CHAPTER XVII.

Since those two things which it seemed needful to understand before

the text could be proceeded with have been seen and understood, it now

remains to proceed with the text and to explain it, and the text then

begins:

I say that from one root

Each Virtue firstly springs,

Virtue, I mean, that Happiness

To man, by action, brings

And I subjoin:

This, as the Ethics teach,

Is habit of right choice;

placing the whole definition of the Moral Virtues as it is defined by

the Philosopher in the second book of Ethics, in which two things

principally are understood. One is, that each Virtue comes from one

first principle or original cause; the other is, that by "Each Virtue"

I mean the Moral Virtues, and this is evident from the words, "This,

as the Ethics teach"

Hence it is to be known that our most right and proper fruits are the

Moral Virtues, since on every side they are in our power; and these

are differently distinguished and enumerated by different

philosophers. But it seems to me right to omit the opinion of other

men in that part where the divine opinion of Aristotle is stated by

word of mouth, and therefore, wishing to describe what those Moral

Virtues are, I will pass on, briefly discoursing of them according to

his opinion.

There are eleven Virtues named by the said Philosopher. The first is

called Courage, which is sword and bridle to moderate our boldness and

timidity in things which are the ruin of our life. The second is

Temperance, which is the law and bridle of our gluttony and of our

undue abstinence in those things requisite for the preservation of our

life. The third is Liberality, which is the moderator of our giving

and of our receiving things temporal. The fourth is Magnificence,

which is the moderator of great expenditures, making and supporting

those within certain limits. The fifth is Magnanimity, which is the

moderator and acquirer of great honours and fame. The sixth is the

Love of Honour, which is the moderator and regulator to us of the

honours of this World. The seventh is Mildness, which moderates our

anger and our excessive or undue patience against our external

misfortunes. The eighth is Affability, which makes us live on good

terms with other men. The ninth is called Truth, which makes us

moderate in boasting ourselves over and above what we are, and in

depreciating ourselves below what we are in our speech. The tenth is

called Eutrapelia, pleasantness of intercourse, which makes us

moderate in joys or pleasures, causing us to use them in due measure.

The eleventh is Justice, which teaches us to love and to act with

uprightness in all things.

And each of these Virtues has two collateral enemies, that is to say,

vices; one in excess and one in defect. And these Moral Virtues are

the centres or middle stations between them, and those Virtues all

spring from one root or principle, that is to say, from the habit of

our own good choice. Wherefore, in a general sense, it is possible to

say of all, that they are a habit of choice standing firm in due

moderation; and these are those which make a man happy in their active

operation, as the Philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics

when he defines Happiness, saying that Happiness is virtuous action in

a perfect life.

By many, Prudence, that is, good, judgment or wisdom, is well asserted

to be a Moral Virtue. But Aristotle numbers that amongst the

Intellectual Virtues, although it is the guide of the moral, and

points out the way by which they are formed, and without it they could

not be. Verily, it is to be known that we can have in this life two

happinesses or felicities by following two different roads, both good

and excellent, which lead us to them: the one is the Active Life and

the other is the Contemplative Life, which (although by the Active

Life one may attain, as has been said, to a good state of Happiness)

leads us to supreme Happiness, even as the Philosopher proves in the

tenth book of the Ethics; and Christ affirms it with His own Lips in

the Gospel of Luke, speaking to Martha, when replying to her: "Martha,

Martha, thou art anxious and troubled about many things: verily, one

thing alone is needful," meaning, that which thou hast in hand; and He

adds: "Mary has chosen the better part, which shall not be taken away

from her." And Mary, according to that which is previously written in

the Gospel, sitting at the feet of Christ, showed no care for the

service of the house, but listened only to the words of the Saviour.

For if we will explain this in the moral sense, our Lord wished to

show thereby that the Contemplative Life was supremely good, although

the Active Life might be good; this is evident to him who will give

his mind to the words of the Gospel.

It would be possible, however, for any one to say, in argument against

me: Since the happiness of the Contemplative Life is more excellent

than that of the Active Life, and both may be, and are, the fruit and

end of Nobility, why not rather have proceeded in the argument along

the line of the Intellectual Virtues than of the Moral? To this it is

possible to reply briefly, that in all instruction it is desirable to

have regard to the capability of the learner, and to lead him by that

path which is easiest to him. Wherefore, since the Moral Virtues

appear to be, and are, more general and more required than the others,

and are more seen in outward appearances, it was more convenient and

more useful to proceed along that path than by the other; for thus

indeed we shall attain to the knowledge of the bees by arguing of

profit from the wax, as well as by arguing of profit from the honey,

for both the one and the other proceed from them.

The Banquet (Il Convito) · 第 17 / 30 章