen band would accept aught at his hands. The soldiers

caught the full spirit of their leader. Night and day they marched

forwards, taking their hurried meals in the ranks and resting by relays

in the waggons which the zeal of the country-people provided, and which

followed in the rear of the column.

Meanwhile, at Rome, the news of Nero's expedition had caused the

greatest excitement and alarm. All men felt the full audacity of the

enterprise, but hesitated what epithet to apply to it. It was evident

that Nero's conduct would be judged of by the event, that most unfair

criterion, as the Roman historian truly terms it. ["Adparebat (quo nihil

iniquius est) ex eventu famam habiturum."--LIVY, lib. xxvii. c. 44.]

People reasoned on the perilous state in which Nero had left the rest of

his army, without a general, and deprived of the core of its strength,

in the vicinity of the terrible Hannibal. They speculated on how long

it would take Hannibal to pursue and overtake Nero himself, and his

expeditionary force. They talked over the former disasters of the war,

and the fall of both the consuls of the last year. All these calamities

had come on them while they had only one Carthaginian general and army

to deal with in Italy. Now they had two Punic wars at one time. They

had two Carthaginian armies; they had almost two Hannibals in Italy,

Hasdrubal was sprung from the same father; trained up in the same

hostility to Rome; equally practised in battle against its legions; and,

if the comparative speed and success with which he had crossed the Alps

was a fair test, he was even a better general than his brother. With

fear for their interpreter of every rumour, they exaggerated the

strength of their enemy's forces in every quarter, and criticised and

distrusted their own.

Fortunately for Rome, while she was thus a prey to terror and anxiety,

her consul's nerves were strong, and he resolutely urged on his march

towards Sena, where his colleague, Livius, and the praetor Portius were

encamped; Hasdrubal's army being in position about half a mile to the

north. Nero had sent couriers forward to apprise his colleague of his

project and of his approach; and by the advice of Livius, Nero so timed

his final march as to reach the camp at Sena by night. According to a

previous arrangement, Nero's men were received silently into the tents

of their comrades, each according to his rank. By these means there was

no enlargement of the camp that could betray to Hasdrubal the accession

of force which the Romans had received. This was considerable; as Nero's

numbers had been increased on the march by the volunteers, who offered

themselves in crowds, and from whom he selected the most promising men,

and especially the veterans of former campaigns. A council of war was

held on the morning after his arrival, in which some advised that time

should be given for Nero's men to refresh themselves, after the fatigue

of such a march. But Nero vehemently opposed all delay. "The officer,"

said he, "who is for giving time for my men here to rest themselves, is

for giving time to Hannibal to attack my men, whom I have left in the

camp in Apulia. He is for giving time to Hannibal and Hasdrubal to

discover my march, and to manoeuvre for a junction with each other in

Cisalpine Gaul at their leisure. We must fight instantly, while both the

foe here and the foe in the south are ignorant of our movements. We must

destroy this Hasdrubal, and I must be back In Apulia before Hannibal

awakes from his torpor." [Livy, lib. xxvii. c. 45.] Nero's advice

prevailed. It was resolved to fight directly; and before the consuls and

praetor left the tent of Livius, the red ensign, which was the signal to

prepare for immediate action, was hoisted, and the Romans forthwith drew

up in battle array outside the camp.

Hasdrubal had been anxious to bring Livius and Porcius to battle, though

he had not judged it expedient to attack them in their lines. And now,

on hearing that the Romans offered battle, he also drew up his men, and

advanced towards them. No spy or deserter had informed him of Nero's

arrival; nor had he received any direct information that he had more

than his old enemies to deal with. But as he rode forward to reconnoitre

the Roman lines, he thought that their numbers seemed to have increased,

and that the armour of some-of them was unusually dull and stained. He

noticed also that the horses of some of the cavalry appeared to be rough

and out of condition, as if they had just come from a succession of

forced marches. So also, though, owing to the precaution of Livius, the

Roman camp showed no change of size, it had not escaped the quick ear of

the Carthaginian general, that the trumpet, which gave the signal to

the Roman legions, sounded that morning once oftener than usual, as if

directing the troops of some additional superior officer. Hasdrubal,

from his Spanish campaigns, was well acquainted with all the sounds

and signals of Roman war; and from all that he heard and saw, he felt

convinced that both the Roman consuls were before him. In doubt and

difficulty as to what might have taken place between the armies of the

south, and probably hoping that Hannibal also was approaching, Hasdrubal

determined to avoid an encounter with the combined Roman forces, and

to endeavour to retreat upon Insubrian Gaul, where he would be in a

friendly country, and could endeavour to re-open his communications with

his brother. He therefore led his troops back into their camp; and, as

the Romans did not venture on an assault upon his entrenchments, and

Hasdrubal did not choose to commence his retreat in their sight, the day

passed away in inaction. At the first watch of the night, Hasdrubal led

his men silently out of their camp, and moved northwards towards the

Metaurus, in the hope of placing that river between himself and the

Romans before his retreat was discovered. His guides betrayed him;

and having purposely led him away from the part of the river that was

fordable, they made their escape in the dark, and left Hasdrubal and his

army wandering in confusion along the steep bank, and seeking in vain

for a spot where the stream could be safely crossed. At last they

halted; and when day dawned on them, Hasdrubal found that great numbers

of his men, in their fatigue and impatience, had lost all discipline and

subordination, and that many of his Gallic auxiliaries had got drunk,

and were lying helpless in their quarters. The Roman cavalry was soon

seen coming up in pursuit, followed at no great distance by the legions,

which marched in readiness for an instant engagement. It was hopeless

for Hasdrubal, to think of continuing his retreat before them. The

prospect of immediate battle might recall the disordered part of his

troops to a sense of duty, and revive the instinct of discipline. He

therefore ordered his men to prepare for action instantly, and made the

best arrangement of them that the nature of the ground would permit.

Heeren has well described the general appearance of a Carthaginian army.

He says: "It was an assemblage of the most opposite races of the human

species, from the farthest parts of the globe. Hordes of half-naked

Gauls were ranged next to companies of white clothed Iberians, and

savage Ligurians next to the far-travelled Nasamones and Lotophagi.

Carthaginians and Phoenici-Africans formed the centre; while innumerable

troops of Numidian horse-men, taken from all the tribes of the Desert,

swarmed about on unsaddled horses, and formed the wings; the van was

composed of Balearic slingers; and a line of colossal elephants, with

their Ethiopian guides, formed, as it were, a chain of moving fortresses

before the whole army. Such were the usual materials and arrangements of

the hosts that fought for Carthage; but the troops under Hasdrubal were

not in all respects thus constituted or thus stationed. He seems to have

been especially deficient in cavalry, and he had few African troops,

though some Carthaginians of high rank were with him. His veteran

Spanish infantry, armed with helmets and shields, and short

cut-and-thrust swords, were the best part of his army. These, and his

few Africans, he drew up on his right wing, under his own personal

command. In the centre, he placed his Ligurian infantry, and on the left

wing he placed or retained the Gauls, who were armed with long javelins

and with huge broadswords and targets. The rugged nature of the ground

in front and on the flank of this part of his line, made him hope that

the Roman right wing would be unable to come to close quarters with

these unserviceable barbarians, before he could make some impression

with his Spanish veterans on the Roman left. This was the only chance

that he had of victory or safety, and he seems to have done everything

that good generalship could do to secure it. He placed his elephants in

advance of his centre and right wing. He had caused the driver of each

of them to be provided with a sharp iron spike and a mallet; and had

given orders that every beast that became unmanageable, and ran back

upon his own ranks, should be instantly killed, by driving the spike

into the vertebra at the junction of the head and the spine. Hasdrubal's

elephants were ten in number. We have no trustworthy information as to

the amount of his infantry, but it is quite clear that he was greatly

outnumbered by the combined Roman forces."

The tactic of the Roman legions had not yet acquired the perfection

which it received from the military genius of Marius, [Most probably

during the period of his prolonged consulship, from B.C. 104 to B.C.

101, while he was training his army against the Cimbri and the Teutons.]

and which we read of in the first chapter of Gibbon. We possess in

that great work an account of the Roman legions at the end of the

commonwealth, and during the early ages of the empire, which those alone

can adequately admire, who have attempted a similar description. We

have also, in the sixth and seventeenth books of Polybius, an elaborate

discussion on the military system of the Romans in his time, which was

not far distant from the time of the battle of the Metaurus. But the

subject is beset with difficulties: and instead of entering into minute

but inconclusive details, I would refer to Gibbon's first chapter, as

serving for a general description of the Roman army in its period of

perfection; and remark, that the training and armour which the whole

legion received in the time of Augustus, was, two centuries earlier,

only partially introduced. Two divisions of troops, called Hastati and

Principes, formed the bulk of each Roman legion in the second Punic war.

Each of these divisions was twelve hundred strong. The Hastatus and the

Princeps legionary bore a breast-plate or coat of mail, brazen greaves,

and a brazen helmet, with a lofty, upright crest of scarlet or black

feathers. He had a large oblong shield; and, as weapons of offence, two

javelins, one of which was light and slender, but the other was a strong

and massive weapon, with a shaft about four feet long, and an iron head

of equal length. The sword was carried on the right thigh, and was a

short cut-and thrust weapon, like that which was used by the Spaniards.

Thus armed, the Hastati formed the front division of the legion, and the

Principes the second. Each division was drawn up about ten deep; a space

of three feet being allowed between the files as well as the ranks, so

as to give each legionary ample room for the use of his javelins, and

of his sword and shield. The men in the second rank did not stand

immediately behind those in the first rank, but the files were

alternate, like the position of the men on a draught board. This was

termed the quincunx order. Niebuhr considers that this arrangement

enabled the legion to keep up a shower of javelins on the enemy for some

considerable time. He says: "When the first line had hurled its pila,

it probably stepped back between those who stood behind it, who with

two steps forward restored the front nearly to its first position; a

movement which, on account of the arrangement of the quincunx, could be

executed without losing a moment. Thus one line succeeded the other in

the front till it was time to draw the swords; nay, when it was found

expedient, the lines which had already been in the front might repeat

this change, since the stores of pila were surely not confined to the

two which each soldier took with him into battle.

"The same change must have taken place in fighting with the sword;

which, when the same tactic was adopted on both sides, was anything but

a confused MELEE; on the contrary, it was a series of single combats."

He adds, that a military man of experience had been consulted by him on

the subject, and had given it as his opinion, "that the change of the

lines as described above was by no means impracticable; and in the

absence of the deafening noise of gunpowder, it cannot have had even any

difficulty with trained troops."

The third division of the legion was six hundred strong, and acted as a

reserve. It was always composed of veteran soldiers, who were called the

Triarii. Their arms were the same as those of the Principes and Hastati;

except that each Triarian carried a spear instead of javelins. The rest

of the legion consisted of light armed troops, who acted as skirmishers.

The cavalry of each legion was at this period about three hundred

strong. The Italian allies, who were attached to the legion, seem to

have been similarly armed and equipped, but their numerical proportion

of cavalry was much larger.

Such was the nature of the forces that advanced on the Roman side to the

battle of the Metaurus. Nero commanded the right wing, Livius the left,

and the praetor Porcius had the command of the centre. "Both Romans and

Carthaginians well understood how much depended upon the fortune of this

day, and how little hope of safety there was for the vanquished. Only

the Romans herein seemed to have had the better in conceit and opinion,

that they were to fight with men desirous to have fled from them. And

according to this presumption came Livius the consul, with a proud

bravery, to give charge on the Spaniards and Africans, by whom he was so

sharply entertained that victory seemed very doubtful. The Africans and

Spaniards were stout soldiers, and well acquainted with the manner

of the Roman fight. The Ligurians, also, were a hardy nation, and not

accustomed to give ground; which they needed the less, or were able now

to do, being placed in the midst. Livius, therefore, and Porcius found

great opposition; and, with great slaughter on both sides, prevailed

little or nothing. Besides other difficulties, they were exceedingly

troubled by the elephants, that brake their first ranks, and put them in

such disorder, as the Roman ensigns were driven to fall back; all this

while Claudius Nero, labouring in vain against a steep hill, was unable

to come to blows with the Gauls that stood opposite him, but out of

danger. This made Hasdrubal the more confident, who, seeing his own left

wing safe, did the more boldly and fiercely make impression on the other

side upon the left wing of the Romans." ["Historie of the World," by Sir

Walter Raleigh, p. 946.]

But at last Nero, who found that Hasdrubal refused his left wing, and

who could not overcome the difficulties of the ground in the quarter

assigned to him, decided the battle by another stroke of that military

genius which had inspired his march. Wheeling a brigade of his best men

round the rear of the rest of the Roman army, Nero fiercely charged the

flank of the Spaniards and Africans. The charge was as successful as it

was sudden. Rolled back in disorder upon each other, and overwhelmed

by numbers, the Spaniards and Ligurians died, fighting gallantly to the

last. The Gauls, who had taken little or no part in the strife of the

day, were then surrounded, and butchered almost without resistance.

Hasdrubal, after having, by the confession of his enemies, done all that

a general could do, when he saw that the victory was irreparably lost,

scorning to survive the gallant; host which he had led, and to gratify,

as a captive, Roman cruelty and pride, spurred his horse into the midst

of a Roman cohort; where, sword in hand, he met the death that was

worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal.

Success the most complete had crowned Nero's enterprise. Returning as

rapidly as he had advanced, he was again facing the inactive enemies in

the south, before they even knew of his march. But he brought with him

a ghastly trophy of what he had done. In the true spirit of that savage

brutality which deformed the Roman national character, Nero ordered

Hasdrubal's head to be flung into his brother's camp. Eleven years had

passed since Hannibal had last gazed on those features. The sons of

Hamilcar had then planned their system of warfare against Rome, which

they had so nearly brought to successful accomplishment. Year after year

had Hannibal been struggling in Italy, in the hope of one day hailing

the arrival of him whom he had left in Spain; and of seeing his

brother's eye flash with affection and pride at the junction of their

irresistible hosts. He now saw that eye glazed in death and, in the

agony of his heart, the great Carthaginian groaned aloud that he

recognised his country's destiny.

[Carthagini jam non ego nuntios

Mittam superbos. Occidit, occidit

Spes omnis et fortuna nostri

Nominis, Hastrubale interemto.--HORACE.]

Rome was almost delirious with joy: [See the splendid description in

Livy, lib. xxvii. sec. 50, 51.] so agonising had been the suspense with

which the battle's verdict on that great issue of a nation's life and

death had been awaited; so overpowering was the sudden reaction to the

consciousness of security, and to the full glow of glory and success.

From the time when it had been known at Rome that the armies were in

presence of each other, the people had never ceased to throng the forum,

the Conscript Fathers had been in permanent sitting at the senate house.

Ever and anon a fearful whisper crept among the crowd of a second Cannae

won by a second Hannibal. Then came truer rumours that the day was

Rome's; but the people were sick at heart, and heeded them not. The

shrines were thronged with trembling women, who seemed to weary heaven

with prayers to shield them from the brutal Gaul and the savage African.

Presently the reports of good fortune assumed a more definite form. It

was said that two Narnian horseman had ridden from the east into the

Roman camp of observation in Umbria, and had brought tidings of the

utter slaughter of the foe. Such news seemed too good to be true,

Men tortured their neighbours and themselves by demonstrating its

improbability and by ingeniously criticising its evidence. Soon,

however, a letter came from Lucius Manlius Acidinus, who commanded in

Umbria, and who announced the arrival of the Narnian horsemen in his

camp, and the intelligence which they brought thither. The letter

was first laid before the senate, and then before the assembly of the

people. The excitement grew more and more vehement. The letter was read

and re-read aloud to thousands. It confirmed the previous rumour. But

even this was insufficient to allay the feverish anxiety that thrilled

through every breast in Rome. The letter might be a forgery: the Narnian

horseman might be traitors or impostors. "We must see officers from the

army that fought, or hear despatches from the consuls themselves, and

then only will we believe." Such was the public sentiment, though some

of more hopeful nature already permitted themselves a foretaste of joy.

At length came news that officers who really had been in the battle were

near at hand. Forthwith the whole city poured forth to meet them, each

person coveting to be the first to receive with his own eyes and ears

convincing proofs of the reality of such a deliverance. One vast throng

of human beings filled the road from Rome to the Milvian bridge. The

three officers, Lucius Veturius Pollio, Publius Licinius Vasus, and

Quintus Caecilius Metellus came riding on, making their way slowly

through the living sea around them, As they advanced, each told the

successive waves of eager questioners that Rome was victorious. "We have

destroyed Hasdrubal and his army, our legions are safe, and our consuls

are unhurt." Each happy listener, who caught the welcome sounds from

their lips, retired to communicate his own joy to others, and became

himself the centre of an anxious and inquiring group. When the officers

had, with much difficulty, reached the senate house, and the crowd was

with still greater difficulty put back from entering and mingling with

the Conscript Fathers, the despatches of Livius and Nero were produced

and read aloud. From the senate house the officers proceeded to the

public assembly, where the despatches were read again; and then the

senior officer, Lucius Veturius, gave in his own words a fuller detail

of how went the fight. When he had done speaking to the people,

an universal shout of rapture rent the air. The vast assembly then

separated: some hastening to the temples to find in devotion a vent for

the overflowing excitement of their hearts; others seeking their homes

to gladden their wives and children with the good news, and to feast

their own eyes with the sight of the loved ones, who now, at last, were

safe from outrage and slaughter. The senate ordained a thanksgiving of

three days for the great deliverance which had been vouchsafed to Rome;

and throughout that period the temples were incessantly crowded with

exulting worshippers; and the matrons, with their children round them,

in their gayest attire, and with joyous aspects and voices, offered

grateful praises to the immortal gods, as if all apprehension of evil

were over, and the war were already ended.

With the revival of confidence came also the revival of activity in

traffic and commerce, and in all the busy intercourse of daily life.

A numbing load was taken off each heart and brain, and once more men

bought and sold, and formed their plans fleely, as had been done before

the dire Carthaginians came into Italy. Hannibal was, certainly, still

in the land; but all felt that his power to destroy was broken, and that

the crisis of the war-fever was past. The Metaurus, indeed, had not only

determined the event of the strife between Rome and Carthage, but it

had ensured to Rome two centuries more of almost unchanged conquest.

Hannibal did actually, with almost superhuman skill, retain his hold on

Southern Italy for a few years longer, but the imperial city, and her

allies, were no longer in danger from his arms; and, after Hannibal's

downfall, the great military republic of the ancient world met in her

career of conquest no other worthy competitor. Byron has termed Nero's

march "unequalled," and, in the magnitude of its consequences, it is

so. Viewed only as a military exploit, it remains unparalleled save by

Marlborough's bold march from Flanders to the Danube, in the campaign

of Blenheim, and perhaps also by the Archduke Charles's lateral march

in 1796, by which he overwhelmed the French under Jourdain, and then,

driving Moreau through the Black Forest and across the Rhine, for a

while freed Germany from her invaders.

SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS BETWEEN THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS, B.C. 207, AND

ARMININIUS'S VICTORY OVER THE ROMAN LEGIONS UNDER VARUS, A.D. 9.

B.C. 205 to 201. Scipio is made consul, and carries the war into Africa.

He gains several victories there, and the Carthaginians recall Hannibal

from Italy to oppose him. Battle of Zama in 201: Hannibal is defeated,

and Carthage sues for peace. End of the second Punic war, leaving Rome

confirmed in the dominion of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, and

also mistress of great part of Spain, and virtually predominant in North

Africa.

200. Rome makes war upon Philip, king of Macedonia. She pretends to

take the Greek cities of the Achaean league and the AEtolians under her

protection as allies. Philip is defeated by the proconsul Flaminius at

Cynocephalae, 198; and begs for peace. The Macedonian influence is now

completely destroyed in Greece, and the Roman established in its stead,

though Rome nominally acknowledged the independence of the Greek cities.

194. Rome makes war upon Antiochus, king of Syria. He is completely

defeated at the battle of Magnesia, 192, and is glad to accept peace on

conditions which leave him dependent upon Rome.

200-190. "Thus, within the short; space of ten years, was laid the

foundation of the Roman authority in the East, and the general state

of affairs entirely changed. If Rome was not yet the ruler, she was at

least the arbitress of the world from the Atlantic to the Euphrates. The

power of the three principal states was so completely humbled, that

they durst not, without the permission of Rome, begin any new war; the

fourth, Egypt, had already, in the year 201, placed herself under the

guardianship of Rome; and the lesser powers followed of themselves:

esteeming it an honour to be called the allies of Rome. With this name

the nations were lulled into security, and brought under the Roman yoke;

the new political system of Rome was founded and strengthened partly by

exciting and supporting the weaker states against the stronger, however

unjust the cause of the former might be, and partly by factions which

she found means to raise in every state, even the smallest."--(HEEREN.)

172. War renewed between Macedon and Rome. Decisive defeat of Perses,

the Macedonian king, by Paulus AEmilius at Pydna, 168, Destruction of

the Macedonian monarchy.

150. Rome oppresses the Carthaginians till they are driven to take up

arms, and the third Punic war begins, Carthage is taken and destroyed by

Scipio AEmilianus, 146, and the Carthaginian territory is made a Roman

province.

146. In the same year in which Carthage falls, Corinth is stormed by

the Roman army under Mummius. The Achaean league had been goaded into

hostilities with Rome, by means similar to those employed against

Carthage. The greater part of Southern Greece is made a Roman province,

under the name of Achaia.

133. Numantium is destroyed by Scipio AEmilianus. "The war against the

Spaniards, who, of all the nations subdued by the Romans, defended their

liberty with the greatest obstinacy, began in the year 200, six years

after the total expulsion of the Carthaginians from their country,

206. It was exceedingly obstinate, partly from the natural state of the

country, which was thickly populated, and where every place became a

fortress; partly from the courage of the inhabitants; but at last all,

owing to the peculiar policy of the Romans, who yielded to employ their

allies to subdue other nations. This war continued, almost without

interruption, from the year 200 to 133, and was for the most part

carried on at the same time in Hispania Citerior, where the Celtiberi

were the most formidable adversaries, and in Hispania Ulterior, where

the Lusitani were equally powerful. Hostilities were at the highest

pitch in 195, under Cato, who reduced Hispania Citerior to a state

of tranquillity in 185-179, when the Celtiberi were attacked in their

native territory; and 155-150, when the Romans in both provinces were so

often beaten, that nothing was more dreaded by the soldiers at home than

to be sent there. The extortions and perfidy of Servius Galba placed

Viriathus, in the year 146, at the head of his nations, the Lusitani:

the war, however, soon extended itself to Hispania Citerior, where many

nations, particularly the Numantines, took up arms against Rome, 143.

Viriathus, sometimes victorious and sometimes defeated, was never more

formidable than in the moment of defeat; because he knew how to take

advantage of his knowledge of the country and of the dispositions of his

countrymen. After his murder, caused by the treachery of Saepio, 140,

Lusitania was subdued; but the Numantine war became still more violent,

and the Numantines compelled the consul Mancinus to a disadvantageous

treaty, 137. When Scipio, in the year 133, put an end to this war,

Spain was certainly tranquil; the northern parts, however, were still

unsubdued, though the Romans penetrated as far as Galatia."--HEEREN.

134. Commencement of the revolutionary century at Rome, I.E. from the

time of the excitement produced by the attempts made by the Gracchi

to reform the commonwealth, to the battle of Actium (B.C. 31), which

established Octavianus Caesar as sole master of the Roman world.

Throughout this period Rome was engaged in important foreign wars, most

of which procured large accessions to her territory.

118-106. The Jugurthine war. Numidia is conquered, and made a Roman

province.

113-101. The great and terrible war of the Cimbri and Teutones against

Rome. These nations of northern warriors slaughter several Roman armies

in Gaul, and in 102 attempt to penetrate into Italy, The military genius

of Marius here saves his country; he defeats the Teutones near Aix, in

Provence; and in the following year he destroys the army of the Cimbri,

who had passed the Alps, near Vercellae.

91-88. The war of the Italian allies against Rome. This was caused by

the refusal of Rome to concede to them the rights of Roman citizenship.

After a sanguine struggle, Rome gradually grants it.

89-86. First war of the Romans against Mithridates the Great, king of

Pontus, who had overrun Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Greece. Sylla defeats

his armies, and forces him to withdraw his forces from Europe. Sylla

returns to Rome to carry on the civil war against the son and partisans

of Marius. He makes himself Dictator.

74-64. The last Mithridatic wars. Lucullus, and after him Pompeius,

command against the great King of Pontus, who at last is poisoned by his

son, while designing to raise the warlike tribes of the Danube against

Rome, and to invade Italy from the north-east. Great Asiatic conquests

of the Romans. Besides the ancient province of Pergamus, the maritime

countries of Bithynia, and nearly all Paphlagonia and Pontus, are formed

into a Roman province, under the name of Bithynia; while on the southern

coast Cilicia and Pamphylia form another, under the name of Cilicia;

Phoenicia and Syria compose a third, under the name of Syria. On

the other hand, Great Armenia is left to Tigranes; Cappodocia to

Ariobarzanes; the Bosphorus to Pharnaces; Judaea to Hyrcanus; and some

other small states are also given to petty princes, all of whom remain

dependent on Rome.

58-50. Caesar conquers Gaul.

54. Crassus attacks the Parthians with a Roman army, but is overthrown

and killed at Carrhae in Mesopotamia. His lieutenant Cassius collects

the wrecks of the army, and prevents the Parthians from conquering

Syria.

49-45. The civil war between Caesar and the Pompeian party. Caesar

drives Pompeius out of Italy, conquers his enemy's forces in Spain,

and then passes into Greece, where Pompeius and the other aristocratic

chiefs had assembled a large army. Caesar gives them a decisive

defeat at the great battle of Pharsalia. Pompeius flies for refuge

to Alexandria, where he is assassinated. Caesar, who had followed him

thither, is involved in a war with the Egyptians, in which he is finally

victorious. The celebrated Cleopatra is made Queen of Egypt. Caesar next

marches into Pontus, and defeats the son of Mithridates, who had taken

part in the war against him. He then proceeds to the Roman province of

Africa, where some of the Pompeian chiefs had established themselves,

aided by Juba, a native prince. He over throws them at the battle of

Thapsus. He is again obliged to lead an army into Spain, where the sons

of Pompeius had collected the wrecks of their father's party. He crushes

the last of his enemies at the battle of Munda. Under the title of

Dictator, he is the sole master of the Roman world.

44. Caesar is killed in the Senate-house; the Civil wars are soon

renewed, Brutus and Cassius being at the head of the aristocratic party,

and the party of Caesar being led by Mark Antony and Octavianus Caesar,

afterwards Augustus.

42. Defeat and death of Brutus and Cassius at Philippi. Dissensions soon

break out between Octavianus Caesar and Antony.

31. Antony is completely defeated by Octavianus Caesar at Actium.

He flies to Egypt with Cleopatra. Octavianus pursues him. Antony

and Cleopatra kill themselves. Egypt becomes a Roman province, and

Octavianus Caesar is left undisputed master of Rome, and all that is

Rome's. The state of the Roman world at this time is best described

in two lines of Tacitus:--"Postquam bellatum apud Actium, atque OMNEM

POTESTATEM AD UNUM CONFERRI PACIS INTERFUIT." (Hist. lib. i. s. 1.)

The 44th year of the reign of Augustus, and the 1st year of the 195th

Olympiad, is commonly assigned as the date of THE NATIVITY OF OUR LORD.

There is much of the beauty of holiness in the remarks with which the

American historian, Eliot, closes his survey of the conquering career

and civil downfall of the Roman Commonwealth:--

"So far as humility amongst men was necessary for the preparation of

a truer freedom than could ever be known under heathenism, the part

of Rome, however dreadful was yet sublime. It was not to unite, to

discipline, or to fortify humanity, but to enervate, to loosen, and

to scatter its forces, that the people whose history we have read were

allowed to conquer the earth, and were then themselves reduced to deep

submission. Every good labour of theirs that failed was, by reason

of what we esteem its failure, a step gained nearer to the end of the

well-nigh universal evil that prevailed; while every bad achievement

that may seem to us to have succeeded, temporarily or lastingly, with

them was equally, by reason of its success, a progress towards the good

of which the coming would have been longed and prayed for, could it have

been comprehended. Alike in the virtues and in the vices of antiquity,

we may read the progress towards its humiliation. ["The Christian

revelation," says Leland, in his truly admirable work on the subject

(vol. i. p. 488), "was made to the world at a time when it was most

wanted; when the darkness and corruption of mankind were arrived at the

height.... if it had been published much sooner, and before there had

been a full trial made of what was to be expected from human wisdom and

philosophy, the great need men stood in of such an extraordinary divine

dispensation would not have been so apparent."] Yet, on the other hand,

it must not seem, at the last, that the disposition of the Romans or

of mankind to submission was secured solely through the errors, and the

apparently ineffectual toils which we have traced back to these times of

old. Desires too true to have been wasted, and strivings too humane to

have been unproductive, though all were overshadowed by passing wrongs,

still gleam as if in anticipation or in preparation of the advancing

day.

"At length, when it had been proved by ages of conflict and loss, that

no lasting joy and no abiding truth could be procured through the power,

the freedom, or the faith of mankind, the angels sang their song in

which the glory of God and the good-will of men were together blended.

The universe was wrapped In momentary tranquillity, and 'peaceful was

the night' above the manger at Bethlehem. We may believe, that when

the morning came, the ignorance, the confusion, and the servitude of

humanity had left their darkest forms amongst the midnight clouds. It

was still, indeed, beyond the power of man to lay hold securely of the

charity and the regeneration that were henceforth to be his law; and the

indefinable terrors of the future, whether seen from the West or from

the East, were not at once to be dispelled. But before the death of the

Emperor Augustus, in the midst of his fallen subjects, the business of

THE FATHER had already been begun in the Temple at Jerusalem; and near

by, THE SON was increasing in wisdom and in stature, and in favour with

God and man." [Eliot's "Liberty of Rome," vol. ii. p. 521.]