_Editor Popular Science Monthly_:
SIR: In your editorial, in the issue of September, you speak of “faith
as the organ of religious apprehension.” This suggests some important
facts that are not always apprehended, or are forgotten. There is no
organ for the discovery, the proof, or the apprehension of truth but
reason, whether facts of Nature or of religion. “Faith” is not a sixth
sense which we do not use in scientific pursuits, but which comes to
our help when we seek for religious truth. Much of the difficulty
comes from the fact that the word “faith” is ambiguous, having two
meanings, which are not distinguished. It is (1) simply belief of a
fact because of evidence presented to and apprehended by the reason; or
is it (2) trust, confidence in, belief in, as in a person, resting on
the belief of that person’s competency and truthfulness, that belief
resting on evidence apprehended by the reason. Because of this “faith”
in the person we accept his testimony as to facts beyond our personal
cognizance, we believe them not because we have discovered them, or
may be are competent to discover them, but because of our “faith” in
a person whom we have seen reason to believe is trustworthy--i. e.,
competent and truthful.
Now, these two meanings of “faith” are often confused, interchanged.
Hence the discredit thrown upon belief of religious truth, because an
illegitimate use is made of the place of “faith” in its justification.
And writers defending religious belief have been great sinners in this
illegitimate use of “faith.”
The place of “faith” is the same in science as in religion--i. e., it
is the condition and justification of our acceptance of truth which is
beyond our personal cognizance. We accept it because of the testimony
of men in whom we have learned to have faith--e.g., How few of us who
accept the revelations of the spectrum analysis as to the composition
of the stars have any other justification for accepting them than just
this? We believe them simply because men, whom we, in the exercise
of our reason, have come to believe competent and truthful, tell us
what they have seen. We believe on their testimony because we trust
them. Our process involves three steps: (1) Belief of their competence
through appeal to reason; (2) trust in them because of this belief; (3)
belief of their testimony because of this trust or “faith” in them.
The only organ we have used is reason, in its initial act of belief of
the competence and truthfulness of the witnesses. Error in the use of
reason here vitiates all that follows. Correct use of reason here gives
a legitimate condition for correct results of the other steps. But
reason must go along with us and guide us in these, that we may come to
a rationally accepted belief of the truth.
Here is the place of “faith” in science, as belief and as trust. By its
use we accept the great issues of scientific truth which we believe,
and do it legitimately.
It is the same in all right acceptance of religious truth. Here appears
a person in human history claiming to reveal facts beyond our sphere
of cognizance. Now, the first (1) step is belief in his competence
and truthfulness as a witness, just as in cases of science. His only
appeal is to reason, our only organ for apprehending truth. We, because
of the evidence presented to our reason, believe him competent and
truthful--i. e., trustworthy--and we take the second step (2), as in
case of search for scientific truth. We trust him, we have “faith”
in him. Then (3) we believe his testimony as to facts beyond our
cognizance, as to God, as to the inner world and life, as to his
own person and work, and his agency in helping us to the true life.
Here are the same three steps as in our believing the great facts of
science, and they are equally legitimate, and the belief is equally
legitimate, and with the same use of “faith” in both cases, which use
is legitimate if we have applied our reason correctly.
It may be said that there is this difference in the two cases: We are,
it may be, competent with training to perceive with our reason the
facts to which the scientists witness, whereas in religion we are not
competent by any training, in our present state, to see what Jesus
Christ testified to; therefore the believing him is not legitimate.
Space forbids arguing this point, but the writer is confident it can
be shown that this does not vitiate the process in the least. The
only point now argued is that reason is the only organ of man for
the apprehension of truth, and that “faith” acts the same part in
scientific and religious belief.
JOHN R. THURSTON.
WHITINSVILLE, MASS., _September 30, 1899_.
[The point which our correspondent discusses is one which falls rather
within the province of theology or philosophy than within that of
science. In the article to which he refers we did not distinctly say
that “faith” was “the organ of religious apprehension.” What we said
was that _granting_ such was the case, the question still remained to
be settled where the line should be drawn between faith and knowledge.
We doubt whether the account which our correspondent gives of faith
would be widely accepted by those who approach the subject from the
theological side, while those who approach it from the scientific
side would--at least many of them would--be disposed to consider the
term one which might better be dispensed with in favor of the less
ambiguous word “belief.” Belief is the inclination of the mind toward a
proposition for which absolute or demonstrative proof is wanting, and
it is this condition of mind, it seems to us, that our correspondent
has in view. Faith in the religious sense, unless we are mistaken, is
something different. It is an affirmation made by the human conscience
or consciousness in its own behalf--a certain instinctive recognition
of a presence and power in the universe which, though inaccessible
to scientific investigation, sustains an intimate, profound, and
all-essential relation to man’s moral nature. If trust in an individual
ever rises to the level of faith in this sense, it is because the
influence of the individual harmonizes with and re-enforces the primal
instinct. That, at least, is how we view the matter.--EDITOR.]