"If one army was above the sand-pit, and another army was down here,
trying to storm the position, there would be an opportunity for a
remarkably good fight and plenty of strategy; and if I led the Fifth and
Sixth against the sand-pit, or if I defended the sand-pit against
attacks by the Upper and Lower Fourth, the result would be very
interesting."
And Blades agreed with me. He said he believed that it would give the
Upper and Lower Fourth frightful pleasure to have a battle, and he was
certain they would be exceedingly pleased at the idea. In fact, he went
off at once to find Pegram and, if possible, Rice and Mitchell. The
school was taking a walk that afternoon, as the football ground was
eight inches under snow; and some were digging in the snow for eating
chestnuts, of which a good many were to be found in West Wood, and
others were scattered about. So Blades went to find Mitchell, Rice, and
Pegram, and I considered the situation. The edge of the sand-pit was
about eight feet high, and a frontal attack would have been very
difficult, if not impossible; but there was an approach on the left--a
gradual slope, fairly easy--and another on the right, rather difficult,
as it consisted of loose stones and tree roots. On the whole, I thought
I would rather defend than attack; but as, if anything came of it, I
should be the challenger, I felt it would be more sporting to let the
foe choose.
Then Rice and Mitchell came back with Blades, and they said that nothing
would give them greater pleasure than a fight. They had heard my idea,
and thought exceedingly well of it. They examined the spot and
pretended to consider strategy, but, of course, they knew nothing about
the possibilities of defence and attack. What they really wanted to
know was how many troops they would have, and how many we should. We
counted up and found that in the Fifth and Sixth, leaving out about four
who were useless, and Perkins, who would have been valuable, but was
crocked at footer for the moment, we should number thirty-one, while the
Upper and Lower Fourth would have thirty-eight. I agreed to that, and
Rice made the rather good suggestion that we should each have ten kids
behind the fighting line to make ammunition. And I said I hoped there
would be no stones in the snowballs, and Mitchell said the Fourth didn't
consist of Germans, and I might be sure they would fight as fair as we
did, if not fairer.
So it was settled for the next Saturday, and Brown and Fortescue
consented to umpire the battle, and Fortescue showed great interest in
it.
There were a good many preliminaries to decide, and I asked Mitchell
what chap was to be general-in-chief for the Fourth, and, much to my
surprise, he said that Pegram was. And, still more to my surprise, he
said that Pegram wished to attack and not defend. This alone showed how
little they knew about strategy; but I only said "All right," and
Mitchell actually said that Pegram backed the Fourth to take the
sand-pit inside an hour! And I said that pride generally went before a
fall. Then I saw Pegram--which was at a meeting of the
commanders-in-chief--and we arranged all the details. He asked about the
fallen, and I said that nobody would fall; but he said he thought some
very likely would; and he also said that it would be more like the real
thing and more a reward for strategy if, when anybody was fairly bowled
over in the battle and prevented from continuing without a rest, that
that soldier was considered as a casualty and taken to the rear. This
was pretty good for Pegram; but as our superior position on the top of
the sand-pit was bound to make our fire more severe than his, and put
more of his men out of action, I pointed that out. But he said that if
I thought our fire would be more severe than his, I was much mistaken.
He said the volume of his fire would be greater, which was true. So I
let him have his way, and we each selected ten kids for the ammunition.
Travers minor didn't much like fighting against me, but, of course, he
had to, though it was rather typical of Mitchell and Pegram that they
were very suspicious of him before the battle, and wouldn't tell him any
of the strategy, or give him a command in their army, for fear of his
being a traitor. And they felt the same to Briggs, though, of course,
Briggs and Travers minor were really just as keen about victory for the
Fourth as anybody else in it. And the only reason why my brother didn't
like fighting against me was that, with my strategy, he felt pretty sure
I must win.
The generals--Pegram and I--visited the battlefield twice more, and
arranged where the wounded were to lie and where the umpires were to
stand, in comparative safety behind a tree on the right wing; but, of
course, we didn't discuss tactics or say a word about our battle plans.
The fight was to last one hour, and if at the end of that time we still
held the sand-pit, we were the victors. And for half an hour before the
battle began, we were to make ammunition and pile snow and do what we
liked to increase the chances of victory.
I, of course, led the Fifth and Sixth, and under me I had Saunders, as
general of the Sixth, and Norris, as general of the Fifth. As for the
enemy, Pegram was generalissimo, to use his own word, and Rice and
Abbott and Mitchell and Blades were his captains. It got jolly
interesting just before the battle, and everybody was frightfully keen,
and the kids who were not doing orderly and red-cross work, were allowed
to stand on a slight hill fifty yards from the sand-pit and watch the
struggle.
And on the morning of the great day, happening to meet Rice and
Mitchell, I asked them what was the psychical idea behind the attack of
the Fourth; and Rice said his psychical idea was to give the Sixth about
the worst time it had ever had; and Mitchell said his psychical idea was
to make the Sixth wish it had never been born. They meant it, too, for
there was a lot of bitter feeling against us, and I realised that we
were in for a real battle, though there could only be one end, of
course. They had thirty-eight fighters to our thirty-one, and they had
rather the best of the weight and size; but in the Sixth we had Forbes
and Forrester, both of the first eleven and hard chuckers; and we had
three other hard chuckers and first eleven men in the Fifth, besides
Williams, who was the champion long-distance cricket ball thrower in the
school.
We had all practised a good deal, and also instructed the kids in the
art of making snowballs hard and solid. The general feeling with us was
that we had the brains and the strategy, while the Fourth had rather the
heavier metal, but would not apply it so well as us. When a man fell,
the ambulance, in the shape of two red-cross kids, was to conduct him to
a place safe from fire in the rear; and when he was being taken from the
firing-line, he was not to be fired at, but the battle was to go on,
though the red-cross kids were to be respected. I should like to draw a
diagram of the field, like the diagrams in the newspapers, but that I
cannot do. I can, however, explain that, when the great moment arrived,
I manned the top of the sand-pit with my army, and during the half hour
of preparation threw up a wall of snow all along the front of the
sand-pit nearly three feet high. And along this wall I arranged the
Fifth, led by Norris, on the right wing. Five men, commanded by
Saunders, specially guarded the incline on the left, which was our weak
spot, and the remaining ten men, all from the Sixth, took up a position
five yards to the rear and above the front line, in such a position that
they could drop curtain fire freely over the Fifth. I, being the Grand
Staff, took up a position on the right wing on a small elevation above
the army, from which I could see the battle in every particular; and
Thwaites, of the Sixth, who was too small and weak to be of any use in
the fighting lines, was my adjutant to run messages and take any
necessary orders to the wings.
As for the enemy, they made no entrenchments or anything of the kind,
though they watched our dispositions with a great deal of interest.
Pegram studied the incline on our wing, and evidently had some ideas
about a frontal attack also, which would certainly mean ruin for him if
he tried it, as it would have been impossible to rush the sand-pit from
the front. They made an enormous amount of ammunition, and as they
piled it within thirty yards of our parapet, they evidently meant to
come to close quarters from the first. I was pleased to observe this.
They arranged their line rather well, in a crescent converging upon our
wings; but there was no rearguard and no reserve, so it was clear
everybody was going into action at once. The officers were
distinguished by wearing white footer shirts, which made them far too
conspicuous objects, and it was clear that Pegram was not going to
regard himself as a Grand Staff, but just fight with the rest. Needless
to say, I was prepared to do the same, and throw myself into the
thickest of it if the battle needed me and things got critical. But I
felt, somehow, from the first that we were impregnable.
Well, the battle began by Fortescue blowing a referee's football
whistle, and instantly the strategy of the enemy was made apparent.
They opened a terrific fire, and their one idea evidently was to
annihilate the Sixth. They ignored the Fifth, but poured their entire
fire upon the Sixth; and a special firing-party of about six or seven
chosen shots, or sharpshooters, poured their entire fire on me, where I
stood alone. About ten snowballs hit me the moment Fortescue's whistle
went, and the position at once became untenable and also dangerous. So I
retired to the Sixth, and sent word to the Fifth by Thwaites to very
much increase the rapidity of their fire. Which they did; and Pegram
appealed that I was out of action, but Fortescue said I was not.
It was exceedingly like the Great War in a way, and the Fourth evidently
felt to the Fifth and Sixth what the Germans felt to the French and
English. They merely hated the Fifth, but they fairly loathed the
Sixth, and wanted to put them all out of action in the first five
minutes of the battle. Needless to say, they failed; but we lost
Saunders, who somehow caught it so hot, guarding the slope, that he got
winded and his nose began to bleed at the same moment, which was a
weakness of his, brought on suddenly by a snowball at rather close
range. So he fell, and the red-cross kids took him out of danger. This
infuriated us, and, keeping our nerve well, we concentrated our fire on
Mitchell, who had come far too close after the success with Saunders. A
fair avalanche of snowballs battered him, and he went down; and though
he got up instantly, it was only to fall again. And Fortescue gave him
out, and he was conducted to a ruined cowshed, where the enemy's
ambulance stood in the rear of their lines.
I had already ordered the Sixth to take open formation and scatter
through the Fifth; and this undoubtedly saved them, for though we lost
my aide-de-camp, Thwaites, who was no fighter and nearly fainted, and
was jolly glad to be numbered with those out of action, for some time
afterwards we lost nobody, and held our own with ease. Once or twice I
took a hand, but it wasn't necessary, and when we fairly settled to
work, we made them see they couldn't live within fifteen yards of us.
They made several rushes, however, but, by a happy strategy, I always
directed our fire on the individual when he came in, and thus got two
out of action, including Rice. He was a great fighter, and I was
surprised he threw up the sponge so soon; but after a regular battering
and blinding, he said he'd "got it in the neck," and fell and was put
out with one eye bunged. Travers minor also fell, rather to my regret;
and what struck me was that, considering all their brag, the Fourth were
not such good plucked ones when it came to the business of real war, as
we were. It made a difference finishing off Rice, for he had fought
well, and his fire was very accurate, as several of us knew to our cost.
I felt now that if we could concentrate on Pegram and Blades, who were
firing magnificently, the battle would be practically over. But Blades,
owing to his great powers, could do execution and still keep out of
range. He was, in fact, their seventeen-inch gun, you might say; and
though Williams on our side could throw further, he proved in action
rather feeble and not a born fighter by any means. As for Pegram, he
always seemed to be behind somebody else, which, knowing his character,
you would have expected. At last, however, he led a storming party to
the slope, and, leaving the bulk of my forces to guard the front, I led
seven to stem his attack. For the first time since the beginning of the
battle, it was hand-to-hand; but we had the advantage of position, and
were never in real danger. I had the great satisfaction of hurling
Pegram over the slope into his own lines, and he fell on his shoulder
and went down and out. He was led away holding his elbow and also
limping; but his loss did not knock the fight out of the Fourth, though
in the same charge they lost Preston and we nearly lost Bassett. But he
got his second wind and was saved to us, though only for a time, for
Blades, who had a private hate of Bassett, came close and scorned the
fire, and got three hard ones in on Bassett from three yards; and
Fortescue had to say Bassett was done. Blades, however, was also done,
and there was a brief armistice while they were taken away.
We now suddenly concentrated on Mitchell, who was tiring and had got
into range. I think he was fed up with the battle, for, after a feeble
return, he went down when about ten well-directed snowballs took him
simultaneously on the face and chest, and then he chucked it and went to
the ambulance. At the same moment one of their chaps, called
Sutherland, did for Norris. Norris had been getting giddy for some
time, and he also feared that he was frost-bitten, and when Sutherland,
creeping right under him, got him well between the eyes with a hard one,
he was fairly blinded, though very sorry to join our casualties. I had
a touch of cramp at the same moment, but it passed off.
We'd had about half an hour now, and five of the ammunition kids were
out of action with frozen hands. Then we got one more of the enemy, in
the shape of Sutherland, and their _moral_ ought to have begun to get
bad; but it did not. Though all their leaders were now down, they stuck
it well, while we simply held them with ease, and repelled two more
attempts on the slope. In fact, Williams wanted to go down and make a
sortie, and get a few more out of action; but this I would not permit
for another five minutes, though during those exciting moments we
prepared for the sortie, and knocked out Abbott, who, much to my
surprise, had fought magnificently and covered himself with glory,
though lame. On their side they got MacAndrew, owing to an accident.
In fact, he slipped over the edge of the sand-pit, and was taken
prisoner before he could get back, and we were sorry to lose him, not so
much for his own sake, as because his capture bucked up the Fourth to
make fresh efforts.
And then came the critical moment of the battle, and a most unexpected
thing happened.
With victory in our grasp, and a decimated opposition, a frightful
surprise occurred, and the most unsporting thing was done by the Fourth
that you could find in the gory annals of war.
It was really all over, bar victory, and we were rearranging ourselves
under a very much weakened fire, when we heard a shout in the woods
behind us, and the shout was evidently a signal. For the whole of the
Fourth still in action made one simultaneous rush for the slope, and of
course we concentrated to fling them back. But then, with a wild
shriek, there suddenly burst upon us from the rear the whole of their
casualties!
Mitchell and Rice and Pegram came first, followed by Travers minor and
Preston and Blades and Sutherland and Abbott. They had rested and
refreshed themselves with two lemons and other commissariat, and then,
taking a circuitous track from behind their ambulance, had got exactly
behind us through the wood. And now, uttering the yells that the
regular Tommies always utter when charging, they were on us with
frightful impetus, just while we were repelling the frontal attack on
the slope, and before we had time to divide to meet them. In fact, they
threw the whole weight of a very fine charge on to us and fairly mowed
us down. There was about a minute of real fighting on the slope, and
blood flowed freely. We got back into the fort, so to say; but the
advancing Fourth came back, too, and the casualties took us in the rear.
Then, unfortunately for us, I was hurled over the sand-pit, and three
chaps--all defenders--came on top of me, and half the snow-bank we had
built came on top of them. With the snowbank gone, it was all up. I
tried fearfully hard to get back, but of course the Fourth had guarded
the slope when they took it, and in about two minutes from the time I
fell out of our ruined fortifications, all was over. In fact, the
Fourth was now on the top of the sand-pit and the shattered Fifth and
Sixth were down below. One by one our men were flung, or fell, over,
and then Fortescue advanced from cover with Brown and blew his whistle,
and the battle was done.
We appealed; but Pegram said all was fair in war, and Fortescue upheld
him; and in a moment of rage I told Pegram and Mitchell they had behaved
like dirty Germans, and Mitchell said they might, or they might not, but
war was war, anyway. And he also said that the first thing to do in the
case of a battle is to win it. And if you win, then what the losers say
about your manners and tactics doesn't matter a button, because the rest
of civilisation will instantly come over to your side.
And Blades said the Sixth had still a bit to learn about strategy,
apparently, and Pegram--showing what he was to a beaten foe--offered to
give me some tips!
Mind you, I'm not pretending we were not beaten, because we were; and
the victors fought quite as well as we did; but I shall always say that,
with another referee than Fortescue, they might have lost on a foul. No
doubt they thought it was magnificent, but it certainly wasn't war--at
least, not what I call war.
We challenged them to a return battle the next Saturday, and Pegram
said, as a rule, you don't have return battles in warfare, but that he
should be delighted to lick us again, with other strategies, of which he
still had dozens at his disposal. Only Pegram feared the snow would
unfortunately all be gone by next Saturday; and the wretched chap was
quite right--it had.
Mitchell, by the way, got congestion of his lungs two days after the
battle, showing how sickness always follows warfare sooner or later.
But he recovered without difficulty.