Is it not true that the criminal is a natural product, and that society
unconsciously produces these children of vice? Can we not safely take
another step, and say that the criminal is a victim, as the diseased
and insane and deformed are victims? We do not think of punishing a man
because he is afflicted with disease--our desire is to find a cure. We
send him, not to the penitentiary, but to the hospital, to an asylum.
We do this because we recognize the fact that disease is naturally
produced--that it is inherited from parents, or the result of
unconscious negligence, or it may be of recklessness--but instead of
punishing, we pity. If there are diseases of the mind, of the brain, as
there are diseases of the body; and if these diseases of the mind, these
deformities of the brain, produce, and necessarily produce, what we
call vice, why should we punish the-criminal, and pity those who are
physically diseased?
Socrates, in some respects at least one of the wisest of men, said:
"It is strange that you should not be angry when you meet a man with an
ill-conditioned body, and yet be vexed when you encounter one with an
ill-conditioned soul."
We know that there are deformed bodies, and we are equally certain that
there are deformed minds.
Of course, society has the right to protect itself, no matter whether
the persons who attack its well-being are responsible or not, no matter
whether they are sick in mind, or deformed in brain. The right of
self-defence exists, not only in the individual, but in society. The
great question is, How shall this right of self-defence be exercised?
What spirit shall be in the nation, or in society--the spirit of
revenge, a desire to degrade and punish and destroy, or a spirit born of
the recognition of the fact that criminals are victims?
The world has thoroughly tried confiscation, degradation, imprisonment,
torture and death, and thus far the world has failed. In this connection
I call your attention to the following statistics gathered in our own
country:
In 1850, we had twenty-three millions of people, and between six and
seven thousand prisoners.
In 1860--thirty-one millions of people, and nineteen thousand prisoners.
In 1870--thirty-eight millions of people, and thirty-two thousand
prisoners.
In 1880--fifty millions of people, and fifty-eight thousand prisoners.
It may be curious to note the relation between insanity, pauperism and
crime:
In 1850, there were fifteen thousand insane; in 1860, twenty-four
thousand; in 1870, thirty-seven thousand; in 1880, ninety-one thousand.
In the light of these statistics, we are not succeeding in doing away
with crime. There were in 1880, fifty-eight thousand prisoners, and
in the same year fifty-seven thousand homeless children, and sixty-six
thousand paupers in almshouses.
Is it possible that we must go to the same causes for these effects?