ISLE OF PINES, DANISH WEST INDIES, AND ALGECIRAS
For a number of years there was considerable controversy over the
ownership of the Isle of Pines, a small island separated from Cuba
by about thirty miles of water, containing 1200 square miles. This
dot of land was not of the slightest account to the United States,
so far as I could see; but after the treaty of peace with Spain,
a number of Americans purchased land there for the purpose of
establishing homes. When the United States withdrew from Cuba and
the Cuban Republic was established, and the flag of Cuba was extended
over the Island of Pines, those American residents protested and
insisted that the island belonged to the United States. They had
considerable ground for this contention, as Mr. Meikeljohn, when
Assistant Secretary of War, had written a number of letters in
which he stated that the Isle of Pines had been ceded to the United
States by Spain, and therefore was a part of our territory, although
attached at the time to the division of Cuba for governmental
purposes.
The treaty of peace provided in article one that Spain relinquishes
all claims of sovereignty over, and title to, Cuba; and in article
two, that Spain cedes to the United States the Island of Porto
Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.
A strict construction of the treaty of peace with Spain would
probably give the island to the United States under article two.
Cuba, however, insisted that the island was a part of Cuban territory,
but it was provided in article six of the Platt amendments that
the title to the island should be left to future adjustment by
treaty.
Cuba granted to the United States two very valuable coaling stations,
and the United States on its part agreed to enter into a treaty by
which we should relinquish whatever title we might have to the
Island of Pines in favor of Cuba.
A rather interesting incident occurred in connection with this
treaty which I believe I violate no confidence in now detailing,
as both Presidents have retired from office. President Roosevelt
was very anxious that the treaty be ratified; he was also most
solicitous that we should retain friendly relations with the Republic
of Cuba, and felt that the island was not of the slightest importance
to the United States from any standpoint, declaring that he would
not accept it. I was at the White House one day when the treaty
was before the committee, and he showed me a letter written to him
by President Palma, of Cuba, and my recollection is that he gave
me a copy of it for such use as I might desire to make. Mr. Palma
urged in that letter that the Senate act favorably on the treaty,
because if it did not his re-election as President of the Cuban
Republic would thereby be endangered.
So much opposition to the treaty developed in the Senate that I
deemed it useless to endeavor to bring it to a vote; and really,
as I look at it now, there is very little use for the treaty at
all, as Cuba is and has been exercising jurisdiction over the Isle
of Pines. Cuba must be giving the island a good government for
the American residents, as I have heard nothing from the island
for several years.
It was during the Fifty-seventh Congress that the treaty with
Denmark, providing for the purchase by the United States of the
Danish West Indies, consisting of the Islands of St. Thomas, St.
John, and St. Croix, came before the committee. I reported the
treaty to the Senate and urged, and finally secured, its
ratification.
The United States by this treaty agreed to pay five million dollars
to Denmark for the islands.
We first attempted to purchase the islands in 1865, during the
administration of President Lincoln. Secretary Seward was particularly
anxious that the United States should acquire them, and a treaty
was negotiated and agreed to by Denmark. The treaty was not acted
upon during the administration of President Johnson, and because
President Grant was particularly anxious for its ratification,
Charles Sumner, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (as
in the case of the Santo Domingo treaty), opposed its ratification
by the Senate, and it was defeated.
President Grant showed a far-sighted policy in favoring the
acquisition of every foot of territory which we could secure in
the West Indies. The Danish islands are of great importance to
the United States in a strategic way, whether the strategy be
military or commercial. St. Thomas is the natural point of call
for all European trade bound for the West Indies, Central America,
or Northern South America. These islands, together with Porto
Rico, occupy the north-eastern corner of the Caribbean Sea; and
they are of more importance now than ever, because of the fact that
we are constructing the Isthmian canal. In view of that canal,
and the European settlements in South America, every additional
acquisition by the United States in the West Indies is invaluable.
Porto Rico is difficult of defense. The harbors are poor, while
the harbor in the Island of St. Thomas can be made one of the very
best in the West Indies. Our own officers who investigated the
subject reported that the Island of St. Thomas possesses all the
natural advantages of a second Gibraltar.
The Danish Parliament, after a long debate, declined to ratify the
treaty of 1901 which had been ratified by the Senate, and for the
present at least the subject is in abeyance.
I still hope, before I shall retire from the Committee on Foreign
Relations, that the United States may succeed in purchasing these
valuable islands.
During the Winter of 1906 there occurred in the Senate a very
interesting debate over the appointment of representatives of the
United States to participate in the so-called Algeciras Conference,
held in Algeciras in 1905 to consider conditions in Morocco. No
action was taken by the Senate, and in due course the act or treaty
agreed to at that conference was submitted to the Senate for
ratification.
I do not think there can be the slightest doubt that President
Roosevelt had full authority to appoint the delegates on the part
of the United States, and that he was thoroughly justified in
contending that it was not only the right but the duty of the United
States to participate in this conference. The action of the
President in accepting the invitation to the conference and appointing
the delegates, and the very important part therein which he took
personally, in addition to the interest manifested through his
representatives, very properly received the commendation of the
people of this country and of the whole European world.
The Moroccan Empire was one of the earliest and most interesting
of the world's Governments. During the latter part of the eighteenth
century Morocco occupied the attention of the maritime nations of
the civilized world, as it was the home of the Barbary pirates who
preyed upon the commerce of all the nations. The United States
itself paid tribute for the purchase of immunity from these pirates.
One of our earliest treaties, made before the adoption of the
Constitution in 1787, was a treaty of peace and friendship with
Morocco. We entered into several treaties with Morocco later, and
joined in treaties concerning that country in 1865 and 1880 with
Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal,
and other Nations.
For many years Great Britain and France have claimed to have superior
rights in Morocco, and it has seemed to be the desire of France to
annex it. Germany has intervened, and the country has been a bone
of contention among the European Nations. In 1904 Great Britain
and France, by a secret treaty, agreed that France should have the
dominating control in Morocco, and that Great Britain should dominate
in Egypt. Germany opposed the French Protectorate and insisted
that an international conference of the powers should be called.
At one time it seemed that war was inevitable, and it probably was
averted only by the Algeciras Conference. The United States was
asked to participate, as we had participated in the conference of
1880. If we had not accepted the invitation there would have been
no conference, as two of the great powers had served notice that
all nations represented at the 1880 conference must participate in
the Algeciras Conference, or they would withdraw. Our participation
was in the interest of averting a European war.
The General Act or Treaty agreed to at that conference was a lengthy
and important one. Its details are not of much importance, as our
delegates signed it under a significant reservation that we would
not assume any obligation or responsibility for the enforcement of
the Act.
When it came to the Senate, there was quite a combat over its
ratification. We could not secure its endorsement during the
session which closed the first of July, 1906, but we were able to
reach an agreement that it should be voted on in committee and in
the Senate during the month of December following.
President Roosevelt was very much concerned about its ratification,
and on June 26, 1906, when it seemed pretty certain that the Senate
would adjourn without acting on the general Act, he wrote me this
quite characteristic letter:
"White House, Washington, _June 26, 1906_.
"My dear Senator Cullom:
"Having reference to the letter which Secretary Root wrote you
yesterday about the Algeciras Convention, I can only add that I
earnestly hope this matter will receive favorable report from the
committee at this session. I am literally unable to understand
how any human being can find anything whatever to object to in this
treaty; and to reject it would mean that for the first time since
the adoption of the Constitution this Government will be without
a treaty with Morocco. It seems incredible that there should be
a serious purpose to put us in such a position.
"Sincerely yours,
"(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt."
The General Act would probably not have been ratified by the Senate
had we not agreed on the form of the resolution of ratification.
That resolution provided:
"Resolved further, that the Senate, as a part of this act of
ratification, understands that the participation of the United
States in the Algeciras Conference and in the formation and adoption
of the general Act and Protocol which resulted therefrom, was with
the sole purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in
Morocco, the protection as to life, liberty, and property of its
citizens residing and travelling therein, and of aiding by its
friendly offices and efforts in removing friction and controversy
which seemed to menace the peace between powers signatory with the
United States to the treaty of 1880, all of which are on terms of
amity with this Government, and without purpose to depart from the
traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by
the United States in the settlement of political questions which
are entirely European in their scope."
After this form of resolution had been agreed to by those favoring
and those opposing the treaty, I showed it to President Roosevelt.
He expressed his satisfaction with it, and the Act was ratified by
the Senate.
I have endeavored to cover only a very few of the more important
matters which have come before the Committee on Foreign Relations
since I have been its chairman. The treaties before the committee
have embraced almost every subject of contact between two independent
Nations. Numerous treaties involving extradition, boundaries,
naturalization, claims, sanitation, trade-marks, consular and
diplomatic friendship, and commerce, and many other subjects, have
been before the committee and have been acted upon and ratified by
the Senate. During the period of which I am now writing, I believe
that we have ratified treaties with almost every independent Nation
of the world. The many important matters now pending, or of more
recent date, I am not at liberty to refer to, the injunction of
secrecy not yet having been removed.
The Foreign Relations Committee will continue in the future, as it
has in the past, one of the Senate's foremost committees.