an Indian title_ to the Circars, against the Subah, who might reclaim
them, negotiated for a grant of those provinces at Delhi, over the head
of the Subah; which grant they obtained. But the pretensions of the
Subah, who was close at hand, might disturb them in their attempts to
occupy the provinces; they therefore thought it _expedient_, to
temporize with the Subah, and to enter into a separate negotiation with
him, to induce him to surrender them; and they agreed to hold the
provinces of him also, under an engagement to supply him with a
contingent aid of _military force_, when called upon; and moreover, to
pay him annually a tribute in money. By thus confusing their titles
(which, instead of confirming, mutually defeated each other), they fully
demonstrated the inefficacy and impotency of the Mogul's grant, in the
present fallen state of that Empire. But the Company could only engage
themselves for _military service_, so far as they possessed the ability;
and their ability, is limited by the extent of their _military power_;
which, being a part of their _sovereign power_, must necessarily
determine with their sovereign capacity: as will be shown in the next
article. Whenever that capacity ceases, they will be unable to furnish a
single soldier, because they will be unable to raise a single soldier
for the defence of the provinces. In that event, the Crown must of
necessity interfere, to maintain and defend the territories; and then,
_the original cause_ which led to the acquirement of the Circars,
namely, the expulsion of the French _by force of arms_, and their
exclusion by _the influence of the same arms_ in the Treaty of 1763,
will be the true ground on which to rest _the question of right_: a
right in _the Crown of England_, which had existence, prior to _the
form_ of the Mogul's grant, and prior also to _the expedient_ of the
grant from the Subah. And here we must keep in mind, that all
territories possessed by the Company in India, by whatever means they
have been acquired, are necessarily incorporated into the British
Empire, and become subject to its Imperial Crown; conformably to the
resolution of the House of Commons, in the year 1773: "_That all
acquisitions made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty
with foreign Princes, do of right belong to the State._" And as the
whole fabric of BRITISH INDIA grew out of a principle of advancing _the
public welfare_, and was not an edifice raised merely for the separate
welfare of _the Company_, every private interest comprehended in that
fabric is, by every acknowledged maxim of State, public right, and
consistency, subordinate; and must be determined by the security of the
public good.
2. _A right to retain in perpetuity certain essential rights of
sovereignty, after the present delegated sovereignty of the Company
shall have reverted to the Crown._--Although this pretension is a
contradiction in terms, yet the assertors of it entertained no doubts of
its reality. They claimed for the Company, in their permanent capacity
of a trading body corporate, a right "_to appoint governors, to build
and maintain forts, to muster forces by sea and land, to coin money, and
to erect Courts of Judicature_[16]," even after they shall have lost
their power of administering the Government of India; and this claim is
renewed for the Company at the present day[17]. There is in this
pretension so radical an ignorance of _the nature of sovereignty_, that
it is inconceivable how it could have been entertained by any one, who
had ever given a thought to the subject of law or government. The powers
here enumerated, are essential prerogatives of sovereignty; which may
indeed be delegated for a time by authority of Parliament, but can never
be granted in full property by the Crown. In order to appoint governors,
it is first necessary to be invested with the power of government. The
same power is manifestly necessary, in order to be able _legally to
raise or muster any force by sea or land_, either for defence, or for
any other military service. And it is acknowledged, that _the power of
government_ has never been granted to the East India Company, _but with
limitation_. In the grants of Bombay and St. Helena, the Company is
certainly empowered to erect forts, and to raise and employ forces; but
by the same grants they are invested with the powers of Captain General
in order to that end; virtually in the first, and _expressly_ in the
second. Will it be imagined, that they are to retain the authority of
_Captain General_, after their powers of _government_ shall cease? And
if not, it must be evident, that their authority over forts, and all
their military power, must determine, whenever their delegated power of
Captain General shall determine. It would be an insult to any reader,
who has ever cast his eye even on the elementary Commentaries of Sir
William Blackstone, to insist upon a truth so obvious and simple. With
regard to the _erecting of Courts_, no such power is given in any of the
Charters produced in evidence. The Crown erects the Court, and the power
granted to the Company is, and necessarily must be, limited and
subordinate. The _true cause_ of that extraordinary error, is plainly
this: the Charters of King William and Queen Anne, upon which they rest
these pretensions, conferred at one and the same time (as has been
already observed), both their corporate capacity and their exclusive
privilege. The assertors of those _permanent sovereign rights_, not
discriminating, by the principles of things, between the several powers
conferred in those Charters, have confused the provisions; and have
construed all the powers above enumerated, which by their nature could
only appertain to them as _delegated Sovereigns_, to belong to their
capacity of an _incorporated Company_. And, under this illusion, they
have imagined, that those powers are annexed to that perpetuity of their
corporate body which was first enacted in 1730, and confirmed in the 33d
year of the present reign; and that they do not constitute a part of
those powers of government, which have been conferred upon them, from
time to time, by their exclusive Charters. As this construction is
entirely arbitrary on the part of the Company, and as it is unsupported
by the principles either of law or sound reason, it will be best refuted
by the authority of Parliament.
3. _A right to exclude all British subjects from the Company's Indian
ports, after their own exclusive privilege shall be expired._--This
right has been claimed in the following words:--"Although their
exclusive right to the trade, and their power of administering the
government and revenues of India, were to be determined, they would
still remain an incorporated Company _in perpetuity_, with the
_exclusive_ property and _possession_ of Calcutta and Fort William,
Madras and Fort St. George, Bombay, Bencoolen, and St. Helena, and
various other estates and settlements in India. Whether, in the event of
the sole trade being determined, individuals would be able to carry on a
successful trade to India, _if the Company were to debar them the use of
their ports and factories_, may require a serious consideration[18]."
This is a claim, not only to a _practical_ exclusive trade, after the
right to exclusive trade _expressly granted_ by Parliament shall cease
and determine, but involves also claims of perpetual sovereignty. It is
incomprehensible, how it could be alleged by a writer who, in the
preceding page, had pointedly excepted from their powers, that of
converting the trade into "a _mischievous_ monopoly[19];" for, what more
_mischievous_ form could monopoly, or an hostile sovereignty, assume,
than that of excluding all British individuals from the chief ports and
seats of trade in India? By this alleged right, the grants of Charters
and the provisions of Parliament would be reduced to an absurdity. But
as this is a claim of _private right_ to cause a _public wrong_, it
cannot fail particularly to engage the consideration of Parliament.
The rights _alleged by the Company_ at the present day, are these:--
1. _A right to all the ports and territories in India, possessed by the
Company, of the same kind and extent as the right by which they hold
their freeholds in London._--This right has been solemnly asserted for
the Company, by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of
Directors, in these words:--"The Company are AS MUCH owners of THE CHIEF
SEATS of European trade in the Indian Empire, as they are of THEIR
FREEHOLDS IN LONDON[20]." This is an open and unreserved declaration of
the East India Company, renewing and asserting the preceding allegations
made on their behalf at the expiration of their last exclusive Charter;
and the same allegation is now repeated in their Petition to Parliament,
though in terms somewhat more qualified than those which they addressed
to the Government; viz. "that _no person_ can have a right, except with
the consent of the proprietors of India stock, _to use the seats of
trade_ which the stockholders _have acquired_." But they must bring an
oblivion over all the reasons of state and policy by which _they exist
at all_, before they can carry in the face of the nation the proud
assertion, that they stand equally circumstanced, in regard of _private
right_, with respect to "_the chief seats of European commerce in the
Indian Empire_," and with respect to "_their freeholds in London_." They
will assuredly be told by Parliament, that they _may not_ exercise the
same arbitrary authority over the chief seats of Indian commerce, which
they may over their freeholds in London. With regard to their freeholds
in London, they may exclude all persons from entering them, they may
desert them themselves, or they may let them fall to ruin. But it is NOT
SO with regard to the chief seats of Indian commerce; they will find,
that they cannot arbitrarily exclude British subjects from those seats,
beyond a limited time; that they cannot _debar_ the nation the
beneficial use of them; and that they will not be suffered to render
them unavailable, or unprofitable. As soon as the India Trade shall be
thrown open, the ports of India will necessarily become open; and, if
the Company should then search for _their private right to close them_,
they will find, that it is merged in _the public right to use them_; or,
to use the words of Lord Hale, that "their _jus privatum_ is clothed and
superinduced with a _jus publicum_[21]."
2. The last right _alleged by the Company_ at the present crisis, which
forms the CLIMAX of their pretensions, and is the _key_ to all their
late proceedings, is that of a _perpetual union and incorporation with
the Supreme Government of the Indian Empire_; so that the Indian trade
and government must ever continue to be united _in them_, and cannot now
be separated, without endangering "_the British Empire in India, and the
British Constitution at home_." This pretension renders the question of
a _temporary_ exclusive trade entirely nugatory, because it is the
unqualified assertion of a _perpetual_ one; not to be received any more
as _a grant_ from Parliament, as hitherto it has been, but to be
extorted from Parliament through fear of the subversion of Parliament.
This pretension is founded upon the Company's interpretation of an
observation, made by a late eminent Minister to the Managers of the
Company's affairs, in the year 1800; viz. that "_the Government and the
trade of India are now so interwoven together_," as to establish an
indissoluble "_connexion of government and trade_." This _dictum_, is
assumed by the Company for an incontestable maxim of State, _as
applicable to their own Corporation_; and for an eternal principle,
connecting that Body Corporate with all future Indian Government. This
they denominate, "THE SYSTEM, _by which the relations between Great
Britain and the East Indies are now regulated_;" and, in their sanguine
hopes of gaining _perpetuity_ for their _system_, they already
congratulate themselves upon their Incorporation into the Sovereignty,
as a NEW, and FOURTH ESTATE of the Empire.
It is that maxim, evidently embraced for this construction at the
present crisis, that has emboldened the conductors of the Company's
concerns to assume so lofty a demeanour towards the King's servants; and
to venture to represent the cautious proceedings of Government in a
great political question (in which it appears only as _a moderator_
between two conflicting interests), to be an aggression against their
indisputable rights. It has been asked in the Court of Proprietors,
"whether the Ministers of the present day are become so far exalted
above their predecessors, or the Company so newly fallen, that adequate
communications should not be made to the latter, of the plans and
intentions of the former?" It is neither the one nor the other; but it
is, that _the Company_ are become so elated and intoxicated by the
ambitious expectation of being incorporated as a perpetual Member of the
Supreme Government, that they conceive they have no longer any measures
to keep with the Ministers of the Crown.
And can the British people _now_ fail to open their eyes, and to discern
the strait to which the ancient crown and realm of England would be
reduced, by submitting to acknowledge this _new estate_ in the Empire?
Greatly as it would be to be lamented that any thing should disturb the
present internal tranquillity of our political system, yet, if such
should be the necessary result of a resistance to the ambitious views of
the East India Company, it ought to be manfully and cheerfully
encountered; rather than admit, by a temporizing concession, a claim
which shall bend PARLIAMENT to the will of, and degrade THE CROWN to an
alliance with, a Company of its own subjects; which owes its recent
existence to the charters of the Crown, and the enactments of
Parliament, and yet aspires to seat itself for ever, side by side, by
its own supreme Government.
The Company have carried too far their confidence in the _constitutional
defence_ by which they hoped to ride in triumph over the Executive
Government. Their exorbitant pretensions have bred a _new constitutional
question_, to which the public mind is now turning. In their solicitude
to fortify themselves with _constitutional jealousies_, they have
constructed a formidable fortress, which threatens to embarrass the
Citadel of the State, and must therefore of necessity awaken its
jealousy. A change in the Administration of the Indian Government
(should the Company finally provoke such a change), _need not
necessarily_ throw the patronage of India into the hands of the Crown;
means are to be found, by which that political and constitutional evil
may be effectually guarded against. But if, through a precipitate
assumption, that no such adequate substitute can be provided for the
present system, Parliament should, at this critical moment, unguardedly
yield to the demands of the Company, and give its sanction to their
claims to a _perpetuity_ of those privileges which they have hitherto
been contented to receive _with limitation_, what difficulties would it
not entail upon its own future proceedings? If the _corporate
sovereignty_ of the Company is once absolutely _engrafted_ upon _the
Sovereignty of the State_, it cannot be extracted without lacerating the
ancient stock, and convulsing the general system.
The Company would have done wisely, if, instead of resting their case
upon pretensions erroneous in fact, inadmissible in law, and derogatory
of the authority addressed, they had rested it wholly upon their own
endeavours to promote the original purpose of their incorporation:
namely, _the honour of the Crown_, and _the advantage of the
commonwealth_. Upon that ground the Company might have stood strong; and
all that would then have remained for the consideration of Parliament,
would have been a question, how those great interests could, under
existing circumstances, be best advanced; either by continuing the
present arrangement without alteration, or by modifying it in such
particulars, as Parliament in its wisdom might judge to be necessary.
But instead of this, they have taken ground upon high pretensions of
RIGHT, which must necessarily provoke investigation; and we have
discovered, in the foregoing inquiry, how far those pretensions are
supported.
The determination of this great question, however, is now reserved for
Parliament; and, upon the wisdom of Parliament, the Country may with
confidence rely, for a full consideration of all the public rights,
commercial as well as political; and likewise, for the final adoption of
such an arrangement for the government and trade of India, as shall
appear to be the best calculated to advance the real interests, and to
promote the general prosperity of the Empire, both in the East and West.
GRACCHUS.
THE END.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] Anderson's Hist. of Commerce (1698), vol. ii. p. 221, fol.
[10] A Short Hist. of the East India Company, p. 6.
[11] De Portibus Maris, p. 2. c. 6. p. 77.
[12] Short Hist. of East India Company, p. 11.
[13] History of Indostan, vol. i. p. 335.
[14] Journals of the House of Commons, vol. xxxiii. p. 811.
[15] Short Hist. of the East India Company.
[16] Short Hist. of the East India Company, p. 56.
[17] Morning Post, Jan. 15, 1813, Letter, signed Probus.
[18] Short History of the East India Company, p. 38.
[19] Ibid. p. 37.
[20] Letter to Lord Buckinghamshire, Dec. 30, 1812.
[21] De Portibus Maris, p. 2. c. 7. p. 84.
S. Gosnell, Printer, Little Queen Street, London.