THE CASE OF DOMESTIC ANIMALS.
The main principle of animals’ rights, if admitted to be fundamentally
sound, will not be essentially affected by the wildness or the
domesticity, as the case may be, of the animals in question; _both_
classes have their rights, though these rights may differ largely in
extent and importance. It is convenient, however, to consider the
subject of the domestic animals apart from that of the wild ones,
inasmuch as their whole relation to mankind is so much altered and
emphasized by the fact of their subjection. Here, at any rate, it
is impossible, even for the most callous reasoners, to deny the
responsibility of man, in his dealings with vast races of beings,
the very conditions of whose existence have been modified by human
civilization.
An incalculable mass of drudgery, at the cost of incalculable
suffering, is daily, hourly performed for the benefit of man by these
honest, patient labourers in every town and country of the world. Are
these countless services to be permanently ignored in a community which
makes any pretension to a humane civilization? Will the free citizens
of the enlightened republics of the future be content to reap the
immense advantages of animals’ labour, without recognizing that they
owe them some consideration in return? The question is one that carries
with it its own answer.[17]
But the human mind is subtle to evade the full significance of its
duties, and nowhere is this more conspicuously seen than in our
treatment of the lower races. Given a position in which man profits
largely (or _thinks_ he profits largely, for it is not always a
matter of certainty) by the toil or suffering of the animals, and our
respectable moralists are pretty sure to be explaining to us that
this providential arrangement is “better for the animals themselves.”
The wish is father to the thought in these questions, and there is
an accommodating elasticity in our social ethics that permits of the
justification of almost any system which it would be inconvenient to
us to discontinue. Thus we find it stated, and on the authority of
a bishop, that man may “lay down the terms of the social contract
between animals and himself,” because, forsooth, “the general life of a
domestic animal is one of very great comfort--according to the animal’s
own standard (_sic_) probably one of almost perfect happiness.”[18]
Now this prating about “the animal’s own standard” is nothing better
than hypocritical cant. If man is obliged to lay down the terms of the
contract, let him at least do so without having recourse to such a
suspiciously opportune afterthought. We have taken the animals from
a free, natural state, into an artificial thraldom, in order that
_we_, and not _they_, may be the gainers thereby; it cannot possibly
be maintained that they owe us gratitude on this account, or that this
alleged debt may be used as a means of evading the just recognition
of their rights. It is the more necessary to raise a strong protest
against this jesuitical mode of reasoning, because, as we shall see, it
is so frequently employed, in one form or another, by the apologists of
human tyranny.
On the other hand, I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary
contention, that man is not morally justified in imposing any sort
of subjection on the lower animals.[19] An abstract question of this
sort, however interesting as a speculation, and impossible in itself
to disprove, is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, which is
primarily concerned with the state of things at present existing. We
must face the fact that the services of domestic animals have become,
whether rightly or wrongly, an integral portion of the system of modern
society; we cannot immediately dispense with those services, any more
than we can dispense with human labour itself. But we _can_ provide,
as at least a present step towards a more ideal relationship in the
future, that the conditions under which all labour is performed,
whether by men or by animals, shall be such as to enable the worker to
take some appreciable pleasure in the work, instead of experiencing a
lifelong course of injustice and ill-treatment.
And here it may be convenient to say a word as to the existing line
of demarcation between the animals legally recognized as “domestic,”
and those _feræ naturæ_, of wild nature. In the Act of 1849, in which
a penalty was imposed for cruelty to “any animal,” it was expressly
provided that
“The word _animal_ shall be taken to mean any horse, mare, gelding,
bull, ox, cow, heifer, steer, calf, mule, ass, sheep, lamb, hog, pig,
sow, goat, dog, cat, or any other domestic animal.”
But as time went on, and public opinion was more sensitive, the
interpretation of this vague reference to “any other domestic animal”
became a point of considerable importance, since it closely affected
the welfare of certain captive animals which, though regarded as wild,
and therefore outside the pale of protection, were to all intents and
purposes in a state of domestication. The Act of 1849 was accordingly
amended by the Wild Animals in Captivity Act of 1900, which made it
an offence to maltreat a wild animal while actually in a state of
captivity. (_See also_ the Act of 1911, _infra_ p. 34.)
“Food, rest, and tender usage,” were declared by Humphry Primatt, the
old author already quoted, to be the three rights of the domestic
animals. Lawrence’s opinion was to much the same effect.
“Man is indispensably bound to bestow upon animals, in return for
the benefit he derives from their services, good and sufficient
nourishment, comfortable shelter, and merciful treatment; to commit
no wanton outrage upon their feelings, whilst alive, and to put them
to the speediest and least painful death, when it shall be necessary
to deprive them of life.”
But it is important to note that something more is due to animals,
and especially to domestic animals, than the mere supply of provender
and the mere immunity from ill-usage. “We owe justice to men,” wrote
Montaigne, “and grace and benignity to other creatures that are capable
of it; there is a natural commerce and mutual obligation betwixt them
and us.” Sir Arthur Helps admirably expressed this sentiment in his
well-known reference to the duty of “using courtesy to animals.”[20]
If these be the rights of domestic animals, it is pitiful to reflect
how commonly and how grossly they are violated. The average life of our
“beasts of burden,” the horse, the ass, and the mule, is from beginning
to end a rude negation of their individuality and intelligence; they
are habitually addressed and treated as stupid instruments of man’s
will and pleasure, instead of the highly-organized and sensitive beings
that they are. Well might Thoreau, the humanest and most observant of
naturalists, complain of man’s “not educating the horse, not trying
to develop his nature, but merely getting work out of him”; for such,
it must be acknowledged, is the prevalent method of treatment, in
ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, at the present day, even where
there is no actual cruelty or ill-usage.
We are often told that there is no other western country where tame
animals are so well treated as in England, and it is only necessary
to read the records of a century back to see that the inhumanities of
the past were far more atrocious than any that are still practised in
the present. Let us be thankful for these facts, as showing that the
current of English opinion is at least moving in the right direction.
But it must yet be said that the sights that everywhere meet the eye
of a humane and thoughtful observer, whether in town or country, are
a disgrace to our vaunted “civilization.” Watch the cab traffic in
one of the crowded thoroughfares of our great cities--always the same
lugubrious patient procession of underfed overloaded animals, the same
brutal insolence of the drivers, the same accursed sound of the whip.
And remembering that these horses are gifted with a large degree of
sensibility and intelligence, must one not feel that the fate to which
they are thus mercilessly subjected is a shameful violation of the
principle which moralists have laid down?
Yet it is to this fate that even the well-kept horses of the rich must
in time descend, so to pass the declining years of a life devoted to
man’s service! “A good man,” said Plutarch, “will take care of his
horses and dogs, not only while they are young, but when old and past
service. We ought certainly not to treat living beings like shoes and
household goods, which, when worn out with use, we throw away.” Such
was the feeling of the old pagan writer, and our good Christians of the
present age scarcely seem to have improved on it. True, they do not
“throw away” their superannuated carriage-horses--it is so much more
lucrative to _sell_ them to the shopman or cab-proprietor, who will in
due course pass them on to the knacker and cat’s-meat man.
The use of machinery is often condemned, on æsthetic grounds, because
of the ugliness it has introduced into so many features of modern life.
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that it has immensely
relieved the huge mass of animal labour, and that when such forces are
generally used for purposes of traction, one of the foulest blots on
our social humanity is likely to disappear. Scientific and mechanical
invention, so far from being necessarily antagonistic to a true beauty
of life, may be found to be of the utmost service to it, when they are
employed for humane and not merely commercial, purposes.[21] Herein
Thoreau is a wiser teacher than Ruskin. “If all were as it seems,” he
says, “and men made the elements their servants for noble ends! If the
cloud that hangs over the engine were the perspiration of heroic deeds,
or as beneficent as that which floats over the farmer’s fields, then
the elements and Nature herself would cheerfully accompany men on their
errands and be their escort.”
It is no part of my purpose to enumerate the various acts of injustice
of which domestic animals are the victims; it is sufficient to point
out that the true cause of such injustice is to be sought in the
unwarrantable neglect of their many intelligent qualities, and in the
contemptuous indifference which, in defiance of sense and reason, still
classes them as “brute-beasts.” What has been said of horses in this
respect applies still more strongly to the second class of domestic
animals. Sheep, goats, and oxen are regarded as mere “live-stock”;
while pigs, poultry, rabbits, and other marketable “farm-produce,” meet
with even less consideration, and are constantly treated with brutal
inhumanity by their human possessors. Let anyone who doubts this pay a
visit to a cattle-market, and study the scenes that are enacted there.
The question of the castration of animals may here be briefly referred
to.[22] That nothing but imperative necessity could justify such a
practice must, I think, be admitted; for mutilation of this kind is not
only painful in itself, but deprives those who undergo it of the most
vigorous and spirited elements of their character. It is said--with
what precise amount of truth I cannot pretend to determine--that
man would not otherwise be able to maintain his dominion over the
domestic animals; but on the other hand it may be pointed out that
this dominion is in no case destined to be perpetuated in its present
sharply-accentuated form, and that various practices which, in a sense,
are “necessary” now,--_i.e._ in the false position and relationship
in which we stand towards the animals,--will doubtless be gradually
discontinued under the humaner system of the future. Moreover,
castration as performed on cattle, sheep, pigs, and fowls, with no
better object than to increase their size and improve their flavour
for the table, is, even at the present time, utterly needless and
unjustifiable. “The bull,” as Shelley says, “must be degraded into the
ox, and the ram into the wether, by an unnatural and inhuman operation,
that the flaccid fibre may offer a fainter resistance to rebellious
nature.” In all its aspects, this is a disagreeable subject, and one
about which the majority of people do not care to think--probably from
an unconscious perception that the established custom could scarcely
survive the critical ordeal of thought.
There remains one other class of domestic animals, viz., those who
have become still more closely associated with mankind through being
the inmates of their homes. The dog is probably better treated on the
whole than any other animal;[23] though, to prove how far we still
are from a rational and consistent appreciation of his worth, it is
only necessary to point to the fact that he is commonly regarded by a
large number of educated people as a fit and proper subject for that
experimental torture which is known as vivisection. The cat has always
been treated with far less consideration than the dog, and, despite
the numerous scattered instances that might be cited to the contrary,
it is to be feared that De Quincey was in the main correct, when he
remarked that “the groans and screams of this poor persecuted race, if
gathered into some great echoing hall of horrors, would melt the heart
of the stoniest.” The institution of “Homes” for lost and starving dogs
and cats is a welcome sign of the humane feeling that is asserting
itself in some quarters; but it is also no less a proof of the general
indifferentism which can allow the most familiar domestic animals to
become homeless.
It may be doubted, indeed, whether the condition of the household
“pet” is, in the long run, more enviable than that of the “beast of
burden.” Pets, like kings’ favourites, are usually the recipients of
an abundance of sentimental affection but of little real kindness; so
much easier is it to give temporary caresses than substantial justice.
It seems to be forgotten, in a vast majority of cases, that a domestic
animal does not exist for the mere idle amusement, any more than for
the mere commercial profit, of its human owner; and that for a living
being to be turned into a useless puppet is only one degree better than
to be doomed to the servitude of a drudge. The injustice done to the
pampered lap-dog is as conspicuous, in its way, as that done to the
over-worked horse, and both spring from one and the same origin--the
fixed belief that the life of a “brute” has no moral purpose, no
distinctive personality worthy of due consideration and development.
In a society where the lower animals were regarded as intelligent
beings, and not as animated machines, it would be impossible for this
incongruous absurdity to continue.
This, then, appears to be our position as regards the rights of
domestic animals. Waiving, on the one hand, the somewhat abstruse
question whether man is morally justified in utilizing animal labour
at all, and on the other the fatuous assertion that he is constituting
himself a benefactor by so doing, we recognize that the services of
domestic animals have by immemorial usage become an important and,
it may even be said, necessary element in the economy of modern life.
It is impossible, unless every principle of justice is to be cast to
the winds, that the due requital of these services should remain a
matter of personal caprice; for slavery is at all times hateful and
iniquitous, whether it be imposed on mankind or on the lower races.
Apart from the rights they possess in common with all intelligent
beings, domestic animals have a special claim on man’s courtesy and
sense of fairness, inasmuch as they are not his fellow-creatures only,
but his fellow-workers, his dependents, and in many cases the familiar
associates and trusted inmates of his home.