THE LETTERS
GRACCHUS
ON THE
_EAST INDIA QUESTION_.
_LONDON_:
PRINTED FOR J. HATCHARD,
BOOKSELLER AND PUBLISHER,
NO. 190, OPPOSITE ALBANY, PICCADILLY.
1813.
Printed by S. GOSNELL, Little Queen Street, London.
ADVERTISEMENT.
The following Letters appeared in the MORNING POST, at the dates which
are annexed to them. The impartial Reader will find in them a strong
determination, to uphold the public rights of the Country, with respect
to the India Trade; but he will not discover any evidence of a desire to
lower the just, and well-earned honours, of THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, nor
any symptom of a disposition hostile to their fair pretensions.
LETTERS
OF
GRACCHUS.
LETTER I.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE EAST INDIA QUESTION.
_Tuesday, January 12, 1813._
The crisis, at which the affairs of the East India Company are now
arrived, is one which involves the most important interests of the
British Empire. It would be unnecessary to prove a proposition which is
so universally acknowledged and felt. It has happened however, that, in
our approaches towards this crisis, the Public understanding has been
but little addressed upon the subject; so that the appeal which is now
suddenly made to their passions and imaginations, finds them unprepared
with that knowledge of the true circumstances of the case, which can
alone enable them to govern those passions, and control those
imaginations. Let us then endeavour to recover the time which has been
lost, by taking a deliberate view of the circumstances which produce
this crisis.
The crisis, is the proximity of the term which may conclude the East
India Company's rights, to the exclusive trade with India and China, and
to the powers of government now exercised by them over the Indian
Empire.
The rights of the East India Company are two-fold; and have long been
distinguished as, their _permanent_ rights, and their _temporary_
rights. Those rights are derived to them from distinct Charters, granted
to them at different times by Parliament. By the former, they were
created a _perpetual_ Corporate Society of Merchants, trading to
India[1]. By the latter, they obtained, for a _limited period of time_,
the exclusive right of trading with India and China, and of executing
the powers of government over those parts of the Indian territory, which
were acquired either by conquest or by negotiation. The Charter
conveying the latter limited rights, is that which will expire in the
course of the ensuing year 1814; on the expiration of which, the
exclusive trade to the East will be again open to the British population
at large, and the powers of the India Government will lapse in course
to the Supreme Government of the British Empire, to be provided for as
Parliament in its wisdom may judge it advisable to determine.
The renewal of an _expired_ privilege cannot be pursued upon a ground of
_right_. The exclusive Charter of the Company is _a patent_, and their
patent, like every other patent, is limited as to _its duration_. But
though the patentee cannot allege a ground of right for the renewal of
his patent, he may show such strong pretensions, such good claims in
equity, such weighty reasons of expediency for its renewal, as may
ensure its attainment. Such are the claims and the pretensions of the
East India Company to a renewal of their Charter; and as such they have
been promptly and cheerfully received, both by the Government and the
country at large.
But the progress of society, during a long course of years, is of a
nature to produce a considerable alteration in the general state of
things; the state of things must, therefore, naturally be called into
consideration, upon the expiration of the term of years which determines
the exclusive Charter of the East India Company; in order to inquire,
whether that Charter should be renewed precisely in the same terms, and
with the same conditions, as before; or whether the actual state of
public affairs demands, that some alteration, some modification, of
terms and conditions, should be introduced into the Charter or System
which is to succeed.
The arduous task of this investigation must necessarily fall upon those
persons, who chance to be in the Administration of the Country, at the
latest period to which the arrangements for the renewal of the Charter
can be protracted; and it is hardly possible to imagine a more difficult
and perplexing position, for any Administration. Those persons, if they
have any regard for the duties which they owe to the Public, will
consider themselves as standing _between two interests_; the interest of
those who are about to lose an exclusive right, and the interest of
those who are about to acquire an open and a common one. They will be
disposed to listen, patiently and impartially, to the pretensions of
both parties; of those who pray for the renewal of an exclusive
privilege, and of those who pray that they may not be again wholly
excluded from the right which has reverted. And although they may amply
allow the preference which is due to the former petitioners, yet they
will endeavour to ascertain, whether the latter may not, with safety to
the public interest, receive some enlargement of the benefits, which the
opportunity opens to them, and from which they have been so long
excluded.
While they thus look alternately to each of these interests, and are
engaged in striving to establish a reconciliation between the two, it
will be neither equitable nor liberal for one of the interested parties
to throw out a doubt to the Public, whether they do this "from a
consciousness of strength, and a desire of increasing their own power
and influence, or from a sense of weakness and a wish to strengthen
themselves by the adoption of popular measures[2]." And the author of
the doubt may find himself at length obliged to determine it, by an
awkward confession, that Ministers do not do it "with any view of
augmenting their own patronage and power[3]."
It is thus that the Ministers of the Crown have conducted themselves, in
the embarrassing crisis into which they have fallen. Fully sensible of
the just and honourable pretensions which the East India Company have
established in the course of their long, important, and distinguished
career, they have consented to recommend to Parliament, _to leave the
whole system of Indian Government and Revenue to the Company_, under the
provisions of the Act of 1793; together with _the exclusive trade to
China_, as they have hitherto possessed them; but, at the same time,
considering the present state of the world, and its calamitous effects
upon the commercial interest in general, they are of opinion, that some
participation in the Indian trade, thus reverting, might possibly be
conceded, under due regulations, to British merchants not belonging to
the East India Company; which would not impair the interests either of
the Public or of the Company.
In this moderate opinion, they are fully justified, by the consent of
the Company, to admit the Merchants of the out-ports to a share in the
Indian trade. And thus far, all is amicable. But the out-port Merchants
having represented to Government, that the condition, hitherto annexed
to a Licensed Import Trade,--of bringing back their Indian Cargoes to
the port of London, and of disposing of them solely in the Company's
sales, in Leadenhall Street,--would defeat the object of the concession;
and that the delay, embarrassment, and perplexity, which such an
arrangement would create, would destroy the simple plan of their
venture; and having therefore desired, that they might be empowered to
return with their cargoes to the ports from whence they originally
sailed, and to which all their interests are confined; Government, being
convinced of the justice of the representation, have proposed that the
Import Trade may be yielded to the Out-ports, _under proper
regulations_, as well as the Export Trade. To this demand the Court of
Directors peremptorily refuse their consent; and upon this _only point_
the parties are now at issue. This question alone, retards the final
arrangements for the renewal of their Charter.
Yet it is this point, which one of the parties interested affirms, to be
"a question of the last importance to the safety of the British Empire
in India, and of the British Constitution at home;" and therefore
undertakes to resist it, with all the determination which the importance
of so great a stake would naturally inspire. But, when we compare the
real measure in question with the menacing character which is thus
attempted to be attached to it, we at once perceive something so
extravagantly hyperbolical, something so disproportionate, that it at
once fixes the judgment; and forces upon it a suspicion, that there is
more of policy and design, than of truth and sincerity in the assertion.
That objections to the measure might arise, capable of distinct
statement and exposition, is a thing conceivable; and, these being
stated, it would be a subject for consideration, how far they were
removable. But to assert, in a round period, that the safety of the
empire in Europe and Asia is fundamentally affected in the requisition,
that a ship proceeding from Liverpool or Bristol to India, might return
from India to Liverpool or Bristol, instead of to the Port of London,
is calculated rather to shake, than to establish, confidence in those
who make the assertion. Yet this is the question which the country is
now called upon to consider, as one tending to convulse the British
Constitution. Surely, if the foundations of the empire in both
hemispheres have nothing more to threaten them, than whether the
out-port shipping shall carry their cargoes home to their respective
ports, or repair to the dock-yards in the port of London, the most timid
politician may dismiss his alarms and resume his confidence. When the
East India Company, by conceding a regulated Export Trade, have at once
demonstrated the absurdity of all the predictions which foretold, in
that Trade, the overthrow of the Indian Empire; we may confidently
believe, that the Import Trade will prove as little destructive, and
that its danger will be altogether as chimerical as the former.
Whether the Court of Directors endeavour to fix that menacing character
upon the proposed Import Trade, as a bar against any further
requisition, is a question which will naturally occur to any
dispassionate person, who is not immediately and personally interested
in the conditions of the Charter; and he will be strongly inclined to
the affirmative in that question, when he finds, that the reason which
they have alleged for their resistance, is their apprehension of the
increased activity which the practice of smuggling would acquire, from
the free return of the out-port ships from India to their respective
ports. It is not a little extraordinary, that they should so strenuously
urge this argument against those persons, who, while they propose the
measure, are themselves responsible for the good management and
protection of the revenue; and who must therefore be supposed to feel
the necessity of providing means and regulations, adapted to the measure
which they propose. The Ministers of the Crown have not failed to inform
the Court of Directors, that, in consequence of the communications which
they have had with the Commissioners of the Customs and Excise upon the
subject, they find that the Directors have greatly over-rated the danger
which they profess to entertain; and they acquaint them, that new
regulations will be provided to meet the new occasion; and that the
out-port ships and cargoes will be subject to forfeiture upon the
discovery of any illicit articles on board. Yet the Court of Directors
still persist in declaring, that the hazard of _smuggling_ is _the
reason_ why they will not grant to the out-ports an import trade; and
this, through a fear of compromising "the safety of the British Empire
in India, and the British Constitution at home."
A calm and temperate observer, who scrupulously weighs the force and
merits of this reasoning, will naturally be forced into so much
scepticism as to doubt, whether there may not be some _other reasons_,
besides the safety of the Empire, which may induce the East India
Company to stand so firm for the condition of bringing all the import
Indian trade _into the Port of London_? Whether there may not be some
reasons, of a _narrower_ sphere than those of the interests of the
Empire? In searching for such reasons, it will occur to him, that the
Port of London is the seat of the Company's immediate and separate
interests; and he will shrewdly suspect, that those interests are the
_real_, while those of the Empire are made the _ostensible_, motive for
so vigorous a resistance. When he reflects, _that it is proposed to
leave the Company in the undisturbed possession of all the power of
Government over the Indian Empire, which they have hitherto enjoyed;
that they are to remain possessed, as heretofore, of the exclusive trade
to China, from whence four-fifths of their commercial profit is
derived_; that they themselves have virtually admitted the falsity of
the theoretical mischiefs, foretold as the certain results of an
out-port trade, by having agreed to concede that trade, to the extent
required by Government; that they equally allow, an import trade for the
merchants of the out-ports; but make their resistance upon the single
point, that the import trade should be all brought together into their
own warehouses, and should be disposed of in their own sales in
Leadenhall Street: when he combines all these considerations, he will
think that he plainly discovers, that the interests of the Empire at
large are not quite so much involved in the question as they proclaim;
and that, if any interests are more pressingly calculated than others,
it must be their own, and not the Public's. If their interests are to be
affected by the measure, let them fairly state it, and show the extent;
but let them not endeavour to defend them covertly, under an artful and
factious allegation of _the ruin of the British Constitution_. And if
they really do apprehend that the Constitution would be endangered, let
them not hazard such consequences by their own proceedings. Let them not
come forward as advocates for the preservation of the Empire, if their
rhetoric is to sink into a threat, of "_shutting up the great shop of
the India House."_
It may be well to call to the recollection of the East India Company,
that they owe their present state to an assertion of those very rights
to open trade which have now been brought forward; for, when the first,
or London East India Company had experienced certain disappointments and
failures, various adventurers came forward with claims similar to those
which have been alleged by the merchants of the present day, and
obtained an incorporation, to the prejudice of the old Company; and
although the old, or London East India Company, afterwards effected an
union with the new, or English East India Company, and with them gave
origin to the present Company, yet the UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY should
not forget, how much the activity of the Indian trade was stimulated by
the assertion of the rights of their predecessors, _to participate in
the trade which had been granted exclusively to a former Company_.
GRACCHUS.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The _rights and pretensions_ of the Company are fully considered in
the Tenth Letter.
[2] Considerations on the Danger of laying open the Trade with India and
China, p. 13.
[3] Ibid. p. 18.
LETTER II.
_Wednesday, January 13, 1813._
It is a distinguishing character appertaining to Britons, to express
forcibly their feelings, whenever they think they discover any
disposition to encroach upon their rights. It is not therefore to be
wondered at, that the communication of the papers, on the subject of the
East India Company's Charter, which was made by the Directors to the
Proprietors, on the 5th instant, should have produced the effect which
was then manifested; of an almost unanimous disposition, to support the
Directors in their resistance of a measure, which, at the time, was
regarded as an invasion, on the part of the Government, of the
established rights of the East India Company.
But now that the momentary ebullition of that spirit has had time to
subside, and to give place to cool and sober reflection, it may not be
unacceptable to the Proprietors at large to look calmly and attentively
into the subject; and to examine its bearings on their own substantial
interests.
It must be manifest to every man, who will only refer to the accounts
which have been published in the Reports of the Select Committee of the
House of Commons, that, from the magnitude of the Company's debt, it
would be impossible to calculate the time at which the Proprietors could
contemplate any augmentation of their present dividends of 10½ per
cent.; even though the Charter, instead of being within one year of its
expiration, had an extended period of twenty years to operate.
It is equally manifest, from the correspondence of the Court of
Directors with Government, that, in agreeing to the proposition of
opening the Export Trade to the out-ports of the United Kingdom, they
were free from any apprehension, that the continuance of the present
dividend could be endangered by their conceding that point. And,
therefore, although the Proprietors were precluded from entertaining any
reasonable expectation of _an increase_ to their dividends, they were
perfectly warranted to consider the continuance of that which they now
receive, as free from any hazard, in consequence of the extension
proposed to be granted to the Export Trade.
Whether they may remain in the same confidence, under _all_ existing
circumstances, is a question which the Proprietors are now earnestly
solicited to examine. The point at issue (if I may apply that expression
to a case, in which the Company are upon the disadvantageous ground of
petitioning for the renewal of a privilege, now about to expire) is,
whether the ships which shall be permitted to clear out from the
out-ports of the United Kingdom, ought to be allowed to return to any
given description of those ports, or whether they should all be
compelled to enter at the Port of London? And upon _this point_ is made
to hinge a question, which may affect (not the _British Empire and
Constitution_, but) the main interest of the Proprietors, namely, _their
dividends_. For no man can be so inconsiderately sanguine as to suppose,
that the Company, under the present pressure of their pecuniary
embarrassments, (whatever may have been the causes from whence they have
arisen;) embarrassments proceeding from a debt, in India and in England,
of _more than forty-two millions_; nearly four millions of which are in
accepted bills on England, which will shortly become due, and for the
payment of which there are not funds at the India House; no man can be
so inconsiderately sanguine as to suppose, that the dividend may not
become a little precarious, under such circumstances. It must be evident
to the most superficial observer, that the credit of the Company with
the Public can only be sustained by the prompt and liberal aid of
Parliament; and it will hardly be maintained, that it is a _propitious_
mode of soliciting that aid, to connect with the solicitation an avowed
determination to oppose a measure, which Government represent it to be
their duty to recommend to Parliament, for the general benefit of the
community; a measure, founded on, and growing out of, the principle of
the Charter of 1793, which first opened the private trade between India
and this country; the provisions respecting which trade have been
progressively extended at subsequent periods, and of which trade the
Public will now call for a further enlargement and participation, as a
just and necessary qualification to the proposed renewal of the
Company's Charter.
The City of London, indeed, is _now_ an exception, and apparently a very
weighty one, to this general call; but it will lose much of that weight
with the Public, and must fall into the scale of an interested party,
when it is recollected, that so long as the question between the Company
and the Public was, whether the commerce with India should remain a
strict monopoly, or whether a participation in it should be granted to
individuals, under the restriction of importing to London the
commercial interest of the metropolis was powerfully incited against the
Company; and that, to that great commercial interest, supported by the
weight of Mr. Dundas's opinion, and to the more enlarged view which Lord
Wellesley took of the subject, the extension that has hitherto been
given to the private trade with India is to be attributed. The
experience of twelve years has now proved, that both India and the
parent state have greatly benefited by that extension; and it has
followed, as a necessary consequence of that experience, that the active
and intelligent merchants of the other large ports of the United
Kingdom, have urged their fair pretensions, to be admitted to a share in
the profits of that widely diffused trade; by sending their merchandise
from their own ports, and by receiving the returning cargoes into their
own warehouses, in those ports.
A reference to the printed papers (as has already been signified) will
show, that the Court of Directors were prevailed upon to concede _the
first_ of those points, but that they have been immoveable with respect
to _the second_; although their own commercial knowledge must have made
it evident to them, that the concession of the first, that is, _a free
export_, would be nugatory, unless supported by the benefit arising from
the _freedom of import_; which is not only in the proportion of four to
one in amount to the export, but is requisite to give that unity to the
concern, without which great commercial establishments cannot be kept
up.
Such is the state of the question, or, as it has been called, by some
strange perversion of ideas, the _negotiation_, between the Company, as
applicants for a renewal of their Charter which is about to expire, and
the Government, through whose aid it is to be solicited, or at least,
without whose concurrence it is certainly very questionable, whether
they would be able to obtain it. These are the circumstances, under
which the affairs of the East India Company must necessarily, and
speedily, be brought forward, for the consideration of Parliament. Can
it, then, be considered an exaggerated view of the hazards of such a
situation, to suppose, that some guardian of the public purse may deem
it requisite to inquire, whether the application for pecuniary aid from
Parliament ought not to be preceded by a substantial proof, not of
concession, for they have in fact nothing to concede, but of something
like accommodation on the part of the Proprietors? And in that event,
might it not be questioned, whether, since the dividend of 10 per cent.
was sanctioned upon an assumption, that the revenue of the Company
yielded a _surplus_ of upwards of a million; now, when instead of a
surplus, a _deficit_ is admitted to exist, the dividend ought not to be
reduced, not merely to the standard from which it had been raised under
the supposed prosperous state of the Company's affairs, but to a
standard to be regulated by the amount of the ascertained profits upon
their own trade, under whatever circumstances it may hereafter be
conducted?
It is not meant to insinuate, that any condition of the kind alluded to
is likely to be imposed, in granting the relief so pressingly required
by the present exigencies of the Company; but if a necessity for the
winding up of their affairs, as an exclusive Company, should arrive, and
if their own resources, with the profits they may derive from their
commerce as a Corporate Body, should not be adequate to the payment of a
dividend of 10½ per cent.; could it reasonably be expected, that
Parliament would, in _all future times_, extend its liberality towards
the Proprietors of India stock, to the extent of _securing to them_ a
continuance of their present dividend?
It is to be feared, that those who may have calculated upon such a
result, have taken a false measure of their _prospective situation_; and
it is on account of this apprehension, that it appears highly important
to call the attention of the Proprietors to the care of their own
substantial interest in the dividend; an interest, which to them is, and
must be paramount.
GRACCHUS.
LETTER III.
_Thursday, January 14, 1813._
It is at all times an object equally interesting and instructive, to
trace the origin of laws and institutions, and to follow them in the
progress of their operation; but this inquiry becomes more powerfully
attractive, when the pursuit is stimulated by an anxiety to defend a
supposed right, or to acquire an extension of advantages which are
already possessed.
Such an investigation appearing to be a necessary sequel of the subject
treated of in a former communication, let us now take a succinct view of
those provisions of the Act of 1793, by which the East India Company,
upon the last renewal of their Charter for a fixed time, were called
upon to relax from the exclusive restrictions of the monopoly which they
had so long enjoyed. Taking that Act as the source and origin from
whence the present India Question arises, let us briefly follow the
subject in its progress, down to the propositions that are now before
the Public.
It is necessary to premise, that the Company had, from an early period
of their commerce, granted as a favour and indulgence to the Captains
and Officers of their ships, permission to fill a regular portion of
tonnage with certain prescribed articles, upon their private account,
subject to the condition; that those privileged articles should be
lodged in the warehouses of the Company, that they should be exposed by
them at their sales, and that they should pay from 7 to 5 per cent. to
cover the charge of commission and merchandise.
The Act of 1793, relieved the trade carried on under this indulgence, by
reducing the rates of charge to 3 per cent.; which was established as
the rate, at which the more enlarged trade, for the first time allowed
by that Act to private merchants unconnected with the Company, should
pay to the Company; which trade was then limited to 3000 tons, the
shipping for which was to be provided by the Company, who were to be
paid freight for such tonnage, and were to have the same control over
the goods which might be imported, as they already exercised over the
trade of their Captains and Officers.
It was soon found, that the conditions, under which this trade was
opened, changed its operations, so as to render the privilege of little
value. The residents in India, for whose benefit it was professed to
have been principally intended, presented memorials upon the subject to
the Governments abroad; and the merchants of London represented to the
authorities in England, the necessity of an enlargement of the
principle, as well as a correction of the regulations. It is not
necessary, to go into any detail of the reasons upon which those
applications were supported; because Mr. Dundas, who then presided over
the affairs of India, and who had introduced and carried through
Parliament the Bill of 1793, did in the most explicit terms inform the
Court of Directors, in his letter of the 2d April, 1800, that "he should
be uncandid, if he did not fairly acknowledge, that experience had
proved it to be inadequate to the purposes for which it was
intended--and that therefore he was clear, that the clause in the Act
ought to be repealed, and in place thereof _a power be given to the
Governments abroad, to allow the British subjects, resident in India, to
bring home their funds to Britain on the shipping of the country_;" that
is to say, on ships built in India. This letter, of the President of the
Board of Control, was referred by the Court of Directors to a special
Committee of their body; who, in a very elaborate Report, dated 27th
Jan. 1801, that is to say, after the deliberation of eight months,
declared that it was impossible for them to acquiesce in the proposition
then made by Mr. Dundas. They supported their opposition by a variety of
arguments, from which the following short passage need alone be
selected:--"The proposals which have been brought forward by certain
descriptions of men, both in India and in England, for the admission of
their ships into the trade and navigation between India and Europe,
_proposals which extend to the establishment of a regular and systematic
privilege_ in favour of such ships, appear, when maturely weighed, and
followed into all their operations, _to involve principles and effects
dangerous to the interests both of the Company and of the nation_; that
_the adoption of those principles would, immediately and essentially,
affect both the system of policy which the Legislature has established
for maintaining the connexion and communication between this country and
British India, and the chartered privileges of the East India Company_.
And the introduction of any practice of this nature, would tend to widen
gradually, and indefinitely, the channel of intercourse between India
and Britain; to multiply the relations between the two countries; and to
pour Europeans of the lower sort into India, and Indian sailors into
this country; to lessen, by both these means, the respect for the
European character; _to disturb and shake our government there_; and, in
a word, to lead progressively but surely to colonization."
The language employed by the Court of Directors at the present day, in
opposition to the proposition for allowing private ships returning from
India to import to the places from whence they had sailed upon their
outward voyage, is feeble and languid; in comparison with the passage
which has been just now recited, from the Report of their Special
Committee, made upwards of twelve years ago, upon the proposition then
submitted by Mr. DUNDAS. That Minister, in his reply of the 21st March,
1801, to the Court of Directors, observed, "_I have reviewed my own
opinions with the most jealous attention, and I have weighed, with the
most anxious care, the arguments of those who suppose that the system
which I have recommended, is likely to produce any inconvenience or
danger to the rights, privileges, and exclusive interests of the East
India Company: but it is my misfortune to view the subject in an
opposite light. If any thing can endanger that Monopoly, it is_ AN
UNNECESSARY ADHERENCE TO POINTS NOT ESSENTIAL TO ITS EXISTENCE." Mr.
Dundas then adverted to a letter of the 30th September, recently
received from the Governor-General, Marquis Wellesley, which, he said,
"had with clearness and precision ably detailed and demonstrated the
grounds of those opinions."
But, the judgment and reasoning of Mr. Dundas, elucidated by the
arguments of Marquis Wellesley, (which were founded on the knowledge of
what, at the time, was passing under the eye of the Governor-General,)
had not influence upon the Court of Directors, sufficient to make them
adopt the proposition of the President of the Board of Control; and
still less, the enlargement of that proposition, as suggested by Lord
Wellesley; who represented, "the great advantages that would result to
the Sovereign State, by encouraging the shipping and exportation of
India; and, that if the capital of the Merchants in India, should not
supply funds sufficient for the conduct of the whole private Export
Trade from India to Europe, no dangerous consequences could result from
applying, to this branch of commerce, capital drawn directly from the
British Empire in Europe:" thereby taking that trade from foreign
nations, whose participation in it was become "_alarmingly increasing_."
These distinct and concurring opinions, of the President of the Board of
Control and the Governor-General, could not prevail upon the Court of
Directors to "alter the opinion they had delivered." They accordingly
drew up paragraphs, to be sent to the Governments in India, conveying
their _final resolutions and instructions_.--"The British residents in
India," they said, "aided by those who take up their cause here (_viz._
the King's Ministers and the Merchants of London), desire to send their
own ships to Britain, with private merchandise; and the principle of
employing British capital in this trade, is also contended for. This
trade, although it might for a time be carried on through the existing
forms of the Company, would at length supersede them; the British
commerce with India, instead of being, as it is now, _a regulated
monopoly_, would deserve, more properly, the character of a regulated
free trade; a title, which it is to be feared would not suit it long."
Such is the substance of the paragraphs which the Directors had
prepared, upon the propositions we have been considering; although both
the one and the other of those propositions explicitly provided, _that
all the private trade with India, export as well as import, should be
confined to the Port of London_. The Board of Control, though no longer
presided at by Mr. Dundas, interposed its authority; and, on the 2d
June, 1801, the Directors were enjoined not to send those paragraphs to
India.
The language of the Court of Directors in 1813, upon the question of the
Import Trade, is, as has been already affirmed, feeble and languid in
comparison with that which the same body employed in 1800 and 1801, with
regard to the admission of India-built ships in the carrying trade
between Britain and India; but Indian-built ships have, from that time
to the present, been employed in that trade, and none of the alarming
consequences, which the Directors had predicted, have resulted from that
practice.
May it not therefore be reasonably assumed, that the alarm under which
they now profess themselves to be, would prove to be equally unfounded;
that the direful influence upon the Constitution and Empire, which the
Directors tell us is to be apprehended, from any change in the existing
system that shall admit private ships returning from India to import at
the places whence they had cleared out, would be found to be as little
entitled to serious consideration; and that neither the public revenue,
nor the immediate interests of the Company, would be endangered by an
experiment, which the Government and the Company would be equally bound
to watch; and which Parliament could at all times control, and if
necessary, absolutely bring to a termination?
GRACCHUS.
LETTER IV.
_Saturday, Jan. 16, 1813._
Having hitherto taken a view of those parts of the India Question, which
more immediately relate, to the commercial interests of this country,
and to the Proprietors of East India Stock; let us now advert to the
deportment of the Directors towards the Ministers of the Crown, in their
last communication made to the Court of Proprietors.
It appears, from the printed papers, that as long back as the month of
April, the President of the Board of Control put the Court of Directors
in full possession of the _final opinion_ of His Majesty's Ministers;
concerning the privileges of trade which, they conceived, it would be
their duty to submit to Parliament, as the basis of a Charter. Early in
the month of December, a deputation from the Court of Directors appears
to have been admitted, by special appointment, to a conference; in which
it is known to every clerk and messenger about the offices, as well as
to every member of that deputation, that the three Secretaries of State,
the First Lord of the Treasury, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer
attended. And it is equally notorious, that two subsequent meetings were
held, between the same parties. We are warranted to infer, from the
letter of Lord Buckinghamshire, that the discussions which took place at
those several conferences, were declared to be open and unreserved; with
a view that the Members of Government, and the Members of the
Deputation, might freely, and without restraint of form, deliver their
reasons for the opinions which they respectively held.
The impression which the Court of Directors received, from the conduct
of the Ministers of the Crown, in those conferences, is manifested in
the Letter from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to the President of the
Board of Control, of the 30th December, in which "they return sincere
acknowledgments for the attention with which their representations had
been listened to, in the various interviews with which they had been
honoured by his Lordship, and His Majesty's Ministers, who attended."
In conferences of this nature, and between parties thus relatively
circumstanced, all that was to be expected from the Ministers of the
Crown was, that they should listen with attention to the representations
made to them, and should reply to those representations, so as to
command the acknowledgment of the inferior party. If, in the issue, (to
use the words of Mr. Dundas to the same authorities in 1801,) "after
having reviewed their opinions with the most jealous attention, and
after having weighed, with the most anxious care, the arguments brought
forward, it was still their misfortune to view the subject in an
opposite light" to that which presented itself to the judgment of the
Directors; it was not to be expected, that they should surrender their
own judgment to that of the Directors, who stood in the anomalous
character of defendants and judges in their own cause.
At the time that these conferences were terminated, the Ministers appear
to have entertained an expectation, that the subject would not be
further agitated, until an official communication should be made upon it
from Government. The Court of Directors, however, met on the 18th
December, and entered something very like a protest, by anticipation,
against the measure, which they knew, (from what appears to have passed
at the conferences,) would be the subject of that official
communication; and they transmitted it to the India Board. By the
irregularity of this proceeding; which bore upon the face of it the
appearance of a design, either of intimidating Government from coming to
the final decision which they had signified, or of creating a bar
against future discussion; they precluded Government from going into any
detail of argument, and consequently, the reply of the President of the
Board of Control appears to have been principally intended, to convey
officially to the Court of Directors that result, which the Members of
the Deputation were already in possession of; namely, "those conditions,
upon which alone, consistently with their public duty, the King's
Servants could submit a proposition to Parliament for the renewal of the
Charter."
To this official communication, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the
East India Company sent a reply, wherein they offer some explanation of
the irregularity; but, in their opposition to the ultimate determination
of Government, they call upon the King's confidential servants, to
impart to them all the reasons which had determined them to think, that
"the privilege of Eastern commerce should be extended to British
merchants;" and also, the specific regulations which they may propose to
adopt, for giving additional security to the revenue against smuggling.
The President of the Board of Control, thus called upon to step out of
his sphere, or to admit the Court of Directors to _Cabinet discussions_,
was constrained to acquaint them, that "the duty of Ministers had been
performed, by communicating to the Company the conditions on which they
were disposed to submit the business to Parliament;" at the same time
informing them, that they would find most of the reasons, which had
determined the judgment of Ministers to yield to the representations of
the out-port merchants, stated "in the petitions presented by those
merchants to the Houses of Parliament." And he finally referred them,
with confidence, to the "justice and wisdom of Parliament, for obtaining
a due regard to their interests."
If the Court of Directors did not entertain feelings and views very
different from those of the community at large, in consequence of that
peculiar position which renders them _defendants, and judges, in their
own cause_, they could not fail to contemplate with applause, the
temper, patience, and regard to public engagements, which mark the whole
proceedings of Government on this arduous occasion. But, being at one
and the same moment, petitioners and arbitrators, and having their
judgments biassed under those clashing characters, they have not always
kept themselves within the capacity, in which alone they can
consistently treat with the Government of the country. In their
communications with the Servants of the Crown, respecting the renewal of
their Charter, all that they are authorized to pretend to, is to have a
distinct knowledge of the conditions, on which the Government think they
shall be justified in the sight of the country, in proposing to
Parliament the renewal of their Charter; and, in the course of obtaining
this information, they have experienced the utmost consideration, and
have received the most ample and unreserved communications from His
Majesty's confidential servants; who have given their attention to every
argument urged by those who appeared as representatives of the Court of
Directors, and have put them in possession of all the grounds upon which
they differ from them in opinion. After having done this, they have
discharged their highly responsible duty to the Public; and if "_they
have the misfortune to view the subject in an opposite light_," the
Company's records will show them, that this is not the first time a
radical difference of opinion had subsisted, concerning their
pretensions, between the King's Ministers and the Court of Directors.
Such being the true state of the case, it becomes a subject of grave
inquiry, why the Directors, in the Court of Proprietors held at the
India House on the 5th instant, took no step whatever for moderating the
spirit which was then shown; or for rectifying the false impressions
which were there testified, respecting the deportment of His Majesty's
Ministers. It does not appear, that any one of the Directors who were
parties in those various conferences, in which they acknowledge to the
President of the Board of Control that they experienced so much
attention, took any forward step to set right the misrepresentations
which were delivered; or to repel the charges, implied or declared, of
contempt, neglect, encroachment, &c. which were so freely imputed to the
Servants of the Crown. But they left the spirit which had improperly
been excited, to act by the impulse of an erroneous impression; omitting
to render to the Government that justice, which the frankness of their
proceedings strongly called for.
A review of the debate at the India House,--with the Directors, either
silently withholding what they were enabled to impart in justification
of the Government, or by the rhetoric of some of them tending to blow
wider the flames of discord,--would almost authorize a suspicion, that
the Directors were not displeased at the fever which their silence
nourished. It is therefore earnestly to be hoped, for the honour of the
East India Company, and more especially for the interest of the
Proprietors, that some Director, or other individual, may, at the next
General Court, strive to efface the memory of the last; who may call
upon the Deputation, to render to the Ministers of the Crown whatever
justice is due to them, for their conduct in the late discussions; and
who may recommend a revision of the statement, in which they represent
to those Ministers, that the terms on which Government have offered to
the Company a Charter, are such as may "_leave their dividend unprovided
for_," and "_create a necessity for their going to Parliament_!" For,
unless they have brought themselves to a state to suppose, that
Ministers and the Public have lost all intelligence, they must know,
that both Ministers and the Public are well aware, that they are
actually under _a necessity of going to Parliament_ for aid, as soon as
Parliament shall be assembled; and that, at the present moment, _their
dividend_ may, in strictness, be considered as _unprovided for_.
GRACCHUS.
LETTER V.
_Tuesday, January 19, 1813._
The writers, who have recently undertaken to defend and justify the
opposition of the Court of Directors to any extension of the Import
Trade from India to the out-ports of the kingdom, have laid a peculiar
stress upon an opinion conveyed in that part of Mr. Dundas's Letter of
the 2d of April 1800, in which that Minister was considering "the
_agents_ to be employed at home; to manage the private trade of
individuals from India, and to take care of their interests in the
cargoes of the returning ships." He states his opinion, that "there is
no use of any interference by the Company; that the great interest to be
attended to on _the part of the Company_, is, that no goods come from
India that are not deposited in the Company's warehouses; and that the
goods, so imported, be exposed at the Company's sales, agreeably to the
rules prescribed for that purpose."
In taking ground upon any principle, it is necessary to ascertain
whether it applies to the case in point. That it was a great interest to
the East India Company to watch and control the trade carrying on under
their own licenses, is obvious; and this the Company could not
effectually do, unless that Trade, on its return from India, was brought
under their own eye, and collected within the sphere of their own
control; which is confined to the Port of London. But the case, to which
this argument is now applied by the advocates for the Company, is so
essentially deficient, that the principles appear to be wholly
inapplicable. In this _new case_, the extended trade would be carried
on, not under _the Company's licenses_, but under _the provision of
Parliament_; and the protection and control of that trade would become
the care, not of the Company, but of the executive Government. Here then
the determination of that trade would be governed, not by the separate
interest of the Company (which alone came within the scope of Mr.
Dundas's argument), but by the combined interests of the Company and the
Public at large. To this _combined interest_, Mr. Dundas's argument was
_not_ directed; and it is a fallacy in reasoning, to apply a partial
argument to a general case.
But, let us grant what these advocates assume; that the opinion here
delivered by Mr. Dundas, does really apply to the case in question. May
not that have happened at the present day, which actually did happen
with regard to the regulations of the Charter of 1793? Might not new
light be thrown upon a subject in 1813, which was supposed to have been
thoroughly investigated in 1800? And, as the candour and openness of Mr.
Dundas caused him, in 1800, to avow, that the provisions of 1793 were
_inadequate_, and prompted him strenuously to recommend the adoption of
a _new principle_; is it not possible that, taking into his view all the
circumstances which bear upon the question at the present day, he might,
had his life been spared, have been convinced, that the extraordinary
and unforeseen changes which have taken place in the political and
commercial world, might have now rendered it, not only expedient but,
necessary to relax, in some degree, upon the point of the import trade
from India?