impending, and threatening to engulph farmers and landlords
in one general ruin, I have thought it not amiss to insert
the following table, which shows that a reduction of ten per
cent does not reach a degree approaching to anything like
a comparison with the losses farmers are suffering. To the
occupier of land rented at £4, it is 8s. an acre against a loss
of £2, 4s. 1d.--more than half his rent. To the occupier of the
second class, rent £2, it is 4s. an acre against the loss of
£1, 14s. 7-3/4d.--nearly the whole of his rent. To the occupier
of the third class, rent £1, it is 2s. an acre against a loss
of £1, 6s. 4-1/2d.--6s. 4-1/2d. more than his rent. And to the
unfortunate occupier of the fourth class, rent 7s., it is 8
2/5d. an acre against a loss of £1, 1s. 4-3/4d.--or more than
three times his rent.
"I have taken four farms, of one hundred acres each, of
different descriptions of soil, showing the net loss on each
farm, deducting ten per cent from the rent. For results, see
below:--
Key: A = Classes
B = No. of Acres
| | | | | Total | | |
| | | | 10 per | Outlay | Per- | |Net Loss,
| | Rent | | cent. | on Farms,|centage| |deducting
| | per |Amount of |reduction| including| on |Total Loss| 10 per
A | B | Acre. | Rent. | on Rent.| Rent. |Outlay.| per Farm.| cent.
---+---+-------+----------+---------+----------+-------+----------+----------
| |£ s. d.| £ s. d. |£ s. d. | £ s. d. | | £ s. d. | £ s. d.
1 |100|4 0 0 |400 0 0 |40 0 0 |975 8 4 |4.1 |220 8 4 |180 8 4
2 |100|2 0 0 |200 0 0 |20 0 0 |704 7 6 |2.8375 |173 4 7 |153 4 7
3 |100|1 0 0 |100 0 0 |10 0 0 |577 1 8 |1.733 |131 15 5 |121 15 5
4 |100|0 7 0 | 35 0 0 | 3 10 0 |285 17 6 |1.221 |106 19 7 |103 9 7
"The above table shows that, though a reduction of ten per
cent may be thought considerable and fair on the part of the
landlord, it is like a drop in the bucket when viewed as a
set-off against the farmer's losses; and that along with
every possible reduction that can be made on the rent, other
measures, more comprehensive in character, must be adopted, to
place the farmer in a position to enable him to cultivate the
soil."[6]
[6] Other tables contained in the same pamphlet, but which are too long
for insertion here, exhibit the various items and particulars of the
loss sustained.
Thus much we have said regarding the adequacy of reduction of rent
to meet the agricultural depression, because of late a very vigorous
effort has been made by the Liberal press to mislead public opinion
on this subject. "After all," say these organs, deserting their
first position that farming was as profitable as ever--"after all,
it is a mere question of rent: let the farmer settle that with the
landlord." It is not a mere question of rent: _it is the question
of the extinction of a class_; for if, in the long run, it shall
become apparent that no reduction of rent, short of that which must
leave the owners of the soil generally without profit, owing to the
amount of incumbrances which are known to exist upon the land, can
suffice to render cultivation profitable, then the landlord must
necessarily supersede the tenant, and the owner the occupier; and one
of the two profits which hitherto have been recognised as legitimate,
be extinguished. To this point things are tending, and that very
rapidly. The process has begun in Ireland and in the northern parts of
Scotland, and it will become more apparent with the ebbing of the tide.
Continental prices cannot rule in this country without reducing the
whole of our agricultural system to the Continental level, and placing
the collection of the revenue and the maintenance of the national
credit in the greatest jeopardy.
Still, nothing can be more reasonable than the request generally
urged by the farmers for a reduction of their rents. They say, and
say truly, that they are not able to meet the pressure of the times.
They do not say, however, that any reduction which the circumstances
of the landlords will enable them to make can suffice to remedy the
mischief. It insures them no profit; it merely saves them from a
certain additional loss. In some cases the landlords either will not,
or cannot, grant such reductions. They have no margin left them. They
can but preach hope against knowledge; and in doing so, they play
the game of the enemy, and justly lay themselves open to the charge
of hypocrisy. In fact, what the farmers want, is less a reduction of
rent--which they know to be but a temporary expedient--than a more
manly and decided attitude on the part of the owners of the soil.
Too many of the landlords allowed themselves to be led astray by
the specious representations of the Free-Traders, or were betrayed
into supporting the policy of a Minister, for whose antecedents and
ability they entertained an egregiously exaggerated respect. Trusting
to vamped reports and speculative opinions, presumptuously hazarded
by men who knew nothing whatever of the subject, they disregarded the
clear warnings of those who foresaw the magnitude and imminency of
the danger; and surrendered themselves, without retaining the means
of defence, to a faction which laughed at their credulity. These are
the men who at agricultural meetings affect to talk hopefully of the
prospects of agriculture, and who always assure the farmers that their
case is regarded with the utmost sympathy by the Legislature. They are
constantly advising their hearers, not only to have patience, for that
were a proper charge, but to augment the amount of their outlay. They
are grand upon the subject of artificial manures, and seem to have an
idea that guano is an inexhaustible deposit. They will even bring down
lecturers--dapper young chemical men from laboratories--to enlighten
their tenants; but seldom, or rarely, will they grant a single sixpence
of reduction. Is it wonderful if the honest farmer, thoroughly alive
to the real peril of his situation, and indignant at the treachery of
which he has been made the innocent victim, should conceive any feeling
but those of respect and cordiality for the landlord who is acting
so paltry a part, and condescending to so wretched an imposture? The
farmer feels that now or never his cause must be resolutely fought. He
knows that the interest of the landlord is as much concerned as his
own; and yet when he applies to him for support and encouragement, he
is met with silly platitudes.
As it has turned out, the agricultural meetings of the present autumn
have proved far more fruitful to the journalists than they had any
reason to expect. Our brethren of the Liberal press have extracted from
them grounds for exceeding jubilation and triumph. Mr Disraeli, Mr
Palmer, Mr Henley, and others, justly considered as very influential
members of the Protectionist party in the House of Commons, are
represented to have expressed themselves in a manner inconsistent with
the maintenance of the great struggle which, Session after Session,
has been renewed. They are claimed as converts, not to the principles
of Free Trade--for those they have distinctly repudiated--but to the
doctrine that it is impossible, by direct legislation, to disturb the
present existing arrangement; and, as a matter of course, a defection
so serious as this is joyously announced as an abandonment of the cause
by several of those men who were its most doughty champions.
Before proceeding to consider the merits of that line of policy which
Mr Disraeli proposes to adopt during the ensuing session, and which,
in his judgment, is that most likely, under present circumstances, to
procure some measure of relief for the agricultural interest, let us
distinctly understand whether or not Protection, as a principle, has
been abandoned by any of its supporters in Parliament. We have perused
the speeches which have been made the subject of so much comment with
the greatest care and anxiety; but we have not been able to discover
any admission that the views so long and so ably maintained by those
gentlemen have undergone an iota of change. They may, indeed, and very
naturally, despair of success in the present Parliament. Knowing, as
they do, the weight and apportionment of parties in the present House
of Commons, and enabled by experience to calculate upon the amount of
support which would be given to any proposition, they may have arrived
at the conclusion that the best course of policy which they can adopt,
is to concentrate their efforts towards obtaining relief from what is
clearly unjust taxation, leaving the grand question of a return to the
Protective system in the hands of the country, to be decided at the
next general election.
This is our distinct understanding of the views which have been
announced by these gentlemen. It may be that some of them have
not sufficiently guarded themselves against the possibility of
misrepresentation; an error of judgment which, in the present state of
the public mind, may have a detrimental effect. We have no hesitation
in expressing our opinion that the sentiments uttered by the Marquis of
Granby, and those contained in the admirable letters of Mr G. F. Young,
are more calculated to advance the cause, and to insure co-operation
amongst all classes who are opposed to the bastard system of Free
Trade, than speeches which are only directed towards a subsidiary
point, which are apt to be misunderstood, and which have been seized on
by our opponents as proofs of despondency or despair.
No one, we believe, expected that, in the present Parliament, such
a change of opinion could be wrought as would lead to the immediate
restoration of Protection. In May 1850, the Earl of Derby, then Lord
Stanley, distinctly explained to the delegates who waited upon him,
that "it was not in the House of Lords, it was not in the House of
Commons, _it was in the country at large_, that the battle must be
fought, and their triumph must be achieved." "You have," said the
noble lord, "the game in your own hands. You may compel your present
members--or, at least, you may point out to them the necessary, the
lamentable consequences to themselves of persisting in their present
courses; _and when the time shall come, you will have it in your own
power, by the return of men who really represent your sentiments,
to exercise your constitutional influence over the Legislature of
the country, and to enforce your just demands in another House of
Parliament_." What has since taken place has most clearly established
the soundness and wisdom of this advice. Beyond all question, the
cause of Protection during the last two years has advanced with rapid
strides. The total failure of every prophesied result on the part of
the Free-Traders--the continued depression which has prevailed, not
only in agriculture, but in manufactures, trade, and commerce--the
state of the working-classes, which has experienced no amelioration
since the latter measures of Free Trade were carried--the depopulation
of Ireland, and the astounding increase of emigration from the northern
part of Great Britain--all have contributed to dispel the popular
delusion, and to give new courage and confidence to the disinterested
supporters of the cause. Public opinion, in so far as that can be
gathered from the results of casual elections, has declared itself in
favour of Protection. Meetings of the working-classes have been held in
the metropolis, at which resolutions in favour of a return to a general
protective policy have been passed by acclamation. Nothing whatever
has occurred to give a check to the advance of these principles; much
has transpired to show how rapidly and strongly they are progressing.
That progress does not depend, and never did depend, solely upon the
result of the agricultural experiment. The true secret of the reaction
against Free Trade lies in this, that every one of the productive
classes of the community is interested in opposing a system which
crushes and enthrals labour for the undue benefit of the capitalist.
It may be that, in some quarters, that common interest is not yet
fully understood. It may be that relative cheapness of provisions may
be considered by many unthinking and unreflective people in the light
of a positive blessing, irrespective altogether of the effect of that
cheapness in diminishing the sphere of employment, and contracting the
wages of labour at home. This is not wonderful, because, previous to
the repeal of the Corn Laws, the tariff had been deliberately altered,
and the pressure and privation occasioned by these first experiments
upon British industry were, for a time, materially relieved by the
fall on the price of provisions consequent on the later measures. But
very soon it became apparent to all thinking men, that the prostration
of so great a branch of industry as that of British agriculture must
act prejudicially upon all the others, and that the temporary benefit
was more than counterbalanced by the universal decline of employment.
Among the working-classes, even in larger towns, that opinion is daily
gaining ground, and becoming a settled conviction. Labour is so much
depressed that some effectual remedy must be found, if the country is
to remain without convulsion; and it is most important for us all that
the remedy, which may finally be resorted to, should be a just and
equitable one, not such as unscrupulous demagogues might apply.
Therefore, at the present time, and in the present temper of the
public mind, if we read its symptoms aright, we greatly deprecate any
deviation from the broad principle and assertion of Protection to all
branches of British Industry. To argue the Agricultural case alone,
however important that may be, is to weaken the general cause, which
is the cause of Labour. To make terms for the agriculturists only, by
adjustment of taxation or otherwise, even if such adjustment could by
possibility enable them to struggle on, would not be a wise policy.
Never let it be forgotten that the Corn Laws could not have been
repealed, but for the previous alterations on the tariff, stealthily
and insidiously made, which left the agriculturists of Britain in the
possession of an apparent monopoly. As monopolists, they never can
regain their former position; but they may, and, we believe, will
regain it, if they are true to the common cause, as British producers
against foreign competition, on account of the burdens imposed upon all
production by the State, and on account of monetary laws and changes
which have more than doubled their original burden. But they never will
obtain that justice to which they are entitled, unless they combine
with the other classes who are equally suffering under the withdrawal
of Protection, and insist upon a total change, in the commercial policy
of Great Britain, as affecting not this or that interest only, but the
whole mass of productive labour upon which the wealth of the nation
depends.
We have no hesitation in stating our opinion on this matter in the
broadest possible terms. We do not differ from Mr Disraeli in his
estimate of the unequal burdens which are laid upon the land in
comparison with the other property of Great Britain. That is a subject
well worthy of consideration; and if it can be treated as entirely
subsidiary to the greater question of Protection, and enforced without
any appearance of an attempt at compromise, we are not prepared to say
that any other step, under existing circumstances, would be preferable.
But we cannot regard any such adjustment of taxation as a remedy of the
grand evil. We doubt the advantage to be derived from a policy which,
if successful, would only protract the period of general suffering;
whilst, in the mean time, it will assuredly be represented as an
attempt to compromise a principle, and therefore, weaken the amount
of that support upon which we now can confidently reckon. "Never,"
said Burke, in his latest political treatise, "never succumb. It is a
struggle for your existence as a nation. But I have no fears whatever
for the result. There is a salient living principle of energy in the
public mind of England, which only requires proper direction to enable
her to withstand this or any other ferocious foe. Persevere, therefore,
till this tyranny be overpast." The lesson of the great statesman,
though directed to other dangers than those which now beset us, has
lost none of its value. Perseverance, where the principle is clear,
is less matter of policy than a duty; and therefore we cannot but
feel some regret that, at such a time as this, any declaration should
have been made, or any policy indicated, which can have the effect of
damping the hopes or checking the ardour of those who are most resolute
in the cause. That the efforts of our adversaries to misrepresent the
tenor of some of the late speeches have been partially successful,
can hardly be doubted by any one who has noted the prevalent tone
at the subsequent farmers' meetings. We believe that Mr Disraeli is
at heart and by conviction as much a Protectionist as before. We do
not even deny that his tactics, if pursued and successful, might,
from the universal impatience of taxation which prevails, compel any
Ministry then in power to raise an additional amount of revenue by
the imposition of customs duties. Or otherwise, the success of his
movement might have the effect of displacing the present Ministry,
and necessitating an entire party change in Her Majesty's counsels.
We are fully alive to the advantage of one or other of these results.
We are opposed to further direct taxation, and we have no confidence
whatever in the present advisers of the Crown. But we cannot approve
of any move or any tactics which may have the effect of throwing even
the slightest doubt on the determination of the great Protectionist
party to persevere in this struggle, until due Protection is obtained
for all the productive classes of the community. That party has taken
its stand upon a principle so just and so true, that, sooner or later,
despite every effort on the part of its opponents--every shortcoming on
the part of its advocates--it must be triumphant; for the cause is that
of the whole industrious population of Britain, not of a section or a
class.
Mr Disraeli proposes to equalise the burdens upon land. Let us suppose
him successful; and, according to his own showing, £6,000,000 of
taxation, or rather of local rates, should be removed from the land and
levied elsewhere. We do not doubt the accuracy of his calculation: we
believe it to be strictly correct. But, were that grievance remedied,
would the case be materially altered? We are given to understand that
£90,000,000 is the amount of the annual depreciation of agricultural
produce which has taken place since the Corn Laws were repealed. That
calculation was made nearly two years ago, and since then prices have
considerably fallen. Would the farmers accept such share of this
£6,000,000 as might fall to their lot as a compensation for their
losses? The idea is preposterous. We are well aware that Mr. Disraeli
has never said this; but does he not see that, in bringing forward this
subject in any shape approaching to, or appearing to be, a compromise,
he incurs the danger of sacrificing the support, and alienating the
interest of the most important, honest, and honourable body of men
that exist within the British dominions? The farmers will not stand
finessing. They neither comprehend circuitous _coups d'etat_, nor
will they follow those who attempt them. The plain English sense is
hostile to such manoeuvres. They are ready to follow any one in whose
capacity and judgment they can place reliance, so long as he pursues
a clear and open course; but the moment that his tactics are veiled,
uncertain, or unintelligible, they lose confidence in his guidance.
That we believe to be, at all times, the tendency of the English
character. Late events have engendered, not without great reason, much
suspicion of the sincerity of public men, whatever be their party or
denomination, and therefore it is the more needful that, wherever a
principle is involved, no step whatever should be taken which may
lead to the remotest suspicion that such principle is about to be
compromised. We believe most firmly, most sincerely, that any idea of
such compromise never entered into the mind of Mr Disraeli, or any
other of the gentlemen whose speeches have been made the subject of
joyous comment by the Free-Traders. We are satisfied that the line of
action they have announced is, in itself, honourable and praiseworthy;
but we regret that they have not made it distinctly and unequivocally
subordinate to the grand cause in which every man in this country, who
lives by his labour, physical or intellectual, is concerned.
We have long regarded with much anxiety the position of the farmers
of England. Viewed as a body, they form the great conservative
nucleus of the country; and it is to their hatred of innovation,
sound constitutional feeling, and determined loyalty, that we owe our
immunity from those democratic convulsions which have taken place in
almost every other part of Europe. To subject such a class of men as
this to gross and cruel injustice--to persevere in a policy which is
reducing them to ruin, after its effects have been made evident--to
insult them by the mock language of sympathy, whilst denying them
an effectual remedy--these are acts of infatuation which were never
committed by any British Ministry save that under Lord John Russell,
or approved of by any House of Commons save that which is presently
in existence. Of the patience which the farmers have exhibited under
such trying circumstances, we cannot speak in terms of sufficient
admiration. But all endurance has its limit. The farmers were content
to wait so long as there was a reasonable prospect of a change of
that policy which was gradually bringing them to ruin, and long
abstained from joining in any agitation for purposes which, though
they might have had the effect of alleviating their condition, were
fraught with danger to the commercial credit of the country, and in
some respects to the stability of its institutions. But now, finding
that both Government and Parliament are obstinately deaf to their
representations, and dogged in their refusal of redress--meeting with
far less support than they were entitled to expect on the part of many
of the landlords--embarrassed and confused by the tactics announced by
some of their supporters in Parliament --they have combined for their
own defence, and are instituting a movement which may hereafter have a
most important effect upon the credit and the destinies of the kingdom.
Are they to be blamed for this? It would be difficult so to blame
them. Rather let the blame rest with those whose obstinacy, ignorance,
selfishness, or pride has driven them to this position, and compelled
the farmer to seek from extravagant and impracticable schemes, and
from clamorous agitation, that relief which was denied him as a sound
supporter of the Constitution.
The nature and objects of the Agricultural Relief Associations may be
gathered from the report of the Suffolk meeting, lately held at Bury
St. Edmunds. The assumption of all the speakers was, that Protection
cannot be expected either from the present or the future Parliament.
"Politicians," said one gentleman, "were every day shifting
their ground. Men who a few short months ago threatened to
assume the reins of Government, with the express design of
reversing the policy of the last few years, were now faltering
in their purpose, and confessing both their inability and
unwillingness to effect these changes."
Another spoke as follows:--
"It was generally known, that while the farmers were asleep the
Free-Trade policy came into operation. This at once cut off not
less than 20 per cent of the capital employed in farming. This
blow the farmers felt very keenly. They at once began to open
their eyes, unstop their ears, and to unloose their tongues.
They earnestly inquired what steps should be taken by them in
the new circumstances under which they were placed. They heard
various voices in reply, but the loudest and most powerful of
these assured them that they would go back to Protection, and
that by next Session too. Next Session passed, however, without
exhibiting the least prospect of that result, and they had been
going on, Session after Session, until the present moment, when
they seemed farther from Protection than ever. Others told
them to lay out all their capital on land, and they would be
sure to get remuneration. They had done that too, and their
capital was gone without any prospect of remuneration."
Another gentleman, hitherto known as a staunch Protectionist, thus
announced his reasons for joining the movement:--
"The fact was, that when he found members of the House of
Commons, who had been returned to Parliament for the express
purpose of supporting Protection, saying, behind the scenes,
that it was impossible to expect Protection back again; and
when he found members of the House of Peers telling him that
if they stood out for Protection it would cost them their
coronets, he was forced to come to the conclusion that the
voice of the people had doomed these laws. He then began to
ask himself this plain and simple question--if they give the
country cheap corn, _won't they give us cheap taxation_? He was
willing to grow corn against any man, come from where he might;
but, at the same time, he must have a fair field to do it in."
Here are the views of the society as contained in the chairman's
summary:--
"When their agricultural distress had been relieved by the
repeal of the malt-tax, by the permanent fixation of tithe
on an equitable basis, by the extinction of church-rates, by
a revision of the county expenditure, the abolition of the
game-laws, the removal of all restrictions on the cultivation
of land, a change in the law of distress, the rights of
the tenant-farmers recognised, the abominable abuses of
the poor-law corrected, and when the bulk of taxation was
shifted from the shoulders of the productive to those of the
unproductive classes--from industry upon wealth--then might
they hope that honesty, industry, and perseverance would meet
their due reward."
We do not make these quotations with any intention of criticising the
opinions expressed. We simply lay them before our readers as a specimen
of that spirit which is now possessing the farmers--a spirit engendered
by wrong, and strengthened by the suffering of years. If anything could
make us believe that coronets are in danger of falling, it is the
expression of such views on the part of men who hitherto have been the
best defenders of the Constitution, and the most averse to yield to
any of the impulses of change. But, as we have already said, we cannot
blame the speakers. If they are convinced in their own minds that a
return to Protection is impossible, their condition is such that they
must necessarily have recourse to any expedient, however desperate,
which can afford them the prospect of relief. We have long foreseen
this crisis. Situated as Great Britain is, the choice lies simply
between a return to Protection to Labour, and an assault on the public
burdens. There is no other alternative. Cheapness may be established as
the rule, but cheapness cannot co-exist with heavy taxation. To hope
that the burden can be shifted from one shoulder to another is clearly
an absurdity. If it is to be sustained, the productive classes must
have the means of sustaining it. If those means are denied them, the
burden is altogether intolerable.
It is not a little instructive to remark that, even now, the supporters
of Free Trade are compelled to stop and leave their scheme unfinished.
They cannot carry it out in its integrity without ruining the finances
of the country. They have exposed the farmer to unlimited competition
in produce, but they still continue to restrict the sphere of his
industry and production. The malt-tax is a heavy burden upon him,
and he is specially prohibited from growing tobacco, or engaging
in the manufacture of beetroot sugar. These restrictions, say the
Free-Traders, are absolutely necessary for revenue. Granted; but if you
put on restrictions, are you not bound to give an equivalent? As for
the argument in favour of the malt-tax, that it is the consumer who
really pays the duty, that might be extended with equal justice to the
instance of raw cotton. Why is barley, the produce of our own country,
to be taxed, and cotton, the produce of a foreign country, to be
exempted? Besides this, we have always understood that beer, tobacco,
and sugar, are articles which enter largely into the consumption of
the agricultural as well as that of other classes; so that here is a
grievance totally opposed to the principles of Free Trade, and yet
supported and perpetuated by the very men who have adopted Free Trade
as their motto! We instance these things as proofs that Free Trade
never can be made, in the strict sense of the word, the law and system
of the land, so long as the present enormous expenditure is continued;
and in saying this, we hope it will be understood that we are as much
opposed as ever to the views of the party who are for cutting down our
national establishments.
We anticipate, in the course of next Session, to hear many propositions
made on the subject of adjustment of taxation. Each class is anxious
to be freed from its own peculiar burdens, and to devolve them upon
others; and certainly never was there any case so strong or so urgent
as that which can be brought forward on the part of the agriculturists.
But who is to relieve them? Will any other class submit to the
transference which is necessarily implied? Will the manufacturers or
the capitalists undertake to provide for the six millions which at
present they are most unjustly wresting from the owners and occupiers
of the soil? Here is the real difficulty. Justice, we know, is not
regarded as an indispensable element of taxation: if it were so, the
income-tax would never have been imposed in its present form. If the
claims of the farmers who are banded together for agricultural relief
were granted, immediate national bankruptcy would be the result. This
is the grand dilemma in which we are placed by the Free-Traders.
Either a gross and palpable act of injustice and oppression must
be perpetuated--so long at least as the victims have the means of
payment--or, as was long ago prophesied, the capitalists and the
fundholders must suffer. The truth is, that the productive power of the
country cannot meet the demands upon it in the shape of taxation if it
remains exposed to unlimited foreign competition.
In order properly to comprehend this point, which is one of the utmost
importance, it is necessary to discard theory altogether, and to adopt
history as our guide. The financial system of Great Britain, acting
upon and influencing the commercial arrangements and social relations
of the country, is not difficult of comprehension if we trace it
step by step; and without a due understanding of this, and the vast
influence which monetary laws exercise over the wellbeing and progress
of a nation, it is impossible for any one to form a sound judgment on
the conflicting principles of Protection and Free Trade, or to discover
the true and only source of the difficulties which now surround us.
It is the misfortune of the present age that so little attention
is paid to the abstruser portions of history, which, in reality,
are the most valuable for us. Wars of succession or conquest, naval
engagements, records of intrigue or details of diplomatic dexterity,
have a peculiar charm and interest for readers of every kind; but few
take the pains to go more deeply into the subject, and investigate in
what manner such events have affected the resources of a country, and
whether, by diminishing its wealth or by stimulating the energies of
its population, they have lowered or raised its position in the scale
of nations. That portion of history which relates to external events is
worthless for practical purposes, unless we combine with it the study
of that portion which relates to its finance. Under the modern system,
now universal throughout Europe, which leaves the debts and engagements
of former generations to be liquidated or provided for by the next,
no man can be called a statesman or politician who has not addicted
himself to these studies.
The Funding System, as is well know, began with the Revolution, and
has continued up to the present hour. It was strenuously opposed and
vigorously assailed by some of the most able and clear-sighted in the
country, such as Bolingbroke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, who from time
to time pointed out the consequences which must ultimately ensue from
this method of mortgaging posterity, more especially if the burden
were allowed to increase without any steps being taken to provide
for its ultimate extinguishment. It is the peculiarity of a debt so
constituted, that for a time it gives great additional stimulus to
the energies of a country. It enables it to prosecute conquests, and
to undertake designs, which it could not otherwise have achieved; and
it is not until long afterwards, when the payment of the interest or
annual charge becomes a severe burden upon a generation which had no
share in contracting the debt, that the mischievous effects of the
system become apparent. At the outbreak of the French Revolution, the
public debt of Great Britain amounted to £261,735,059, and the annual
charge was £9,471,675. A very large portion of this debt was incurred
for the war waged with our American colonies.
At that time the currency of the country was placed on the metallic
basis, but the great drain of the precious metals occasioned by the
enormous subsidies which Great Britain furnished to her allies on the
Continent, to engage their support against the revolutionary armies
of France, reduced the nation to the very verge of bankruptcy, and
necessitated in 1797 the suspension of cash payments. The immediate
effect of this step upon the finances of the country has been so
justly, and at the same time so clearly, stated by Mr Alison in his
_History of Europe_, and the consequences of the subsequent return to
the old system of cash payments, after their suspension for nearly
a quarter of a century, are so graphically depicted, that we cannot
do better than entreat the attention of the reader to the following
extract:--
"This measure having been carried by Mr Pitt, a committee
was appointed, which reported shortly after that the funds
of the Bank were £17,597,000, while its debts were only
£13,770,000, leaving a balance of £3,800,000 in favour of
the establishment; but that it was necessary, for a limited
time, to suspend the cash payments. Upon this, a bill for
the restriction of payments in specie was introduced, which
provided that bank-notes should be received as a legal tender
by the collectors of taxes, and have the effect of stopping the
issuing of arrest on mesne process for payment of debt between
man and man. The bill was limited in its operation to the 24th
June; but it was afterwards renewed from time to time, and in
November 1797 continued till the conclusion of a general peace;
and the obligation on the Bank to pay in specie was never again
imposed till Sir Robert Peel's Act in 1819.
"Such was the commencement of the paper system in Great
Britain, which ultimately produced such astonishing effects;
which enabled the empire to carry on for so long a period so
costly a war, and to maintain for years armaments greater than
had been raised by the Roman people in the zenith of their
power; which brought the struggle at length to a triumphant
issue, and arrayed all the forces of Eastern Europe in English
pay, against France on the banks of the Rhine. To the same
system must be ascribed ultimate effects as disastrous, as
the immediate were beneficial and glorious; the continued
and progressive rise of rents, the unceasing, and to many
calamitous, fall in the value of money during the whole course
of the war; increased expenditure, the growth of sanguine ideas
and extravagant habits in all classes of society; unbounded
speculation, prodigious profits and frequent disasters among
the commercial rich; increased wages, general prosperity, and
occasional depression among the labouring poor. But these
effects, which ensued during the war, were as nothing compared
to those which have, since the peace, resulted from the return
to cash payments by the bill of 1819. Perhaps no single measure
ever produced so calamitous an effect as that has done. It has
added at least a third to the National Debt, and augmented in a
similar proportion all private debt in the country, and at the
same time occasioned such a fall of prices by the contraction
of the currency as has destroyed the sinking fund, rendered
great part of the indirect taxes unproductive, and compelled
in the end a return to direct taxation in a time of general
peace. Thence has arisen a vacillation of prices unparalleled
in any age of the world; a creation of property in some and
destruction of it in others, which equalled, in its ultimate
consequences, all but the disasters of a revolution."[7]
[7] ALISON'S _History of Europe_, chap. xxii.
The immediate effect of the suspension of cash payments on the part of
the State bank was an enormous increase in the circulation of paper.
The prices of commodities rose to nearly double their previous value,
and a period of prosperity commenced, at least for one generation.
During the twenty-two years which elapsed from the suspension of cash
payments in 1797 down to 1819, when their resumption was provided
for by Act of Parliament, or at least during eighteen years of that
period, reckoning down to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the
career of England has no parallel in the annals of the world. The vast
improvements and discoveries in machinery which were made towards the
latter end of the century--the inventions of Hargreaves, Arkwright,
Cartwright, Crompton, and Watt, came into play with astounding effect
at a time when Great Britain held the mastery of the seas, and could
divert the supplies of raw material from all other shores except
her own. During the hottest period of the war, and in spite of all
prohibitions, England manufactured for the Continent. Capital, or that
which passed for capital, was plentiful; credit was easy, and profits
were enormous. Some idea of the rapidity with which our manufactures
progressed may be drawn from the fact that, whereas in 1785 the
quantity of cotton wrought up was only 17,992,882 lbs., in 1810 it had
increased to 123,701,826. Under this stimulus the population augmented
greatly. The rise in the value of commodities gave that impulse to
agriculture by means of which tracts of moorland have been converted
into smiling harvest-fields, fens drained, commons enclosed, and huge
tracts reclaimed from the sea. The average price of wheat in 1792, was
42s. 11d.; in 1810, it was 106s. 2d. per quarter. Wages rose, though
not in the same proportion, and employment was abundant.
In short, the paper age, while it lasted, transcended, in so far as
Britain was concerned, the dreams of a golden era. Those who suffered
from the suspension of cash payments were the _original_ fundholders,
annuitants, and such landlords as had previously let their properties
upon long leases. But the distress of such parties was little heard,
and less heeded, amid the hum of the multitudes who were profiting
by the change. The creditor might be injured, but the debtor was
largely benefited. One immediate effect of this rise in prices was, a
corresponding rise in fixed salaries and the expenses of government.
Hence, the domestic expenditure of the country was greatly increased;
new taxes were levied, and the permanent burden of the National
Debt augmented to an amount which, sixty years ago, would have been
reckoned entirely fabulous. As a specimen of the increased expense
of cultivating arable land, it may here be worth while to insert the
following comparative table, calculated by Mr Arthur Young, and laid
before a committee of the House of Lords. The extent is one hundred
acres:--
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE EXPENSES OF ARABLE LAND.
| | 1790. | 1803. | 1813. |
| +---------------+---------------+---------------+
|Rent, | £88 6 3-1/4 |£121 2 7-1/4 |£161 12 7-1/4 |
|Tithe, | 20 14 1-3/4 | 26 8 0-1/4 | 38 17 3-1/4 |
|Rates, | 17 13 10 | 31 7 7-3/4 | 38 19 2-3/4 |
|Wear and tear, | 15 13 5-1/4 | 22 14 10-1/4 | 31 2 10-3/4 |
|Labour, | 85 5 4 | 118 0 4 | 161 12 11-1/4 |
|Seed, | 46 4 10-1/4 | 49 2 7 | 98 17 10 |
|Manure, | 48 0 3 | 68 6 2 | 37 7 0-1/4 |
|Team, | 67 4 10 | 80 8 0-1/4 | 134 19 8-1/2 |
|Interest, | 22 11 11-1/2 | 30 3 8-1/2 | 50 5 6 |
|Taxes, | 0 0 0 | 0 0 0 | 18 1 4 |
| +---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Total, |£411 15 11-3/4 |£547 10 11-1/2 |£771 16 4-1/2 |
| Deduct rent, | 88 6 3-1/4 | 121 2 7-1/4 | 161 12 7-1/4 |
| +---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Nett expenses, |£323 9 8-1/2 |£426 8 4-1/2 |£610 3 9-1/4 |
| +---------------+---------------+---------------+
|Price of wheat | | | |
| per quarter, | 46s. | 56s. 9d. | 108s. 9d. |
So long as the war lasted, the import of corn from abroad into this
country was insignificant in amount. In 1814 the amount of wheat
and wheat flour brought in amounted to only 681,333 quarters, being
considerably above the average of years since the commencement of the
century. In fact, Britain was then self-supporting. In time of war
it is plain that, from our insular position, we cannot trust to any
supplies beyond those which are raised at home, and there cannot be any
doubt of the capability of the land to support a much larger population
than that which presently exists. To those who glance superficially
at the above table, the price of wheat in the year 1813 will appear
monstrous, even when the great increase in the cost of cultivation is
taken into account. This is the error, and it is a gross one, which has
been studiously perpetuated by our statists, and even by some eminent
writers on political economy. True, the price of wheat was then 108s.
9d., _but it was estimated in a depreciated currency_. Owing to various
causes which it would be tedious to explain, the apparent difference
between the value of the pound note and the guinea was far slighter
than might have been expected, not amounting to more than seven or
eight shillings, and actual depreciation, by sale of the notes for
less than their nominal value, was by statute made penal. The price
of gold and silver bullion never rose to an extent commensurate with
the depreciation of the paper: in fact the coinage, as must be in the
recollection of many, almost entirely disappeared, and was replaced
by tokens of little intrinsic value, which served as the medium of
interchange. In this depreciated and fluctuating currency commodities
were valued, and by far the greater part of our National Debt was
contracted. The paper pound in 1813 was probably, we may almost say
certainly, not worth more than 10s. of metallic currency. In this view
the quarter, estimated according to the present standard, was sold
for 54s. 4-1/2d--a price which modern statesmen allow to be barely
remunerative.
If this point were generally understood, a vast amount of delusion
which possesses the public mind would be dispelled. The relative value
of money to commodities has been as entirely changed, by the return
to cash payments, as if shillings had been substituted for sixpences.
If the creditor suffered in 1797, the debtor has suffered far more
severely in consequence of the Act of 1819, as we shall immediately
proceed to show. Meantime, we shall entreat the reader to keep in mind
that all incomes and expenditure, public or private, during the war and
the suspension of cash payments, are to be estimated not by our present
metallic standard, but by the fluctuating value of a depreciated
currency.
When peace was established the ports were opened. Then it became
evident that foreign importations, if permitted, would at once and for
ever extinguish the landed interest. The annual charge of the debt
alone was, in 1816, the first year of peace, £32,938,751; and the
current annual expenditure £32,231,020--in all, _upwards of sixty-five
millions_. Had, therefore, the price of wheat in Britain been suddenly
reduced to the Continental level, as would have been the case but for
the imposition of the Corn Laws, the national bankruptcy would have
been immediate. No argument is required to prove this and it has often
struck us as singular that this crisis--for such it was--has been so
seldom referred to, especially in later discussions. We are not now
defending the original suspension of cash payments--a measure which,
nevertheless, seems to us to have been dictated by the strongest
political necessity, however baneful its results may prove to the
present and future generations. We simply say, that eighteen years'
operation of that system, with the enormous expenditure and liabilities
which it entailed, rendered Protection necessary the moment importation
was threatened, to save the country from immediate bankruptcy following
on its unparalleled efforts.
It is utter folly, and worse, to say, as political economists now
contend, and as ignorant demagogues aver, that the Corn Laws were
originally proposed solely for the benefit of the landlords. Without
the imposition of such laws, the whole financial system of Great
Britain must instantly have disappeared. The amount of taxes which
were required--first, to pay the interest of the National Debt, and,
secondly, to meet the expenses of Government, (greatly increased by
the change in the monetary laws effected in 1797)--rendered Protection
to labour and to native produce absolutely indispensable. How could
it be otherwise? Had wheat been sold in the British market at 46s.,
or even 50s., from what sources could the revenue have been levied?
Under the new system, the expenses of cultivation had nearly doubled
in twenty-three years--could the produce be put back to the same rates
as before? So long as the monetary system then established did exist,
that was clearly impossible. Protection was imperatively demanded, not
by any class of the community, but by the state. To refuse it would
have been national suicide. And so it was carried, doubtless very
much against the inclination of the populace, who naturally enough
expected that the return of peace would bring with it some substantial
advantages in the shape of cheapness, and were proportionally
disappointed when they discovered that the whole rent-charge of the
wars, which had been so long maintained, must be liquidated before they
could taste the anticipated blessings of the cheap loaf.
The return to cash payments, effected by the Act of 1819, is by far
the most important event in our history since the change of dynasty.
We believe that the late Sir Robert Peel, then a very young man, who
was made the mouthpiece of a particular party on that occasion, really
did not understand, to its full extent, the tremendous responsibility
which he incurred. He acted simply as the exponent of the measure,
at the instigation and by the direction of Mr Ricardo, who, under
the guise of a political economist, concealed the crafty and selfish
motives of the race from which he originally sprung. Ricardo was
at that time considered a grand authority on matters of finance,
his field of preparatory study having been the Stock Exchange, on
which he is understood to have realised a large fortune. All his
prepossessions, therefore, were in favour of the capitalists; and
it is not uncharitable to conclude that his private interests lay
in the same direction. That act provided for the gradual resumption
of cash payments throughout England, to be consummated in 1823, for
the establishment of a fixed gold standard, and for the withdrawal
of all bank-notes under the amount of five pounds. Had this act been
carried into effect in all its integrity, general bankruptcy must have
immediately ensued, from the absorption of the circulating medium.
The existence of the small notes, however, was respited, and this
enabled the country bankers to go on for some time without a crash.
Still the violent contraction of the currency, so caused, had the
necessary effect of spreading dismay throughout all sections of the
community. The circulation of the Bank of England, at 27th February
1819, was £25,126,700. On the 28th February 1823, it was contracted
to £18,392,240. At the former period its private discounts amounted
to more than nine millions; at the latter, they were considerably
under five. As a matter of course, the country bankers were compelled
to follow the example of the great establishment, and the immediate
results of this grand financial measure may be described in a few
words. The tree was thoroughly shaken. According to Mr Doubleday--
"As the memorable first of May 1823 drew near, the country
bankers, as well as the bank of England, naturally prepared
themselves, by a gradual narrowing of their circulation, for
the dreaded hour of gold and silver payments "on demand," and
the withdrawal of the small notes. We have already seen the
fall of prices produced by this universal narrowing of the
paper circulation. The effects of the distress produced all
over the country--the consequence of this fall--we have yet to
see."
"The distress, ruin, and bankruptcy, which now took place,
were universal; affecting both the great interests of land and
trade; but amongst the landlords, whose estates were burdened
by mortgages, jointures, settlements, legacies, &c., the
effects were most marked, and out of the ordinary course. In
hundreds of cases, from the tremendous reduction in the price
of land which now took place, the estates barely sold for as
much as would pay off the mortgages; and hence the owners were
stripped of all, and made beggars. I was myself personally
acquainted with one of the victims of this terrible measure.
He was a schoolfellow, and inherited a good fortune, made
principally in the West Indies. On coming of age, and settling
with his guardians, he found himself possessed of fully forty
thousand pounds; and with this he resolved to purchase an
estate, to marry, and to settle for life. He was a young
man addicted to no vice; of a fair understanding and a most
excellent heart; and was connected with friends high in rank,
and likely to afford him every proper assistance and advice.
The estate was purchased, I believe, about the year 1812 or
1813, for eighty thousand pounds, one moiety of the purchase
money being borrowed on mortgage of the land bought. In 1822-3
he was compelled to part with the estate, in order to pay off
his mortgage, and some arrears of interest; and when this was
done, he was left without a shilling--the estate bringing only
half of its cost in 1812."[8]
[8] _Financial History of England._ By THOMAS DOUBLEDAY.
But isolated instances, however great may be their interest, will not
adequately exhibit the effects of this measure upon the vital interests
of the country. At least one half of the National Debt was incurred
after the suspension of cash payments, and during the prevalence of
the Paper Currency. The interest of that debt was now, and in all time
coming, to be paid in coin greatly above the value of the currency
in which it was contracted; and the Private Creditor shared in the
advantage which thus was given to the Fund-holder. The taxes were all
to be levied in the same way, the metallic standard being made of
universal application. As a matter of course, prices fell, and fell in
a corresponding ratio.
The great prosperity of England during the war, and the unexampled
development of its resources, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or
commercial may be traced to the combination of at least three causes.
In the first place, England was thoroughly protected. Her artisans and
labourers had nothing to fear from foreign competition. They had the
monopoly of their own home market, and were not liable to be undersold
by the products of other nations. In the second place, we had a most
extensive foreign trade, the real value of which cannot be ascertained
from the official tables, owing to the manner in which that trade
was carried on. But even according to the defective records which we
possess, it appears that our exports in 1805 were equal to those of
1823, many of the intermediate years showing a much larger amount. In
1810, our exports were close upon forty-six millions; in 1832 they were
barely above thirty-six. In the third place, the country possessed a
large circulating medium, which gave ample scope to enterprise. We
shall not enter upon the vexed question of systems of currency in the
abstract; it is enough for us to know that for more than twenty years
British prosperity went on without a check, until it was strangled
by the bullionists. At present, we have neither Protection, nor
an Expanded Currency. Our foreign trade, in so far as exports are
concerned, is nominally large; but those who are best qualified to
judge of the value of that trade, declare that it is unremunerative.
We are therefore very much at a loss to know what element of prosperity
exists at the present time. We have every faith in British energy if
it is allowed fair play, but that is precisely what we contend is not
vouchsafed to it. Our whole legislation, under the guidance of the
political economists, may be characterised as a systematic attempt
to depress British industry. This could not have been effected at
once, or by one isolated effort: several attacks upon the productive
classes were required before this was consummated. The change of
currency lowered the value of produce, and increased the burden of
taxation. In other words, it brought down both prices and wages, to the
manifest gain of the capitalist. Then came the gradual relaxation of
the tariff, which has resulted in free importation--a measure by which
all the working-classes, without any exception, are assailed. This
was effected with a perseverance and ingenuity which we cannot help
admiring, even when we denounce it as diabolical. The first advances
to Free Trade were no more remarked by the public in general than the
footmarks of the tiger in the jungle when he advances stealthily on his
prey. The real instigators were the exporting manufacturers. After the
return of peace, they saw clearly enough that their old monopoly was
at an end. Cobbett wrote, very shrewdly, though in his own peculiar
manner, in 1815:--
"It is now hoped by some persons that the restoration of the
Pope, the Inquisition, the Jesuits, and the Bourbons, will so
far brutalise the people of the Continent of Europe that we
shall have no rivals in the arts of peace; and that thus we
shall be left to enjoy a monopoly of navigation, commerce,
and manufactures; and be thereby enabled to pay the interest
on our debt, and to meet the enormous annual expenses of our
government. Without stopping to comment on the morality and
humanity of this hope, entertained in a country abounding with
Bible Societies, I venture to give it as my decided opinion,
that the hope is fallacious. Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Holland,
Austria, Spain, the Italian States, and even the Bourbons, will
all push forward for their share of the benefits of the arts
of peace. While our purse is open to them all, they will be
subservient to us; but that cannot be for ever."
The old sergeant was perfectly right--with the return of peace our
monopoly of the foreign market was over; but the question still
remained, whether, by the sacrifice of home labour, our exporting
manufacturers might not be able, for a considerable period at least, to
keep ahead of their new rivals in distant markets. Unfortunately for us
all, the political economists determined to make the attempt.
In some important branches of manufacture Britain was still unrivalled.
The nearest, readiest, and therefore most lucrative market for these
was to be found in Europe, and in consequence, it was deemed necessary
that concessions should be made to admit some kinds of produce as
imports, by way of inducing the foreigners to concede a free admission
to our exports. There is a scene in Shakspeare's play of _Julius
Cæsar_, in which Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus are represented, seated
at a table, conceding amicably the deaths of the near relations
of each, in exchange for a similar surrender. This is not quite a
parallel to the case before us. Our statesmen doomed their friends
and fellow-countrymen without requiring a reciprocal sacrifice, and
the consequence was that we gradually opened our home market to the
foreigner, without insisting that he should render to us the same
measure of justice. The artisans were the first to feel the blow. They
had already suffered, most severely, from the change in the currency,
which brought down prices, and, with them, the remuneration of labour;
and the withdrawal of Protection from them made them the natural
enemies of all those who were still shielded from foreign competition.
The feeling was perfectly natural. The system begun by Huskisson, and
consummated by Peel, could have no other effect than in arming one
class of the community against the other. Deprive John forcibly of his
coat, under the pretext of justice, and he will immediately insist that
the same measure of deprivation shall be extended to James. He has a
converse of a Christian rule to utter in his defence--"Why should not
others be done to, precisely as I have been done by?"
This argument, in the hands of its able advocates, has proved
irresistible. John and James are alike without coats; and until they
agree with one another, and come to a common understanding, there is
not much likelihood of their resumption of their necessary wear. It
never has been, and never can be, for the interest of the producer
that prices should be generally low. Very great nonsense has of late
years been talked by public men, and, amongst others, by members of
the present cabinet, regarding the "natural price" of corn. They seem
to think that they have stumbled upon a happy phrase, and claim credit
to themselves for patriotism in resisting all attempts to make the
bread of the people dearer. But they do not, or will not, see that
the great body of the people are interested in this question, not as
consumers, but as producers. The vast majority of the population of
these islands have hitherto derived their means of subsistence, not
from manufactures, but from the soil. Manufactures do not in reality
constitute more than one-fourth part of the annual creation of our
wealth; and two-thirds at least of all our manufactures are intended
for the home market, and will be profitable or not according to the
circumstances of the general body of consumers. Now, the natural price
of corn depends upon the circumstances of the country in which it is
produced. It may be ten shillings in Poland: it may be sixty shillings
in England. No doubt you can get corn, and are getting it, from Poland
far cheaper than you can raise it in England--but at what cost? Why,
at the sacrifice of that enormous capital which has been sunk in the
cultivation of the land, and of nearly one-half of the annual creation
of our wealth!
The average price of wheat, for a number of years preceding 1790, was
46s. per quarter. It is so stated in Mr Arthur Young's table, which
we have given above, and may be taken as the average of thirty years.
The average for 1790 was considerably higher, for we observe that Mr
Porter states it at 53s. 2d. Now, since that period, both the amount
of our debt and of our current annual public expenditure has been
tripled--that is, we have three times as much to pay in the shape of
taxation as formerly. This is independent of poor-rates and local
taxation, which have also greatly increased. That being the case, we
ask how it is possible that corn can be grown now in Britain at a
profit, when the ruling price, owing to importations from abroad, is
_eight shillings per quarter_ lower than it was on an average of years
preceding 1790? The absurdity is palpable.
How, then, are the taxes to be paid? That is the question. Not out of
the profits of the foreign trade certainly, for the whole value of
our exports is not much above the amount of the national expenditure,
and when we add the local taxes, would not reach one-half of the
requisite sum. Besides, at the present moment, the exports are not
nearly balancing the imports. According to the official tables, the
declared value of the exports for the year ending 5th January 1850,
was £63,596,025; the official value of the imports for the same period
was £105,874,607. We presume it will be admitted that taxes can only
be permanently paid out of profits, and we want to know where these
profits are? It is perfectly evident that the cultivation of the land
cannot be carried on for ever at a loss. Sooner or later both capital
and credit must be exhausted; soils of an inferior description--indeed
all except the best land in the neighbourhood of towns--must be
abandoned and withdrawn from tillage, and the working-classes will find
themselves utterly unable to meet the demands of taxation. An immense
portion of our taxation is, and must be, drawn from the labouring men.
They contribute largely to our revenue through the customs and excise,
and the extent of their consumption depends entirely upon the amount
of the wages which they receive. Any measure which tends to lessen
the sphere of production is a direct blow at their interests. Cheap
bread is just another word for low wages, as already many of them have
discovered to their cost; and we have now arrived at that stage of the
experiment when its effects will be rapidly developed.
Mr Porter, whose brains are principally valuable in the preparation of
cumbrous statistics, breaks out, for once in a way, into a fine burst
of eloquence on the subject of over-population. Let us hear him in his
animated mood:--
"Whence arises this fear--this childish fear of the increase of our
numbers?--childish, because it exists without regard to the lessons
of experience. What evidence is there in our present condition to
justify the complaint of 'surplus population,' that did not exist in
as great, or even in a greater degree of force, when our numbers had
not reached one-half their present amount? Why, then, shall we not go
forward to double, and again to double our population in safety, and
even to advantage, if, instead of rearing millions of human _clods_,
whose lives are passed in consuming the scanty supplies which is all
that their task of intelligence enables them to produce, the universal
people shall have their minds cultivated to a degree that will enable
each to add his proportion to the general store?"[9]
[9] PORTER'S _Progress of the Nation_, p. 692.
Good lack, Mr Porter, there was no occasion at all for your putting
yourself into such an inconvenient heat! Nobody, so far as we know,
is making any complaint of surplus population. You and your friends
have taken effectual measures to prevent such a state of matters, and
we may now rest without any apprehension of a visit from the ghost
of Malthus. The "universal people" alluded to in your last brilliant
though somewhat unintelligible sentence, are likely to follow your
advice, and abstain from "rearing millions of human clods," at least
upon British soil. Be satisfied--you have done for the clods. Ireland
is a noble example of your trophies in that way; and if you want to
glorify yourself on another, you may refer to the Scottish Highlands.
The true way to provide against the evils of over-population is to
lower the value of produce, which is the condition of labour, below the
remunerative point. Do that, and you may make a wilderness out of the
most fertile region of the earth. But then, Mr Porter, did you never
ask yourself what is to become of those who derive their subsistence
and incomes from the labour of these self-same clods? A good many of
us, we suspect, are in that condition, and very melancholy indeed would
be our countenances if called upon to assist at the funeral of the last
of that race. "Meddle not," said the Giant, in the German fable, to his
child, who had picked up a peasant as a plaything--"meddle not with the
husbandman! But for him, what would become of us Giants?" It would be
well if you and your political allies had the intelligence to apprehend
the moral.
The _Times_, in a late number, has treated the subject of emigration
in a lively manner. The depopulation which has taken place since Free
Trade became the law of the land, is too startling a fact to be passed
over without notice; and it is thus that the leading journal speculates
on the strange phenomenon. The announcement in the opening sentence may
puzzle, if not alarm, some of the most zealous advocates of foreign
production:--
"The stream of emigration now set towards America will not stop till
Ireland is absolutely depopulated; and the only question is, when will
that be? Twenty years at the present rate would take away the whole
of the industrious classes, leaving only the proprietors and their
families, members of the learned professions, and those whose age or
infirmities keep them at home. Twenty years are but a short time in
treating great social or political questions. It is more than twenty
years since the passing of the Emancipation Act and the introduction
of the Reform Bill. What if it should really come to pass that before
another twenty years the whole Celtic race shall have disappeared from
these isles, and the problem of seven centuries received its solution?
We dwell in wonderful times, in an age of great discoveries, splendid
improvements, and grand consummations. Art has always been found the
handmaid of human developments. The discovery of gunpowder put an end
to the little wars and little states of the middle ages, and introduced
larger political manipulations. The discovery of printing prepared for
the revival of learning and arts, and paved the way to the Reformation.
The discovery of the mariner's compass showed our navigators a path
to the East Indies and the New World. It may be the first mission of
railways to set all the populations of the Old World on the move, and
send them in quest of independent and comfortable homes.
And when will this movement stop? Incuriousness and prejudice are ready
with the reply, that it will stop, at all events, when the Celtic race
is exhausted. The Englishman, we are assured, is too attached to his
country, and too comfortable at home, to cross the Atlantic. But surely
it is very premature to name any such period for this movement, or to
say beforehand what English labourers will do, when seven or eight
millions of Irish have led the way to comfort and independence. The
Englishman is now attached to his own home, because he knows of no
other. His ideas of other regions are dark and dismal. He trembles at
the thought of having to grope his way through the Cimmerian obscurity
of another hemisphere. The single fact that he will have no 'parish'
in America is, in his mind, a fatal bar to locomotion. But all this is
quickly passing away. Geography, union workhouses, ocean mails, and the
daily sight of letters arriving in ten days from prosperous emigrants,
are fast uprooting the British rustic from the soil, and giving him
cosmopolitan ideas. In a very few years the question uppermost in his
mind will be whether he will be better off here or there? Whether he
should go with the young and enterprising, or stay at home with the
old and stupid? If a quarter of a million British subjects have left
this country for the Australian colonies in the present generation,
there may easily be a much larger movement to a nearer and more wealthy
region. It has been imagined, indeed, that such a migration will have
a natural tendency to stop itself at a certain stage. We are told that
the English labourer will find a new field in Ireland, deserted by
the Celt. It will, however, cost no more effort of mind to cross the
ocean at once than to cross the Irish Channel for a land which, in the
English mind, must ever be associated with violence and blood. High
wages, again, we are told, the enjoyment of a liberal government, and
an improved condition, will bind the Englishman afresh to the soil of
his ancestors. But when you make the English labourer richer, more
independent, more intelligent, and more of a citizen, you have put him
more in a condition and temper to seek his fortune, wherever it may
be found. The men who in the United States leave their homes for the
Far West are generally they who have prospered where they are, and who
want the excitement of another start in life. On the whole, we are
disposed to think that the prospect is far too serious to be neglected,
or treated as a merely speculative question. The depopulation of these
isles, supposing the Celtic exodus to run out its course, and a British
exodus to follow, constitute about as serious a political event as
can be conceived; for a change of dynasty, or any other political
revolution, is nothing compared with a change in the people themselves.
All the departments of industry--the army, the navy, the cultivation
of the fields, the rent of landed property, the profit of trades, the
payment of rates and taxes--depend on the people, and without the
people there must ensue a general collapse of all our institutions.
We are, however, rather desirous to recommend the question to the
consideration of others, and especially of our statesmen, than to
answer it ourselves."
Is it only _now_ that this question is submitted to the consideration
of our statesmen? Why, if they are statesmen at all, they must have
thought and dreamed of little else for the last few years. The picture
here presented, though a frightful one, is by no means new. It has been
drawn over and over again by the advocates of the protective policy,
and as regularly ridiculed by the Free-Traders as a suggestion of a
diseased imagination. Now, the facts have emerged, the prophecy has
proved strictly true, and we are asked to consider about a remedy! What
remedy is there open to us, save one? Let labour be made remunerative
at home, which can only be done by Protection, and we shall answer for
it that the tide of emigration will be stayed. People do not leave
their country and their homes, at least in numbers like this, except
under the coercion of the most stringent necessity. Give an Englishman
work to do, and wages to live by, and he will rather remain here than
attempt to better his condition in a foreign soil. But in order that
he may remain here, his labour must be protected. Very truly says the
writer in the _Times_, that "all the departments of industry, the army,
the navy, the cultivation of the fields, the rent of landed property,
the profit of trades, the payment of rates and taxes, depend on the
people; and without the people, there must ensue a general collapse of
all our institutions." To every word of this we adhere. But unless we
can suppose that the people will submit to the degraded position of the
foreign serfs, with whose produce they are now called upon to compete,
Britain cannot hope to retain anything like its present population. The
exodus must go on, and every vestige of our former greatness disappear.
Unprotected labour and high taxation cannot exist together. Prolong the
struggle as we may, the experience of each succeeding month will show
the impossibility of such a reconciliation.
We are curious to know if, with such facts before them as those
admitted in the _Times_, Ministers will have the temerity next year to
assure us that the country generally is in prosperous circumstances. Do
men emigrate wholesale from prosperous countries? Are they ever ready
to leave comfort behind them, and recommence the struggle of life on
a more unpromising field? If we are forced to reject that conclusion,
then we defy any one to arrive at another save this--that our recent
legislation has so narrowed the sphere of labour, and so depressed its
prospects, that the population are driven per force from their native
country, to seek elsewhere the means of existence which they cannot
procure at home.
To talk of Protection as hopeless, is to acquiesce in the national
doom. All classes of the community, from the fundholder and capitalist
down to the meanest labourer, have a stake in this great question. Let
not the former deceive themselves. Without the labour of the people
their securities are as valueless as the mere paper on which they are
written. Therefore, it is their part to see that no line of policy
shall be allowed to continue if it has the effect of drying up the
springs of our national prosperity. If they will not listen to the
remonstrances of the distressed, let them at all events view their own
position dispassionately. We may be on the verge of a great crisis,
and a great struggle may be approaching, but we have not the slightest
doubt that the cause which must ultimately prevail is that which is
essentially the cause of the people. Prosperity will only return to the
nation when Native Industry is protected.
_Printed by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh._
[Transcriber's Note:
Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation are as in the original.]