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Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=).
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BELGIANS UNDER THE GERMAN EAGLE
by
JEAN MASSART
Vice-Director of the Class of Sciences in the Royal Academy of Belgium
Translated by Bernard Miall
London
T. Fisher Unwin Ltd.
Adelphi Terrace
First published June 1916
(All rights reserved)
PREFACE
These pages were written in Belgium between the 4th August, 1914, and
the 15th August, 1915.
I employed in this work only those books and periodicals which
entered the country, whether secretly or openly, and which every one,
therefore, can procure.
But to drive conviction into the reader's mind I have observed a rule
of selection in using these documents: I have used those exclusively
which are of German origin, or which are censored by the Germans.
They are--
(A) German posters exposed in Belgium.
(B) Books and newspapers coming from Germany.
(C) Newspapers published in Belgium under the German censorship.
(D) The _Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant_, the only foreign newspaper
which has been authorized in Belgium since the beginning of the
occupation. As for the Belgian _Grey Books_, the Reports of the
Commission of Inquiry, and books published in Belgium, of these I
used only those which were known to us in Belgium before the 15th
August, 1915.
In short, since I crossed the frontier I have not inserted a single
idea into this book: it therefore precisely reflects the state of mind
of a Belgian who has lived a year under the German domination.
I have forced myself to remain as far as possible objective, in order
to give my work the scientific rigour which characterizes the Reports
of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry. I have simply transferred, to a
domain which is new to me, the methods of my customary occupations.
* * * * *
Here is a list of my principal sources, with the abbreviations which
denote them in the text:--
_N.R.C._ _Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant._ From this journal
(with two exceptions) I have taken only those
articles which were not stopped by the German
censorship.
_K.Z._ _Kölnische Zeitung._
_K.Vz._ _Kölnische Volkszeitung._
_D.G.A._ _Düsseldorfer General-Anzeiger._
_F.Z._ _Frankfurter Zeitung._
_N.A.Z._ _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung._
1st to 12th Report. _Reports of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry._
1st and 2nd Belgian. _Grey Books_.
_Belg. All._ Davignon, _La Belgigue et l'Allemagne_.
The English edition is not a complete translation of the French text.
To save space, many facts, and above all, many quotations, have been
suppressed.
J. M.
ANTIBES, VILLA THURET,
_October, 1915_.
CONTENTS
PAGE
=Preface= 1
=Introduction= 9
INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN BELGIUM 12
Prohibition of Newspapers and Verbal Communication--The
German Censorship--Authorized German Newspapers--Authorized
Dutch Newspapers--Newspapers
introduced Surreptitiously--Secret Propagation of News--Secret
Newspapers--German Placards--Regulations as to
Correspondence--Railway Journeys.
CHAPTER I
=The Violation of Neutrality= 27
A. THE PRELIMINARIES 27
The Belgians' Distrust of Germany lulled--German
Duplicity on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August, 1914--The
Ultimatum--The Speech of the Chancellor in the Reichstag.
B. JUSTIFICATION OF THE ENTRY INTO BELGIUM 31
C. GERMAN ACCUSATIONS AGAINST BELGIUM 36
Necessity of influencing Neutrals--Absurdity of the First
Accusations--A Change of Tactics--The Revelations of the
_N.A.Z._--1. The Report of M. le Baron Griendl, some time
Belgian Minister in Berlin--2. The Reports of Generals
Ducarne and Jungbluth--The Attitude of the Belgians
toward the German Falsifications--Neutral Opinion--The
Falsification of M. de l'Escaille's Letter.
D. THE DECLARATION OF WAR AND THE FIRST HOSTILITIES 50
The three successive Proposals of Wilhelm II to
Belgium--Hostilities preceding the Declaration of War--The
Pacific Character of Belgium--German Espionage in
Belgium--The Mentality of the German Soldiers at the
beginning of the Campaign--Letters from German
Prisoners of War--German Lies respecting the Occupation
of Liége--The sudden attack upon France is checked--The
Disinterested Behaviour of Belgium.
CHAPTER II
=Violations of the Hague Convention= 63
A. THE "REPRISALS AGAINST FRANCS-TIREURS" 63
Murders Committed by the Germans from the Outset--Were
there any "Francs-tireurs?"--The Obsession of
the "Francs-tireurs" in the German Army--The Obsession
of the "Francs-tireurs" in the Literature of the
War--The Obsession of the "Francs-tireurs" in Literature
and Art--Responsibility of the Leaders--Animosity
toward the Clergy--Animosity toward Churches--Intentional
Insufficiency of Preliminary Inquiries--A
"Show" Inquiry--Mentality of an Officer charged with
the Repression of "Francs-tireurs"--Drunkenness in the
German Army--Cruelties necessary according to German
Theories--Terrorization: "Reprisals" as a "Preventive"
Incendiary Material--The two great Periods of Massacre--Protective
Inscriptions--Accusations against the Belgian
Government--Treatment of Civil Prisoners--The Return
of Civil Prisoners--German Admission of the Innocence
of the Civil Prisoners.
B. THE "BELGIAN ATROCITIES" 98
The Pretended Cruelty of Belgian Civilians toward the
German Army--Some Accusations--The Pretended
Massacres of German Civilians--Preventive and Repressive
Measures taken by the Belgian Authorities.
C. VIOLATIONS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 111
Military Employment of Belgians by the Germans--Measures
of Coercion taken by the Germans--Living
Shields--A German Admission--Belgians placed before the
Troops at Charleroi--Belgians placed before the Troops at
Lebbeke, Tirlemont, Mons--Belgian Women placed before
the Troops at Anseremme--Belgians forcibly detained at
Ostend and Middelkerke--Bombardment of the Cathedral
at Malines--The Pretended Observation-post on Notre-Dame
of Antwerp--German Observation-posts admitted
by the Germans--Pillage--Thefts of Stamps--Illegal
Taxation--Fines for Telegraphic Interruptions--Fines
for Attacks by "Francs-tireurs"--Hostages--Contributions
and Requisitions--Contributions demanded from the
Cities--Exactions of a Non-commissioned Officer--Requisitions
of Raw Materials and Machinery--Conclusions--The
Famine in Belgium--The Flight of the Belgians--The
Causes of the Famine--Creation of Temporary
Shelters--The National Relief Committee--Belgium's
Gratitude to America.
CHAPTER III
=The German Mind, Self-depicted= 179
A. PRIDE 179
Some Manifestations of Pride and the Spirit of Boasting--1.
Militarism--Might comes before Right--2. Disdain
of Others--Some Inept Proclamations, etc.--Lies Concerning
the Situation in Belgium--Lies concerning
"Francs-tireurs"--3. Cynicism--Photographs and
Picture-postcards--Alfred Heymel on the Battle of
Charleroi--Surrender of the Critical Spirit. Refusal to
Examine the Accusations of Cruelty--The Abolition of Free
Discussion in Germany--German Credulity--Voluntary Blindness
of the "Intellectuals"--The Manifesto of the
"Ninety-three"--The Manifesto of the 3,125 Professors--The
Protestant Pastors--The Catholic Priests and Rabbis.
B. UNTRUTHFULNESS 217
1. A Few Lies--Written Lies--A French Dirigible
Captured by the Germans--The Transportation of the
German Dead--Some Lying Placards--M. Max's Denial--How
the Officers Lie to their Men--2. Perseverance in
Falsehood--The German treatment of Mgr. Merrier--3.
The Organization of Propaganda--(_a_) Propagandist
Bureaux Operating in Germany--(_b_) Propagandist Matter
issued by the Publishing Houses--(_c_) Propagandist
Bureaux operating Abroad--Sincerity of the Censored
Newspapers--Persecution of Uncensored Newspapers--(_d_)
Various Propaganda--4. The Violation of Engagements--The
Independence of Belgium--The Promise
to respect the Patriotism of the Belgians--The Forced
Striking of the Flag--The Belgian Colours forbidden
in the Provinces--Prohibition of the Belgian Colours
in Brussels--The "Te Deum" on the Patron Saints' Day
of the King--The Portraits of the Royal Family--Obligation
to Employ the German Language--The Belgian
Army is our Enemy!--The "Brabançonne" Prohibited--The
National Anniversary of July 21st--The Anniversary
of the 4th August--School Inspection by the Germans.
C. INCITEMENTS TO DISUNION 282
Incitements to Disloyalty--The Walloons incited against
the Flemings--Inciting the People against the Belgian
Government--Inciting the Belgians against the English.
D. A FEW DETAILS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF BELGIUM 295
(_a_) Present Prosperity in Belgium--Assertions of the
German Authorities--The Parasitical Exploitation of
Belgium admitted by Germany--The Tenfold Tax on
Absentees--Railway Traffic in Belgium--Trouble with the
Artisans of Luttre--Traffic suppressed at Malines--(_b_)
The Germans' Talent for Organization--Conflict between
Authorities--Supression of the Bureau of Free Assessment--The
Belgian Red Cross Committee Suppressed--(_c_)
The Belgian Attitude toward the Germans--(_d_) Behaviour
of the German Administration--The Appeal to
Informers--German Espionage--Agents-Provocateurs or
"Traps."
E. FEROCITY 333
1. Aggravations--Treatment inflicted upon Belgian Ladies--Filthy
Amusements--2. Physical Tortures--The Fate
of the Valkenaers Family--3. Moral Tortures--Moral
Torture before Execution.
=Index= 361
INTRODUCTION
Bismarck was given to quoting, with approval, a saying which has often
been attributed to him, but which was, in reality, first made in his
presence by a hero of the American Civil War--General Sheridan. It was,
that the people of a country occupied by a conquering army should be
left nothing--save eyes to weep with!
And we Belgians, truly, are weeping: weeping for our native country,
invaded, in contempt of the most solemn conventions, by one of the
signatories of those treaties; weeping for our villages, which
are levelled to the ground, and our cities, which are burned; our
monuments, which are broken by shell-fire, and our treasures of art
and science, which are for ever destroyed. We mourn to think of those
hundreds of thousands of our countrymen who have wandered without
shelter along the highways of Europe; of Belgium, lately so proud
of her prosperity, but now taxed and crushed and exhausted by war
requisitions and contributions, and reduced to holding out her hand for
public charity.
Who could help but weep when, in Flanders, our soldiers are defending
the very last corner of our territory; when, in our villages, men, old
folks, women, and children have been, and are yet, shot down without
pity in reprisal for imaginary crimes; when thousands of civilians
are imprisoned in Germany as hostages; when the burgomaster of the
capital, for daring to defend the rights of his constituents, is
confined in a Silesian prison;[1] when our rural clergy is decimated,
to such a point that divine service has necessarily been suspended
in entire cantons; when a scholar like Van Gehuchten dies in exile,
after seeing his manuscripts and his drawings, the fruit of ten years'
labours, disappear in the flames of Louvain?
* * * * *
Our sobs are mingled with tears of gratitude for the compassionate
intervention of Holland, America, Spain, the Scandinavian countries,
Switzerland, and Italy ... not forgetting our Allies. It is this
generosity that has prevented us from dying of hunger and want; a
million of our refugees have found in Holland a fraternal succour which
has never for a moment been relaxed; the United States, thanks to the
influence and the incomparable activity of their Minister in Brussels,
Mr. Brand Whitlock, supply us with our daily bread.
Belgium will never forget the exactions of those who have reduced to
famine one of the richest and most fertile countries in the world, nor
the unequalled charity of the nations which have enabled us to live to
this day, and have saved us from death by starvation.
* * * * *
We are weeping! But we do not surrender ourselves to despair, for we
have kept intact our faith in the future, and the firm resolve to leave
no stone unturned that we may for ever be spared such another trial.
Above all, we refuse to bow our heads beneath the yoke. In vain have
the Germans afflicted us with increasingly unjust and unjustifiable
and vexatious demands; they will never daunt us. Let them proscribe
the Belgian flag as a seditious emblem; we have no need to unfurl it
to remain faithful to it; they are welcome to forbid the _Te Deum_
on the day of the King's patron saint; since the King and the Queen
are valiantly sharing, on the Yser, in the efforts and the sufferings
of our brothers and our sons, royalty has no firmer supporters among
us than the leaders of Socialism. No, we assuredly are not ready to
abandon ourselves to despair. And nothing can sustain us more than the
international sympathies by which we feel ourselves surrounded in this
our unmerited misfortune.
* * * * *
The time has not yet come to judge the events which have delivered
Europe to fire and blood. Yet we hold that it is the duty of all those
who believe themselves in a position usefully to intervene to make
themselves heard. For Germany possesses so perfect an organization for
the diffusion of her propaganda in foreign countries, that the public
opinion of neutral States, hearing but one side of the question, would
finally come to believe our enemies.
It would be useless and ineffectual to accumulate, as did the
ninety-three German "intellectuals," among others, a number of denials
and affirmations, without supporting them by a single definite fact. We
do not wish to put forward anything which we cannot immediately support
by easily verified proofs. This rule which we have compelled ourselves
to observe, has forced us narrowly to limit our field of investigation.
We shall speak only of actions and intellectual manifestations which
are immediately connected with the present war; and as the field
would be too vast even when so circumscribed, we shall say nothing of
military operations properly so-called, nor of all that has happened
beyond the Belgian frontiers. We do not propose to write a history. We
leave to those more competent the task of extricating the truth as to
present events; we shall content ourselves with taking indisputable
documents, which are nearly always cuttings from German books, or
German newspapers, or German posters, and with analysing their mental
significance; and, further, with showing how the Belgians react against
the actions recorded.
In the following pages we shall first of all examine the _violation
of Belgian neutrality by Germany_, then the _infractions of the Hague
Convention of 18th October, 1907_. We shall be careful to invoke only
_precise and unquestionable facts_; but for that matter the number of
German infractions of the law of nations in Belgium is so enormous
that we have been able provisionally to exclude all those which are
not established in the most positive manner. At the same time we
shall endeavour to derive from these facts a few indications as to
our enemies' manner of thinking. This last will be studied in further
detail in a third chapter: _German Mentality Self-depicted_.
INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN BELGIUM.
A few words as to the documents utilized.
As the Germans occupied our country they took pains to isolate us from
the rest of the world. They immediately suppressed all our journals,
as these naturally refused to submit to their censorship. At the same
time the Germans forced certain journals to reappear; notably _L'Ami de
l'Ordre_, at Namur, and _Le Bien Public_, at Gand. The first of these
journals took care frankly to inform its readers that the military
authorities were forcing it to continue publication.
As for foreign newspapers, their introduction was forbidden under heavy
penalties.
_Prohibition of Newspapers and Verbal Communications._[2]
OFFICIAL NOTICE.
Although the District Commandant[3] is continually causing
authentic news of the military operations to be published, the
foreign newspapers are intentionally publishing false news.
It is brought to the knowledge of the public that it is therefore
strictly forbidden to any one whomsoever to introduce into Spa and
the surrounding district newspapers other than German, without the
previous authorization of the District Commandant.
Offenders will be punished according to the laws of war.
The same penalties will be applied to those who have verbally
spread false news.
THE DISTRICT COMMANDANT,
ASKE, _Colonel_.
SPA, _22nd September, 1914_.
(_Placard posted at Spa._)
NOTICE.
I call the attention of the population of Belgium to the fact that
the sale and distribution of newspapers and of all news reproduced
by letterpress or in any other manner which is not expressly
authorized by the German censorship is strictly prohibited. Every
offender will be immediately arrested and punished by a long term
of imprisonment.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN BELGIUM,
BARON VON DER GOLTZ,
_Field-Marshal_.
BRUSSELS, _4th November, 1914_.
(_Posted in Brussels._)
MILITARY COURT.
In pursuance of 18, 2 of the Imperial decree of 28th December 1899,
the following persons have been punished:--
(_a_) The coal-merchant Jules Pousseur, of Jambes, with 2 months'
imprisonment and a fine of 100 marks, or 20 days' additional
imprisonment.
(_b_) His daughter, Camille Pousseur, with 2 months' imprisonment,
because they frequently bought foreign newspapers and articles
from newspapers whose sale is prohibited; and further because the
daughter copied and collected, with the knowledge and permission
of her father, poems and articles hostile to Germany, containing,
for the most part, vulgar and obscene insults in respect of the
Emperor, the Confederate Princes, and the German Army; and because
she further, as one may fully realize from the careful manner in
which the numerous copies were made, communicated the originals to
others, and finally because Jules Pousseur admits that he has for
some time been engaged in forwarding letters, which is forbidden.
The terms of imprisonment will run from the first day of detention. The
copies and other writings will be retained.
_L'Ami de l'Ordre_, _4th April, 1915_.
_The German Censorship._
After the 20th August the eastern half of Belgium was thus deprived of
all intellectual communication with the outside world. For a fortnight
we were left absolutely without news. Then, from the 5th September,
the German Government permitted the publication of journals which were
carefully expurgated, and falsified by a rigorous censorship:[4] _Le
Quotidien_, _Le Bruxellois_, _L'Écho de Bruxelles_, _Les Dernières
Nouvelles_; and later _Le Belge_, _La Belgique_, _La Patrie_, etc., in
Brussels, _L'Avenir_ in Antwerp, and many more. Although submitted to
the censorship, the appearance of these newspapers was only provisional
and uncertain. _Le Bien Public_ reminds its readers of the fact in its
issue for the 13th December, 1914. All these journals were on occasion
suspended; for example, _Le Quotidien_, from the 9th to the 11th
December, 1914, without any reason being given; _L'Ami de l'Ordre_,
from the 2nd to the 7th September, 1914, for having printed an acrostic
regarded as insulting; and _Le Bien Public_, during the whole of May,
1915.
The illustrated journals were as much subject to the censorship as
the ordinary newspapers. Numbers 1 to 3 of _1914 Illustré_, published
before the arrival of the Germans, could no longer be exposed for
sale: No. 1 containing portraits of King Albert, Nicholas II, M.
Poincaré, and King George V; No. 2 the portrait of General Leman, and
No. 3 that of M. Max. From November onwards the issues were severely
edited, so that they contained, for example, scarcely any more
photographs of towns burned by the German army. The other illustrated
papers--_Actualité Illustré_, _Le Temps Présent_, etc., also had none
but anodyne photographs, such as portraits of the new masters, military
and civil.
In some degree to replace the newspapers, the printers conceived the
idea of publishing little booklets relating to the war, but giving
no direct news of the military operations. These publications were
naturally subjected to the censorship, and many of those which were
published before the decree of the 13th October, 1914, were prohibited;
it was thus with the very interesting brochure, _M. Adolphe Max,
bourgmestre de Bruxelles, son administration du 20th août au 26th
septembre, 1914_, and the Nos. 1 to 10 of the booklets issued by Mr.
Brian Hill. Illustrated postcards also were censored; the series in
course of publication, representing the ruins of Louvain, Dinant,
Charleroi, Liége, etc., had to be interrupted. Music even had to
receive the official approbation (_see_ the placard of 27th March,
1915, p. 274).
In short, it will be seen that our public life already very closely
approached the German ideal: _Alles ist verboten_. To think that
Belgium, so justly proud of her constitutional liberties, is now
crushed, breathless, under the heavy Prussian jack-boot!
_Authorized German Newspapers._
As a compensation for those which the German Administration felt
obliged to suppress, it allowed us, about the 10th September,
to receive some German newspapers--the _Kölnische Zeitung_,
_Kölnische Volkszeitung_, _Düsseldorfer Tageblatt_, _Düsseldorfer
General-Anzieger_, and also a few illustrated papers, notably the
_Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung_, _Die Wochenschau_, _Du Kriegs-Echo_.
At a later date other newspapers were tolerated: _Vossissche Zeitung_,
_Berliner Tageblatt_, _Frankfurter Zeitung_, _Berliner Zeitung am
Mittag_, _L'Ami du Peuple_ (a special edition, for Belgium, in French
and German, of _Der Volksfreund_, of Aix-la-Chapelle), and also some
new illustrated papers, for example, _Kriegsbilder_, _Zeit im Bild_,
and above all the _Illustrierte Kriegs-Kurier_, published in German,
Flemish, French, and English,[5] whose sixteen pages, all covered
with illustrations, cost only 15 centimes: evidently an instrument of
propaganda, subsidized by the Central Administration. We shall have
occasion later on to insist on its veracity, if one may call it that.
For a long time none of these journals reached us regularly.
We had also access to two journals published by the Government
itself: (1) the _Deutsche Soldatenpost_ (_Herausgegeben von der
Zivil-Vorwaltung des General-Gouverneurs in Belgiën_), originally
reserved for soldiers, but which was also sold to civilians--in a very
intermittent fashion, it is true--from September 1914 to the beginning
of December 1914; (2) _Le Réveil_ (_Écho de la Presse, Journal officiel
du Bureau allemand à Düsseldorf pour la publication de nouvelles
authentiques à l'étranger_), the latter being published simultaneously
in French and German. Forty-nine numbers were published. It felt such
an insurmountable disgust for untruth that having announced in the
introductory article of its first number that Belgium was entirely
in the hands of the Germans, it spoke, in a neighbouring column, of
battles in Western Flanders between the Germans and the Allies. Let
us say at once that from the point of view of sincerity and liberty
of opinion all the newspapers of the Trans-Rhenian world are of equal
worth: official or otherwise, they only publish that which is allowed,
or rather, inspired, by the Government.
_Authorized Dutch Newspapers._
One newspaper not subject to the Imperial censorship, one only, has
found grace with the authorities--the _Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant_.
Its tendencies, clearly favourable to Germany, enable it to penetrate
into Belgium; but not equally all over the country. At Gand one may
subscribe to it; but its sale in single numbers is prohibited. In
Antwerp it was proscribed for several months from the 7th December.
At Louvain and Brussels it may be sold in the street, and also supplied
to subscribers. But it must not be supposed that the paper is anywhere
regularly distributed; the edition of the morning of the 10th November,
1914, was forwarded on the 27th November to a few subscribers who
were particularly persistent in their demands; it is true that this
number contains the article on the letters of prisoners of war made
by the Belgians (pp. 104-5), and that these letters annihilate not a
few accusations made by the Germans, while they throw a singular light
on their lies and acts of pillage. As for the issues for the 6th,
7th, and 8th December, 1914, they were never distributed; an official
announcement, which appeared in _L'Ami de l'Ordre_ of the 9th and 10th
December states that these numbers contain "inadmissible communications
as to the dislocation of troops." The issues of the 24th, 25th, and
26th December were also withheld. Since January 1915 some ten numbers
have been prohibited each month.
From the _Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant_ we have copied only the
articles by contributors and correspondents of the journal itself; it
has seemed to us that to reproduce articles extracted from Belgian
newspapers was a proceeding which, while quite usual among the Germans,
is not entirely honest.
Another Dutch journal, the _Algemeen Handelsblad_ of Amsterdam, arrived
in Brussels at the beginning of November; but its licence was withdrawn
at the end of a week.
From February 1915 its sale was again authorized in Belgium. At
the same time the introduction of a few other Dutch journals was
permitted, their pro-German character being indubitable: such were _Het
Vaterland_, _De Maasbode_, _De Nieuwe Courant_.
_Newspapers introduced surreptitiously._
Let us say at once that despite all prohibitions and all the sentences
pronounced, prohibited newspapers continue to trickle into the occupied
portion of the country. These newspapers were at first those which were
normally appearing in the towns not yet subject to German authority.
Thus _La Métropole_ and _Le Matin_ of Antwerp, _Le Bien Public_ and
_La Flandre Libérale_ of Gand were very soon carried as contraband and
secretly sold in Brussels. Again, in the regions not yet invaded, some
of the newspapers of the towns already occupied were printed: thus
_L'Indépendance Belge_ of Brussels appeared at Ostend until the arrival
of the Germans in that town.
The agents who sold these newspapers had also foreign papers,
especially French and English. Later, when all Belgium, save a corner
of Flanders, was subjected to the Germans, a number of Belgian papers
were printed abroad: _La Métropole_ and _L'Indépendance Belge_ in
London and _Le XX^e Siècle_ at Havre.
We also used to receive from time to time occasional newspapers
published by Belgian refugees abroad. Of these we may cite: _L'Écho
Belge_, of Amsterdam, _La Belgique_, of Rotterdam, _Les Nouvelles_, and
_Le Courrier de la Meuse_, of Maastricht.
It will be understood that prohibited journals are rare. On certain
days, when the hunt for the vendors is particularly fruitful, people
will offer fifty francs, or even two hundred, for a copy of the
_Times_. As it is chiefly across the Dutch frontier that the smuggling
of the English "dailies" is carried on, the authorities have enacted
measures which grow more and more Draconian relating to the traffic
across this frontier. By the end of 1914 it had become practically
impossible to enter Belgium from Holland by the ordinary route (_see_
the _Düsseldorfer General-Anzeiger_ of the 20th December, 1915). The
smugglers of journals are therefore obliged to insinuate themselves in
secret, and their trade is not without danger; only in the suburbs of
Putte (province of Antwerp) the German sentinels killed two of them in
December 1914.
Since the spring of 1915 the frontier has been guarded with barbed wire
and wires traversed by high-tension electric currents; the crossing has
naturally become more difficult. But "difficult" is not "impossible."
_Secret Propagation of News._
So that a greater number of readers may profit by the newspapers
smuggled into the country, the important passages, especially those
relating to military operations, are copied by means of the typewriter.
These extracts are searched after as much as the originals, but none
the less there are those who continue to prepare and to distribute
them in secret. In Brussels alone there are fifteen of these secret
sheets, each of which has its public of subscribers; many of them are
gratuitous. From time to time our oppressors scent out one of these
typewriting establishments, but some other devoted person immediately
continues the business.
In certain well-known establishments one could, for a time, obtain
the use of a newspaper for ten minutes for one or two francs; but the
secret was finally betrayed, thanks to one or other of the innumerable
spies supported by the Government.
_Secret Newspapers._
Finally, not a few persons, possessing a typewriting machine or other
means of reproducing writing, copy and sell clandestinely, for the
profit of some charitable undertaking, articles from foreign newspapers
or reviews, which bear upon the current political situation. Many
documents have reached us in this form.
Lastly, courageous Belgians have undertaken to print, in the midst of
the occupied territory, and in spite of all the German prohibitions,
newspapers which reach a circulation of many thousands. The two most
important are _La Libre Belgique_ and _La Vérité_. In vain have our
persecutors promised the most enticing rewards to those who should
denounce the authors of these sheets; they continue imperturbably to
appear. Which proves, be it said in passing, that the Germans lie most
horribly when they state that numbers of Belgians send them anonymous
information.
_German Placards._
Our intellectual pasture also includes placards. In the first place,
the _Notices_, _Orders_, and _Proclamations_ of all kinds. Then the
_News published by the German Government_, placards usually written in
three languages, in the principal towns. In Brussels, where they are
known as _Lustige Blätter_, they are particularly numerous. At Louvain,
Vilverde, and Mons they are in manuscript, and usually written in
German only.
Two important sources of documentation are completely closed:
photography and correspondence by post. The taking and reproduction of
photographs is strictly prohibited, above all in the towns ruined by
the Germans.
NOTICE.
Whosoever produces, without authorization, representations of
destruction caused by the war, or who displays, offers for sale,
sells, or otherwise distributes, by means of postcards, illustrated
reviews, daily newspapers, or other periodicals containing such
representations, above all of buildings or localities burned or
devastated by the war, will be punished by a fine not exceeding
5,000 marks or a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year.
The seizure of formes and plates which shall have served for
the reproduction of these representations, as well as their
destruction, may also be ordered.
THE IMPERIAL GOVERNOR,
FREIHERR VON HUENE,
_General of Infantry_.
ANTWERP, _1st December, 1914_.
(_Posted at Antwerp._)
_Regulations as to Correspondence._
The sending of letters by carrier is prohibited. Until about the
middle of December correspondence was carried from town to town by
the carriers who undertake the goods traffic since the suspension of
the railways; one could still, therefore, easily enough obtain news.
But, as a souvenir of his joyous entry, the Herr Baron von Bissing,
who succeeded the Herr Baron von der Goltz as Governor-General in
Belgium, suppressed this little supplementary vocation of the carriers.
Thus Senator Speyer was condemned to pay a fine of 1,000 marks and to
undergo 10 days' imprisonment for the conveyance of letters. We have
no longer the resource of sending letters by carrier pigeons, as these
are closely scrutinized by the Germans. Finally, two remaining methods
of transmitting letters were taken from us: the use of a bow and arrow
(_N.R.C._, 1st January, 1915), and enclosure in a loaf baked in Holland
and sold in Belgium. So it is needless to say that we have neither
telegraph nor telephone.
There is nothing to be done but to go in search of information oneself,
after finding out the hours (highly variable) during which one is
allowed to "circulate" in the localities through which one has to pass.
Since then it has become very difficult to obtain precise information
as to an event which has occurred in another locality, for obviously
one cannot trust a missive of this kind to the German post, which
accepts only open letters, and passes them through a _cabinet noir_;
moreover, it does not guarantee communication with all points.
BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN AUTHORITY.
After 8 p.m. (7 p.m. Belgian) there must be no lights in the
windows of the houses of the town of Herve.
The patrol has orders to fire into every window lit up, giving upon
the street.
AD. CAJOT, _Sheriff_.
F. DE FRANCQUEX, _Judge_.
(_Posted at Herve._)
It must also be explained what administrative formalities one
had to fulfil in order to obtain a lodging. Thus, from January
1915 no one could obtain a lodging in Gand, whether in an hotel,
or a boarding-house, or apartments, without first obtaining the
authorization of the _Kommandantur_.
_Railway Journeys._
Once furnished with a proper passport, one has only to set out. By
suitably arranging one's route, one can often take advantage of
the local tramways. All other means of communication are extremely
precarious. The automobile is forbidden. Horses have been requisitioned
by the military authorities.
_November 1914._
OFFICIAL RAILWAY TIME-TABLE
_of railways at present operating in Belgium under the
administration of the German Government_. With details of journeys.
Price, 0 _fr._ 10.
GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS.
A certain number of trains have during the last few days been run
over the Belgian railways by the German Government.
These are:--
1. Brussels--Aix-la-Chapelle.
2. Brussels--Lille.
3. Brussels--Namur.
4. Brussels--Charleroi.
5. Louvain--Charleroi.
6. Brussels--Antwerp.
7. Brussels--Courtrai.
Owing to the defective state of the lines and the telegraphic and
signalling apparatus, these trains can as yet travel only at a
moderate pace, and the duration of the journey is not guaranteed.
For this reason it is prudent to provide oneself on departure with
the necessary provisions for the journey.
* * * * *
The time-table of the railways is often made up in such a way that the
Belgian cannot make use of the trains. Thus the only train leaving
Brussels for Mons in November 1914 reached Mons at 9 p.m. But after
9 p.m. it is forbidden to walk through the streets of Mons. The only
train leaving Mons for Brussels leaves at 12.14 a.m., but one may not
"circulate" in the streets of Mons earlier than 4 a.m.
We see to what extremities the Belgian population is reduced. Well,
well!--despite all these difficulties, we have procured documents of
great importance. We cannot, unfortunately, publish them all at this
juncture; for they would result in the identification of those who
conveyed them to us, and expose them to reprisals; and we have learned,
to our cost, all that this term signifies according to the ideas of our
present rulers.
* * * * *
This work, then, will necessarily be incomplete. We publish it only
because we think it useful to demonstrate that in spite of all the
annoyances which they receive at the hands of the Germans, the Belgians
do not allow themselves to be intimidated. Moreover, whatever may be
the provisional lacunæ (mostly intentional) of our documentation, we
cannot in any case be reproached with falsification. This, whatever our
enemies may think, is a point of capital importance.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Since this was written, M. Max is reported to have been released,
and to be living in Switzerland.
[2] These documents are as far as possible translated literally, any
inelegancies of diction may probably be attributed to the German
authors, whose syntax is often peculiar.--(TRANS.)
[3] _Commandant de Place._--(TRANS.)
[4] We give examples of this censorship later (pp. 256-60).
[5] The English text was soon discontinued.
BELGIANS UNDER THE GERMAN EAGLE
CHAPTER I
THE VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY
A.--The Preliminaries.
We were too confiding.
With the exception of the military and a few statesmen, the Belgians
were convinced that nations, just as individuals, were bound by
their engagements, and that as long as we remained faithful to our
international obligations, the signatories of the Treaty of London
(19th April, 1839), which set forth the conditions of the neutrality,
or rather of the neutralization, of Belgium (_Belg. All._, p. 3), would
equally observe their obligations towards us.
However, in 1911, during the "Agadir crisis," our calm was a little
shaken by a series of articles in _Le Soir_. According to this journal,
all the German military writers held the invasion of Belgium to be
inevitable in the event of a war between France and Germany.
_The Belgians' Distrust of Germany lulled._
But our faith in international conventions--just a trifle ingenuous, it
may be--very soon regained its comforting influence. Had not Wilhelm
II, "the Emperor of Peace," assured the Belgian mission, which was
sent to greet him at Aix-la-Chapelle, that Belgium had nothing to fear
on the part of Germany (see _L'Étoile Belge_, 19th October, 1911). In
September 1912 the Emperor made a fresh reassuring statement. Being
present at the Swiss manoeuvres, he congratulated M. Forster, President
of the Swiss Confederation, and told him how glad he was to find that
the Swiss Army would effectually defend the integrity of her frontier
against a French attack. "What a pity," he added, "that the Belgian
Army is not as well prepared, and is incapable of resisting French
aggression." This evidently meant that Belgium ran no risk from the
side of Prussia.
It was not only the Emperor who assured us of his profound respect for
international statutes. The German Ministers made similar declarations
in the Reichstag (_Belg. All._, p. 7).
In Belgium itself the Germans profited by every occasion to celebrate
their friendship for us and their respect for treaties. In 1905, at
the time of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian independence,
Herr Graf von Wallwitz stated at an official reception: "And as for
us Germans, the maintenance of the treaty of warranty concluded at
the birth of modern Belgium is a sort of political axiom which, to
our thinking, no one could violate without committing the gravest of
faults" (_see_ p. 185 of the _Annales parlementaires belges, Senate,
1906_).
In 1913, at the time of the joyous entry of the King and Queen into
Liége, General von Emmich, the same who was entrusted with the
bombardment of the city in August 1914, came to salute our sovereigns
in the name of the Emperor. He spoke incessantly of the German
sympathies for the Belgians and their country.
In August 1913 Herr Erzberger gave his word of honour, as Catholic
deputy to the Reichstag, that there had never been any question of
invading Belgium, and that Belgium might always count on the party of
the Centre to cause international engagements to be respected. This is
the very party that is now heaping up manifest falsehoods in order to
justify the aggression of Germany.
_German Duplicity on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August, 1914._
Let us consider the days immediately preceding the war. The German
newspapers were announcing that the troops occupying, at normal times,
the camps near the Belgian frontiers had been directed upon Alsace and
Lorraine; and these articles, reproduced in Belgium, had succeeded in
finally lulling our suspicions.
In the currents of thought which were then clashing in Belgium, it was
confidence that carried the day. Many of us who were present on the 1st
of August at a session of the Royal Academy of Belgium, were speaking,
before the session was opened, of the serious events which were
approaching, the war already declared between Austria and Serbia, and
the conflict which appeared imminent between Germany, France, Russia,
and England. Yet no one imagined that Belgium could be drawn into the
conflagration. That very morning, it was related, France had officially
renewed, through her Minister in Brussels, the assurance that she
would faithfully abstain from violating the neutrality of Belgium (1st
_Grey Book_, No. 15); and there was no reason to doubt his words. A
few days earlier the German Minister in Brussels had affirmed that his
country had too much respect for international conventions to permit
herself to transgress them; and we believed him too! Oh, simplicity!
We still believed him, on the following day, when he repeated the
same declaration (1st _Grey Book_, No. 19; _Belg. All._, p. 7). And
on the evening of that Sunday, the 2nd of August, he presented to our
Government the ultimatum of Germany (1st _Grey Book_, No. 20).
_The Ultimatum._
The telegram of the 2nd of August, by which Herr von Jagow sent the
ultimatum to the German Minister in Brussels, declared: "Please
forward this Note to the Belgian Government, in a strictly official
communication, at eight o'clock this evening, and demand therefrom
a definite reply in the course of twelve hours, that is, at eight
o'clock to-morrow morning" (_Lüttich_, p. 4). Never, since Belgium's
birth, had a problem so breathless been placed before her Government.
And Germany left her twelve hours to solve it: twelve hours of the
night! She was not willing that our Government should have time to
reflect at leisure; she hoped that in a crisis of distraction Belgium,
taken at a disadvantage and forgetful of her dignity, would accept the
inacceptable.
* * * * *
However, the German Minister in Brussels continued to offer us
explanations which were as perfidious as they were confused and
obscure, and to assure us up to the last of the friendly intentions
of his Government. The Germany fashioned by Bismarck has assuredly
nothing about it to remind us of the Germany of Goethe and Fichte. We
might have guessed as much, for that matter, when we saw the Germans
glorifying the man who _boasted_ of having falsified the famous Ems
telegram in order to make the war of 1870 inevitable, and who succeeded
in making his countrymen accept, as a guiding principle, that "might
comes before right."
_The Speech of the Chancellor in the Reichstag._
However, we may suppose that some slight scruples lingered in the
recesses of the German conscience, since on the very day when the
Chancellor of the Empire told the British Ambassador in Berlin that
an international convention is merely "a scrap of paper,"[6] and
that neutrality is only a word, he recognized, in his speech to the
Reichstag, that the invasion of Belgium constituted an injustice;
but he immediately excused this violation of the law of nations by
strategic necessities.
B.--Justification of the Entry into Belgium.
"Strategic necessities!" said the German Chancellor. These necessities
are expounded in the ultimatum, and may be summed up thus: "Germany
knows that France is preparing to attack her through Belgium."
The first question which occurs to us is: Was France really preparing
to cross our territory, and had she massed troops near our frontier?
There is assuredly no one outside Germany who would admit this. Indeed,
if important bodies of troops had been massed in the north of France
they could effectually have opposed the advance of the Germans through
Belgium. Now in all the battles which the French fought in our country
their numbers were much too small to resist the Germans. Let us also
remark that these attempts on the part of the French were made on
the 15th August at Dinant, the 19th August at Perwez, and the 23rd
August at Semois. How then can any one believe that the French were
massed close to our frontier as early as 3rd August? Moreover, the map
published in the _N.R.C._ of the 16th December, 1914, confirms the
untruthfulness of the German allegations.
This "strategic reason" was again invoked by the Chancellor of the
Empire on the 4th August. But owing to the irrefutable manner in which
the tardiness of the French movements disproved this assertion the
latter is no longer uttered, save in an evasive manner. The German no
longer says: "France was ready to cross into Belgium," but "France
would not have failed to enter Belgium, and we simply outstripped her."
It is thus that Count Bernstoff, the German ambassador to Washington,
expressed himself in the interview published by _L'Indépendant_ in
September 1914, while the same assertion is found in the manifesto of
the ninety-three German "Intellectuals" and the letter addressed by
Herr Max Bewer to M. Maeterlinck (in the _D.G.A._ of October 1914 and
the _Soldatenpost_ of the 14th October, 1914).
Let us now ask if Germany had such suspicions of France as amounted to
a semi-certitude? In other words, was she sincere in declaring that
she knew that France was on the point of invading Belgium? We do not
hesitate to assert that she was lying: for if she had really believed
that France was ready to violate our neutrality it would have been
enormously to her advantage to wait until the violation was committed.
For Belgium has always asserted that in case of war between France and
Germany she would resist by arms the first invader and immediately join
herself to the other Power. Now Germany, however profound her political
perversity may be, had no reason to suspect the sincerity of Belgium;
she knew then--and this time she _did_ know--that by allowing the
French to enter our country she would assure herself of the assistance
of our army against her enemy. And scanty as was her esteem for the
Belgian soldiers--perhaps she has since had occasion to change her
mind!--it was none the less obviously to her interest to avoid having
them as her adversaries.
For the rest, we may boldly assert that the very terms of the German
ultimatum prove, without possible doubt, that she did not believe
in the danger of a French irruption into Belgium. For if she had
entertained this conviction she would have said to Belgium: "I warn you
that if you do not take the necessary measures to resist the entrance
of the French I shall be fully authorized to invade your territory in
my turn, in order to defend myself." In acting thus she would have had
the right on her side ... and the German diplomatists of the day are
certainly capable of distinguishing justice from injustice in cases
where the distinction is so easy.
We say, therefore, that the imminence of a French attack upon Belgium
was only a pretext and a bugbear; a pretext to justify the violation
of Belgium in the eyes of other nations; a bugbear to catch votes of
credit in the Reichstag without previous discussion. "We were not able
to wait for this session before commencing hostilities and invading
Luxemburg, perhaps even Belgium," declared the Chancellor. Observe
how clumsy is this "perhaps"; the German troops entered Belgium on
the night of the 3rd of August (1st _Grey Book_, No. 35), and on the
afternoon of the 4th, at the session of the Reichstag, the Chancellor
had no knowledge of it! We thought the official telegraph service
worked better than that in Germany!
* * * * *
What, then, were the real reasons for invading our country? They were
strategic reasons, it is true, but not those which the Chancellor
indicated in his speech! They had been known for a long time; the
German staff had always regarded a sudden attack upon France as an
unavoidable necessity, and for that it was necessary at all costs
to cross Belgium. Moreover, on the very day when the Chancellor was
still invoking the French preparations in the Reichstag, the Secretary
of State, von Jagow, openly avowed the true motive for violating
Belgium. The pamphlet of propaganda, _Die Wahrheit über den Krieg_,
after invoking, without insisting on, the danger of a French attack,
described at length the German plan of campaign; a sudden attack upon
France, delivered by passing through Belgium; then, immediately after
victory, a change of front, and the crushing of the Russian Army. The
same idea is expounded in an infinity of articles and pamphlets.
There can, therefore, be no remaining doubt as to the determining
motives of Germany: she wished to pass through Belgium in order
to fall upon France before the latter was ready. Germany had been
preparing for war for several days, for she knew that she had made the
war inevitable, while France, deceived by her adversary's peaceful
professions of faith, and, moreover, anxious to preserve the peace,
which she still believed to be possible, had hardly commenced her
mobilization. Let us recall the comparison drawn by Mr. Lloyd George in
his speech at the City Temple on the 11th November, 1914. "Imagine," he
said, "that your right-hand neighbour came and made you the following
proposal: 'See, my friend, I've got to cut the throat of your left-hand
neighbour. Only as his door is barred I can't catch him unawares, and
so I shall lose my advantage over him. So you will do me a little
service; nothing that isn't entirely reasonable, as you will see. You
will just let me come through your garden; if I trample down your
borders a little I'll have them raked and put in good order again; and
if by ill-luck I damage or kill one of your children I promise you a
nice little indemnity.'"
And it is because we would not help Germany in this task that she has
spattered us with insults. The Germans cannot understand how we could
have rejected her "well-intentioned" proposal, as the Emperor calls it
in his declaration of war. Evidently they have ideas of honour which
differ from ours. We can regard this proposal only as an insult to the
Belgian people.
C.--German Accusations against Belgium.
There is one circumstance which aggravates the evil deed which has
soiled the German name. It is the insistence with which the Press and
the politicians of Germany seek to cast the blame on Belgium herself.
For if we are to believe them it was Belgium who began.
_Necessity of influencing Neutrals._
When the German rulers discovered, to their utter stupefaction, real or
feigned, that America and the other neutral States did not benevolently
accept the strategical excuse for the violation of Belgian neutrality,
their attitude underwent a sudden modification. Since the whole world,
in a spontaneous impulse of indignation, branded the conduct of
Germany, the traitor and perjurer, in assailing a nation which she was
actually under an obligation to protect, the German Government adopted
the classic procedure of evildoers, which consists in reversing the
rôles, and posing as an innocent victim, driven into a corner by an
adversary who does not abide by legitimate methods of defence. What was
to be done in such a case? The German Government must seem to believe,
and then claim to have proved, that Belgium had already violated her
own neutrality before the German invasion; for then Germany could no
longer be blamed for her attitude.
_Absurdity of the first Accusations._
Immediately the German newspapers invented stories of French troops
disentraining in Belgium from the 30th July, 1914, and of French
officers teaching us how to handle Krupp guns!--of French airmen
flying over Belgium, of French and Belgian soldiers attacking the
Landwehr at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 2nd August, 1914. These pitiful
accusations were demolished by M. Waxweiler in _La Belge Neutre et
Loyale_. We will content ourselves with remarking that all these
infractions of neutrality are anterior to the 4th of August. If they
had really been committed the innumerable spies scattered about Belgium
would have warned the German Minister in Brussels, who would have
telegraphed to the Chancellor, and the latter would have taken good
care to make them the basis of a serious complaint against Belgium in
his speech to the Reichstag. What weight would not these revelations
have lent to his arguments? If he did not do thus it was because he was
not informed, and if he was not informed it was because the facts were
non-existent. They were invented--very clumsily, moreover--after the
event.
If now we cast a glance at the tales which the Germans have imagined
to extenuate their crime against justice, we shall say, with a certain
professor of Utrecht (_K.Z._, 4th November, first morning edition),
that one might with difficulty have pardoned the German rulers for
violating Belgian neutrality if it had been proved that imperious
strategic necessities compelled them to it, but that they should have
stuck to their original declarations, "for," he adds, "we have been
painfully impressed by all the offences which have been alleged after
the event to demonstrate that Germany had the right to act as she did."
To insult and calumniate an innocent person in order to excuse oneself
is an attitude little worthy of a self-respecting nation.
_A Change of Tactics. The Revelations of the_ N.A.Z.
Week by week the German journals add an item to the indictment of
Belgium. One would say that their method of reasoning must be as
follows: "Since we cannot bring forward a single convincing proof, let
us accumulate as many as possible of any degree of value; we shall
end by crushing Belgium with the weight of evidence." In order that
we might judge of the efficacy of this procedure, Germany ought, of
course, to tell us how many bad arguments are to her thinking worth one
good one.
Yet it was extremely important that Germany should be able to bring
forward proof of the crime of Belgium; for directly the neutrals, and
in particular America, began to doubt our political honesty they would
withdraw their sympathies and leave our executioners full liberty of
action. At the same time Germany would be able to pretend that she knew
of Belgium's intrigues, and that by invading our territory in spite of
treaties she was not, properly speaking, committing a treacherous act.
There are reasons for supposing that Germany herself was conscious of
the insufficiency of these accusations. Hence the change of tactics
which we observe after the month of October 1914.
The Government itself entered into the lists. In its official organ,
the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, it commented upon the documents
discovered in the Ministries of Brussels.
To judge of the relevance of this collection of documents we must keep
in mind the two following points: (1) That England played the part
of protector of Belgian neutrality; (2) the probability of a German
invasion in case of war between France and Germany. Let us rapidly
examine these.
1. _England as the Guarantor of Belgian Neutrality._--Every one knows
that for centuries England has been interested, more than any other
nation, in ensuring that Belgium should not be annexed either to France
or to Prussia.
As far back as 1677, says Sorel (_L'Europe et la Révolution française_,
vol. i. p. 338), a French agent in London wrote to Louvois: "It has
been voted unanimously by the Lower Chamber that the English will
sell their very shirts (this is the phrase they use) to make war on
France for the preservation of the Low Countries." During the French
Revolution, and later, under the Empire, the struggle between England
and France was largely provoked by the desire to turn France out of
Belgium.
The Treaty of London (1839) makes no distinction between the five
guarantors of our neutrality: Austria, France, Great Britain,
Prussia, and Russia; but it is none the less unanimously admitted
that England has the most immediate interest in the preservation of
our independence, as it matters greatly to England that Antwerp--that
loaded pistol aimed at the heart of England, as Napoleon used to
say--should become neither French nor German.
Therefore, as soon as Belgium was threatened by an armed invasion, the
traditional policy of England was at once invoked.
It was in virtue of this policy that Great Britain, in 1870, demanded
of France and Germany whether they engaged themselves to maintain
the neutrality of Belgium. The two belligerents gave and kept their
promise. France, driven up against the Belgium frontier at Sedan, did
not even then consider that she had the right to break her word; she
preferred to allow herself to be crushed. If ever there were "strategic
reasons" which would excuse the breaking of a promise, it was then!
All this being so, no one was surprised when in August 1914 the
newspapers announced that England had put the usual question to France
and Germany. This time again France made the reply inspired by her
sense of honour; Germany refused to commit herself.
The historical facts which we have recalled suffice to show that the
protective rôle of England was not invented for the needs of the
moment, as Germany would have the world believe. The Chancellor cannot
be ignorant of these facts; they are known to all. Why then does he
persist in asserting that England would not have intervened had France
been the country to violate our neutrality?
2. _The danger of a German Invasion._--For several years German
generals have been agreed in admitting the necessity of marching the
German army across Belgium in case of war with France.[7] In military
circles this was a _secret de polichinelle_, as the _N.R.C._ remarked
on the 22nd December, 1914 (evening edition).
Moreover, the Germans themselves held that the Belgians could not
have been ignorant of the threat of a German invasion; this idea is
expounded, notably, in a booklet of official aspect, entitled _La_
_part de la culpabilité de l'Angleterre dans la guerre mondiale_.
Belgium therefore had serious reasons for expecting a German attack.
There was evidently only one thing for her to do: to demand assistance
of the country which had constituted itself the protector of her
neutrality, and on which she had always been accustomed to rely with
unshakable confidence.
1. THE REPORT OF M. LE BARON GREINDL, SOMETIME BELGIAN MINISTER IN
BERLIN.
_Falsification of the Greindl Report._
On the 14th October, 1914, the German Government posted on the walls of
Brussels a placard entitled: _England and Belgium_ (_Documents found at
the headquarters of the Belgian Staff_). A reproduction of this placard
was distributed gratuitously, thousands of copies being issued the same
day. This document contains, first, a rapid summary of a report on the
relations which existed in 1906 between the Belgian Chief of Staff
and the British military attaché. Then the placard reproduces, "word
for word," a portion of a report made by M. Greindl, dated the 23rd
December, 1911. In this report M. Greindl warns the Belgian Government
of the possibility of a French attack.
Whosoever will attentively read the exhibited portion of this report
will at once remark that its phrases lack connection and logical
sequence. Thus, there is certainly a hiatus between the opening phrases
and those that begin with: "When it became evident that we should not
allow ourselves to be alarmed by the pretended danger of closing the
Scheldt, the plan was not abandoned, but modified, in the sense that
the English army of assistance would not be disembarked on the Belgian
coast, but in the nearer French ports." Now what is meant by this
"pretended danger"? Pretended by whom? And then "we should not allow
ourselves to be alarmed." Who is "we?" Remark that a few lines farther
on the report speaks of the eventuality of a battle between the Belgian
army and the British army; Belgium, which was just now the ally of the
British, is now their adversary, although nothing indicates how she
passed from the first attitude to the second. In the same sentence
the closing of the Scheldt is spoken of with an English landing on
the _Belgian coast_; yet we cannot imagine M. Greindl placing Antwerp
on the Belgian coast. Can we doubt after this that phrases have been
suppressed in this portion of the document? Evidently not; for it is
radically impossible to realize the bearing and the meaning of the
report by reading the portion published. What, then, is the conclusion
forced upon us? It is that the German Government has "cooked" the
text; omitting to copy certain passages which would not tally with the
deductions which it wished to draw from it, and that it has perhaps
even twisted the meaning of certain phrases.
The publication of the complete report was demanded by the Belgian
Government (see _K.Z._, 24th October, first morning edition). But
Germany refused; the report was too long, it replied, by the medium of
the _N.A.Z._ (25th November, 1914). All that could be obtained was the
publication in facsimile, in the same issue of the _N.A.Z._, of the
heading and the two first lines. Since the German Government did not
publish the rest, we have the right to conclude that this was because
it had subjected the document to falsifications such as were introduced
in that we are now about to consider. In any case, the report as it
was published means nothing. One feels that it was intentionally made
confusing. By whom?
2. THE REPORTS OF GENERALS DUCARNE AND JUNGBLUTH.
The falsifications inserted in these documents by the German
diplomatists have already been lucidly exposed (for example, by E.
Brunets, _Calomnies Allemandes_); so there would be no need to return
to the subject, had not the German Government thought fit to attempt to
use these documents in order to demoralize the Belgians.
At the end of December 1914, and in January 1915, Germany distributed
hundreds of thousands of copies of a pamphlet containing several
documents, among which were translations (into Flemish and French) and
facsimiles of the Ducarne and Jungbluth reports. The famous words of
the "reference" are replaced in their natural position in the middle
of the fourth paragraph,[8] but--and this was a wholly unexpected
discovery--they were also found in the commentary. According to the
copy in the text, one reads: "The document bears on the margin: 'The
entrance of the English into Belgium would take place only after the
violation of our neutrality by Germany.'"
Disconcerting fecundity of Kultur! The Germans have reason to be proud
of their chemical industry. Thanks to a special fertilizer prepared in
the offices of Wilhelmstrasse, the famous phrase, which occurs only
once in the original document, is promptly multiplied and is able to
appear twice over.
_The Attitude of the Belgians toward the German Falsifications._
Note that to give more weight to their explanations the Germans were
careful to have them printed in Flemish and in French, on the paper
and with the type habitually employed by the _Moniteur belge_. It is
then, in the last resort, the Belgian public which has paid the cost of
printing this falsification of a public document. Well, well! they have
mistaken our psychology, for despite these "revelations" our conviction
is unshaken. Not a Belgian has criticized the actions of his Government
in respect of the defensive agreement with England. It would be like
blaming a man whose house was destroyed by fire for having insured it
with a reliable insurance company.
Confronted by the failure of their endeavours to discourage the
Belgians and to embroil them with their legitimate Government, Germany
returned to the charge. A placard dated 10th March, 1915, posted in
Brussels, stated that the Belgian statesmen replied to the publication
of the Ducarne and Jungbluth reports only after the lapse of three
months. The placard evidently alludes to the Belgian Note of the 13th
January, 1915 (_see_ the 2nd _Grey Book_, No. 101). Now the first
sentence of this Note states that the Belgians had already replied on
the 4th December, 1914. Germany could not have been unaware of this
reply; let us add that we ourselves knew of it on the 10th December,
thanks to the issue for the 7th of _L'Indépendance Belge_ (appearing in
London), which was smuggled into Brussels.
The third document contained in the pamphlet of the German Government
related to the _military geographical manuals_.[9] It shows that a
final collaboration (after the violation of her engagements by Germany)
was carefully devised by the British and Belgian staffs. Truly it ill
becomes the Germans, so proud of the introduction of their scientific
method into the art of war, which leaves nothing unthought of, to
reproach others for acting in the same way, and for making meticulous
preparations at an opportune time! In two places the article insists
on the fact that the preparations of these manuals was effected in
"time of peace." But come! should the Belgians and the British have
waited until the Germans were in Belgium before thinking of measures of
defence?
Finally, the pamphlet contains _Fresh and Serious Proofs demonstrating
the complicity of Belgium and England_. Documents were found on the
escritoire of the British Legation in Brussels relating to the Belgian
mobilization, the defence of Antwerp, and the French mobilization. The
accusation is this: these documents were found in the British Legation,
a proof that the Belgian Government had no military secrets from the
British Government, and that they had a close military understanding.
Once again: was Belgium, aware of the Germanic peril, to deliver
herself bound hand and foot to the invader, who, not content with
forgetting his international obligations, was about to run precisely
counter to them? It would evidently have been more agreeable to Germany
to have found in Belgium a lamb all ready to allow itself to be
sacrificed on the altar of _Kultur_. Unhappily for _Kultur_, Belgium
behaved like an enraged ram, determined to sell its life dearly.
* * * * *
Whatever aspect of the question of Belgian neutrality we may consider,
we always come back to this fact: Germany violated this neutrality on
the 4th August, although Belgium had given her no plausible excuse for
doing so. Since then the Germans have undertaken a campaign for the
purpose of justifying their "injustice," as their Chancellor termed
it. But none of the accusations invented after the event can in the
slightest degree extenuate this injustice; their only effect has been
to render still more execrable the treachery of the perjured protector.
_Neutral Opinion._
It is pleasant, in this connection, to cite here the opinion of four
writers belonging to countries which have not taken part in the war.
A Dutch writer published in _De Amsterdammer_ an interesting article
which was translated into French, but of which the sale in Belgium was
immediately prohibited by the Germans.
In a lecture which has achieved a very great celebrity, Herr Karl
Spitteler, a well-known literary man of German-speaking Switzerland,
also took the part of Belgium. We know of this lecture only by the
slashing which it received in the _K.Z._ on the 30th December, in the
first morning edition.
Here is a passage which particularly infuriated the German paper:--
"I consider that to take the documents from the pockets of the gasping
victim (Belgium) is, as to the spirit which inspired the act, a gross
fault of taste. It would have been quite enough to throttle the
victim; to blacken him afterwards is too much. As for Switzerland, if
it associated itself with these calumnies against Belgium, it would
commit not merely an infamy, but a mistake; for on the day when another
Power grudges us our national existence, the same accusations might be
employed against us: do not let us forget that malice is now counted
among the munitions of war."
Another Swiss writer, M. Philippe Godet, expresses his opinions with no
less energy in the _Journal de Genève_ (8th September, 1914).
_The Falsification of M. de l'Escaille's Letter._
In the preceding pages we have dealt only with matters relating to
Belgium. Do not let our attitude be misunderstood. We have not the
presumption to suppose that Belgium has ever occupied the foreground
in the negotiations described; on the contrary, we are perfectly
well aware of the diplomatic insignificance of our country in the
discordant "Concert of Europe" which has ended in the present war.
Our sole object is to show that Belgium has not played the unavowable
rôle which the Germans attributed to her. As to the origin of this
war, and the responsibility which the German rulers seek to foist
upon Great Britain, in order that their own country, and, above all,
their ally, Austria, may evade it, this is a discussion into which we
do not wish to enter, for it lies outside the programme which we have
set ourselves. We ought, however, to speak a word as to the placards
which the German authorities had posted up in Belgium during the month
of September 1914. The first is dated the 16th September; it gives
the résumé of a letter written by M. B. de l'Escaille to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Ten days later a new placard appeared: this time the complete text of
the letter was given, and it was explained how it came to fall into the
hands of the Germans.
Let us leave this last point: it concerns the criminal law, not
diplomacy. Let us examine only the summary which was published and the
conclusions which the Germans drew from it.
Was the summary honest? To discover this let us take the essential
sentence, printed in heavier type: "They possess even the definite
assurance that England will come to the assistance of France"; and let
us compare this with the corresponding passage of the text: "To-day
they are strongly convinced in St. Petersburg, they even have the
assurance, that England will support France." The term "assistance"
(_secouer_) in the summary can apply only to military assistance, while
the text speaks only of "support" (_soutien_), which means diplomatic
action. So the second conclusion also is false--"that England did
not intervene in the war on account of Belgium, but because she had
promised France to give her assistance."
Let us now look at the first conclusion. It is "that Germany was
actuated by pacific intentions, and sought by all means to avoid war."
In reality the text, like the summary, states only that Germany sought
to avoid a general conflict, which means that she wished to localize
the war between Austria and Serbia; in other words, Germany wished
Europe to give Austria a free hand to crush Serbia. Nowhere does the
text say that Germany did anything to avoid "the war": the only war
which was declared on the 30th July, that of Austria against Serbia. In
short, this conclusion is falsified.
There remains the phrase which introduces the two conclusions: "By
this report of the diplomatic representative of Belgium at the Court
of St. Petersburg it is proved".... Was M. de l'Escaille really the
diplomatic representative of Belgium in St. Petersburg? Open an
administrative almanack, and you will see that _the_ representative was
M. le Comte Conrad de Buisseret-Steenbecque de Blarenghien. As for M.
de l'Escaille, he was Secretary of Legation.
The conclusions concluding here, there is no room for further
falsifications.
* * * * *
It is not our intention to make an exhaustive examination of the
diplomatic documents relating to the war; the more so as this
examination has been conducted in masterly fashion by MM. Dürckheim and
Denis, by M. Waxweiler, and by the author of _J'Accuse_. It is enough
for us to prove that Germany has intentionally falsified documents,
since this simple proof disposes of all her attempts to befoul Belgium;
for he who has a good argument at his disposal is not so foolish as to
spoil it and deprive it of all real value by means of falsifications.
D.--The Declaration of War and the first Hostilities.
_The three Successive Proposals of Wilhelm II to Belgium._
Under its dry, cold, diplomatic phrasing the reply to the ultimatum
(1st _Grey Book_, No. 22) scarcely conceals the indignation which
thrilled the heart of Belgium when Wilhelm II offered her the chance
of associating herself with his crime against loyalty. But the
German Government did not understand this indignation, neither was
it conscious of its own infamy. Otherwise how could it have repeated
the same offer a few days later--an offer at once contemptible and
full of contempt, as was so well said by M. Jules Destrée before the
meeting of the Federation of Advocates, on the 3rd August, 1914. Two
remarks on the subject of this fresh proposal (1st _Grey Book_, No.
60). In the first place the United States Minister in Belgium, who was
entrusted with the German interests, refused to transmit it; as for the
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, he accepted the mission "without
enthusiasm." In the second place, when the Emperor affirmed, on the
9th August, that the fortress of Liége had been taken by assault, he
must have known that the fortress was still resisting; for although the
_city_ of Liége was occupied by the Germans from the 7th, the _forts_
were intact. Let us remember that the first fort which fell was that
of Barchon, on the 8th August, 1914; that of Évegnée fell on the 11th,
that of Fléron on the 14th, that of Loncin, commanded by General Leman,
fell only at 5 p.m. on the 15th: and several forts were at that time
still holding out.
German diplomacy naturally received a fresh indignant refusal (1st
_Grey Book_, No. 23).
Even then official Germany, dazzled by the brilliance of its _Kultur_,
had not yet grasped the full baseness of its crime, since on the 10th
September it posted up in Brussels its new proposal and Belgium's reply.
Could candour in perfidy go any farther? Yes! for the German
Government, during the siege of Antwerp, made proposals of peace
for the third time. This offer was secret. The terms have not been
published; even the Germanic Press sought to deny that it had been
made; but the avowal appeared in a Viennese newspaper, the _Neue Freie
Presse_, and was reproduced by order of the German authorities in _La
Belgique_ (Brussels, 13th January, 1915).
_Hostilities preceding the Declaration of War._
So the Emperor Wilhelm II did not succeed in making us his accomplices.
Needless to say, we did not tremble before the two bogies which are
given so large a place in his harangues: his store of dry powder and
his newly-whetted sabre.
And so the sovereign of the formidable German Empire declared war upon
tiny Belgium. "He would find himself, to his keenest regret, obliged
to execute, if need be by force of arms, the measures of security set
forth as indispensable," as the declaration of war expressed it (1st
_Grey Book_, No. 27). This declaration reached Brussels at 7 a.m. on
the 4th of August. But, apparently unknown to the Emperor, the German
troops, before the telegram had reached Belgium, had crossed the
frontier during the night of the 3rd.
We have just seen that the declaration of war reached Brussels on the
4th August, at seven o'clock in the morning. This, at least, is what
we learn from the official documents published by Belgium. What does
official Germany say upon this point? Nothing. Nowhere is any mention
made of the declaration of war, and it is this intentional vagueness
which allows the Germans to declare, without blushing, that the German
troops entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd August. They let it be
supposed that the state of war existed from the moment when Belgium, on
the 3rd, refused the German ultimatum. Thus the _Chronik des Deutschen
Krieges_ (p. 33) gives the text of the ultimatum; then, in two lines,
a summary of the reply. The first document which follows relating to
Belgium is the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of
the Meuse (_6th Report_, I).
This is very vague as to the political relations between the two
countries: are they at war, or are they not? No one could say. Of the
declaration of war, which should have found a place here, not a word;
there is no further question of Belgium before the telegrams of the 7th
August (p. 84).
When we say that the declaration of war is not mentioned in any German
publication, we are going too far. _Die Wahrheit über den Krieg_
("die Wahrheit!") speaks of the declaration of war; but only to say
that Belgium declared war (p. 40): _Belgiën antwortete darauf mit der
Kriegserklärung_.[10]
The same publication appends some documents; No. 41 (p. 160) is a
reproduction of the ultimatum. One would naturally expect that No.
42 would be either Belgium's reply or the declaration of war. By no
means; these two documents are not given. Any one who reads the text
and hopes thereby to learn "die Wahrheit" concerning the war will be
no better informed by the documents. Let us in passing remark that
the German Government, in the _White Book_ published for the session
of the Reichstag of the 4th August, had also, by its own admission,
made a selection among the documents which it submitted to the members
of Parliament. This procedure is no doubt a logical consequence of
_Kultur_.
_The Pacific Character of Belgium._
Nearly all the nations of Europe cherish national animosities, racial
hatreds handed down from century to century, the heritage of conflicts
never pacified, which a mere nothing suffices to renew; or the survival
of oppressions and spoliations suffered of old by men's forbears, whose
abhorred memory is transmitted like a sacred trust from generation
to generation. And in all these countries, moreover, there is a
chauvinist, a jingo party, which urges a "war of revenge against the
hereditary enemy." In Belgium, as Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in
Dublin, there was nothing of the kind. We had no spite against any one,
and our people, laborious and peaceful, only asked to be allowed to
live in friendship with its neighbours. Never had there been in Belgium
any manifestation against a foreign country; never had a political
party inscribed in its programme any sort of hostility towards another
people. Who, then, will be persuaded that "the Belgian Government had
for a long time been carefully preparing for this war,"[11] as the
Emperor Wilhelm II asserted in his telegram to the President of the
United States (in which he also stated that his heart was bleeding!)?
No, there is no possible doubt on this point: Belgium brought into the
conflict no racial enmity,[12] and if she has found herself thrown into
the furnace, despite her constant love of peace, it is solely because
her haughty neighbour confronted her with this dilemma: either peace
with dishonour, or honour with war. The choice was not in doubt.
_German Espionage in Belgium._
It is idle to insist on the accusation of premeditation, for it is
unhappily too certain that Belgium was is no way ready for war. But
it is also incontestable that Germany had "for a long time carefully
prepared for" the invasion of Belgium. We cannot as yet reveal in
detail the facts as to German espionage, with its often odious methods,
for in most cases these revelations would expose those who have
informed us to reprisals. We must for the present be intentionally
vague, reserving preciser details for a later date.
When the occupation comes to an end we shall report in detail the case
of a German engineer, who, in returning to us with the rank of officer,
presided over the systematic destruction by fire of the workshop
which he had managed; and the case of another engineer, who commanded
the gang ordered to set fire to the quarter adjoining the factory in
which he had been employed. Thanks to his knowledge of the locality,
he was able in a few seconds to set fire to the richest streets of
the neighbourhood. We shall be able to mark on a map the foundations
of reinforced concrete for the great German guns, constructed long
in advance, in the localities most favourable to bombardment; we
shall also point to the store of timber intended to serve for the
construction of a bridge over the Scheldt, which was found in a factory
established by Germans on the banks of the river. As for the store of
Mauser rifles discovered at Liége, our newspapers spoke of that at the
time.
Here is a fact which can be related without danger. A German officer
dropped from his pocket--we shall state later on in what locality--a
detailed plan of the town of Soignies, in which his troops had lodged a
few days earlier. This plan gives, besides the details of streets, and
even houses, information concerning the occupants of certain buildings:
pharmacies, breweries, tanneries, the Communal treasury, the bank, and
other establishments where the army might need to make requisitions.
The large buildings are coloured blue. It was there that the troops
were lodged. This plan, drawn in Chinese ink and coloured, dates from
fifteen years back according to the indications which it contains.
But it has quite recently been revised and completed, for the latest
alterations in the town have been added in pencil; improvement of the
Senne, creation of a public square, etc.
The case related by the _N.R.C._ of 19th August (evening) is
particularly instructive. When the Germans occupied Liége and Seraing
the Cockerill workshops naturally refused to work for them, since the
Germans wished them to make munitions for them. The German Colonel
Keppel then assumed the direction of the works, promising the workers
an increased salary of 50 per cent. And this officer did not blush to
sign his proclamation: "Attaché of the German Government at the Liége
Exposition." He had consequently profited by his privileged situation
in Belgium in order to make himself familiar with the organization of
the Cockerill works. But it must be supposed that matters were too
difficult for him, for Herren Koester and Noske (_Kriegsfahrten_, p.
21) assert that he had to abandon the position.
_The Mentality of the German Soldiers at the beginning of the Campaign._
Until the very last moment our enemies deluded themselves as to the
loyalty of the Belgians: they still hoped that the latter would
only resist as a matter of form. This idea is openly expressed in
the Chancellor's speech of the 2nd December; it is also implicitly
contained in the proclamation of General von Emmich (see _6th Report_,
I). The officers and soldiers who crossed the frontier at the beginning
of the war were quite bewildered by the unforeseen resistance of the
Belgian Army; this is what the German prisoners interned at Bruges tell
their relatives; they even go so far as to deplore having to fight a
neutral country.
LETTERS FROM GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR.
We hear from Belgium:--
The correspondence of the German prisoners of war (to the number of
about two thousand) who, at the beginning of the war, were interned in
the barracks of the Bruges Lancers, has passed almost entirely through
our hands.
All say they are well treated. Some even hope that the Belgian
prisoners in Germany will be as well treated as they. One wounded
soldier in a Bruges hospital relates that the Belgians treat the German
wounded like brothers; another speaks only of his "Belgian comrades"!
The good food served to them seems to make a great impression. Most
of them say, "We have enough to eat"; or even, "We have food in
abundance." Only one complains of "beer without flavour and bad wine";
but another says with much simplicity: "The people here are very
kind to us, for we have enough to eat and drink." The word _for_ is
amusing....
The letters of the officers are quite different. No more joy because
their lives are safe. The war absorbs them entirely. They are warriors
at heart and the struggle interests them passionately. They know
nothing of what is happening, or rather they are not told what is
happening, and they want to know ... to know, and it is painful to hear
in each letter the same question: what news? The forced inactivity
becomes a torture. Boredom presses on them: they are discouraged and
greatly disillusioned; they had hoped to pass very rapidly across
Belgium (it must be remembered that at this time the war was only
beginning, that Brussels was not yet occupied, and that the letters
date from this period).
The attack upon Belgium does not seem to please a great many of them.
"We have attacked a neutral country," says a medical officer, "and we
shall now have to suffer the eventual consequences."
"When we got out of the train," says another, "we received the order
to fight against Belgium, a thing which is to me and to all highly
antipathetic. But what is commanded has to be executed."
"The attack on Belgium was from the first a shameful thing."
"We violated Belgium before any declaration of war had been made"!
All the letters show how little the resistance of Liége was expected.
Many say: "Of all our company, of our battalion, of our regiment,
there are left only so many or so many men." One relates how in a
few minutes his colonel, his major, the captains, and nearly all the
lieutenants were mown down by the balls. "We are all mightily deluded,"
admits another; "we were too confident; we thought the Belgians were
disheartened"! "The Belgians fight like lions," says another.
_German Lies respecting the Occupation of Liége._
It is the truth, although the news is partly from a German source, that
the Germans entered Belgium on the night of the 3rd of August; they
crossed the frontier near Gemmenich at two o'clock in the morning, and
the following night (of the 4th of August) they were already attempting
an attack upon Liége. But the official telegrams from Berlin have never
mentioned this date. To make it believed that the capture of Liége
was extremely rapid and that the German army had met with no serious
resistance, the staff pruned the siege of Liége at both ends; it made
the operation commence on the 5th August instead of the 4th, and
declared that it was already completed by the 7th August.
We could not give a more precise idea of the manner in which the
Government and its "reptile Press" deceives public opinion than by
reproducing two telegrams relating to the fall of Liége. On the 7th of
August, having reported the entrance of the troops into Belgium on the
previous day, the telegrams announced the capture of the fortress of
Liége.[13] Note this: the capture of the _fortress_ (Festung). Now the
Germans had merely occupied the town of Liége, a town absolutely open,
without ramparts or defences of any kind. They themselves were forced
to own, on the 10th, that the forts had not been captured; but they
added that the guns were no longer firing, which was false (p. 50).
BERLIN, _7th August_.--Our advance guard entered Belgium the day
before yesterday, along the whole frontier. A small division
attempted, with great valour, a surprise attack upon Liége. A few
cavalrymen pushed on into the city, and attempted to seize the
commandant, who was only able to escape by flight. The surprise
attack against the fortress, constructed according to modern
principles, did not succeed. Our troops are before the fortress,
in contact with the enemy. Naturally the whole enemy Press will
describe this enterprise as a defeat; but it has no influence on
the great operations; for us it is only an isolated fact in the
history of the war, and a proof of the aggressive courage of our
troops.
(_Kr. D. des K. Z._, p. 9.)
BERLIN, _7th August_. Official. (_Wolff Agency._)--The fortress of
Liége is taken. After the divisions, which had attempted a surprise
attack upon Liége, had been reinforced, the attack was pushed to a
successful termination. This morning at 8 o'clock the fortress was
in the power of Germany.
(_Kr. D. des K. Z._, p. 11.)
However, it was necessary to prevent the bad effect which would be
produced on the population by foreign communiqués announcing that the
German army was continuing to besiege Liége after taking it. After the
complete success announced on the 7th the task was, in fact, rather
difficult. How was it to be effected?
(_a_) Discredit might be thrown on news coming from abroad, for
example, by "demonstrating" its untruthfulness. _Der Lügenfeldzug_
gives on p. 19 the announcement of the taking of Liége, and on the
_following_ page the Havas telegram stating that Liége is not taken.
What will the superficial reader conclude if he does not take the
trouble to dissect the telegrams? That the Allies are shameless liars,
going to the length of denying the obvious. But examine the dates:
Liége was taken, according to the Germans, on the 7th August, at 8
a.m., while the Allies declare that Liége is not taken--on the 6th!
And to think that the book which perpetrates this trickery is entitled
_Der Lügenfeldzug unserer Feinde_ ("Our Enemies' Campaign of Lies")!
and that it undertakes the mission of calling attention to the lies and
calumnies of the enemy in order to correct them!
(_b_) To establish confusion between the city and the fortress. As
early as the 7th August the false newsmongers were rejoicing over
the taking of the fortress, intentionally confusing the city and the
fortified place, so that the reader of these communiqués no longer
knows what to think, and naturally accepts the official news of his own
country.
_The sudden Attack upon France is checked._
To understand how completely it was in Germany's interest to create the
belief that Liége was taken in two days by a small body of troops, we
must remember that the object of the Germans was to traverse Belgium
as rapidly as possible, in order to crush the French and capture
Paris. The author of _J'accuse_ reports the remark of old Marshal
von Haeseler, who proposed to celebrate in Paris the anniversary of
Sedan--on the 2nd September, 1914. We ourselves copied a charcoal
inscription written on the front of a house burned down at Battice,
making an appointment in Paris for the 2nd September with a certain
regiment of artillery.
Now this sudden march was completely spoiled and the German plan of
campaign undone by the unexpected resistance of the Belgians, first at
Liége, then at Hesbays. This loss of a few days was fatal to Germany,
and Germany bears us malice on that account.
_The Disinterested Behaviour of Belgium._
One last point as to the violation of our neutrality.
The Germans now pretend to pity the poor Belgians, who allowed
themselves to be fooled by England as much as by their King and
Government, and who, by their credulity, brought the war upon
themselves. But what am I saying?--the German Government assures the
world that we ourselves desired the war. Official Germany has become
incapable of conceiving that a people should remain faithful to its
international obligations, and if need be sacrifice itself for them.
"Why," our adversaries ask us, "did you not accept the proposals of
Germany? You would have profited by them." And indeed our eastern
neighbours offered us £200,000 as the price of our complicity (F.
Bettix, _Der Krieg_).
It would be very interesting to know on what data Germany calculates
the value of a nation's honour; in any case, we may assure her that no
one in the world would be so simple as to offer so great a sum for hers.
* * * * *
For the rest, as far as we Belgians are concerned our interest has
never entered into our calculations. It was not in order to profit
by it that we resisted Germany; it was because we judged that such
was our obligation as an honest nation. And yet, as the Minister, M.
Carton de Wiart, remarked, at the Hotel de Ville in Paris, on the 20th
December, 1914, we had, even then, the vision of our country ravaged
by the Prussian hordes; but even to-day, after suffering such terrible
atrocities, there is not a Belgian "who would change his poverty for
the profits of a bandit."
FOOTNOTES:
[6] The Germans do not like one to quote these words of Herr
Bethmann-Hollweg. A series of pamphlets, _Histoire de la guerre de
1914_, which has appeared in Brussels during the occupation, reports
the last conversation of the Chancellor with the British Ambassador on
the 4th of August, 1914 (p. 206), but the "scrap of paper" does not
figure therein: the censorship suppressed this too compromising passage.
[7] See, for example, Bernhardi's _How Germany makes War_, pp. 190,
191, 192. On the 4th of March, 1882, the _Nord. Allg. Zeit._ declared:
"Germany has no political motive for violating Belgian neutrality, but
the military advantage which might result forces her thereto." Emile
Bauning, _La Belgique au point de vue Militaire et International_,
Brussels, 1906, p. 58.
[8] Apparently such unusual honesty cannot long survive in the mind of
a German diplomatist. The phrase is in its proper place in the French
text, but it is lacking in the Flemish text, which is printed facing it.
[9] _K.Z._, 2nd December, 1st edition, morning, published the same
revelations. This article is more complete than that printed in
Brussels. We hasten to correct a numerical error which renders the
opening of the second paragraph incomprehensible: it states that five
years had elapsed between 1905 and 1914. According to the _K.Z._ one
should read 1909 instead of 1905.
[10] The same lie figures in _Lüttich_, p. 5.
[11] The French text here quoted is that which was posted up. The
German text, also posted, states that Belgium had long ago carefully
armed the civil population (see p. 208).
[12] An article on "Flemings and Walloons" in _K.Z._ for 13th March
(noon edition), declares that Belgium knew nothing of chauvinism, nor
even, adds the writer, of nationalism.
[13] These lies die hard. Herren Koester and Noske, in the introduction
of their book, _Kreigsfahrten durch Belgiën und Nordfrankreich_,
literally state: "The German troops entered Belgium on the 6th of
August; on the following day the fortress of Liége had been taken by
assault."