LITIGATION, 1867-1871.
Mr Bradlaugh took part in so many law-suits during his life that
people have hurriedly jumped at conclusions, and condemned him as a
"litigious" man. They have not troubled to consider the circumstances
of the different suits; it was sufficient that Mr Bradlaugh took part
in them, and that at once stamped him as litigious. Now, as a matter
of fact, it will be found that in a large number of cases he figured
as _defendant_ in the action, and where he was plaintiff I think it
must be admitted that it was rarely without sufficient cause. Although
many years constantly libelled, he seldom brought an action for libel;
there were indeed such actions, all of which will be found mentioned
in this book. After he had engaged a hall for lectures, it was no
uncommon thing for the proprietor to break his contract; and if it was
a very gross case this occasionally resulted in a suit, but much more
frequently he accepted the situation, trusting to time to wear away
prejudices against him.
In each of the four cases I am now about to speak of Mr Bradlaugh
was the plaintiff. The first was an action arising purely out of his
business as a financial agent, and would have little interest now were
it not for the terms of the Vice-Chancellor's judgment. The second also
arose in the course of business, but was greatly complicated by the
oath question. The third was a libel case; while the fourth was against
the Mirfield Town Hall Company for breach of contract.
In January 1867 the case of the English Joint Stock Bank (Limited)
and Charles Bradlaugh was heard in the Court of Chancery before
Vice-Chancellor Wood. Mr Bradlaugh claimed to be admitted as a
creditor against the Bank, then in course of winding up, for £12,350,
or for such less sum as the Court might think just and reasonable,
in consideration of his having negotiated a purchase for the Bank of
the banking business of Messrs Harvey & Hudson of Norwich for the
sum of £210,000. The sum thus claimed was the one agreed to be paid
him by the general manager of the Bank. The Court decided against
him for reasons not necessary to enter fully upon here, and the
Vice-Chancellor's judgment was reported at considerable length in the
_Times_ of the following day. The extracts given here are based upon
the shorthand notes of the case. Vice-Chancellor Wood commenced his
judgment by referring to "the great ability with which Mr Bradlaugh
had argued his case;" and after dealing with the arguments at some
length, said that he regretted to come to the conclusion that there was
no completed agreement which could be enforced, "as Mr Bradlaugh--to
whom he gave implicit credit as to everything stated by him on his own
recollection--had no doubt been put to very great trouble and anxiety,
but in deciding against his present claim he would not be shut out
from obtaining what he could for his services on a _quantum meruit_.
The costs of the summons would be reserved until the result of such an
application should have been ascertained. The question had been argued
with extreme ability by Mr Bradlaugh, and he could not possibly have
been assisted better by whatever counsel he could have retained than he
had been by his own advocacy. He had put it in the clearest and most
concise manner possible, and the Court had been much assisted by the
whole of his argument. He had very fairly produced every document that
he knew anything about, or which he thought could throw any light upon
the transaction. "The Vice-Chancellor repeated that he gave unfeigned
credit to everything that Mr Bradlaugh had said; he did not try to
exaggerate or to improve upon his case; and he was sorry--because he
had no doubt that Mr Bradlaugh had had great trouble and anxiety in the
matter--he was sorry that he must decide against him on his claim.
These words of Vice-Chancellor Wood's are specially valuable; first,
as showing a judge's appreciation of Mr Bradlaugh's legal ability
even when he was arguing a case which concerned an ordinary business
matter only, and was neither directly or indirectly a defence of those
principles of liberty of speech, of press, or of conscience which
were so close to his heart; and next, as a tribute to that calm and
well-balanced temperament which even as a young man of thirty-three
enabled him to state his case so manifestly without gloss or
exaggeration.
Later in the same year (1867) my father commenced a suit against a
gentleman named De Rin. This case went through various Courts, and
although the subject in dispute was really a private matter, the
peculiar course taken by the defendant resulted in a public benefit,
viz. the extension of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1869. The suit,
begun in 1867, was not finally disposed of until 1870, but during these
years the side issue of the competency of an Atheist to give evidence
involved so much fighting that my father actually lost about fifteen
hundred pounds before it was decided in his favour.
As endorser of three bills of exchange, Mr Bradlaugh brought an action
against Mr De Rin as acceptor of the same. The bills were drawn in
Brussels, and sent for acceptance to the defendant in England; he
accepted, and afterwards endorsed them to a legal gentleman named
Gallet, who in turn endorsed them in France to Mr Bradlaugh. The action
was brought by the latter to enable him to realise the bills in this
country, and was heard before Mr Justice Montague Smith and a common
jury, in the Court of Common Pleas, in December 1867. Mr Lumley Smith
was counsel for the plaintiff; Mr D. Keane, Q.C., and Mr Wood were for
the defendant.
When Mr Bradlaugh entered the witness-box Mr Keane interposed, saying:
"I have a most painful duty to perform, and that is to object to the
witness being sworn on account of his being an Atheist and holding
notoriously Atheistic opinions." Mr Keane repeated that he felt it an
extremely painful duty, but that he had no discretion in the matter;
he had instructions to take this objection, and therefore he must take
it. He added: "At the same time I must say that I have met Mr Bradlaugh
several times on business, and have never seen any conduct on his part
unbecoming a gentleman."
Mr Justice Smith: "You have power, Mr Keane, to waive the objection.
Sometimes it is material to make the objection considering the matters
in issue. But in the present case is it so? I consider this a case in
which the objection had better be waived."
As counsel against Mr Bradlaugh in the Devonport case, Mr Montague
Smith, Q.C., had himself examined Mr Bradlaugh upon his opinions, but
this he considered altogether a different matter; this was purely a
commercial transaction.
Mr Bradlaugh stated that he was ready to affirm or to give evidence
upon oath, and after a short discussion Mr Justice Smith said that
he should take it upon himself to allow him to affirm; but Mr Keane
again interposed, urging that he would not be competent to do so. Mr
Bradlaugh then made his counsel formally tender him as a witness, but
after some conversation Mr Keane agreed to admit the facts which Mr
Bradlaugh was to prove. It was then contended that the endorsement was
not valid according to the law of France, but ultimately the verdict
was given for the plaintiff, with leave to the defendant to move the
verdict for him on the objections he had raised.
Mr De Rin accordingly moved the Court of Common Pleas, and in July
1868 the Court granted a rule absolute to enter the verdict for the
defendant, on the ground that the endorsement did not confer on the
plaintiff the right of suing on the bills in this country. Mr Bradlaugh
appealed against this decision to the Court of Exchequer, and the Court
of Appeal suggested an inquiry as to the fact whether the endorsed
bills came into Mr Bradlaugh's possession by post in England or
whether they were handed to him in France, and Mr S. Prentice, Q.C.,
was nominated as a referee to ascertain the fact. When the case came
on appeal before Mr Justice Lush in October 1868, in the Exchequer
Chamber, bail had to be given for costs, and Mr Austin Holyoake was
tendered as such bail, but Mr Wood, counsel for the defendant De Rin,
objected to Mr Holyoake as not competent to take the oath. "I am known
to be a Freethinker," wrote Austin Holyoake, with just indignation,
"and it is therefore competent for any solicitor or barrister to openly
insult me by calling in question my ability to speak the truth."
After a very long delay, in December 1869 the case came before Mr
Prentice to ascertain, as I have said, whether the bills were delivered
to Mr Bradlaugh in England or in France. Once more Mr Bradlaugh
presented himself as a witness, to prove their delivery to him in
England, and once more, despite the passing of the Evidence Amendment
Act in the previous August, his evidence was objected to. Mr Bradlaugh
appeared in person, and Mr Wood, who had been counsel for the defendant
at the hearing before Mr Justice Lush, again appeared for him. On
Mr Bradlaugh tendering himself as witness, Mr Wood--who, like his
predecessor Mr Keane, said that, acting under special instructions,
he took a course which gave him considerable pain--asked him: "Do you
believe in God?"
Mr Bradlaugh's objection to answer this question was followed by a long
discussion, at the end of which Mr Prentice held that he was bound to
answer. Again Mr Wood put the question: "Do you believe in God?"
Mr Bradlaugh: "I do not; that is, I do not believe in any being
independent of the universe, governing or ruling it."
Mr Prentice: "Do you believe in a future state of rewards and
punishments?"
Mr Bradlaugh: "After death, certainly not."
"Then," said Mr Prentice, "I must refuse your evidence."
A day or so later my father, undaunted, carried his case before Mr
Justice Brett at Judges' Chambers, and asked for an order to compel
Mr Prentice to take his evidence; but Mr Justice Brett held, although
with some doubt, that Mr Prentice was not authorised by the Act of
Parliament to administer the alternative declaration.[126] The Judge
added that Mr Bradlaugh ought to have liberty to apply to the Court
against the decision, and endorsed his judgment with the opinion that
it was "a fit case to go before the full court."
[Footnote 126: The Evidence Amendment Act 1869 (32 and 33 Vict. c.
68) enacted "that if any person called to give evidence in any court,
whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an
oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath, such
person shall, if the presiding judge is satisfied that the taking of
the oath would have no binding effect upon his conscience, make the
promise and declaration the form of which is contained in the same
section." Mr Prentice, as arbitrator, did not consider himself a
"presiding judge" within the meaning of the Act, and was not therefore
qualified to satisfy himself as to the state of a witness's conscience.]
A few days after this refusal of Mr Prentice to hear his evidence,
and Mr Justice Brett's confirmation of this refusal, Mr Bradlaugh
was called as a witness in the Central Criminal Court to prove the
signature of Dr Shorthouse of the _Sporting Times_ in an action for
libel brought by Sir Joseph Hawley. On his objecting to take the oath
he was readily permitted to give his evidence upon affirmation. Such
was the confusion in which the law of evidence was left after the
passing of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1869. A witness perfectly
competent to give evidence in one Court was incompetent in another, or
else it was a matter of doubt whether he was competent or not.
In January 1870 Mr Bradlaugh carried his case before Lord Chief Justice
Bovill and Justices Keating, Brett, and Montague Smith, in the Court of
Common Pleas; but after half-an-hour's argument the Judges refused to
hear him on the ground that he was not moving on affidavit. "That is,"
said Mr Bradlaugh, "I was sent back to be sworn as to the refusal of
my testimony before I could be allowed to argue that I was not liable
to take the oath, and before I could be allowed to claim that I had,
notwithstanding, the right to give evidence." A very pretty tangle of
contradiction!
He then proceeded to satisfy all conventions by swearing (affidavits
could not then be affirmed) that Mr Prentice did not consider him
competent to give evidence on oath, nor himself competent to receive
the evidence on affirmation. Mr Bradlaugh returned two days later to
the Court of Common Pleas and asked that "Mr Prentice be directed to
take the evidence of Mr Charles Bradlaugh on the fact to be stated in a
special case." After a very long argument the Court decided that it had
no power to give directions to an arbitrator.
Although no more advanced than when he first brought his action in the
winter of 1867, Mr Bradlaugh did not even yet despair, but determined
to carry his case to the highest possible legal tribunal. Pending the
final decision of the law, petitions were got up all over the country
and sent into Parliament, praying for a further amendment of the Act.
On the 7th of February the case was mentioned at the Sittings in Error;
but although there were seven judges present, Lord Chief Baron Kelly
refused to proceed with it in the absence of the Lord Chief Justice. He
said that the case was one "of the greatest possible importance, not
only in this country, but throughout all Europe; it was therefore of
importance that the Court should be so constituted as to insure general
satisfaction with its decision. The Lord Chief Justice Cockburn had
been present when an argument on part of the case had been heard; it
would be advisable, therefore, that the case should stand over until
the Sittings in Error after the next term."
In consequence of this, it was not until the 16th of May that
the long-drawn-out proceedings in this suit--involving at the
outset a simple business transaction, but now including far wider
issues--entered upon their final stage. For more than two years justice
had been persistently perverted from its course, and used as the tool
of fraud, but now at length matters wore a different aspect. The case
was heard in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, before Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn, Lord Chief Baron Kelly, Justices Blackburn, Mellor, and
Lush, and Barons Channell and Cleasby. The Court was unanimous in its
decision that the endorsee was entitled to sue, and that the verdict
must be entered for Mr Bradlaugh. The Lord Chief Justice remarked that
the defendant had no merits at all in the case; he had relied upon this
"somewhat unrighteous" defence, and the judgment now given was "in
accordance with the good sense and justice and equity in the case."
So, in the end, my father won his suit, but the victory was very
costly. The judgment of the Court of Exchequer did not entitle him
to recover any of the expenses he had incurred in fighting the oath
question. Upon that point the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was
final. In a public statement made at the end of the year at Bristol,
in reply to some observations which had fallen from Professor Newman,
Mr Bradlaugh remarked that in contesting the oath question in the law
courts he had himself lost £1500. This was an allusion to his losses in
the De Rin case, the costs in which alone reached to more than £1100;
in addition to these enormous costs, he lost his debt of £360 because
the Christian De Rin, who objected to the evidence of an Atheist,
became bankrupt when the case was finally decided.
Before the passing of the Evidence Amendment Act in 1869 all persons
who disbelieved in God or in a future state of rewards and punishments
were held to be incompetent to give evidence in a Court of Law.
Freethinkers had long and bitterly felt the injustice and hardship of
their position; and in 1868 and 1869, after the first action in the
case of Bradlaugh and De Rin, a most determined effort was made to move
Parliament to amend the law of evidence. The National Secular Society
sent in petitions to the House of Commons, and the Executive of that
Society put itself in communication with members of both Houses. Mr
Bradlaugh said in 1870 that they tried "to pass a much more distinct
clause in favour of Freethinkers than the one as it now stands,
which is in its legal effect entirely different from the clause as
originally drawn by the Hon. Mr Denman, and printed in the Bill first
read before the Commons. It is Lord Cairns to whom we were ultimately
indebted for the main words which really serve us in the Act of 1869."
In 1870 another Bill, prepared by the Hon. G. Denman and Mr Locke King,
was passed through Parliament to further amend the law of evidence, but
it only met such difficulties as had arisen in the case of Bradlaugh
and De Rin, and did not touch the law as it related to jurymen,
affidavits, or Scotland. Mr Bradlaugh was continually urging members
of the House to get these points amended, but nothing further was done
until he himself carried his Oaths Act of 1888, by which the whole law
relating to oaths was radically altered.
Until the passing of this Act, jurors without religious belief were
liable to be committed to prison if they refused to be sworn, and
the law did not permit them to affirm. Affidavits on interlocutory
proceedings could only be made upon oath. In Scotland all Atheists
and disbelievers in eternal torment were, in addition, incompetent as
witnesses.
In any case, too much discretion was left to the Judge, who was
supposed to satisfy himself, according to the monstrous formula laid
down by the Act, that the oath would have "no binding effect" upon
the conscience of a heretical witness. A promise is binding upon the
conscience of an honest man in whatever form it may be made, and it
put Freethinkers in an entirely false position to be obliged to assent
to the statement that some particular form was not binding upon them.
Conscientious witnesses who wished to affirm hardly knew what to answer
when the Judge put the question to them, and he would not always be
satisfied with the mere statement that the oath gave no additionally
binding effect to the promise. And sometimes his assent to the formula
would be used to the discredit of a witness. I myself once heard Baron
Huddleston tell the jury that it was for them to consider what was the
value of the evidence of a witness whom an oath would not bind.
* * * * *
Amongst the multitude of papers hostile to Mr Bradlaugh's candidature
for Parliamentary honours in 1868 was one called the _Razor_. This
journal went so far in its condemnatory strictures that Mr Bradlaugh
felt--as his counsel, Mr Digby Seymour, put it--that he had no option
but to bring an action against the proprietor. The _Razor_ must have
been in a general way a tolerably obscure publication, for when I
went to look it up in the British Museum, no trace of it could be
discovered, although the officials there took considerable pains to
find it for me. But the article against Mr Bradlaugh had been recopied
from its columns and widely circulated in Northampton, where it was
calculated to produce serious mischief. Later on Northampton grew
accustomed to hearing my father accused of every possible crime, and,
knowing their absolute falsity, became hardened to such slanders;
still, at that time the acquaintance was comparatively young between
Northampton and the man whose statue it has this year placed in one of
its most public thoroughfares.
The libel endeavoured to connect Mr Bradlaugh with Broadhead (of the
Sheffield trade outrages), and with the misdeeds of which Mr Montagu
Leverson had been guilty two years after my father quitted his office.
It was published on August 15th, and was read by Mr Bradlaugh on the
19th. He at once telegraphed a demand for an apology, and on the same
day received a letter from the proprietor saying that the editor, who
was then absent, would be requested to offer a suitable apology. This
the editor showed no inclination to do, and some correspondence ensued.
Ultimately the _Razor_ people agreed to publish a statement of facts if
Mr Bradlaugh would draw it up and send it to them. This he did, but the
statement did not appear, and, tired of these proceedings, in October
he issued a writ against them. The case came on in December, at the
_nisi prius_ sittings at the Guildhall, before Mr Justice Blackburn and
a common jury. Mr Bradlaugh did not conduct his own case, but Mr Digby
Seymour, Q.C., and Mr Day appeared on his behalf, while the defendant
Mr Brooks was represented by Mr O'Malley, Q.C., and Mr Griffiths.
No attempt was made to justify the libel, nor was any apology offered,
although Mr Digby Seymour intimated the willingness of his client to
accept it even at that late hour. Mr Bradlaugh was the only witness
(the defence called no evidence whatever) other than those required
for formal proofs; and, having no case, the counsel for the defence
endeavoured to excite the prejudices of the jury by cross-examining
him as to his theological opinions. The method pursued by Mr O'Malley
was so gross that, lest I seem to do him an injustice, I will quote
the exact words of the report of his cross-examination. After asking
a number of questions about Broadhead and trades unions, Mr O'Malley
asked:
"Do you believe in the existence of a God?"
C. BRADLAUGH: I decline to answer that question, because,
according to the present laws of this country I might by so doing
render myself liable to prosecution.
Mr O'M.: Have you not said, "There is no God"?
C.B.: No; on the contrary, I have repeatedly said and written that an
atheist does not say "There is no God."
Mr O'M.: Have you not made statements in public against the existence
of God?
C.B.: I decline to answer that question.
Mr O'M.: Did you not once at a public lecture take out your watch
and defy the Deity, if he had any existence, to strike you dead in a
certain number of minutes?
C.B.: Never; such a suggestion is utterly unjustifiable.
Mr JUSTICE BLACKBURN: If any issues in the action depended
on this course of proceeding, Mr O'Malley, I should not object, but
I cannot see that these questions have any relevance to the matter
before us.
Mr O'M.: I think I shall be able to show by a few questions more the
importance of the plaintiff's answers. Are you (to plaintiff) a writer
in the _National Reformer?_ And have you written under the name of
"Iconoclast"?
C.B.: I decline to answer these questions, because prosecutions for
penalties are at present pending against the _National Reformer_ at
the instance of the late Government.
Mr O'M.: Did you write this passage, which appeared in the _National
Reformer_: "There is a great big monkey," etc. [fable already referred
to on p. 233].
C.B., after some hesitation: I might refuse to answer this question
on the same ground I have refused to answer the other questions. I
prefer, however, to answer, and I say that passage did appear in
a paper with which I was connected, but was not written by me. It
was part of a translation of a German fable, and was copied nearly
two years ago into the _Saturday Review_ without the context. If
the context were read with it, the meaning of the passage would be
entirely different It related as much to Hinduism as to Christianity.
I wrote a reply to the _Saturday Review_ at the time.[127]
[Footnote 127: This reply was refused insertion.]
Mr O'M.: Did you ever take legal proceedings against the _Saturday
Review_ for publishing this article?
C.B.: No; I considered it a criticism on my opinions, and answered it
by other articles in other papers. I should never sue a journal for an
attack on my opinions.
Mr O'M.: Do you believe in the truth of the Christian religion?
C.B.: I decline to answer, because it is a prosecutable offence for a
man to deny the truth of Christianity after he had been brought up in
its tenets.
The defence, as I have said, called no witnesses; but Mr O'Malley was a
host in himself, and as far as the jury were concerned, the "eloquence"
of his address more than made up for the weakness of his case. He said
that from Mr Bradlaugh's refusals to answer his questions, "it is fair
to assume that he has no character to be injured by such a criticism as
this," meaning by that that an Atheist had no character to be injured
when his principles were likened to those of such a man as Broadhead, a
"self-confessed assassin," and his morality to that of a man compelled
to flee the country on a charge of fraud. Mr O'Malley went on to say
that while it would have been better if the article had not appeared,
"it was nonsense to talk of it as injury to the notorious character of
such a man. The smallest amount of damages would be sufficient to set
up the character of that 'noble' man. He asked the jury, as Christian
men, to refrain from giving their endorsement to that man Bradlaugh, to
that man Bradlaugh, to that man Bradlaugh."
In the course of his summing up, Mr Justice Blackburn said that "all
in Court must have been disgusted with some of the questions which had
been put in cross-examination." That all were not disgusted was soon
apparent, for, after a short consultation, the jury, feeling bound to
respond to this appeal to their Christianity, returned a verdict for
the plaintiff indeed, but with one farthing damages.
My father was deeply hurt at the mockery of this verdict, and, overcome
by a sense of helplessness in the face of such intolerance, he wrote
these bitter words:--
"OUTLAW OR CITIZEN? WHICH AM I?
"When at Bolton I sued for damages occasioned by the breach of
contract for the hire of the hall in which the lectures were to be
delivered, I was non-suited by the County Court Judge on the ground
that the lectures to be delivered were illegal (although there was,
of course, no possible evidence of what I should have said). When I
was illegally arrested at Devonport, confined in a damp cell for one
night, and twice brought before the magistrates, an Exeter jury,
although they in point of fact decided entirely in my favour, gave
me one farthing damages; and Lord Chief Justice Erle, on appeal
to the Court sitting in _banco_, laid down the doctrine that the
imprisonment which prevented a man like myself from making known his
views (although that imprisonment had been by the verdict of the
jury utterly unjustifiable) was rather a benefit to the individual
imprisoned than a wrong for which damages could be sought. When,
at Wigan, the evidence of myself and a gentleman and his wife were
all refused by the County Court Judge, on the ground of our being
all well-known Secularists, I was legally robbed of nearly thirty
pounds. When concerned about three years ago in another litigation,
the statement of my opponent that I was 'Iconoclast, the Atheist,'
sufficed to defeat me. When I sued as plaintiff last year in an
action to which there was no defence [Bradlaugh _v_. De Rin] in the
Court of Common Pleas, my evidence was objected to on account of
my disbelief in the Scriptures. When on appeal on a point of law
I tendered Mr Austin Holyoake as bail, he was refused because he
was a well-known heretic, and could not therefore be allowed to be
sworn. Now I am grossly libelled, the libel is not justified; the
only cross-examination is on my opinions; and the counsel for the
defendant, who actually admits that the libel ought never to have
appeared, asked the jury to give me the smallest possible damages
because I am an Atheist. The jury respond to his appeal to their
religious prejudices, and I get one farthing damages. What am I to
do? If when I am libelled I take no notice, the world believes the
libel. If I sue I have to pay about one hundred pounds costs for
the privilege, and gain the smallest coin the country knows as a
recompense. Duelling is forbidden alike by my code of morals and the
law of the country. If I horsewhip the libeller, I am punishable for
assault. Am I outlaw or citizen--which? Answer me, you who boast your
superiority; you whose religion makes you better than myself. What
mockery to tell me that I live in a free country, when it is thus
justice is dealt out to such as I am!
"CHARLES BRADLAUGH."
In January (1869) Mr Bradlaugh prayed the Court to grant him a rule
for a new trial, and Lord Chief Justice Cockburn observed that "no one
could say that because a man was an Atheist (even assuming him to
be one) anyone was entitled to say he was a murderer or a swindler.
That, however, probably was not quite the way in which it was put to
the jury; it was probably put rather in this way, that when a man
had publicly put forth certain sentiments in certain language, it
might be that his character was not such as deserved or required much
vindication. As a general principle the damages in actions of tort,
especially in actions for libel, were eminently for the jury." Mr
Justice Mellor made some similar remarks, and Mr Justice Hannen having
put some questions as to the refusal of the apology and the manner of
the denial of the charge, the Lord Chief Justice granted the rule.
It never came to a new trial, however, for in the following November
the defendant, Mr Brooks, withdrew the whole of the charges against
Mr Bradlaugh and apologised for their publication, but his solicitor
intimated that he was in no position to pay the costs. Therefore,
although my father obtained the barren satisfaction of this tardy
apology and the withdrawal of the charges, it cost him not less than
£200. The _Razor_ itself did not survive this litigation, for before
the new year of 1869 had dawned it was already discontinued.
* * * * *
In accordance with the wishes of some Yorkshire friends, Mr Bradlaugh
had promised to give two political lectures in Mirfield on the 18th and
19th November 1870. The Mirfield Town Hall was engaged for this purpose
on the 21st of September, and the lectures announced were--"War: its
Effect upon European Peoples, and an Appeal for Peace," and "England's
Balance Sheet." The hall belonged to a Company, and when it was
realised that their property was let to the wicked Atheist for the
purpose of pleading the cause of peace in Europe, some of the directors
objected, and objected so strongly, to the proposed desecration of
their building that they determined to back out of the agreement under
the pretence that the hall-keeper had no authority to let it, although,
in fact, he had taken four guineas, money paid for the hire of the
hall, and had given a receipt for it. Mr Bradlaugh persisted in his
right to lecture, and on making inquiries learned that the hall-keeper
had let the hall on former occasions without any objection on the part
of the directors. In order to complicate matters the Directors let the
hall for the dates assigned to Mr Bradlaugh to a party of Ethiopian
serenaders.
As Mr Bradlaugh made no sign of yielding when the time arrived, the
assistance of the police was summoned, and the hall was guarded, inside
and out, by a body of constabulary numbering about thirty men, under a
superintendent. The directors evidently loved war better than peace. Mr
Bradlaugh reached Mirfield at about a quarter past six on the evening
of the 18th, but, fearing a disturbance, he went straight to the Town
Hall, at once and alone, although the meeting was not summoned until
eight o'clock. Upon reaching the hall he found it prepared for a siege;
in addition to its garrison of police, it was barricaded with huge
baulks of timber. He held some conversation with the Superintendent of
the Police, who was sufficiently polite, and the Chairman of the Board
of Directors, a gentleman particularly prominent in his opposition to
Mr Bradlaugh, and now present to watch over the premises in person.
During the conversation a crowd of about four hundred people collected,
but at my father's request they remained perfectly quiet and took no
part in the proceedings. Mr Bradlaugh then endeavoured to open the
door, but in addition to being strongly barricaded the handle was
held by Mr Johnson (the Chairman), and another man, the former of
whom boasted that he would spend a large sum to keep Bradlaugh out of
Mirfield. Finding the force against him too great, my father, after a
little struggle, gave up the attempt to enter.
He at once commenced an action against the Town Hall Company, but owing
to various delays the suit was not tried until the summer of 1871. It
then came on at the Leeds Assizes on August 7th, before Mr Justice
Mellor and a special jury. Mr Bradlaugh conducted his own case, while
Mr Digby Seymour, Q.C., and Mr Mellor appeared for the Hall Company.
Mr Bradlaugh opened in "a very temperate speech" of "great clearness,"
and then called his witness, Mr Stead, to prove the hire of the hall.
Mr Stead had to go through a preliminary confusing examination as to
his fitness to make affirmation, although Mr Justice Mellor was as
considerate as the obnoxious wording of the Evidence Amendment Act
would allow. Objection being taken to certain questions Mr Bradlaugh
wished to put to his witness, my father was obliged to go into the
witness-box himself to prove the points. Of course Mr Digby Seymour
could not forget the lesson in tactics learned a few months before from
Mr O'Malley, and like his opponent in the _Razor_ case--though happily
with less coarseness--seized the opportunity thus offered to rouse the
religious prejudices of the jury, although the sole question in dispute
was the validity of a contract made by the servant of a Company on its
behalf.
But relevant or irrelevant, by hook or by crook, the religious
question was almost invariably dragged in against Mr Bradlaugh: and
just as invariably a bad case was bolstered up by diverting the minds
of the jury from the real merits of the case to a contemplation of
the wickedness of Atheistic opinions. Hence, according to the usual
procedure, Mr Digby Seymour began:
"You are the proprietor of the _National Reformer_, I think?"
Mr BRADLAUGH: I decline to answer that question on the
ground that it might make me liable to a criminal prosecution. I am
threatened with one at the present moment.
Mr S.: Oh, you state that, do you?
Mr B.: Yes, I do.
Mr S.: I think you hold strong opinions on political subjects as well
as on religion?
Mr B.: Well, I hold opinions some of which are similar to those held
by Dean Stanley, Mr J. S. Mill, and others.
Mr. S.: Without putting it unfairly, you hold extreme opinions?
Mr B.: I hold opinions held by a great many of the first men in Europe.
Mr S.: And I suppose, as you have refused, I must not ask you any
question as to the contents of this _National Reformer_ (holding one
in his hand). May I ask if you think Christianity has a ludicrous
aspect?
Mr B.: You may ask, but I shall not answer the question.
Mr S.: Do you know a work called "The Ludicrous Aspects of
Christianity"? Is it in your library?
Mr B.: It is not in my library.
Mr S.: Then you think that Christianity has a ludicrous aspect?
Mr B.: I cannot answer that.
Mr S.: At all events, under your eloquent handling, I believe
Christianity has been made to assume ridiculous aspects?
Mr B.: I have never written such a pamphlet as you refer to, nor
delivered lectures under such a title.
At this point the Judge interfered, and after pointing out that the
lectures to be delivered at Mirfield were of a political character,
warned Mr Seymour that such questions were unnecessary. "If they were
to destroy Mr Bradlaugh's credit I should not object, but there is
really no part of his evidence in dispute," he said.
As Mr Bradlaugh had not otherwise sufficient evidence of the lettings
of the hall, he was obliged to call the hall-keeper himself. This man,
Thomas Balme, was, as might be expected, a very unwilling witness, with
a peculiarly defective memory. Having heard him, Mr Justice Mellor came
to the conclusion that he really had no authority to let the hall, and
that consequently the plaintiff must be non-suited.
Mr Bradlaugh decided to try for a new trial, and applied to Mr Justice
Willes at Judges Chambers a few days later that judgment might be
stayed until the fifth day of Michaelmas Term, in order to enable him
to move the Court of Queen's Bench. Mr Thomas Chitty appeared for the
defendants.
When Mr Justice Willes read the receipt, which ran as follows:
"Mirfield Town Hall Company, Limited. Mr Charles Bradlaugh have taken
the Hall for two nights, November 18th and 19th, for the sum of four
guineas. Paid 21st of September 1870. Thomas Balme, Hall-keeper, liable
to damages,"--he said to Mr Bradlaugh, "I shall be very glad if you
can make out that the law helps you, for I think your case a very hard
one. (Turning to Mr Chitty) With such a receipt and memorandum as this,
having paid my four guineas, I should most certainly expect to lecture.
It is very hard for the plaintiff so be defeated by the mere statement
of your own servant that he had no authority."
Mr Chitty opposed the application. "There is really no good ground
shown for a new trial," he said. "Perhaps at this moment no legal
ground," replied the Judge, "but a strong suggestion which I am
inclined to listen to. This is an application by a plaintiff who will
be stopped if I do not aid him, and the circumstances, not ordinary
ones, are certainly in his favour."
In the end it was arranged that Mr Bradlaugh should have an opportunity
to move, if he could pay £60 into Court within seven days, and on his
side my father pledged himself not to trouble the Court unless he was
quite satisfied that he could prove that Balme had let the hall on
other occasions. I gather that he was unable to get sufficient evidence
on this point, for he carried the case no further. The taxed costs of
the Mirfield Town Hall Company amounted to £98 7s., and as Mr Bradlaugh
was unable to pay this at once an attempt was made to enforce immediate
judgment, but this failed, and it was ultimately arranged that Mr
Bradlaugh should pay £10 per month. So here was another addition to
debt to the load of an already over-weighted man. The debt incurred in
the Devonport trial took him three and a half years to pay. Happily,
his own expenditure in this (the Mirfield) case was covered by the
subscriptions of his poor friends, and they also ultimately contributed
£25 towards the costs of the Hall Company.