THE AUTUMN OF 1918--LAST BATTLE WITH THE TURKS--CLOSE OF THE WAR IN
MESOPOTAMIA.
The summer of 1918 having come to an end, the British army in
Mesopotamia prepared for another advance.
The general aspect of the Great War had by that time undergone a
sudden and promising change, for the Germans had failed in their
fierce offensive against the Allies on the Western Front, Austria had
shattered herself against their lines in Northern Italy, and Bulgaria
was firmly held by the Salonika force, while in Asia the exhaustion
of the Turks was now very evident. They had completely failed to stop
General Allenby’s victorious advance in Palestine and Syria, and
were hastily withdrawing troops from the Persian frontier and the
Caucasus. In Mesopotamia they were still trying to show a bold front,
but it seemed clear that they were no longer in strength sufficient
to withstand a determined attack by the large and eager British army
opposed to them.
“This, then,” says General Marshall, “seemed the moment to take the
offensive against the Turkish 6th Army, covering the approaches to
Mosul, and it was with great pleasure that on the 7th October I
received orders to carry out this movement.”
The main body of the enemy’s troops, now reduced from long fighting
and other causes to about 9000 men with 59 guns, held a formidable
position astride the Tigris, at the Fatha Gorge--some thirty-five miles
above the British railhead at Tekrit. The position had been thoroughly
prepared for defence during the past eighteen months, and was of great
natural strength. The Turkish right flank rested securely on two
ranges of rugged hills which projected into the waterless desert,
and therefore could not be turned by slow-moving Infantry. Their left
extended for about five miles along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin, and
was strongly entrenched.
[Illustration: _APPROXIMATE SKETCH OF RICHARDSONS BLUFF POSITION_]
To attack such a position by direct advance up the Tigris was a
difficult matter, and General Marshall would have preferred to move his
main force by way of Kirkuk in the north-east, but this was impossible.
A large part of his transport had been taken away by the operations
in Northern Persia and the necessity for collecting the harvest, so
that there was not enough to subsist a large body of troops at such
a distance from the railway. The only available route for the main
force, therefore, was the line of the Tigris, by which supplies could
be pushed up, and this was perforce the one selected. Even so there was
only transport enough to make mobile his Cavalry and half his Infantry.
[Illustration: LT.-COL. T. T. RICHARDSON, D.S.O. SEPTEMBER 1918]
The plan adopted was to work up the eastern bank of the river and turn
or force the enemy’s left. If that could be done, the intention
was to cut his line of retreat on Mosul by means of Cavalry working
round his left, and light-armoured motor-cars moving round his right
through the desert. A small column was sent up towards Kirkuk under
Brigadier-General Lewin to keep off any attack upon the British right.
But the reduction of the Turkish position proved to be an easier task
than any one had expected. On the night of the 23rd October, when
all was ready for the general attack on the Fatha Gorge, a British
column pushed along the crest of the Jebel Hamrin against the enemy’s
left, while the 7th Cavalry Brigade, to which the Thirteenth had now
returned, moved round the north of the range. “The vigorous action
of these two columns,” says General Marshall, “caused the Turks to
abandon the very strong Fatha position before daylight,” and to retreat
up-stream.
Then followed some days of manœuvring and fighting, the Infantry
pressing steadily upon the retreating Turks in spite of great
difficulties, for the enemy had destroyed the road through the hills on
both banks of the river, and a Brigade of Cavalry under General Cassels
trying to work round into the enemy’s rear. In this attempt the Cavalry
were successful. Moving wide of the Tigris, they rode right round the
enemy’s left, and on the 26th October, coming back to the river, they
struck a ford opposite Hadraniya, fifteen miles above Shergat, the
point where the Turks intended to make their real stand. This movement
was masked by the other Brigade, the 7th, under Brigadier-General
Norton, who demonstrated on the line of the Tigris.
The Hadraniya ford was a bad one, for it crossed three channels of the
river, one of which was nearly five feet deep, with a strong current;
but Cassels got his regiments over, and, directly he had done so, sent
one of them at a gallop to seize an important gorge five miles down
stream, between him and the Turks, who were retreating upon him. By
the morning of the 27th October the bulk of the Brigade had taken up a
strong position blocking the road to Mosul, and it had been joined by
the light motor-cars, which had got round through the desert.
It was a daring move, for Cassels had only three weak regiments of
Cavalry and a battery of Horse Artillery, while below him was the
retreating Turkish force, and above him to the north an unknown number
of Turkish reinforcements from Mosul coming down to join it. But this
was the one chance of capturing the main body of the enemy, and the
Brigade meant to hold its position at all costs until supported.
For the next two days, the 27th and 28th October, Cassels was in
serious danger, for though to conceal his weakness he boldly attacked,
he was soon attacked himself from the south by a very superior force
of Infantry and guns, which made repeated attempts to break through,
while the Turkish reinforcements from Mosul moved against his rear. But
though hard pressed he managed to hold his ground, and on the afternoon
and evening of the second day support began to arrive. First came a
battalion of Infantry which had made a forced march of thirty-three
miles from the eastward, and then after dark the 7th Cavalry Brigade,
which after a march of forty-three miles crossed the Tigris by the
difficult Hadraniya Ford. In doing so they lost several men and horses
drowned, but their arrival made all the difference. Cassels was now too
strong to be easily overwhelmed.
Still the position was critical, for the main body of the Turks, though
retreating, had not been beaten, and the British troops were nearly
worn out. The Infantry “had been marching and fighting for four days
under most arduous conditions,” while Cassels and his own Cavalry
Brigade had been continuously in action for seventy-two hours, and all
the force now at his disposal had made long marches. But if the Turkish
force was to be held, there must be no rest for the troops, in spite
of exhaustion and darkness, for the enemy saw that he was trapped, and
would be sure to fight desperately for freedom.
He certainly did so. During the night of the 28th he tried again and
again to break out northwards, and though he did not succeed, he fought
on all through the 29th, and all through the night that followed; and
some of his counter-attacks against the British Infantry who were
pressing him from the south were by no means easily stopped. It was
a splendid defence, and rightly called forth the admiration of his
assailants.
The end of the battle may best be told in General Marshall’s words:--
“Meanwhile a serious threat from Turkish reinforcements (5th Division
troops) moving down from the Mosul direction developed against Cassels’
right flank. These troops established themselves with guns and
machine-guns on the high bluffs near Hadraniya, but were promptly dealt
with by the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The Thirteenth Hussars galloped across
the open, dismounted under the bluffs, and, led by their Colonel,
carried the position by assault, many Turks being accounted for with
the bayonet.
“Mounted pursuit by the remainder of the 7th Cavalry Brigade cleared
away further menace from the north, and resulted in the capture of 1000
prisoners, with 2 guns and 12 machine-guns.
“The enemy’s avenues of escape northwards were now effectively blocked,
thanks to the skilful and resolute handling of his detachment by
General Cassels, and the firm determination of his troops, who repulsed
every attempt by the enemy to break through.
“Gripped as in a vice, with his men packed in ravines which were
raked by our guns from across the Tigris, Ismail Hakki, the Turkish
Commander, found himself in a hopeless position. All attempts to break
through had failed, communication with the Turkish Commander-in-Chief
at Mosul had been rendered impossible, and no relief was in sight.
At dawn on October 30th, just as our troops were about to renew the
attack, white flags appeared all along the Turkish lines, and later on
Ismail Hakki surrendered in person.”
So ended the last battle fought in the Great War by a Turkish army.
It had been gallantly contested, but the victory was as complete as a
victory could be. The Turkish 6th Army had been not only defeated but
captured.
Immediately after the surrender, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and armoured
cars pushed rapidly along the Mosul road and made a considerable
addition to the number of prisoners. The 14th (Indian) Lancers,
charging with the lance, captured a convoy and 500 men, while the
13th Lancers captured a Turkish battalion. Altogether the Turks lost
on the 30th October over 11,000 prisoners and 51 guns, besides great
quantities of machine-guns, animals, and military material of all kinds.
By the first of November both Cavalry Brigades had got within twelve
miles of Mosul, when they were met by a flag of truce informing them
that an armistice had been concluded between Great Britain and Turkey.
Hostilities ceased, and the long campaign in Mesopotamia had closed
with a dramatic success.
At Shergat, as elsewhere, the bulk of the close fighting had of
course been done by the Infantry, but General Marshall reported that
“the daring and brilliant leadership of the Cavalry Brigades under
Brigadier-Generals Cassels and Norton contributed largely to the final
result,” and it may safely be affirmed that no Regiment in those
Brigades had more right to be proud of its share in the work than the
Thirteenth Hussars.
The extracts appended give details of its movements during the last
period of the campaign, and especially of the affair at “Richardson’s
Bluff,” as the scene of the fight at Hadraniya came to be called.
_Account by General Norton, commanding 7th Brigade._
“The Brigade left Fathah at one o’clock on the night of the 27th-28th
October, crossed the Lesser Zab at about 8 A.M., and reached
the Hadrani-Yah Ford over the Tigris at 4.30 P.M. on the 28th,
having marched about 50 miles since 1 A.M., the last 30 under
a very hot sun, and about 70 miles in the last 36 hours.
“The leading Regiment (13th Lancers) immediately commenced to cross to
the right bank, and got over without accident, but as the ford was a
difficult one, there was considerable delay, and, by the time it came
to the turn of the 13th Hussars, it was practically dark. The ford,
which had been difficult in daylight, became positively dangerous after
dusk, and a number of men, particularly those leading pack-horses, got
into difficulties, and were carried down-stream. Hampered as they were
by their ammunition and other equipment, their situation was a very
precarious one, but most of them fortunately managed to scramble out on
one bank or the other.
“When the roll was eventually called, it was found that three men,
viz.:--
No. 8267, Lance-Corpl. Bartlett,
9196, Private Donoghue,
31571, Private Newman,
and two horses, were missing. With the exception of Private Newman,
whose dead body was found by the Infantry several days later some
distance down-stream, no trace of these men has ever been found.
“In the whole Brigade, 21 men were carried away by the strong current,
and drowned while crossing this ford.
“Only three squadrons of the Regiment crossed on this night, the
remaining squadron (‘A’ Squadron, under Lieutenant H. C. D. FitzGibbon,
M.C.) being ordered to remain on the left bank as escort to the
Battery, which could not be got across in the dark.
“The Brigade, less the battery, this squadron, and the 13th D.C.
Lancers, bivouacked on the river bank; the 13th Lancers, as soon as
they were across, had been sent forward to support the right of the
11th Brigade, which was occupying a ridge of hills S.W. of the ford,
parallel to the river, and about 3000 yards away from it.
“The night passed without incident, although there was a considerable
amount of firing from the position occupied by the 11th Brigade and the
13th D.C. Lancers.
“Before daybreak on the 29th, the Brigade was moved into a covered
position under the river bank, and orders were issued for the battery
and the remaining squadron of the 13th Hussars to cross to the right
bank as soon as there was sufficient daylight.
“The moment the squadron commenced to cross, the Turks shelled the ford
heavily and accurately from 2 guns on high ground about 3000 yards to
the N.W.
“The squadron managed to get across, fortunately without casualties,
but it was obviously impossible for the battery to do so until the
hostile fire had been subdued.
“About 7 A.M., V Battery, R.H.A., came into action on the left
bank, and the Turks shortly afterwards withdrew their guns.
“About this time a squadron of the 13th D.C. Lancers, which had been
ordered to push up the Mosul road at daybreak, encountered heavy shell
and M.G. fire, and was compelled to fall back to the Cemetery, where it
held its own with difficulty.
“It was clear now that the enemy were holding the high ground to the
N.W. in considerable force, and did not consist, as reported by aero
reconnaissances, of merely a few scattered groups of Infantry.
“Their position was on a range of hills approximately parallel to the
river, and at about 3000 yards from it. At the southern extremity of
this range was a high bluff, which will be referred to as Hadraniyah
Bluff. Farther to the south again was the range held by the 11th
Brigade and 13th D.C. Lancers, and between Hadraniyah Bluff and the
river, and some 1000 yards to the S.E. of the former, was a fair-sized
isolated hill on which was a Mahomedan cemetery.
“After a personal reconnaissance of the position, so far as was
possible, the Brigadier at 8.15 A.M. issued orders for the
13th Hussars, supported by the 24th Jat Lancers, and covered by the
fire of V Battery, R.H.A., from across the river, and the Vickers guns,
a subsection of which was now in action on the Cemetery Hill, to gallop
across the open from their covered position near the river, dismount
under the Bluff, and carry the position by a dismounted attack.
“It should be explained that the contour of the hill made it obvious,
that unless the Turks came out of their trenches, which were none too
well sited, and advanced a short distance down the hill, there must be
a considerable amount of dead ground at the foot of the slope, which
would give cover to the horses, and enable the troops to form for
the dismounted attack. It was hoped that the gun-fire would make it
impossible for the Turks to leave their trenches for the purpose of
covering this dead ground.
“On debouching from their covered position on the river bank, in
accordance with the above orders, the leading squadron at once came
under a hot fire from the Turkish machine-guns on the hill, and the
squadron leader (Captain Evans, 21st Lancers) fell severely wounded.
“This caused the squadron to lose its direction: it inclined slightly
to its left, and halted under the cover of Cemetery Hill.
“The remaining squadrons followed it, and eventually the whole Regiment
was concentrated behind this hill.
“By this time, it was clear that the guns had not yet succeeded in
subduing the Turkish fire, and the further prosecution of the attack
was held up to allow a further artillery preparation.
“Brigade Headquarters was now on Cemetery Hill, and the F.O.O. of the
Battery was also established there with his signallers.
“About this time--viz., 10 A.M.--a Field Battery, No. A/33,
R.F.A., having crossed the ford, was placed at the disposal of the
Brigadier, and came into action some 2000 yards to the S.E. of Cemetery
Hill.
“At 12.30 P.M. the Brigadier personally gave orders to
Lieut.-Colonel Richardson to renew the attack on the Bluff at 1.20
P.M., and detailed arrangements were made for the attack to be
closely supported by both Batteries and all available Vickers guns.
“In accordance with these orders, the Regiment, in column of wings
with extended files, debouched from under cover of Cemetery Hill, and
galloped straight for the Bluff. The ground was flat and open, the
only obstacle being a rather deep dry nullah about half-way, which
caused a little crowding and delay. The moment the leading squadron
debouched, the Turks opened a heavy fire with all their machine-guns,
but the accurate fire of our two batteries and the Vickers guns made it
impossible for them to leave their trenches, and the squadrons soon got
into the dead ground under the Bluff.
“During this phase of the attack, although these galloping squadrons
were absolutely exposed for at least 500 yards to the fire of 12
machine-guns and 1000 Infantry, at ranges from 1500 to 500 yards, not a
single man was hit, and only one or two horses.
“Had the Turks put down a machine-gun barrage on some point, such as
the afore-mentioned nullah, and kept it there, our casualties must
have been considerable; but they were evidently disconcerted by the
heavy shelling, and there appeared to be no central control, each
machine-gunner firing as he pleased.
“Having reached the foot of the Bluff, the Hussars lost no time in
dismounting and forming for attack. Having fixed bayonets, they swarmed
up the almost precipitous hill, gallantly led by their Commanding
Officer.
“All this time, both batteries, using ‘gun-fire,’ were bursting their
shells with beautiful accuracy along the crest of the Hill, and the
Vickers guns were also keeping up a heavy fire on the trenches.
“This barrage did not lift until the Hussars were within a few yards
of the crest, and there is no doubt that the splendid accuracy and
rapidity of fire of these guns was a most important factor in making
the attack the success it was.
“From Brigade Headquarters on Cemetery Hill, it was clear that the
Turks in the trenches, having seen the squadrons moving towards them at
a gallop, and being unable to see what was happening at the foot of the
hill, were becoming anxious. Individual men and small parties could be
seen getting out of the advanced trenches and moving to the rear, many
being caught by the barrage as they did so.
“As the barrage lifted, the Hussars, still led by their Colonel,
charged over the crest, shot or bayoneted such Turks as still
confronted them in the trenches, and then rapidly forming line to the
right, swept along the crest to deal with the Turks who were still
holding their position at the north end of the hill.
“As soon as the Hussars’ attack had gained the crest, the 13th D.C. and
14th Jat Lancers quickly mounted, and galloped round to the west and
north, captured the enemy’s two guns, and cut off the retreat of the
Infantry retiring before the attack of the 13th Hussars.
“Seeing their retreat entirely cut off, the whole Turkish force
surrendered.
“In this successful operation, 2 mountain-guns, 12 machine-guns, and
982 unwounded prisoners were taken, and there was a considerable number
of Turkish dead and wounded on the hill.
“This enemy force consisted of the whole of the 13th Regiment which had
been sent from the 5th Division in Persia to reinforce the army of Haqi
Bey.”
_Extract from Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell._
”7TH CAVALRY BRIGADE,
IN CAMP OUTSIDE MOSUL,
_4th Nov. 1918_.
”MY DEAR GENERAL,--I must send you a line to tell you of
another fine performance by the Regiment--a performance which our
Brigadier (Gen. Charles Norton), the Commanding Officers of the other
Regiments of the Brigade, and other eye-witnesses describe to me as
the finest thing they have ever seen. I myself agree that not only as
a spectacle but in its complete and immediate success it is the finest
performance put up by the Regiment during the war, but as a test
of discipline and tenacity I would place Lajj first: there we were on
the verge of annihilation, and yet managed to put up a fighting front
to the enemy; here it is true we were foiled in our first attempt,
but the sqdns. reached cover in perfect order, and the failure of the
early morning only made them the keener to score in the afternoon. I
enclose a copy of the dry sober account of the day, which I made in my
note-book two days after the occurrence, so I will only give you here
a brief outline of the events which led up to our being where we were,
and of the few days after the 29th which led us to the occupation of
Mosul.
[Illustration: Sergt. R. HOLLOWAY
(_Killed at Hadraniyeh, 29th October 1918_)]
[Illustration: L.-Sergt. WM. LEEMAN
(_Killed at Hadraniyeh, 29th October 1918_)]
[Illustration: S.-Sergt. J. F. COUCH, D.C.M.
(_Died at Chaldari, 4th July 1918_)]
[Illustration: 2nd Lieut. G. R. RUSSELL
(_Wounded at Hadraniyeh, 29th October 1918_)]
[Illustration: Cpl. A. VINALL, D.C.M.
(_Died of wounds, 31st October 1918_)]
“Since an armistice, in the nature of a complete military surrender by
Turkey, has been arranged and signed, I hardly suppose that the censor
will seriously object to numbers of Brigades and Divisions being given,
but I will not risk more deletion than is necessary for the tale.
“Well, the original objective was the reduction of the Fathah
position--a very strong natural position formed by the passage of the
Tigris through the range of hills known on the left bank as the Jebel
Hamrin and on the right bank as Jebel Makhul--about thirty miles N. of
Tekrit, held on both banks by some 3000 rifles and 40 guns. Two Cavalry
Bgds., ours and Cassels’, had made a long turning movement over the
Hamrin, and were in position to the N. and N.E. of the Turkish position
by dawn of day, and our feelings were rather mixed when we learnt
about 8 A.M. that Johnny Turk had evacuated the position a
day or two earlier, and retired mostly along the main road to Mosul
on the right bank, which ran through a series of strong natural
defensive positions against which the Infantry could make only slow
progress against the Turk, who is a past-master in the art of rearguard
fighting: so obstinate was he in holding on to a position opposite the
confluence of the Lesser Zab river with the Tigris that we were hurried
one night to the Fathah Gorge, which we bridged with a pontoon, to go
up the right bank and create a diversion in favour of our Infantry; on
arriving at Fathah, however, the position had changed--the Turk had
retired, and we were no longer required on the right bank; but in the
meantime Cassels’ Bgde. had crossed the Tigris some twenty-five miles
north of the Lesser Zab, and had taken up a position astride the line
of retreat of the Turks, and reinforcements to the latter were said to
be closing on Cassels’ rear, so after a few hours’ halt we were hurried
back to the Zab and beyond it to the ford, which we reached at dusk
on the 28th, having covered 40 miles since 1 A.M. that day.
The ford was deep and unmarked; I was riding my biggest horse, and the
water was over my knees; on many men it was up to the waist, and we
were unfortunate in losing three men, of whom no trace could be found
in the dark.
“The events of the 29th I have described in the attached account. The
Bgde. that night (29th) bivouacked on its fighting ground, and next
morning moved S.W. to a position on Cassels’ right, where about 10 a.m.
we learnt that the Turks caught between the Infantry and Cassels had
surrendered: we therefore turned our heads northward, and about 2.30
P.M. came up with the Turkish rearguard, who surrendered after
a few rounds from the battery, and the 13th Lancers pursuing brought
back a lot more, making the total captures of the Bgde. up to about
2500 for the two days.
“Next day we continued our advance northward toward Mosul, but about 11
A.M. met Turkish envoys in a car, who came to tell us that an
armistice had been signed.
“We have been on half rations or less for many days, and hardly get
a scrap of outside news, but these days must be fraught with intense
interest and excitement at home, and these details must in comparison
fade into insignificance; but, hereafter, they will be of interest
to all concerned with the Regiment, so I will not labour at further
excuses for writing.”
_Enclosure in Colonel Richardson’s letter to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, of
the 4th November 1918._
“THE STORMING OF THE CLIFF AND PLATEAU NEAR HADRANIYAH,
AFTERWARDS CALLED (IN BRIGADE ORDERS) RICHARDSON’S BLUFF, BY THE
THIRTEENTH HUSSARS, ON THE 29TH OCTOBER 1918.
[Illustration: THE STORMING OF RICHARDSON’S BLUFF
29TH OCTOBER 1918]
“The night of the 28th-29th passed rather cheerlessly, most of the
men having got wet to the waist, and in many cases their blankets and
warm coats also having been soaked in fording the river the previous
evening, and before dawn we moved down under cover of the river
bank, where we were practically immune from the shell-fire which
was opened on us soon after daylight and continued until about 7
A.M. About this time I received orders to gallop the Regiment
and get a footing on a plateau rising almost sheer from the plain,
on which several emplacements could be seen. I asked for and got the
co-operation of V Battery, which put a strong barrage on the plateau
from 8 A.M. to 8.15 A.M., at which hour we emerged
from the river bank, supported on either flank by a subsection of 18
M.G.’s, commanded respectively by Lt. Noel and Lt. Foley. The following
is a rough sketch showing disposition of Regiment and ground to be
covered.
“As the Regiment reached the open, the four squadrons took up a diamond
formation--‘B’ Squadron under Capt. Evans, 21st Lancers, leading, ‘C’
on left flank, ‘D’ on right flank, and ‘A’ Squadron (Lt. Fitzgibbon)
bringing up the rear. I rode in the centre, and on either flank were
the Hotchkiss guns of two squadrons co-operating with the subsection of
machine-guns--_i.e._, ‘B’ and ‘D’ on right, under Lt. Parkes, and ‘A’
and ‘C’ on left, under Lt. Hartigan, M.C.
“As soon as the Regiment came into sight in the open a very hot fire
from M.G.’s, rifles, and camel guns (9-pounders) was opened on it, and
when about 1000 yds. from its objective, Capt. Evans was very seriously
wounded, and the troop leaders of the Leading Squadron led their
troops to the cover of the Cemetery Hill, where the remainder of the
Regiment quickly concentrated. I quite agreed with their action at the
time, and looking back two days afterwards with the knowledge gained
since, I am convinced that it was the right course to take. The crest
of the plateau was very much more strongly held than had ever been
anticipated, and sufficient time had not been allowed for the artillery
barrage.
“We occupied the Cemetery Hill and tried to gain ground to the west,
but the glacis was quite bare and exposed to M.G. fire from the plateau
and from trenches to the west. The Brigadier visited us about 11.30
A.M., and I suggested to him that we should try again to get
the hill if the artillery would plaster the plateau and the known
trenches until we had gained a footing on the crest. This they did with
great effect at intervals until 1.30 P.M., at which time I led
the Regiment from the cover of Cemetery Hill in two waves, ‘A’ and ‘D’
Squadrons (Mr Fitzgibbon and Capt. Jeffrey, M.C.) in the first, and
‘C’ (Mr Norton) and ‘B’ (Capt. Howey) in the second under Capt. Godfree.
“The first wave reached the foot of the bluff with only one casualty, a
man whose horse fell in jumping a deepish nullah which lay across part
of our course--dismounted to climb the almost precipitous cliff-side,
the footing on which was made the worse by the loose rolling gravel
surface; how the men scaled that cliff carrying their Hotchkiss guns
and ammunition-bags will always remain a marvel to me.
“Meantime the second wave had reached the hill, also without
casualties, and taken position on the right of the first. As we
appeared on the crest fire broke on us from all sides, but the _moral_
of the Turks had been so severely shaken by the Artillery that our
casualties were very slight, and by bringing our right forward we were
soon able to bring enfilade fire on the trenches to our front, and
about 1.45 the first white flag was hoisted. The other trenches did not
take long to follow their example, and in less than half an hour after
leaving Cemetery Hill we were in complete possession of the plateau,
and prisoners, whose numbers eventually mounted to 722, were being
marched in batches from every side to a central spot. A few undoubtedly
escaped, but the Indian Cavalry Regiments took up the pursuit and
brought back 200 or 300 and a camel gun. The booty in arms was very
large, at least 20 machine-guns and several thousands of rounds being
taken.
“Our casualties were one, Sergt. Holloway, killed, and the following
N.C.O.’s and men wounded--viz., Sergt. Barnard, Cpls. Vinall and Hill,
Ptes. Little, Patrick, and Tranter (Cpl. Vinall has since died of
wounds).
“Sergt. Leeman had been killed with the following wounded whilst we
were on Cemetery Hill: 2nd Lt. Russell, Ptes. Powell, Gerrard, and
Winter.
“Pte. Harvey was wounded by shell-fire at the ford early in the
morning, and the following were drowned whilst crossing the river on
the previous evening--viz., L.-Cpl. Bartlett, Ptes. Newman and Donoghue.
“It transpired later that the Turkish troops opposed to us on the Bluff
were the three Battns. of the 13th Regiment who had recently come down
from Lake Urmia to reinforce the troops on the Fathah position, and
that they were preparing to attack the ford at 4 P.M. that
afternoon, when our assault destroyed their plans.
“The fight was short and sharp and the victory complete; we owed our
almost complete immunity from loss to the excellent shooting of V
Battery and A 337, and it was, I must admit, some consolation to know
that the troops which brought off the coup were all British.”
_Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Mosul,
12th November 1918._
”MY DEAR GENERAL,--Herewith the sketch (from memory) of the
position assaulted by the Regiment on October 29th and the numbers of
the Regiment taking part in the assault; these were omitted from my
letter of last week; I hope before we leave these parts to get a proper
surveyed sketch of the position,--for the purposes of history.
“We heard to-day that the Armistice with the Huns had been signed
and commenced yesterday, as we take it that this is tantamount to a
surrender which is practically unconditional on their part. I hope
it may not be long before we say good-bye to this God-forgotten
country.--Yours sincerely,
(Signed) J. J. RICHARDSON.
“The numbers of the squadrons:--
Officers. N.C.O.’s and Men. Hotchkiss guns.
A 4 64 4
B 3 52 4
C 6[60] 63 4
D 4 60 4
--- --- ---
17 239 16”
_Letter from Colonel Richardson to Sir R. S. Baden-Powell, dated Zacho,
75 miles N. of Mosul, 30th November 1918._
”MY DEAR GENERAL,--Just a line in continuation of my letter of
the 12th to tell you that we have been given the following Immediate
Rewards in recognition of our work on the 29th October, viz.:--
Myself a bar to the D.S.O.
Capt. D. W. Godfree . . M.C.
Lieut. G. H. Parkes . . M.C.
Corporal Vinall (since died of wounds) . . D.C.M.
Corporal Raynor . . . D.C.M.
Lance-Corporal Viner . M.M.
Corporal Aukett M.M.
Corporal Whitington M.M.
Private Humphrey M.M.
“A batch of honours of which any Regiment may well be proud, as I think
you will agree; and indeed we are all very proud of them, and myself
not the least proud!
“We were pushed off here with 2 guns of V Battery and a subsection
of M.G. at short notice on Monday last to stop reported rioting by
retiring Turks and to see them over the border, which is only some 7 or
8 miles from here, and we did the 75 miles in 31 hours. The Turks had
heard of our coming and quitted--very wisely; we are well in the hills
here in a pretty valley, and snow-covered hills are less than 50 miles
away. Rather a change from the Baghdad temperature of July!
“On the 26th we heard that the M.M. had been awarded to Sergt. W. H.
Burgess and L.-Cpl. Lomas: these I gather are the outcome of the last
despatch.--With all good wishes, yours sincerely,
(Signed) J. J. RICHARDSON.”
_Letter from Lance-Corporal George Costello (56799) of
15th Squadron M.G.C., 7th Cavalry Brigade, to Mr and Mrs
Wallace--parents of James Wallace._
M.E.F.,
_14th November 1918_.
”DEAR MR AND MRS WALLACE,--It is with a sad heart, and with
the deepest sympathy, that I write to you of Jim’s presumed death.
Jim and I were staunch friends together ever since we were in France,
and shared one another’s hardships and joys all the way through. Some
time back ‘A’ Section was split up; Jim went to ‘C’ and I to ‘B,’ so
at the actual time of crossing the river (Tigris) we were apart, as my
section was about one hundred yards in front. From 12 midnight the
night previous to crossing, we had been marching, and crossed at 6.30
P.M. the following evening, and during that period we had
covered a distance of 57 miles, which was a pretty stiff march, and men
and horses were feeling a bit done up. When we got in the water some
of the horses were restless and started plunging and rearing. This is
what happened to Jim: I learnt it from men who were near him at the
time. His horse reared and Jim came off. The current of the river was
very swift at the time, and it was also dark. We have lost four men in
the squadron in the same way, and nothing has been heard of any of them
since. The next morning we got into action! The 13th Hussars formed
line and charged up a hill at the Turks. The hill was too steep to get
up, so when they got half-way up they did a dismounted action, and
within a quarter of an hour the Turks on the top of the hill showed the
white flag, and over one thousand surrendered; by late in the afternoon
the 7th Cavalry Brigade had beat the whole of that force, capturing
nearly three thousand prisoners. The finest piece of work the Brigade
has done during the war. I am sure poor Jim would have delighted in
it. We then proceeded on towards Mosul, and came in contact with, and
captured, two hundred and fifty reinforcements with 7 machine-guns
and some big guns. Towards the evening, with one Regiment of Indians
(14th Lancers) and one section of 16th Squadron M.G.C., we overtook and
captured between two and three miles of convoy and thirteen hundred
prisoners. We are now in Mosul. When about 20 miles from Mosul an
aeroplane dropped a message which said that the Turks had surrendered
Mosul, and that hostilities with Turkey had ceased. Jim has left behind
him a memory which one can never forget. Loved and respected by all
who knew him, as he was always ready to offer his help and sympathy
to any one in trouble. And you have cause to be proud of having had a
son who kept up the traditions of a Britisher to its highest level,
and was a true and noble soldier to the core. You might please write
to Mr Justice Eve and let him know, as I am sure that Jim would wish
it, as he held his late squadron leader, Capt. Eve, 13th Hussars, in
the highest esteem, and I know that a short time ago Jim wrote to Mr
Justice Eve thanking him for the photo. I hope that Jim’s brother who
was wounded has quite recovered by now. Well, bear up, and try and
look on it for the best, as I know that all your trouble has come in a
heap lately. I unfortunately lost my mother in an air-raid since I have
been out here.--From Jim’s old Chum, 56799, GEORGE COSTELLO.
”_P.S._--If I should gather any information I will write and let you
know at once.
“56799 L.-Cpl. COSTELLO,
15th Squadron M.G.C.,
7th Cav. Brigade,
Mesopotamia.”
_Extracts from letter from Private E. Cleary (6759 “B” Squadron) to
Miss E. FitzPatrick of Accrington, Lancashire._
”MESOPOTAMIA,
_25th November 1918_.
”DEAR LIZZIE,--I don’t know how to start answering your
letters--I have received that many from you for the last 4 days; they
all came of a rush, the reason of it was they were in the country, and
could not reach us on account of the shortage of transport....
“Well, we had some hard fighting for about a fortnight, but we managed
to get round them and capture the lot; we were very lucky, for they
nearly captured us instead, but we managed to get a good mounted charge
in on them, and that was the turning-point of our last battle out here.
Our Regt. alone captured 1300 prisoners, but it was a good job they
did surrender to us, for they could have wiped out every man of us if
we fought on, because our Regt. was not near up to strength: we lost a
good many. It was hard lines on them, for it was our last fight; they
surrendered Mosul to us the next day, and a good job too, for we were
about done; we went 2 and 3 days at a time with no rations except a
pound of dry flour per man, and you may know what a big feed one can
get out of a pound of flour (I don’t think), and that flour was ground
barley. You would laugh to see us cooking it: we used to get a bit of
tin, make a fire under it, then mix the flour up with some water into
a dough, then roll it out into little flat cakes and put it on a tin
and bake it, so you may know what nice bread it was (I don’t think),
but still I was glad of it; they kept us going all right, and even now,
although we are in Mosul, all we are living on is what we buy off the
inhabitants, but of course everything will come right again as soon as
we get settled down a bit. We were within 15 miles of Mosul when word
came through that they had surrendered the place, so we stopped where
we were until next day, and then news came through that Turkey had
packed up altogether; it was taken very quietly, every one was that
fed up, not even a cheer was given. Then we marched into the City and
took over all that was there: they had plenty of stuff--food, guns, and
men: it seemed so strange we were fighting them a few hours before,
and then all that was to be seen was our officers and their officers
shaking hands and making much of one another; but it wasn’t so in the
case of the men--if our fellows had their way they would have been
scrapping them, for we haven’t forgotten some of the tricks they done
to our fellows; but still, thank God! it is all over. Well, we had been
in Mosul for about a week when the news came through of Germany packing
up: even that was taken very quietly, for it was raining as hard as it
could, and we didn’t have a bit of shelter, so the only remarks that
were passed was, it’s a bloody good job it’s over; so that is how we
enjoyed the good news: of course every one was delighted but didn’t
show it. Well, Lizzie, you will think I have gone mad on the war, so
I will change the subject. I don’t know if you have heard much about
Mosul or not; well, it is supposed to be one of the great Sacred Cities
out here--they say it’s mentioned several times in the Bible (but as I
don’t know much about the Bible I cannot say); it is much the same as
Baghdad, but a little more up to date: there is a couple of Catholic
Chapels here; of course all Armenians are Catholics, and besides,
there is some French here too, but give me one corner of Accrington
and they can keep all this country. Just outside Mosul is the ruins
of Ninevah, the great city in olden days that was swallowed up by the
great earthquake: it is a big mound now, but there is big holes made
in it that a man can crawl through, and you can see the ruins of the
City beneath: I have been in them many a time, for we find Guards on it
every day; so that is how we pass the time away going through it. If
you ask one of the Priests they may be able to tell you about it (but
I shall be glad to see the back of it). The climate up here is just
like England--in fact it feels colder to me: it has rained ever since
we’ve been here, and I can tell you it’s none too comfortable, for
all we’ve got is one blanket and no other shelter of any kind. Well,
Lizzie, it’s time now I came to thank you for all the trouble I have
put you to; first of all, I don’t know how to thank you for getting me
that Roll of Honour, as you say it is a nice thing, but the reason I
wanted it mostly was because I had a good few mates who were on there.
God rest them! Mr Rolfe was my Troop Officer, he led us in the charge,
and the Turk that killed him was also killed by one of our fellows, so
that was one consolation; if you look on there you will see Private
Stones’ name; he came from Whally. Pte. M‘Nulty came from Birkenhead,
Pte. Cole from Halifax, and Tpr. Spicer from Dublin: he was only about
18 years old. I shall tell you all about them when I go to see you at
No. 41. It was very kind of Mr Eve for writing such a nice letter; his
son was a nice fellow and a fine leader. I seen him get killed, he was
shot right through the head. It was good of you getting them framed.
Again I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Now I must thank you for
sending Xmas card, and above all, I was most delighted at getting poor
Dan’s Memory Card. God rest his soul. It’s the only thing that grieves
me, is he did not live so as to have the pleasure of meeting him again.
I was always looking forward to having a good time with him if both of
us had the luck, but as you say God knows best.”
_Extracts from letter from Captain H. C. D. FitzGibbon, Thirteenth
Hussars._
”FIELD.
”MY DEAR OLIVE,--Well, my goodness, a lot of things have
happened since my last letter to you. Peace! what an extraordinary
word: it is hard to believe the whole thing is over. I will try and
tell you all since my last letter.
“The Brigade was in its summer camp, just a few miles north of Baghdad,
when I got back from leave. You remember I sent you a word saying we
were going out once more. The idea was to take the Fahta position.
The Turkish forces were then holding the gorge where the Tigris runs
through the Jebel Hamrin. It was supposed, and is, a very strong
position, with a desert on one side and a range of hills on the other.
He, however, did not hold all the passes, enabling us (the Cavalry)
to get over and behind his position. We night-marched round, and at
dawn attacked, but to find he did not like the look of the thing and
had gone in the night. We next met him on a rather strong position he
had taken up on the Lesser Zab. He held us up there for about three
days, and started to retreat on Mosul. We, or rather Cassels and his
Brigade (with the 7th Hussars) were rather too quick for him, and had
got between him and Mosul, dug themselves in, and held them up. A most
gallant performance. We were then hurried up to reinforce him as he was
not strong enough for the job, and would undoubtedly have failed had
we not come up. Two days after we had the lot prisoners, about 10,000.
My Regiment had rather a fine chance. About 900 Turks were holding a
fairly strong position on some hills with a very large field of fire
in front of them. We got Archies to clear up that position. The only
way to do it was mounted at the gallop over the open and dismount under
the crest of the hills. We formed up in two lines, Jeffrey’s and my
squadrons in the first line and the other two in the rear, and off we
went. Those who saw it said it was as fine a show as they had ever
seen. The line was as good as on parade. We crossed the open at full
gallop, dismounted under the crest, fixed bayonets, and before you
could say knife had a good footing on the crest. The whole thing was
so quick that the Turk was rather taken unawares, and we had cleared
up the whole position and taken the lot in no time. My squadron at the
time, the same as the others, was only sixty strong--that is to say,
about 40 dismounted men. The Colonel led the first line himself, and
got a bar to his D.S.O. for it--not bad!!!
“After that we were hurried up the Mosul road. We took another 1800
prisoners, reached a place called Hammam Ali about 15 miles south
of Mosul, and for the first time heard of the Turkish Armistice. I
then had a rather interesting time, as I went into Mosul with General
Cassels to interview the Turkish Commander. It was rather a unique
experience, the whole thing in French. To cut a long story short, they
were obliged by the terms to evacuate the Mosul Villayat. We marched
into the town, a very dirty but rather interesting place. A lot of
people speak French. We were camped outside with very few tents and a
very wet and cold climate, and no warm clothes to put on. The Regiment
was then detailed to send a squadron up to a place on the border called
Zakho, about 80 miles north of Mosul, to keep order, and here I am Lord
and Master of my little Kingdom.
“It is rather funny being so far away from everybody, but rather nice
in a way. I have got two officers with me, Stirling and Hartigan. The
first you know of, and the other, also, is one of the best. We are
living for the first time for 2½ years in a house, not a bad one at
all, and even my men have got them into a large building, so on the
whole we are rather comfy. It is very pretty; the village is in a
beautifully fertile valley, with high snow-capped mountains in front
of me. Plenty to eat and lovely _water_ to drink, and so good for
one!!! and I am the Lord and Master of the district. We are well out of
Mesopot, and well into Kurdistan. Kurdish is an extraordinary language,
but quite a lot of people speak French. Their dress is quite pretty, in
a way rather like the Dutch with big trousers. The day before I left
Mosul, news came in that Germany had thrown in. It was early in the
morning, we were in a very small tent; I was shaving at the time: it
was received with great calm and indifference. News came in later the
same day that owing to the rain carts could not get up to us, and we
were put on half rations. Less indifference was shown to this bit of
news.
“I can’t send this letter for a day or two, so will go on with it
to-morrow. Me voila encore une fois!...
“It is extraordinary to think war is over! though I am afraid it will
be a long time before they let us all go. What a lot of mothers and
wives must be thankful. I suppose the sights at home must have been
wonderful.
“I had a very interesting time yesterday. The mine only just started is
full of coal, and if worked with method I should say worth any amount
of money. The tribes in the hills are the most extraordinary thing in
the world: they know no law, and obey no master but the chief of their
tribe. Every man is armed with a rifle, and a modern one at that. Their
villages are in such places that only a goat can get at them, so they
can laugh at the whole world in general. The chief I had lunch with is
a well-known brigand who robs everybody who passes anywhere near him.
“I had rather a funny complaint last night: A man came round most
beautifully dressed, started off with a long-winded speech about the
British and how just they were, &c., ending up by saying that the
headman’s servants had found his wife in the bazaar and soundly beaten
her, and did the British allow that sort of thing?”
_The Thirteenth Hussars’ Charge at Hadraniyah, by an Eye-Witness._
“It can be given to few to watch from a vantage-point, in near
vicinity, a spirited cavalry charge. All cavalrymen live for the day
when they may take part in this most exhilarating of all the movements
of war, and next to being a participator is the privilege of seeing a
charge take place.
“At midday on October 29th, 1918, the situation near Hadraniyah was
critical--to the south, Cassels’ Brigade was still engaged delaying the
retreat of Haqui Bey’s Army; linked with him 2½ miles to the north,
Norton’s Brigade had, since dawn, been opposing the advance of the
reinforcements that were hurrying to the Turkish Commander’s assistance.
“Almost due west of Hadraniyah Ford, in crossing which at nightfall on
the 28th the Brigade had lost twenty men drowned, stands ‘Richardson’s
Bluff.’ This Bluff is the culminating point of the ridge which forms
the old bank of the Tigris; it lies some 2000 yards from the present
river bank, and rises almost precipitously from the plain to the height
of some 150 feet. Just to the south of the Bluff there is a re-entrant
in the ridge, sweeping round which the latter continues to the south,
at first at a lower elevation, but gradually rising till it reaches
Huwaish Gorge, along the edge of which was Cassels’ position. The plain
between the Bluff and the river is as flat as the palm of the hand,
save for two mounds to the south and south-east, on the nearer of
which, some 900 yards distant, is a Mahommedan cemetery. At dawn the
reconnoitring squadron of the 13th Lancers had been driven back by gun
and machine-gun fire from the Bluff, and had taken cover on Cemetery
Hill.
“At 8.15 A.M. the Thirteenth Hussars had endeavoured to gallop
the Bluff, but owing to the leading Squadron Commander, Captain Evans,
having fallen severely wounded, his squadron had lost direction and,
inclining to the left, had arrived at Cemetery Hill and relieved the
squadron of the 13th Lancers, and there it was joined by the remainder
of the Regiment.
“Shortly after this the left was prolonged by the 14th Lancers, who
were disposed so as to intercept a junction between the enemy that were
opposing the 7th Brigade and those that were engaged with Cassels.
“In support, in rear of the centre of our position, the 13th Lancers
were placed, while on the farther bank of the river, 3000 yards to
the east, was V Battery, R.H.A., in action against the enemy guns.
At 10 A.M., having forded the river, 337 A Battery, R.F.A.,
came into action in our support, from about 2000 yards to the south of
Cemetery Hill. The combined fire of the two batteries soon silenced the
enemy guns, and General Norton, realising that the Bluff was the vital
point, decided to make a further attempt to wrest it from the enemy.
“It was evident by this time that the hostile force on the Bluff was
considerably stronger than had been previously reported. Our position
on the lower ground was very precarious, and a successful decisive
attack by the Turks would have driven us into the open, rolled up
Cassels’ flank, and taken him in the rear. The terrain prevented an
accurate reconnaissance of the enemy’s position being made. It remained
for General Norton to take the responsibility of ordering a direct
attack to be made on the Bluff, supported by the guns.
“Orders were issued, the Thirteenth Hussars concentrated on their
right, while both batteries heavily shelled the enemy’s position.
“The concentration of the Thirteenth Hussars was evidently seen by the
enemy, and occasioned a heavy outburst of fire, which revealed the
fact that they were in possession of more machine-guns than up to then
had been calculated. In consequence of this General Norton ordered the
attack to be postponed while further artillery preparation took place.
“At 12.45 P.M. the General decided that further delay would be
dangerous, and that the effort must be made. Our helio winked a message
to the batteries that the Thirteenth Hussars were to attack at 1.20
P.M.; and that they were to increase their rates of fire. Both
batteries redoubled their efforts--admirably directed by Lt. Sutton (V
Battery, R.H.A.), both ranging and fuses being beautifully accurate;
they plastered the Bluff with H.E. and shrapnel. A slight delay in the
arrangements made it impossible for the attack to take place till 1.30
P.M. In the interval the Thirteenth Hussars quietly formed up
in column of wings under cover of Cemetery Hill.
“As the zero time approached urgent messages came from Major
Greenshields, commanding V Battery, that his ammunition was running
low. It was an anxious moment: on the crest of Cemetery Hill the
Brigade Headquarters Staff lay, taking what cover they could behind the
gravestones--down below the Hussars were quietly falling in, resolute
but serious, as all knew that much depended on the coming assault,
while its result was in the hands of the gods--on our left the 13th
and 14th Lancers were ready to ‘Mount’ and ‘Pursue,’ if the attack was
successful, or extricate their comrades if it was a reverse.
“On the Bluff was a veritable inferno--the H.E. bursting in black
clouds, the shrapnel in fleece-like puffs, both hurling death on the
doomed Turks--one continuous and awful roar swept the threatened area.
“Deafened by the noise and rendered dizzy by the concussion, Turks in
the advanced trenches on the crest of the hill could be seen getting
up and running in a drunken manner to the rear; some caught by bullets
while _en route_, fell; others disappeared in the burst of an H.E.
shell, and nothing remained when the black cloud cleared away.
“And then the Hussars advanced; it was a glorious sight--the first line
led by their gallant Colonel, in perfect order, as if one on a drill
parade, swept round the edge of Cemetery Hill--the pace increased--on
they went with a loud inspiring cheer. Then equally steady followed the
second line.
“The enemy’s machine-guns rattled furiously--ours replied
viciously--on, on went the Hussars--then to our horror we saw a check,
and we realised that, straight across the front of the Hussars, between
them and the Bluff, ran a nullah.
“What is going to happen? Is it too wide? Can they cross it? Another
Omdurman or Shabkadr? were among the agonising thoughts that flashed
through our minds.
“A little crowding--a horse down--then a cheer rose to our lips as
we saw the Colonel thread his way across, and then, on his heels,
scrambling, hustling, thrusting, scarcely checking, the first line
crossed and went on.
“By this time the onlookers on the Cemetery Hill were mad with
excitement, and quite oblivious of the bullets still whistling over
them, they were standing up wildly cheering on the gallant Hussars. Now
they had reached the foot of the Bluff--so close was it to us that we
could distinguish individuals.
“Off they get--fix bayonets--up the hill they scrambled, with their
Colonel still at their head; the barrage lifts beautifully in time--and
the Hussars clear the crest and, spreading like a fan, on they go. A
machine-gun is rushed--then a Hussar was seen to fall--bayonet work
begins....
”‘By God, they are counter-attacking!’ bursts from the Brigade Major’s
lips, as a party of Turks drive back a troop of the Hussars; but,
steady as rocks, the Hussars meet the new attack--a few shots, and
then the bayonet. On our left there is a thunder of hoofs--a host of
lance-pennons dotted o’er the countryside shows the 13th and 14th
Lancers are hurrying forward in support, lance in rest ready for the
pursuit. This is the final act in the drama, and then all sobriety is
forgotten; our helmets fly in the air as we cheer and cheer again, as
on all sides white flags of surrender are raised by the defeated Turks.
“From every direction, in a few minutes, small bodies of the enemy,
marshalled by the gallant Hussars, can be seen marching in--and the
affair was over.
“It was with a choke in the throat that, a few minutes later, we shook
hands with the gallant ‘Jimmy,’ and congratulated him on his splendid
success, and ourselves on having been privileged to watch and in some
way partake of it.”
_Transport fording the Tigris, 1918. Major A. Cooke, Q.M._
“On October 31st, the transport, which had been left at Huwaish on
the left bank of the river Tigris, received orders to march at 6
A.M. and join the Brigade at Quayirah.
“After marching about 4 miles the ford was reached--apparently the one
described in Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall’s despatch of 11th
April 1919, by which the 11th Cavalry Brigade, under Br.-General R. A.
Cassels, C.B., D.S.O., had crossed.
“Two channels of the river had to be crossed before reaching the
main stream. Entering the latter, the ford followed a narrow ledge
in mid-river (the water here was about 4½ feet deep) which ran for
a distance of about 500 yards up-stream; it then turned to the left
through fairly shallow water to the right bank. To the right of the
ledge the water was at least 5½ feet deep, to the left flowed the rapid
and deep main stream of the Tigris.
“If a vehicle got off the ledge into the deeper water on the right, it
was extremely difficult to get the animals to start again; but if they
got off to the left there was little or no hope of recovery.
“The crossing was commenced, taking about 15 yards interval between
vehicles. Soon there came a check; the animals of one waggon, tired of
pulling against the rush of ice-cold water, came to a standstill. The
next waggon tried to pass to the right, but got into the deeper water,
and stayed there until extra animals could be hitched in--this, in
itself, proving a most difficult task.
“The column was again got moving, but several similar stops occurred,
until a limbered waggon and a water-cart of the 14th Lancers got off
the ledge to the left and were lost, two of the four drivers and all
the mules being drowned.
“All the transport of the Regiment, except the mess-carts, crossed
without trouble; these, being very light, had great difficulty in
stemming the swift current, and one was carried off the ledge and swept
down-stream.
“The driver of this cart was Pte. Harding, a good old soldier who
was mentioned in despatches during the South African War for great
gallantry (‘Regimental History,’ volume ii. pp. 129 and 207). He was
accompanied in the cart by an Indian cook.
“Every one who saw them carried away thought they were certainly
lost. Harding, however, kept his head, and, whilst being floated down
the river at a great pace, sat and handled his reins as though he
were driving along a hard road. The horse swam with the stream, the
well-laden cart floated evenly on the water, and the whole lot went
down-stream for about 800 yards before coming to a standstill. While in
deep water, Harding gradually steered towards the bank, and at length
guided the horse to where he could just scrape his feet along the
shingly bottom, and come to a halt, standing.
“The horse was dead-beat, and it was feared that they would again be
carried away by the rush of water, when an Indian Artillery driver
rode into the river and reached the cart-horse’s head. By seizing the
rein and assisting and encouraging the horse, he eventually got it to
shallower water, where aid was forthcoming to get the cart ashore.
“It was a most daring and gallant feat on the part of the Indian
driver, and his conduct was brought to the notice of the Army
Commander. Private Harding received the cheers and congratulations of
all assembled there, and was recommended for a reward.
“This may not appear very exciting in print, but when it is remembered
that the Tigris is about 300 yards wide, with such a volume of water
rushing down that no communication by shouting is possible, except at
very short distances, and that men and animals were struggling and
drowning at the time, the writer thinks that all who read this account
will agree that fording the Tigris with the transport afforded not the
least of the many thrilling incidents of the closing days of the war.”