THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL
Probably the most important work before the Committee on Foreign
Relations since the treaty of peace with Spain, were the several
treaties concerning the construction of the Isthmian Canal.
In 1850, the United States entered into what is known as the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain, the purpose of which was to
facilitate the construction of a canal; but instead of operating
to this end, it stood for fifty years or more as an effectual
barrier against the construction by the United States of any canal
across the Isthmus of Panama. Succeeding Administrations had
endeavored to secure the consent of Great Britain to its abrogation,
but it was not until Secretary Hay's time that Great Britain
finally agreed to annul it and substitute in its place a new treaty.
Secretary Hay had been Ambassador to Great Britain, and he enjoyed
the confidence of the then existing British Ministry to a greater
degree than almost any minister or ambassador we have ever sent to
Great Britain. After entering the State Department, Mr. Hay at
once directed his attention to the making of a new treaty with
Great Britain and this resulted in the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.
This convention was considered by the committee, but was not found
satisfactory, and certain amendments were added to it. These
amendments Great Britain would not accept, and the treaty died.
Secretary Hay was very much disappointed, but he at once set to
work to negotiate such a treaty as would go through the Senate
without amendment and such a one as Great Britain would consent
to. He wrote to a number of Senators, members of the committee,
I suppose, asking for suggestions as to just what the Senate would
agree to. I was not at that time chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, but I was very deeply interested in the subject
and had given it considerable study and thought. Secretary Hay
wrote me, and I replied at length, giving my views both as to the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and what I thought should be inserted in the
new treaty.
Mr. Hay promptly renewed negotiations, which resulted in what is
known as the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. After a good deal of
effort this agreement was ratified without amendment. This act
signalized the beginning of my service as chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations.
The principal contention arose over the subject of fortifications,
a question that is still a mooted one. It occurs to me that the
proper reasoning is this--and I believe I took the same position
when the treaty was under consideration:
The first and second Hay-Pauncefote treaties must be construed
together; the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty contained a prohibition
against fortification; the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty neither
prohibited nor in terms agreed to fortifications, but was silent
on the subject; therefore, the legal construction would be that
Great Britain had receded from the position that the canal should
not be fortified. In any event, we will go ahead and fortify the
canal, and do with it whatever we please, regardless of any of the
nations of the world.
That obstacle having been finally removed, the question which next
arose was: What route should be selected? The selection of the
route was not a subject over which the Foreign Relations Committee
had jurisdiction; but after the Panama route was decided on, it
became necessary to negotiate with Colombia, the owner of that
route, for the right of way for the canal. Secretary Hay promptly
proceeded with the negotiation, as it was his duty to do, under
the Spooner Act, and on January 3, 1903, submitted the treaty to
the Senate for its Constitutional action thereon. Senator Morgan
and others led the fight against it; but a vote was taken, and the
treaty was ordered favorably reported. On February 12, 1903, I
called it up in the Senate and made quite an extended speech,
explaining its provisions, and urging its ratification. The session
was to close on March 4, and it finally became manifest that it
would be hopeless to attempt to ratify it before that day, and the
effort was abandoned. President Roosevelt called a special session
of the Senate after the fourth of March, when there would be nothing
for the Senate to consider except the Colombian treaty and other
executive matters. According to the usual rule, the treaty was
referred back to the committee, at the beginning of the special
session, and the subject was again gone over in committee as if
there had been no proceedings on it at all during the regular
session. The proposed agreement was finally reported to the Senate,
and ratified. There is no need for me to go over the story of its
rejection by Colombia. The action of the Colombian Congress was
a hold-up pure and simple, and the treaty was rejected in the hope
that the United States would offer a greater amount for the right-
of-way. Panama promptly seceded, which she had a perfect right to
do. Many people have charged that the Roosevelt Administration
actually incited the revolution. Whether this is true or not, I
do not know. I contended at the time, and still believe, that it
is not true. I hope it is not; but the correspondence did show
that the State Department had pretty close knowledge of events
which were occurring on the Isthmus, and had seen to it that there
was a sufficient naval force in the vicinity "to protect American
interests." It was a remarkable revolution--I think the most
remarkable I have ever read of in history. It was practically
bloodless. One or two shots were fired, a Chinaman was killed,
and yet a new and independent republic entered the family of
Nations.
We were able to make with Panama a much more satisfactory treaty
than we had with Colombia. Senator Morgan this time was assisted
by most of his Democratic colleagues; he denounced the treaty and
made all sorts of charges against the Administration; but after
numerous long sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I
was authorized to report it to the Senate with certain minor
amendments, which, in my opening speech, I asked the Senate to
reject, and to ratify the treaty without amendment. I did this at
the earnest insistence of the State Department. And, in addition,
I did not think that the amendments were of such importance as
would justify resubmitting the treaty to Panama after that little
country had once ratified it. The State Department was led to this
action by the receipt of the following cable from Mr. Buchanan,
the first Minister of the United States to Panama:
"Panama, _January 22, 1904_.
"Hay, Washington:
"I can not refrain from referring to my belief that no amendment
to the treaty should be made. The delimitation of Panama and Colon
involves several things which can only be satisfactorily adjusted
on the ground by joint action. There are several other points in
the treaty which will require a mutual working agreement, or
regulation, including sanitation. While the treaty covers broadly
all these things, my observation here is that the details of
development of the authority conferred by the treaty in these
regards can not be satisfactorily carried out by amendments, but
should be done through a mutually agreed upon regulation or
understanding reached here on the ground between the two countries.
The executive power here can secure for the convention ample
authority to do such things without their being referred to the
convention hereafter. Would it not be possible and best to adopt
this course with these amendments to the treaty; will bring up here
much discussion of many articles which can all be avoided and our
purpose gained by above course. Any time when any specific grants
of land or power not implied in the treaty is desired, it appears
to me the wise course to take will be to do this by a supplemental
convention.
"(Signed) Buchanan."
Secretary Hay showed the most eager anxiety to have the treaty
ratified as it stood, and he wrote me quite a lengthy letter on
the subject, which I now feel at liberty to quote.
"Department of State, Washington.
"_January 20, 1904_.
"Dear Senator Cullom:--
"I enclose a copy of a letter from the Panama Minister which he
sent me last night. He, as well as Mr. Buchanan, who is on the
ground, is greatly disturbed over the possible complications which
may arise if amendments are added to the treaty in the Senate. Of
course, I need not say nobody questions the right of the Senate to
amend the treaty as may seem to them best. I am only speaking of
the matter of opportuneness and expediency. We insisted on an
immediate ratification of the treaty by the Panama Government, and
they acceded to our wishes. If we now, after a very long delay,
send the treaty back to them amended, you can at once imagine the
state of things that it will find there. The moment of unanimity
and enthusiasm, which only comes once in the life of a revolution,
will have passed away and given way to the play of politics and
factions. They will have a certain advantage which they have not
had before in dealing with the matter. We shall have ratified the
treaty with amendments, which gives them another chance to revise
their perhaps hasty and enthusiastic action. They will consider
themselves as entitled to make amendments as well as we, and it
needs only a glance at the treaty to show what an infinite field
of amendments there is from every point of view. The Junta in
making their report to the present Constitutional Convention said
that, although many of the provisions seemed harsh and hard, yet
it was judged for the public good to accept it as it was. When
they get the amended treaty in their hands again, they will compare
it with the treaty we made with Colombia, and see how vastly more
advantageous to us this treaty is than that one was, and there are
never lacking in a body of men like the Constitutional Convention
a plenty of members who like to distinguish themselves by defending
the interests of their country through the advantageous amendment
of a treaty. Meanwhile the country will be open to the intrigues
of the Colombians, and even to the military attacks upon the
frontier.
"All these considerations would, of course, have no weight whatever
if the amendments were vital to our interests, but, as I said to
you yesterday, it was the opinion of all of us who have studied
the matter that every point made by the amendments was intended to
be covered--I do not say how successfully--by the provisions of
the treaty itself. This letter of Mr. Varilla's shows that the
intentions of each Government were thoroughly understood by the
other, exactly in the sense of the amendments now proposed. I
earnestly hope that our friends in the Senate may see the strength
of our present position if the treaty is ratified without amendment,
and the certain complications that will arise if, after a long
debate here, the treaty is put once more in the hands of the Panamans
for reconsideration and amendment.
"If the object of the amendments, as some people say, is to get it
ratified by the new permanent Government, nothing is easier. I
have no doubt we can have a solemn resolution of that sort adopted
by the Convention at any time.
"Very sincerely yours,
"John Hay.
"The Honorable S. M. Cullom,
"United States Senate."
After nearly a month and a half of debate in executive session,
devoted to its consideration, the treaty was finally ratified
without amendment.
Considerable discussion arose over the question of the recognition
of Panama and the right of that country to make the treaty at all.
I contended in the Senate, in open as well as executive session,
that the new Republic of Panama had a perfect right to make the
treaty with the United States because it was a complete, sovereign,
and independent State. The recognition given the new Government
was the highest recognition we could accord. It was not a recognition
of belligerency, which is only a recognition that war exists; it
was not a virtual recognition, which is a recognition only for
commercial purposes; but it was what Pomeroy and Fillmore define
to be a formal recognition--that is, an absolute recognition of
independence and sovereignty. The recognition of the Republic was
a complete and formal recognition of independence, because the
President had received an envoy-extraordinary and minister-
plenipotentiary from that State. The United States Senate was a
party to that complete and formal recognition, because we confirmed
the nomination of Mr. Buchanan as envoy-extraordinary and minister-
plenipotentiary to that country.
This ended the long fight over the construction of the Panama Canal
--at least, so far as it in any way involved the jurisdiction of
the Committee on Foreign Relations. With the ratification of the
treaty, the subject was transferred to the Committee on Interoceanic
canals, where, during every session, matters of more or less
importance connected with the canal are considered.
I do not know whether or not it was wise to change from the Nicaraguan
to the Panama route. Senator Hanna and Senator Spooner were
responsible for the change; and time alone will demonstrate whether
we acted wisely.