THE BATTLE OF CHANTILLY
The enemy's troops thus struck and hurled back were Ewell's division of
Jackson's corps. Hays's and Trimble's brigades were behind the fence,
and were supported by Early's and Lawton's brigades in the woods in
their rear. This was the centre division in Jackson's column. The
leading one, under Starke, had already crossed the Ox Road, and the rear
division, under A.P. Hill, was closed up on Ewell's.
Jackson, judging from the fury of the attack and the numbers of his men
running in disorder out of the woods that he was assailed by a heavy
force, and fearing for his artillery, which had taken position on Ox
Hill, on the north side of the pike, when Ewell's division advanced into
the woods on the south side, at once moved his batteries half a mile
back up the pike to a long ridge, and planted them in position to rally
his troops upon in case of need, while at the same time he hurried
Hill's infantry division forward to maintain the battle. That officer
advanced the brigades of Branch and Brockenbrough (Field's), and
successively threw into the fight those of Gregg, Pander, Thomas, and
Archer, all of which, except the last, became heavily engaged and
suffered severely. General Stevens's division withstood the attack of
these fresh troops stoutly. It had driven back everything in its
immediate front, but the contest now raged over the cornfield on the
left. It was impossible for its scanty numbers long to resist the
pressure of Hill's brigades, successively rushing into the conflict.
But aid was at hand.
At the moment of ordering the fatal charge, General Stevens sent
Lieutenant H.G. Belcher, of the 8th Michigan, back to the main turnpike
with instructions to ask support, and to go from commander to commander
until he secured it. Belcher applied to several generals, who declined
to go without orders, until finally he met General Kearny. Scarcely had
he made known his mission to him, and its urgency was startlingly
emphasized by the rapid and fierce musketry of the battle, when Kearny
exclaimed, "By God, I will support Stevens anywhere!" and at once broke
the head of his column off the pike, and struck across the fields to the
sound of the battle.
It was Birney's brigade that Kearny so promptly brought to the rescue.
They arrived just in time. The 4th Maine, Colonel Elijah Walker, formed
line in rear of the cornfield, considerably to the left of the
farmhouse, and opened on the enemy swarming in the farther edge of the
field. The remaining regiments as they came up, the 101st New York, 3d
Maine, 4th New York, and 1st New York, extended the line to the right as
far as the house, or the right border of the cornfield, and, as General
Birney reports, "held the enemy and sustained unflinchingly the most
murderous fire from a superior force." From this position they made a
gallant advance well into the cornfield, driving back the enemy to the
woods, and then withdrew to their former ground. Captain George E.
Randolph planted his battery of four guns immediately in rear of the
line, and fired over it into the farther side of the cornfield and into
the woods. The 18th New York and 57th Pennsylvania were put in later,
and helped sustain the contest.
General Stevens's troops maintained their unequal battle until after
Birney's line opened. Jackson reports, "So severe was the fire in front
and flank of Branch's brigade as to produce in it some disorder and
falling back," and other Confederate officers mention the severe flank
fire, showing conclusively that both Stevens's and Birney's smote this
brigade, one in flank, the other in front, under which double fire it
was broken and driven back. "This engagement is regarded by this brigade
as one of our severest," says its commander in his report. After holding
their ground for an hour in the unequal contest, and expending all their
ammunition, General Stevens's troops fell back to the Reid house from
the position they had so gallantly won. The enemy did not advance into
the open ground on the right of the cornfield, and Birney's fight was
continued over it until night ended the contest.
Ferrero's brigade, of only three regiments, reached the field
immediately after Stevens's division, and was ordered by General Reno to
cover his right. The 51st New York, the leading regiment, moved forward
into the woods some distance on the right of Stevens's column until it
encountered the line of Starke's division, became somewhat engaged, and
retired with a loss of thirteen. The next regiment, the 21st
Massachusetts, was not to escape so easily. Thrown forward on the left
of the 51st New York, and disconnected from it, it advanced for a long
distance in the woods, somewhat disordered by fallen trees, struck the
enemy's line, and unexpectedly received a deadly volley, and nearly one
hundred brave fellows, dead and wounded, lay prostrate at the blow. The
gallant regiment returned the fire as well as it could, but in the
drenching rain many guns became unserviceable, and it fell back from the
woods, the enemy not pursuing. The third regiment, the 51st
Pennsylvania, entered the woods on the right of the 51st New York, but
were not engaged.
Meantime Starke withdrew his whole division from the woods back to the
Little River pike, and moved to the rear. Whether his line, struck by an
unaccountable panic, fell into disorder, or whether Jackson drew back
the troops for the support of Hill, all of whose brigades were then
going into the fight, is uncertain, but probably the latter. Early moved
to the left and covered the front vacated by Starke, but with a
contracted line, while Trimble's and Lawton's brigades were content to
hold their ground in the woods considerably to the rear of the fence
from which Hays and Trimble had been so roughly driven.
Longstreet deployed Toombs's and Anderson's brigades of his leading
division (Jones's), and advanced them into the woods in support of
Jackson's troops, but they were not called upon, as night soon closed
the contest.
"As I rode up and met General Jackson," says Longstreet in his
"Manassas to Appomattox," "I remarked upon the number of his men
going to the rear.
"'General, your men don't appear to work well to-day?'
"'No,' he replied, 'but I hope it will prove a victory in the
morning.'"
As the stricken 21st Massachusetts emerged from the woods, near where
General Stevens formed his column, it was met by General Kearny, who was
searching for troops to cover the right flank of Birney's line.
"In fierce haste," says General C.F. Walcott, the historian of the
regiment, in a paper on this battle before the Massachusetts
Military Historical Society, "he ordered the regiment to move on the
run to take post on Birney's right, the position of whose line was
indicated only by the flashes of their muskets. Luckily two of our
companies, which had been detached in the woods to cover our flanks,
had escaped the ambuscade into which the others had fallen, and now
joined us with serviceable guns, and the regiment, about two hundred
strong, moved across the open ground towards the cornfield and the
front of Birney's right, deploying a thin skirmish line to cover
our right and front as we advanced.
"As our skirmishers came up to the rail fence of the cornfield they
were fired on by Thomas's skirmishers, whose brigade, with two of
Pender's regiments, was in the cornfield, and coming from the woods
well on Birney's right. Crossing the line of the fence we soon
halted in the corn, under a dropping fire from the enemy. General
Kearny was following us up closely, and as we came to a halt
fiercely tried to force us forward, saying that we were firing on
our own men, and that there were no rebels near us. We had the proof
in two prisoners--an officer and private of a Georgia
regiment--brought in by our skirmishers, besides the warning cries
of 'Surrender,' coming both from our right and front; but,
unfortunately, Kearny's judgment seemed unable to appreciate the
existence of the peril which his military instinct had caused him to
guard against. Lieutenant Walcott, of the brigade staff, took our
prisoners to him, saying, 'General, if you don't believe there are
rebels in the corn, here are two prisoners from the 49th Georgia,
just taken in our front.' Crying out fiercely, '---- ---- you and
your prisoners!' the general, entirely alone, apparently in
ungovernable rage at our disregard of his peremptory orders to
advance, forced his horse through the deep, sticky mud of the
cornfield past the left of the regiment, passing within a few feet
of where I was standing. I watched him moving in the murky twilight
through the corn, and, when less than twenty yards away, saw his
horse suddenly rear and turn, and half a dozen muskets flash around
him: so died the intrepid soldier, General Philip Kearny!
"Diverted by our movement from their design upon Birney's brigade,
the enemy surged up against our front and right flank, took what
fire we could give them at a few paces distance (which they returned
with interest), and in the dark, ignorant of our weakness, allowed
us to withdraw from their front without pursuit, and in a few
minutes also drew back themselves from the cornfield to the woods
behind it. Except a few scattering shots on Birney's front, which
soon ceased, the battle of Chantilly was now over."
Supposing from the non-return of General Kearny that he had fallen or
been captured, General Birney assumed command of his division, and after
the battle was over relieved his hard-fought troops with General Poe's
brigade. Robinson's brigade was posted during the battle on the high
ground near the main turnpike, and was not engaged. The Union troops
held the ground upon which they fought until half past two in the
morning, brought off their wounded, and then retreated to Fairfax Court
House after the last of the troops from Centreville had passed.
Only sixteen Union regiments, viz., six of Stevens's division, three of
Ferrero's brigade, and seven of Birney's brigade, with six guns,
Benjamin's two 20-pounder rifles, and Randolph's four 12-pounders,
fought this battle against Jackson's whole corps of seventy regiments,
of which at least forty-eight were in the fight. The Union force
numbered 5500 effective, the Confederate at least twice as many.
In this brief and fierce battle the losses on each side were from 800 to
1000. The following statement is made up from Confederate official
reports and, on the Union side, from regimental histories, for there are
no official reports of Union losses, except four in Poe's brigade, and
from estimates based on all available data, but undoubtedly falls short
of the actual losses.
How exactly General Stevens grasped the military situation when he
caught sight of the rebel skirmish line, and instantly decided to stay
Jackson's impending advance by an attack that would throw even him on
the defensive, is clearly shown by the Confederate leader's objective,
and the dispositions he had made of his troops to accomplish it.
Jackson had moved down the pike from Chantilly slowly and carefully, to
give time for Longstreet to close up in support. His troops were well
in hand, the infantry of one division, and probably of all three,
marching in two columns, one on each side of the road, and the artillery
on the road between them. Already he had thrown this solid column,
prepared for battle rather than for the march, athwart the Ox Road,
which led straight across to the coveted line of retreat. Already his
skirmishers, supported by a regiment, had pushed southward half a mile,
and were advancing across country to the other pike, and in another half
mile--in ten minutes more--would come in plain sight of the wagons
moving back upon it. His whole corps was in position,--Ewell's division
(under Lawton) in the centre, Starke on the left, Hill on the right. It
lay wholly in Jackson's will and power, advancing but little over a
mile, to hurl this mighty mass, seventy regiments strong, upon Pope's
only road and his retreating troops and trains. Who that knows Jackson's
career can doubt his will and power to seize the golden opportunity?
At the very instant of launching the thunderbolt, Jackson learns that
the enemy is advancing upon him, his skirmishers are driven in, his
centre division is hurled headlong from its position, the fugitives pour
out of the woods, he hurries his artillery to the rear, is forced to
throw the whole of his right division into the fight, brigade after
brigade, and to withdraw his left division for his last reserve. The
possibility of striking his enemy is gone. He can only say, "I hope it
will prove a victory to-morrow."
And the troops that General Stevens led to this desperate and victorious
charge were the same who, but ten weeks since, suffered the slaughter on
James Island, and had just lost half of their number in the bloody
encounters on the plains of Bull Run. Can more be said for the gallantry
and devotion of the soldiers, or the hold upon them of their heroic
leader?
Had General Stevens remained on the defensive and given time--and time
counted by minutes--for Jackson to advance, disaster were inevitable.
How long could his scanty force of nine regiments, outflanked and
overborne, have resisted the avalanche? True, Kearny was on the pike,
and perhaps others would have joined in the defense, but where was the
army or corps commander to put them in, and order and control battle
against Jackson's onslaught, backed by Longstreet? Pope was at
Centreville; Sumner, with his second corps, north of it; Sigel's,
McDowell's, Franklin's troops scattered from Fairfax to Alexandria and
Washington; Banks retreating down Braddock road,--all scattered and out
of reach. The closest study of the situation strengthens the conviction
that General Stevens that day saved the army and the country from an
appalling disaster.
General McDowell, hurrying to Fairfax Court House as directed by General
Pope, met Patrick's brigade near that point and posted it behind
Difficult Run, just in front of Germantown,[21] where it was supported
by Ricketts's division. General Stuart, who with his cavalry preceded
Jackson's column down the pike, after passing the Ox Road some two miles
found his advance arrested by these troops, and, after some skirmishing,
moved off northward toward Flint Hill in a fruitless effort to flank the
Union line. Patrick's brigade lost twenty wounded. Neither force took
any part in the battle of Chantilly.
UNION LOSSES.
Stevens's division: Staff 2
First brigade: {100th Pennsylvania 36
Colonel Daniel Leasure {46th New York 50[A]
Second brigade: {79th Highlanders 40
Colonel David Morrison {28th Massachusetts 99
Third brigade: {8th Michigan (7 killed) 50[A]
Colonel B.C. Christ {50th Pennsylvania (7 killed) 50[A]
---
327
Reno's division:
Ferrero's brigade 21st Massachusetts 130
51st New York 13
51st Pennsylvania (none)
---
143
Kearny's division: Staff 1
Birney's brigade 3d Maine 50
4th Maine 64
40th New York 163
1st New York 40[A]
38th New York 25[A]
101st New York 40[A]
57th Pennsylvania 25[A]
Poe's brigade: Pickets 4
---
Total: 16 regiments 412
---
882
[A] Estimated. No report in war records or histories.
CONFEDERATE LOSSES.
Jackson's corps:
Stark's division 20 regiments 71[B]
Ewell's division:
Lawton's brigade 6 regiments 12
Early's brigade 7 regiments 32
Trimble's brigade 5 regiments 21
Hays's brigade 5 regiments 135
-- ---
43 200
Hill's division:
Branch's brigade 5 regiments 108
Pender's brigade 4 regiments 58
Gregg's brigade 5 regiments 104
Archer's brigade 5 regiments (not engaged)
Field's (or Brockenbrough's) 4 regiments (no report) 75[B]
Thomas's brigade 4 regiments (loss not reported) 75[B]
-- ---
27 420
Longstreet's corps:
Jones's division 1
Total: 70 regiments--48 in action 692
[B] Estimated. General Hill reports his loss as 306. It is impossible to
reconcile these small losses with the Confederate reports of the
severity of the fighting.
NOTE.--The Confederate reports of the battle of Chantilly, or Ox
Hill, show with tolerable clearness their troops engaged, and the
positions and parts taken by them. Early's report definitely locates
Hays's and Trimble's brigades "in line of battle on the right of
Jackson's division, and occupying positions in the edge of a field
beyond a piece of woods through which the Ox Road here runs." This
is unmistakably the very position from which General Stevens's
charge drove the enemy. The loss in Hays's brigade (135) was greater
than that of any other. Early acknowledges that Hays's brigade "fell
back in confusion, passing through these regiments (second line),
followed by the enemy;" that the commander of Trimble's brigade was
killed, and one or two regiments of it were thrown into some
confusion. There are no reports from any officer of Jackson's
(Starke's) division, except the bare mention by one brigade
commander that they met the enemy at Ox Hill, September 1, and
repulsed him; none from Hays's, Trimble's, or Lawton's brigades of
Ewell's division; and none from Field's (Brockenbrough's) brigade of
Hill's division. General Longstreet, in his book _Manassas to
Appomattox_, pp. 193-195, says of this battle: "Two of Hill's
brigades were thrown out to find the enemy, and were soon met by his
advance in search of Jackson, which made a furious attack, driving
back the Confederate brigades in some disorder. Stevens,
appreciating the crisis as momentous, thought it necessary to follow
the opportunity by aggressive battle in order to hold Jackson away
from the Warrenton turnpike. Kearny, always ready to second any
courageous move, joined in the daring battle. At the critical moment
the rain and thunder storm burst with great violence upon the
combatants, the high wind beating the storm in the faces of the
Confederates. So firm was the unexpected battle that part of
Jackson's line yielded to the onslaught. At one moment his artillery
seemed in danger.... As I rode up and met General Jackson, I
remarked upon the number of his men going to the rear:--
"'General, your men don't appear to work well to-day.'
"'No,' he replied, 'but I hope it will prove a victory in the
morning.'
"As both Federal division commanders fell, the accounts fail to do
justice to their fight. Stevens, in his short career, gave evidence
of courage, judgment, skill, and genius not far below his
illustrious antagonist."
Immediately after the close of the Civil War, in June, 1865, the
author visited the battlefield of Chantilly. The ground and its
incidents agreed precisely with his recollections. The remains of
the fence at the edge of the woods from which General Stevens hurled
the enemy were plainly visible, many of the rails as well as the
trees showing marks of bullets. From a point near the corner of the
cornfield, extending nearly perpendicularly into the woods for fifty
yards, and facing to the left, were the vestiges of a hastily thrown
up breastwork, or cover, of earth, rails, logs, and branches, which
the Union troops had scraped together after driving back the enemy
in order to meet the attack of Hill's troops on their left.
In May, 1883, the author, accompanied by the late General Charles F.
Walcott, again visited the field, and by the hospitality of
Lieutenant John N. Ballard, the present owner of the estate, himself
a Confederate soldier, spent the night at the Reid house. Mr.
Ballard exhibited a plan of the estate, made in 1858, accompanying a
former deed, which comprised almost exactly the battlefield, and
kindly permitted a tracing of it to be made. The distance between
the fence where General Stevens fell and the Little River pike was
found by pacing to be about four hundred yards. By this data a
fairly accurate map of the battlefield was obtained. Mr. Charles
Stewart, a very intelligent gentleman, whose house is on the Little
River pike half a mile west of the field, who was at home at the
time of the battle and an eye-witness of the movements of the
Confederate troops, and who went over the field the third day after
the engagement, pointed out to the visitors the localities of
interest in connection with the fight near his house, and
graphically narrated how Jackson hurried his artillery to the rear
at the opening of the battle, and threw it into position half a mile
back on a bare, commanding ridge near the Stewart house. This
account was fully corroborated by Mr. Ballard. A full and
interesting account of this visit, and also an account of the
battle, by General Walcott, is given in volume ii., Military
Historical Society of Massachusetts.
The author has been aided in preparing his account of the battle by
written statements from Colonel David Morrison, Captain William T.
Lusk, and Captain Robert Armour, of the 79th Highlanders; Lieutenant
Samuel N. Benjamin and Captain George E. Randolph, who commanded the
two batteries engaged; Colonel Elijah Walker, of the 4th Maine, and
Colonel Moses B. Lakeman, of the 3d Maine; and by personal
interviews with these officers and many others, including Lieutenant
H.G. Belcher, who participated in the engagement.
_War Records_, series 1, vol. xii., "History of 79th Highlanders,"
by William Todd; _The One Hundredth Regiment Pennsylvania
Volunteers, Roundheads_; James C. Stevenson, _Michigan in the War_,
_Maine in the War_; Bates's _History of Pennsylvania Volunteers_.
The only reports of the battle of Chantilly by Union officers who
took part in it are those of General Birney and Captain Randolph,
and they are very brief. There are actually no reports from any
officers of General Stevens's or General Reno's division, owing to
the death of the commanders--Reno fell at South Mountain a few days
later--and the rapid changes in, and movements of, the troops in the
Maryland campaign, which immediately followed.
FOOTNOTES:
[21] Statement of Colonel Charles McClure, of Patrick's staff.