THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE TERROR

February 17th.

My general impression that the Soviet revolution has passed

through its period of internal struggle and is concentrating

upon constructive work so far as that is allowed by war on

all its frontiers, and that the population is settling down

under the new regime, was confirmed by the meeting of the

Executive Committee which definitely limited the powers of

the Extraordinary Commission. Before the sitting was

opened I had a few words with Peters and with Krylenko.

The excitement of the internal struggle was over. It had

been bitterly fought within the party, and both Krylenko of

the Revolutionary Tribunal and Peters of the Extraordinary

Commission were there merely to witness the official act that

would define their new position. Peters talked of his failure

to get away for some shooting; Krylenko jeered at me

for having refused to believe in the Lockhart conspiracy.

Neither showed any traces of the bitter struggle waged

within the party for and against the almost dictatorial powers

of the Extraordinary Commission for dealing with counter-revolution.

The sitting opened with a report by Dserzhinsky, that strange

ascetic who, when in prison in Warsaw, insisted on doing

the dirty work of emptying the slops and cleaning other

people's cells besides his own, on a theory that one man

should where possible take upon himself the evil which

would otherwise have to be shared by all; and in the

dangerous beginning of the revolution had taken upon

himself the most unpopular of all posts, that of President of

the Extraordinary Commission. His personal uprightness is

the complement of an absolute personal courage, shown

again and again during the last eighteen months. At the time

of the Left Social Revolutionary mutiny he went without a

guard to the headquarters of the mutineers, believing that he

could bring them to reason, and when arrested by them

dared them to shoot him and showed so bold a front that in

the end the soldiers set to watch him set him free and

returned to their allegiance. This thin, tallish man, with a

fanatic face not unlike some of the traditional portraits of St.

Francis, the terror of counter-revolutionaries and criminals

alike, is a very bad speaker. He looks into the air over the

heads of his audience and talks as if he were not addressing

them at all but some one else unseen. He talks even of a

subject which he knows perfectly with curious inability to

form his sentences; stops, changes words, and often,

recognizing that he cannot finish his sentence, ends where

he is, in the middle of it, with a little odd, deprecating

emphasis, as if to say: "At this point there is a full stop. At

least so it seems."

He gave a short colourless sketch of the history of the

Extraordinary Commission. He referred to the various crises

with which it had had to deal, beginning with the drunken

pogroms in Petrograd, the suppression of the combined

anarchists and criminals in Moscow (he mentioned that after

that four hours' struggle which ended in the clearing out of

the anarchists' strongholds, criminality in Moscow

decreased by 80 per cent.), to the days of the Terror when,

now here, now there, armed risings against the Soviet were

engineered by foreigners and by counter-revolutionaries

working with them. He then made the point that

throughout all this time the revolution had

been threatened by large-scale revolts. Now the revolution

was safe from such things and was threatened only by

individual treacheries of various kinds, not by things which

needed action on a large scale. They had traitors, no doubt,

in the Soviet institutions who were waiting for the day

(which would never come) to join with their enemies, and

meanwhile were secretly hampering their work. They did

not need on that account to destroy their institutions as a

whole. The struggle with counter-revolution had passed to

a new stage. They no longer had to do open battle with

open enemies; they had merely to guard themselves against

individuals. The laws of war by which, meeting him on the

field of battle, the soldier had a right to kill his enemy

without trial, no longer held good. The situation was now

that of peace, where each offender must have his guilt

proved before a court. Therefore the right of

sentencing was removed from the Extraordinary

Commission; but if, through unforeseen circumstances, the

old conditions should return, they intended that the

dictatorial powers of the Commission should be restored to it

until those conditions had ceased. Thus if, in case of armed

counter-revolution, a district were declared to be in a state

of war, the Extraordinary Commission would resume its old

powers. Otherwise its business would be to hand offenders,

such as Soviet officials who were habitually late (here there

was a laugh, the only sign throughout his speech that

Dserzhinsky was holding the attention of his audience), over

to the Revolutionary Tribunal, which would try them and,

should their guilt be proved, put them in concentration

camps to learn to work. He read point by point the

resolutions establishing these, changes and providing for the

formation of Revolutionary Tribunals. Trial to take place

within forty-eight hours after the conclusion of the

investigation, and the investigation to take not longer than a

month. He ended as he ended his sentences, as if by

accident, and people scarcely realized he had finished

before Sverdlov announced the next speaker.

Krylenko proposed an amendment to ensure that no member

of the Revolutionary Tribunal could be also a member of the

Extraordinary Commission which had taken up and

investigated a case. His speech was very disappointing. He

is not at his best when addressing a serious meeting like that

of the Executive Committee. The Krylenko who spoke

to-night, fluently, clearly, but without particular art, is a very

different Krylenko from the virtuoso in mob oratory, the

little, dangerous, elderly man in ensign's uniform who

swayed the soldiers' mass meetings in Petrograd a year and a

half ago. I remember hearing him speak in barracks soon

after the murder of Shingarev and Kokoshkin, urging class

struggle and at the same time explaining the difference

between that and the murder of sick men in bed. He

referred to the murder and, while continuing his speech,

talking already of another subject, be went through the

actions of a man approaching a bed and killing a sleeper

with a pistol. It was a trick, of course, but the thrilling,

horrible effect of it moved the whole audience with a

shudder of disgust. There was nothing of this kind in his

short lecture on jurisprudence

to-night.

Avanesov, the tall, dark secretary of the Executive

Committee, with the face of a big, benevolent hawk hooded

in long black hair, opposed Krylenko on the ground that

there were not enough trustworthy workers to ensure that in

country districts such a provision could be carried out.

Finally the resolution was passed as a whole and the

amendment was referred to the judgment of the presidium.

The Committee next passed to the consideration of the

Extraordinary Tax levied on the propertied classes.

Krestinsky, Commissary of Finance, made his report to a

grim audience, many of whom quite frankly regarded the tax

as a political mistake. Krestinsky is a short, humorous man,

in dark spectacles, dressed more like a banker than like a

Bolshevik. It was clear that the collection of the tax had not

been as successful as he had previously suggested. I was

interested in his reference to the double purpose of the tax

and in the reasons he gave for its comparative failure.

The tax had a fiscal purpose, partly to cover deficit,

partly by drawing in paper money to raise the value of the

rouble. It had also a political purpose. It was intended to

affect the propertied classes only, and thus to weaken the

Kulaks (hard-fists, rich peasants) in the villages and to teach the

poorer peasants the meaning of the revolution.

Unfortunately some Soviets, where the minority of the

Kulaks had retained the unfair domination given it by its

economic strength, had distributed the tax-paying equally

over the whole population, thus very naturally raising the

resentment of the poor who found themselves taxed to the

same amount as those who could afford to pay. It had been

necessary to send circular telegrams emphasizing the terms

of the decree. In cases where the taxation had been carried

out as intended there had been no difficulty. The most

significant reason for the partial unsuccess was that the

propertied class, as such, had already diminished to a greater

extent than had been supposed, and many of those taxed, for

example, as factory owners were already working, not as

factory owners, but as paid directors in nationalized

factories, and were therefore no longer subject to the

tax. In other words, the partial failure of the tax was a proof

of the successful development of the revolution. (This is

illustrated by the concrete case of "Uncle"

recorded on p. 73.) Krestinsky believed that the revolution

had gone so far that no further tax of , this kind would be

either possible or necessary.

Russia in 1919 · 第 18 / 38 题