THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON
1865
As I look back now over the vista of years that have come and gone,
it seems to me that I entered the Lower House of Congress just at
the beginning of the most important period in all our history.
The great President had been assassinated; the war was over; Andrew
Johnson, a Union Democrat, was President of the United States.
Reconstruction was the problem which confronted us, how to heal up
the Nation's wounds and remake a Union which would endure for all
time to come. These were the difficult conditions that had to be
dealt with by the Thirty-ninth Congress.
Andrew Johnson was the queerest character that ever occupied the
White House, and, with the exception of Lincoln only, he entered
it under the most trying and difficult circumstances in all our
history; but Lincoln had, what Johnson lacked, the support and
confidence of the great Republican party. Johnson was never a
Republican, and never pretended to be one. He was a lifelong
Democrat, and a slave-holder as well; but he was loyal to the Union,
no man living more so. As a Senator from Tennessee, alone of all
the Southern Senators he faced his colleagues from the South in
denouncing secession as treason. His subsequent phenomenal course
in armed opposition to the rebellion brought about his nomination
for the Vice-Presidency as a shrewd stroke to secure the support
of the War Democrats of the North and the Union men of his State
and section.
He came to the Presidency under the cloud of President Lincoln's
assassination, when the majority of the North believed that a
Southern conspiracy had laid the great President low. The seceding
States hated him as a traitor to his own section; the North distrusted
him as a Democrat. At first I believe the very radical element of
the Republican party in Congress, led by old Ben Wade of Ohio, than
whom there was no more unsafe man in either house of Congress, were
disposed, if not openly to rejoice, which they dared not do, to
see with some secret satisfaction the entrance of Johnson into the
White House. It is well known that Wade did say in his first
interview with President Johnson, when, as a member of the committee
on the conduct of the war, he waited on him, "Johnson, we have
faith in you. By the gods, there will be no more trouble in
running the Government."
I have already, in another chapter, described the scene which took
place in the Senate chamber when Johnson was inducted into office
as Vice-President; the exhibition he made of himself at the time
of taking the oath of office, in the presence of the President of
the United States and the representatives of the Governments of
the world. All this, advertised at the time in the opposition
press, added to the prejudice against Johnson in the North and made
his position more trying and difficult.
There were two striking points in Johnson's character, and I knew
him well: First, his loyalty to the Union; and, second, his utter
fearlessness of character. He could not be cowed; old Ben Wade,
Sumner, Stevens, all the great leaders of that day could not,
through fear, influence him one particle.
In 1861, when he was being made the target of all sorts of threats
on account of his solitary stand against secession in the Senate,
he let fall this characteristic utterance:
"I want to say, not boastingly, with no anger in my bosom, that
these two eyes of mine have never looked upon anything in the shape
of mortal man that this heart has feared."
This utterance probably illustrates Johnson's character more clearly
than anything that I could say. He sought rather than avoided a
fight. Headstrong, domineering, having fought his way in a State
filled with aristocratic Southerners, from the class of so-called
"low whites" to the highest position in the United States, he did
not readily yield to the dictates of the dominating forces in
Congress.
Lincoln had a well-defined policy of reconstruction. Indeed, so
liberal was he disposed to be in his treatment of the Southern
States, that immediately after the surrender of Richmond he would
have recognized the old State Government of Virginia had it not
been for the peremptory veto of Stanton. Congress was not in
session when Johnson came to the Presidency in April, 1865. To do
him no more than simple justice, I firmly believe that he wanted
to follow out, in reconstruction, what he thought was the policy
of Mr. Lincoln, and in this he was guided largely by the advice of
Mr. Seward.
But there was this difference. Johnson was, probably in good faith,
pursuing the Lincoln policy of reconstruction; but when the
Legislatures and Executives of the Southern States began openly
passing laws and executing them so that the negro was substantially
placed back into slavery, practically nullifying the results of
the awful struggle, the untold loss of life and treasure, Mr.
Lincoln certainly would have receded and would have dealt with the
South with an iron hand, as Congress had determined to do, and as
General Grant was compelled to do when he assumed the Presidency.
From April to the reassembling of Congress in December, Johnson
had a free hand in dealing with the seceded States, and he was not
slow to take advantage of it. He seemed disposed to recognize the
old State Governments; to restrict the suffrage to the whites; to
exercise freely the pardoning power in the way of extending executive
clemency not only to almost all classes, but to every individual
who would apply for it. The result was, it seemed to be certain
that if the Johnson policy were carried out to the fullest extent,
the supremacy of the Republican party in the councils of the Nation
would be at stake.
To express it in a word, the motive of the opposition to the Johnson
plan of reconstruction was the firm conviction that its success
would wreck the Republican party, and by restoring the Democrats
to power bring back Southern supremacy and Northern vassalage.
The impeachment, in a word, was the culmination of the struggle
between the legislative and the executive departments of the
Government over the problem of reconstruction. The legislative
department claimed exclusive jurisdiction over reconstruction; the
executive claimed that it alone was competent to deal with the
subject.
This is a very brief summary of the conditions which confronted us
when I entered the Thirty-ninth Congress. Representatives of the
eleven seceding States were there to claim their seats in Congress.
The Republican members met in caucus the Saturday evening preceding
the meeting of Congress on Monday. I, as a member-elect, was
present, and I remember how old Thaddeus Stevens at once assumed
the dominating control in opposition to the President's plan.
Stevens was a most remarkable character,--one of the most remarkable
in the legislative history of the United States. He believed firmly
in negro equality and negro suffrage. As one writer eloquently
expresses it:
"According to his creed, the insurgent States were conquered
provinces to be shaped into a paradise for the freedman and a hell
for the rebel. His eye shot over the blackened southern land; he
saw the carnage, the desolation, the starvation, and the shame;
and like a battered old warhorse, he flung up his frontlet, sniffed
the tainted breeze, and snorted 'Ha, Ha!'"
It was at once determined by the Republican majority in Congress
that the representatives of the eleven seceding States should not
be admitted. The Constitution expressly gives to the House and
Senate the exclusive power to judge of the admission and qualification
of its own members.
We were surprised at the moderation of the President's message,
which came in on Tuesday after Congress assembled. In tone and
general character the message was wholly unlike Johnson. It was
an admirable state document, one of the finest from a literary and
probably from every other standpoint that ever came from an Executive
to Congress. It was thought at the time that Mr. Seward wrote it,
but it has since been asserted that it was the product of that
foremost of American historians, J. C. Bancroft, one of Mr. Johnson's
close personal friends.
There existed three theories of dealing with the Southern States:
one was the President's theory of recognizing the State Governments,
allowing the States to deal with the suffrage question as they
might see fit; the Stevens policy of wiping out all State lines
and dealing with the regions as conquered military provinces; and
the Sumner theory of treating them as organized territories,
recognizing the State lines.
Johnson dealt in a masterful manner with the subject in his message.
He said:
"States, with proper limitations of power, are essential to the
existence of the Constitution of the United States.
"The perpetuity of the Constitution bring with it the perpetuity
of the States; their mutual relations makes us what we are, and in
our political system this connection is indissoluble. The whole
cannot exist without the parts nor the parts without the whole.
So long as the Constitution of the United States endures, the States
will endure; the destruction of the one is the destruction of the
other; the preservation of the one is the preservation of the other.
"The true theory is that all pretended acts of secession were, from
the beginning, null and void. The States cannot commit treason,
nor screen the individual citizens who may have committed treason,
any more than they can make valid treaties or engage in lawful
commerce with any foreign power. The States attempting to secede
placed themselves in a condition where their vitality was impaired
but not extinguished, their functions suspended but not destroyed."
It was but the Johnson theory which we presented to the world,
denying the right of any State to secede; asserting the perpetuity,
the indissolubility of the Union.
But the question was, whether the members from the seceding States
should be admitted to the Senate and House; and he dealt with this
most difficult problem in a statesmanlike way. He said:
"The amendment to the Constitution being adopted, it would remain
for the States whose powers have been so long in abeyance, to resume
their places in the two branches of the National Legislature, and
thereby complete the work of restoration. Here it is for you,
fellow citizens of the Senate, and for you, fellow citizens of the
House of Representatives, to judge, each of you for yourselves, of
the elections, returns and qualifications of your own members."
On the suffrage question, he said:
"On the propriety of making freedmen electors by proclamation of
the Executive, I took for my counsel the Constitution itself, the
interpretations of that instrument by its authors, and their
contemporaries, and the recent legislation of Congress. They all
unite in inculcating the doctrine that the regulation of the suffrage
is a power exclusively for the States. So fixed was this reservation
of power in the habits of the people, and so unquestioned has been
the interpretation of the Constitution, that during the Civil War
the late President never harbored the purpose,--certainly never
avowed it,--of disregarding it; and in acts of Congress nothing
can be found to sanction any departure by the Executive from a
policy which has so uniformly obtained."
Aside from the worst radicals, the message pleased every one, the
country at large and the majority in Congress; and there was a
general disposition to give the President a reasonably free hand
in working out his plan of reconstruction. But as I stated, the
Legislatures of the Southern States and their Executives assumed
so domineering an attitude, practically wiping out the results of
the war, that the Republican majority in Congress assumed it to be
its duty to take control from the Executive.
What determined Johnson in his course, I do not know. It was
thought that he would be a radical of radicals. Being of the "poor
white" class, he may have been flattered by the attentions showered
on him by the old Southern aristocrats. Writers of this period
have frequently given that as a reason. My own belief has been
that he was far too strong a man to be governed in so vital a matter
by so trivial a cause. My conviction is that the radical Republican
leaders in the House were right; that he believed in the old
Democratic party, aside from his loyalty to the Union; and was a
Democrat determined to turn the Government over to the Democratic
party, reconstructed on a Union basis.
I cannot undertake to go into all the long details of the memorable
struggle. As I look back over the history of it now, it seems to
me to bear a close resemblance to the beginning of the French
Revolution, to the struggle between the States General of France
and Louis XVI. Might we not, if things had turned differently,
drifted into chaos and revolution? If Johnson had been impeached
and refused to submit, adopting the same tactics as did Stanton in
retaining the War Department; had Ben Wade taken the oath of office
and demanded possession, Heaven only knows what might have been
the result.
But reminiscing in this way, as I cannot avoid doing when I think
back over those terrible times, I lose the continuity of my subject.
An extension to the Freedman's Bureau bill was passed, was promptly
vetoed by the Executive, the veto was as promptly overruled by the
House, where there was no substantial opposition, but the Senate
failed to pass the bill, the veto of the President to the contrary
notwithstanding.
I had not the remotest idea that Johnson would dare to veto the
Freedman's Bureau bill, and I made a speech on the subject, declaring
a firm conviction to that effect. A veto at that time was almost
unheard of. Except during the administration of Tyler, no important
bill had ever been vetoed by an Executive. It came as a shock to
Congress and the country. Excitement reigned supreme. The question
was: "Should the bill pass the veto of the President regardless
thereof?"
Not the slightest difficulty existed in the House; Thaddeus Stevens
had too complete control of that body to allow any question concerning
it there. The bill, therefore, was promptly passed over the veto
of the President.
But the situation in the Senate was different. At this time the
Sumner-Wade radical element did not have the necessary two-thirds
majority, and the bill failed to pass over the veto of the President.
The war between the executive and legislative departments of the
Government had fairly commenced, and the first victory had been
won by the President.
The Civil Rights bill, drawn and introduced by Judge Trumbull, than
whom there was no greater lawyer in the United States Senate, in
January, 1866, on the reassembling of Congress, was passed. Then
began the real struggle on the part of the radicals in the Senate,
headed by Sumner and Wade, to muster the necessary two-thirds
majority to pass a bill over the veto of the President.
Let me digress here to say a word in reference to Charles Sumner.
For ten years he was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
of the United States Senate, and no man, by education, experience,
knowledge of world politics, and travel, was ever more fitted to
occupy that high position. He was one of the most cultivated men
of his day, a radical, and filled one of the most important places
in the history of his time. When he entered the Senate, the South
dominated this Government; the great triumvirate, Webster, Clay,
and Calhoun, had just passed. The day he entered, Clay for the
last time, feeble, emaciated, appeared on the Senate floor.
Compromise was the word, and the Southerners so dominated that it
was considered treason to mention the slavery question. Charles
Sumner was an abolitionist; he was not afraid, and at the very
first opportunity he took the floor and denounced the institution
in no unmeasured terms. Chase and Seward were present that day,
and quickly followed Sumner's lead. Seward, however, was far more
conservative than either Sumner or Chase.
It was the mission of Charles Sumner to awake the public conscience
to the horrors of slavery. He performed his duty unfalteringly,
and it almost cost him his life. Mr. Lincoln was the only man
living who ever managed Charles Sumner, or could use him for his
purpose. Sumner's end has always seemed to me most pitiful.
Removed from his high position as chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate, followed relentlessly by the enmity of
President Grant, than at the very acme of his fame; drifting from
the Republican party, his own State repudiating him, Charles Sumner
died of a broken heart.
But to return to the struggle between the President and Congress.
Trumbull, Sumner, Wade, and the leaders were bound in one way or
another to get the necessary two-thirds. The vote was taken in
the Senate: "Shall the Civil Rights bill pass the veto of the
President to the contrary notwithstanding?" It was well understood
that the vote would be very close, and the result uncertain.
The excitement was intense. The galleries were crowded; members
of the House were on the Senate floor. The result seemed to depend
entirely upon the vote of Senator Morgan, of New York, and he seemed
to be irresolute, uncertain in his own mind which way he would
vote. The call of the roll proceeded. When his name was reached
there was profound silence. He first voted nay, and then immediately
changed to yea. A wonderful demonstration burst forth as it was
then known that the bill would pass over the veto of the President,
and that the Republican party in Congress at last had complete
control. Senator Trumbull made a remarkable speech on that occasion,
and I was never prouder of any living man.
So the struggle went on from day to day and year to year, growing
all the time more intense. I have always been disposed to be
conservative; I was then; and it was with profound regret that I
saw the feeling between the President and Congress becoming more
and more strained.
I disliked to follow the extreme radical element, and when the row
was at its height, Judge Orth, a colleague in the House from Indiana,
and I concluded to go and see the President and advise with him,
in an attempt to smooth over the differences. I will never forget
that interview. It was at night. He received us politely enough,
and without mincing any words he gave us to understand that we were
on a fool's errand and that he would not yield. We went away, and
naturally joined the extreme radicals in the House, always voting
with them afterwards.
The row continued in the Fortieth Congress. Bills were passed,
promptly vetoed, and the bills immediately passed over the President's
veto. Many of the bills were not only unwise legislation but were
unconstitutional as well. We passed the Tenure of Office bill; we
attempted to restrict the President's pardoning power; and as I
look back over the history of the period, it seems to me that we
did not have the slightest regard for the Constitution. Some of
President Johnson' veto messages were admirable. He had the advice
and assistance of one of the ablest lawyers of his day, Jeremiah
Black.
To make the feeling more intense, just about this time Johnson made
his famous "swing around the circle," as it was termed. His speeches
published in the opposition press were intemperate and extreme.
He denounced Congress. He threatened to "kick people out of office,"
in violation of the Tenure of Office act. He was undignified in
his actions and language, and many people thought he was intoxicated
most of the time, although I do not believe this.
The radicals in both the House and Senate determined that he should
be impeached and removed from office. They had the votes in the
House easily, and they thought they could muster the necessary
number in the Senate, as we had been passing all sorts of legislation
over the President's veto. When the subject was up, I was doubtful,
and I really believe, strong Republican that I was, that had it
not been for Judge Trumbull I would have voted against the impeachment
articles. I advised with the Judge, for whom I had profound respect.
I visited him at his house. I explained to him my doubts, and I
recall very clearly the expression he used in reply. He said:
"Johnson is an obstruction to the Government and should be removed."
Judge Trumbull himself changed afterwards, much to the astonishment
of every one, and denounced the impeachment proceeding as unworthy
of a justice of the peace court.
It seems to me difficult to realize that it was as far back as
March 2, 1868, that I addressed the House in favor of the impeachment
articles. I think I made a pretty good speech on that occasion
and supported my position very well. I took rather an extreme view
in favor of the predominance of the legislative department of the
Government, contending that the executive and judiciary departments
of the Government, while they are finally responsible to the people,
are directly accountable to the legislative department.
The first and principal article in the impeachment proposed by the
House was the President's issuance of an order removing Edwin M.
Stanton as Secretary of War, he having been duly appointed and
commissioned by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
the Senate having been in session at the time of his removal.
I contended then, on the floor of the House, that such a removal
was a violation of the Constitution and could not be excused on
any pretext whatever, in addition to being a direct violation of
the Tenure of Office act.
I do not intend to go into the details of the various articles
proposed by the House; suffice it to say that they were mainly
based on the attempted removal of Mr. Stanton, and the appointment
of Mr. Thomas as Secretary of War.
I was very serious in concluding my speech. My words were:
"Mr. Chairman: The administration of Mr. Johnson since he became
President of the United States has been characterized by an utter
disregard of the laws and Constitution of the United States. And,
sir, I am of the opinion that there should be another article
adopted by this House, and sent to the Senate, upon which he should
be tried, the substance of which should be that Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, is guilty of high crimes in office,
in that he violated the Constitution and laws of the United States,
by using his influence, patronage and power of said office to
hinder, delay and prevent a restoration of the States lately in
rebellion against the Government, to their proper practical relations
to the Union. Congress provided by law for the reconstruction of
the rebel States. The President, from whatever motives it matters
not, stands in his Executive Office, and by all his influence and
power opposes restoration according to law. As an Executive Officer,
he has no such right, and his opposition to the laws of Congress
on the subject of reconstruction has cost this Nation thousands of
loyal men who have been murdered in the South on account of their
devotion to the Flag, and millions of money which is to be added
to the enormous public debt to be cast upon the necks of the people.
Shall the Nation endure it longer? Shall we struggle on and on
until the welcome day comes when his term shall expire? The people
say 'No'; men struggling in business say 'No'; men longing for
peace and harmony in the land say 'No'; the loyal men of the South,
who have been abused and hunted by wicked rebels, say 'No'; and I
trust that the answer of all these may be the answer of this House
to-day, and the answer of the Senate of the United States within
a reasonable time after these articles shall be sent to them."
Needless for me to say, that as the subject continued feeling
remained at a high pitch in the House. It was debated from day to
day. Stevens was urging the impeachment with all the force at his
command; some were doubtful and holding back, as I was; some changed
--for instance, James G. Blaine, who was taunted by Stevens and
sneered at for his change of front.
Under the law then existing the President of the Senate succeeded
a Vice-President who became, by the death or removal of the President,
President of the United States. The radicals in complete control
--and I have no doubt that Stevens had a hand in it--elected the
most radical of their number as President of the Senate--Ben Wade,
of Ohio. Johnson removed, Wade would have been President, and the
extreme radicals would have been in supreme control of the legislative
and executive departments of the Government.
This condition is what made Mr. Blaine hesitate. He told me on
one occasion: "Johnson in the White House is bad enough, but we
know what we have; Lord knows what we would get with old Ben Wade
there. I do not know but I would rather trust Johnson than Wade."
But in the end Blaine supported the impeachment articles, just as
I did, and as Senator Allison and other somewhat conservative
members did, all feeling at the same time not a little doubtful of
our course.
Stevens, Logan, Boutwell, Williams, and Wilson were appointed
managers on the part of the House, and solemnly and officially
notified the Senate of the action of the House in impeaching the
President of the United States. The Senate proceeded without long
delay to resolve itself as a High Court of Impeachment, for the
purpose of trying the President of the United States for high crimes
and misdemeanors. The most eminent counsel of the Nation were
engaged. Mr. Evarts was President Johnson's principal counsel.
He was ably assisted by lawyers of scarcely less renown.
The trial dragged along from day to day. Part of the time the
Senate considered the matter in executive session. The corridors
were crowded; and I remember with what astonishment we heard that
Judge Trumbull had taken the floor denouncing the proceeding as
unworthy of a justice of the peace court. The Illinois delegation
held a meeting, and Logan, Farnsworth, and Washburne urged that we
unite in a letter to Judge Trumbull, with a view to influencing
his vote for conviction, or of inducing him to withhold his vote
if he could not vote for conviction. A number of our delegation
opposed it, and the letter was not sent.
I do not think that it would have made the slightest effect on
Judge Trumbull had we sent it. All sorts of coercing methods were
used to influence wavering Senators. Old Bob Schenck was the
chairman of this movement, and he sent telegrams broadcast all over
the United States to the effect that there was great danger to the
peace of the country and the Republican cause if impeachment failed,
and asking the recipients to send their Senators public opinion by
resolutions and delegations. And responses came from all over the
North, urging and demanding the impeachment of the President.
It is difficult now to realize the intense excitement of that
period. General Grant was there, tacitly acknowledged as the next
nominee of the Republican party for the Presidency. He took no
active part, but it was pretty well understood, from the position
of his friends such as Logan and Washburne, that the impeachment
had his sympathy; and in the Senate Conkling was especially
vindictive. Grimes, Fessenden, and Trumbull led the fight for
acquittal. Many were noncommittal; but in the end the struggle
turned on the one doubtful Senator, Edmund G. Ross of Kansas.
It was determined to vote on the tenth article first, as that
article was the strongest one and more votes could be mustered for
it than any other. It was well understood that the vote on that
article would settle the matter.
More than forty-three years have passed into history since that
memorable day when the Senate of the United States was sitting as
a Court of Impeachment for the purpose of trying the President of
the United States for high crimes and misdemeanors. The occasion
is unforgettable. As I look back now, I see arising before me the
forms and features of the great men who were sitting in that high
court: I see presiding Chief Justice Chase; I see Sumner, cold
and dignified; Wade, Trumbull, Hendricks, Conkling, Yates; I see
Logan as one of the managers on the part of the House; I see old
Thad Stevens, weak and wasted from illness, being carried in--all
long since have passed to the beyond, the accused President, the
members of the high court, the counsel. Of all the eminent men
who were present on that day, aside from the Hon. J. B. Henderson,
I do not know of a single one now living.
As the roll was called, there was such a solemn hush as only comes
when man stands in the presence of Deity. Finally, when the name
of Ross was reached and he voted "No"; when it was understood that
his vote meant acquittal, the friends of the President in the
galleries thundered forth in applause.
And thus ended for the first, and I hope the last, time the trial
of a President of the United States before the Senate, sitting as
a Court of Impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors.