THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN
Early in the morning of Friday, the 28th, Jackson moved back behind the
railroad grade, extended his lines, and took up his defensive position,
extending from near Sudley Church along and in rear of the railroad to
the high ground north of the pike, opposite to, or just north of, the
battle-ground of the previous evening, curving his right to present a
somewhat convex front towards the pike. Ewell's division, now under
General A.R. Lawton, held the right, Hill's the left, and Jackson's,
under General William E. Starke, the centre; Hill and Starke were in the
woods. A battery was placed on the high ground in front of the right,
and between it and the pike, and two regiments of infantry, 13th and
35th Virginia, were thrown across the pike into the woods on the south
side of it. Other batteries were planted on the high "stony ridge" in
rear of the main line. Secure in this position he calmly awaits events,
knowing that a few hours will bring Longstreet on his right.
[Illustration: SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, AUGUST 29, 1862, AT NOON
Except attacks on right, 4 to 5.30 P.M., as indicated]
Sigel's troops are now pushing forward from the vicinity of Henry and
Chinn hills. Schurz's division, with Milroy's independent brigade on its
left, advances to the right across the pike, and, wheeling to the left,
crosses the Sudley road and enters the woods which cover and screen
Jackson's left and centre, with sharp fighting pushes back his
skirmishers, seizes part of the railroad, and develops the enemy's
position there. On the left of the pike Schenck's division advances,
with its right on the pike and Reynolds's division on its left.
Schenck's batteries take position on the ridges on each side of the pike
near Groveton, and keep up a long-range cannonade with the enemy's guns
on the high ridge in front; while the infantry slowly works forward,
unopposed except by artillery fire, to that point. Reynolds also moves
forward, swinging to the right, and driving back the two Virginia
regiments, until he reaches the pike half a mile or more beyond
Groveton, where Gibbon's battle began, and there finds the Union dead
and wounded abandoned when King fell back the previous night. His line
is formed along the road, facing north, and a short advance over the
high ground will throw him on Jackson's extreme right. One of Schenck's
brigades, Stahel's, is on his right; the other, McLean's, is in rear, or
south of Stahel, and in the woods. It is now about ten A.M. It has taken
four hours for Schurz to develop the enemy's left and centre, and for
Schenck and Reynolds to advance a mile and a half over an easy country
and push back a handful of skirmishers; and they have not yet located
Jackson's right, although they have gained a good position from which to
attack it. Their movement diverged from that of Schurz, and opened an
interval in the line between Milroy and Stahel. The ground between them,
indeed, was the open country on the right of the pike, commanded by
their batteries, and the forward movement northward of the troops of
Reynolds would soon have closed the gap. But Milroy was calling on Sigel
for support, and for troops to fill the gap on his left. Schurz was also
asking aid, and to meet their calls Stahel was hastily moved by the
right flank across the fields towards Milroy.
Reynolds was not informed of this movement, but, discovering that the
troops on his right had disappeared, and supposing that the whole of
Schenck's division had moved away, and observing a force of the enemy
approaching his left, which was entirely in air, he immediately swung
his division back, recrossed the Groveton road, and, finding McLean's
brigade in the woods, took position on its left with his line refused
somewhat. It was Longstreet's leading division under Hood just reaching
the field that Reynolds observed, and it was probably well for him that
he moved back so promptly.
Now the troops of the right wing are reaching the field. First Kearny,
who moves across country north of the pike with Poe's brigade pushing
back the enemy's cavalry and skirmishers along Bull Run, and comes up
against Jackson's extreme left, and on the right of Schurz. Then
Stevens's division marches up the pike to the crossing of the Sudley
road, where Sigel is receiving Schurz's and Milroy's cries for aid, and
listening to the thunder of his guns shelling the batteries of the
enemy, with the fervid imagination of a war correspondent. Sigel, with
the consent of Reno, as he claims, immediately scatters this fine
division, sending one brigade to Schurz, another to Milroy, and the
third, with Benjamin's battery, E, of the 2d artillery, up the pike to
Schenck. Reno's division, which next arrived, was dissipated in like
manner, Nagle's brigade being sent to support Schurz, while the other
with the artillery was placed in reserve on the ridge in rear of the
Sudley road. Hooker's division on its arrival was also divided, Grover's
brigade being sent to support Schurz; and afterwards Carr's brigade was
put on the front line, relieving part of Schurz's force, and was in turn
relieved by Hooker's remaining brigade, under General Nelson Taylor.
It was not an uncommon thing during the war, as many an officer knows
from dear-bought experience, for commanders of troops in action to
beseech support, usually claiming that they were out of ammunition, or
their flanks were being turned, and, when the reinforcements reached
them, to put the new-comers into the front line and withdraw their own
troops to the rear. This was what Sigel did with the divisions of the
right wing as they reached the field. Thus these fine troops, second to
none in condition, discipline, and _morale_, which, led by their own
generals and thrown in mass upon the enemy, would have struck a mighty
blow, were frittered away over the field, simply relieving other troops,
and adding but little to the extent or strength of the battle line.
Schurz, ever mightier with the pen than the sword, evinced a marvelous
capacity to absorb reinforcements. And Sigel, having demonstrated his
talents as a strategist and a marcher the previous day, now proved his
ability on the battlefield by so scattering the seventeen thousand
troops of the right wing as to deprive them of their own able and tried
commanders, and reduce them to the least possible weight upon the
fighting line.
His division being thus scattered, General Stevens led up the pike the
brigade which was to reinforce Schenck. This consisted of only a
regiment and a half,--the 100th Pennsylvania and five companies of the
46th New York, the other five companies being detached to guard
trains,--and Benjamin's battery of four 20-pounder rifled Parrotts.
Approaching Groveton, two batteries on the right of the road, on the low
ridge overlooking the hamlet, were exchanging shell-fire at long range
with the enemy's batteries on the high ridge a mile in front. Save this,
no enemy was visible in that vicinity. The little column was moving
without skirmishers in front, for it was said that our troops held the
ground beyond Groveton, the battery first, followed by the infantry in
marching column of fours. The general and staff had reached the
cross-road, the battery was descending the slope in the road, which here
ran in quite a cut gullied out by rains and wear, when an extended line
of gray-coated skirmishers emerged over the crest of the opposite
ridge, two hundred yards distant, and, catching sight of the group of
horsemen and the battery, quickly began firing upon them. It was
impossible to turn the guns either to right or left out of the sunken
road in which they were imprisoned; but Benjamin coolly led his battery
thirty yards forward to where the banks were lower, the skirmishers
coming nearer and their fire sharper every minute, then turned the
leading team short to the left; the drivers plied the whip, the horses
leaped up the steep bank, and with a sudden pull jerked the gun out of
the cut. And piece after piece followed to the same point, and was
extricated in like manner, and then, remounting the ridge, whirled into
battery on the left of the road and opened fire. While Benjamin was thus
extricating his guns, five companies of the 100th Pennsylvania dashed
forward at double-quick, deploying as skirmishers across the cross-road,
drove the enemy's skirmishers back behind their ridge, and held their
ground until withdrawn four hours later. The two half regiments were
placed in line on the reverse slope of the ridge in rear and to the left
of the guns. A short distance on the left were the woods, and in the
edge rested the right of McLean's brigade.
It was the skirmishers of Hood's division that so nearly caught
Benjamin's guns. They were pushed out to feel and locate the Union
position promptly after Reynolds drew back. Longstreet's wing was fast
arriving, and by noon four of his divisions were in position,--Hood
across the pike, Kemper on his right, Jones still farther on their
right, extending to the Manassas Gap Railroad, Evans's independent
brigade in support of Hood, and Wilcox's division also supporting him on
his left and rear. Two batteries of the Washington artillery took post
on the high ridge with Jackson's guns and added their fire.
With these additional batteries the artillery firing waxed heavier, and
soon twenty hostile guns were hurling a storm of missiles upon the Union
artillery at Groveton. After an hour's firing Schenck's batteries on the
right of the road, Dilger and Wiedrich, went to the rear, out of
ammunition, and for three long hours Benjamin was left to sustain
unaided this storm of shot and shell. But Benjamin could plant his
heavy, long-range shells with wonderful accuracy. He concentrated his
fire on one battery, and ere long a caisson was seen to blow up on the
distant ridge, and it ceased firing. Again and again he would
concentrate on a battery and silence it, but only to have the others
redouble their fire, and when he turned on them the first would reopen.
At length two of his guns were disabled, and nearly half his men were
killed or wounded.
Now, at two P.M., Schenck concluded that he "was too far out," because
Reynolds had refused his line on the left, and he could get no fresh
artillery to continue the duel on the pike. Sigel says that he sent him
an order to retire, but that Schenck anticipated it, so the discredit of
the move belongs to both of them. By order of General Schenck, General
Stevens drew in his skirmishers and moved back down the pike, placing
Benjamin's two guns on an eminence of the Chinn Hill, and his two
regiments on the right of the road in advance of the Rosefield House.
Schenck and Reynolds moved back abreast to the western slope of the
Chinn Hill.
Thus, in this sequence of withdrawals, it will be seen that after
Schenck and Reynolds had gotten in position to strike Jackson's right,
although too late to do so without danger of Longstreet's advance
falling upon their flank, Schenck sent off Stahel's brigade at Milroy's
calls. Reynolds then moved back, because Schenck had retired and left
him unsupported, as he supposed, and also because his left was
threatened by Longstreet's advance; and Schenck in turn moved back
because Reynolds had withdrawn, although the latter had only refused his
line, which, situated in open ground with the enemy in force in his
front, was the right thing for him to do.
Our guns at Groveton could see along and flank the front of the Union
line on the right as far as the railroad, and their thunder encouraged
the troops on that wing, and deterred the enemy from aggressive
movements which would subject them to an enfilade fire of artillery. The
position was in truth a key-point, not only commanding the lower ground
to the right, but also affording good ground upon which to receive an
attack, or from which to advance, and, moreover, it covered the roads
southward, by which Porter's troops, as will be seen presently, were
expected to join the army.
The drawing back of our guns and troops from Groveton was the signal for
Jackson's lines to push forward more aggressively. Milroy was roughly
handled and forced back. It was General Stevens's third brigade, under
Colonel Addison Farnsworth, that was sent to support Schurz, and was
posted on the front line along the railroad, next to Schimmelfennig's
brigade. Part of this brigade, on Farnsworth's left, broke at the
advance of the enemy, and fell back through the woods, but the
Highlanders and Faugh-a-ballaghs stood firm and repulsed the attack.
Soon afterwards the fugitives, having reformed, moved up in line from
the rear, and began firing into the backs of the troops who had stood
their ground, mistaking them for the enemy; but this was speedily
stopped, and they were again placed on the line.
The experience of the first brigade was equally unsatisfactory. Placed
in the first line, they were left to bear the brunt of the fighting on
Milroy's front, and were finally obliged to fall back by the giving way
of troops on their flanks.
General Pope arrived on the field about noon, and made his headquarters
in rear of the Sudley road, near Buck Hill. Although he declares in his
report that he refused Sigel's demands for reinforcements, it is clear
beyond doubt that he neither put a stop to the wasteful scattering of
his best troops, nor attempted to unite and bring them together as a
disposable force of weight for offensive movements. All the afternoon he
was expecting Porter's and McDowell's column to fall upon Jackson's
right and rear, for he had worked himself up to the belief that
Longstreet would not be up for another day, and nothing short of
disastrous defeat could shake his dogged belief.
On receiving news of King's and Ricketts's retreat from Gainesville and
Groveton, which he did about daylight, General Pope ordered Porter to
march upon Gainesville with his own corps and King's division. "I am
following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike," he adds. "Be
expeditious, or we will lose much." And later he dispatched a joint
order to McDowell and Porter to the same effect:--
"You will please move forward with your joint commands toward
Gainesville.... Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the
Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I
desire that as soon as communication is established between this
force and your own, the whole command shall halt.... One thing must
be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which
they can reach Bull Run to-night or by daylight."
Porter had already passed Manassas on his way to Centreville when he
received the first order, but immediately countermarched to the Junction
and towards Gainesville as ordered, with Morell's division leading,
Sykes's next, then Piatt's brigade, and King following in rear. About
eleven o'clock the head of the column reached Dawkins Branch, an
insignificant brook four and a half miles from Gainesville, and two and
a half miles south of Groveton. Here the enemy was perceived, and
skirmishers were thrown across the creek, supported by Butterfield's
brigade; and Porter was forming to advance on the enemy, when General
McDowell joined him, and showed a dispatch from Buford as follows:--
"Headquarters Cavalry Brigade, 9.30 A.M. Seventeen regiments, one
battery, and five hundred cavalry passed through Gainesville three
quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road."
The presence of the enemy in front, and clouds of dust rising along the
roads in his rear, corroborated this dispatch. So, too, did the noise of
the artillery combat at Groveton. The two generals rode together through
the woods to the right as far as the Manassas Gap Railroad, but decided
that it was "impracticable" to move northward a mile and a half across
country to effect a junction with the right wing. McDowell then left
Porter, telling him that he would take King's division around by the
Sudley road and put it in between Porter and the right wing. Except for
some slight changes in position of the head of his column, Porter
remained inactive the rest of the day, with his rear stretching back two
and a half miles along the road. What befell King's division, under
McDowell's guidance, will be seen later. Unquestionably, Longstreet was
up and in position in time to resist the attack of McDowell and Porter,
had they made one. And a board of three officers of great reputation and
experience,--Generals Schofield, Terry, and Getty,--after a thorough
examination, has declared that such an attack would have been ill
advised, has applauded Porter's conduct, and pronounced the opinion that
his presence there that day saved the army from disaster.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that this great column of over twenty
thousand troops was kept out of the ring completely. The orders given
and objects to be gained were perfectly plain and simple. They were,
first, to fall upon the enemy, supposed to be Jackson, and, second, to
effect a junction with the right wing. McDowell and Porter did neither.
Granting that an attack was ill judged, why was not a brigade brought up
and deployed athwart the railroad, and a regiment pushed through the
woods northward to locate and connect with the force on the pike, whose
artillery was distinctly heard? Traversing only three quarters of a mile
of intervening woods, such a column would have reached open fields, and
come in sight of Reynolds's troops. But, more surprising still, why was
no one sent up the roads which fork both from the road and railroad only
half a mile back of the head of Porter's column, traverse the woods in a
northerly direction, and lead to Groveton? A staff officer sent up this
road would have come in sight of Reynolds's skirmishers in a ride of
only a mile.
Unable longer to control his impatience, General Pope began about four
P.M. sending peremptory orders to attack, first to one command, then to
another, as he could get hold of them, accompanying the orders with
assurances that the enemy was being driven by some other command, and
that Porter was about to fall, or was falling, on his flank and rear,
and using him up.
The first victim of this plan of beating a corps in strong position by
attacking it with a brigade at a time was General Cuvier Grover's
brigade, first of Hooker's division, comprising five regiments,--1st,
11th, and 16th Massachusetts, 2d New Hampshire, and 26th
Pennsylvania,--which was already supporting Schurz. With muskets loaded
and bayonets fixed, ordered to close on the enemy, fire one volley, and
charge with the bayonet, they struck him where the railroad emerged from
the woods and crossed the hollow on an embankment, broke the first line,
carried the embankment, swept eighty yards beyond it and broke a second
line, only to be forced back by overpowering numbers, with a loss of
four hundred and eighty-six, for this gallant charge was entirely
unsupported. Reports General Grover:--
"We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here
occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with
bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayoneted in
their tracks, others struck down with the butts of pieces, and
onward pressed our line. In a few yards more it met a terrible fire
from a second line, which in its turn broke. The enemy's third line
now bore down upon our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back
the right centre and a portion of the left. With the gallant 16th
Massachusetts on our left I tried to turn his flank, but the
breaking of our right and centre and the weight of the enemy's lines
caused the necessity of falling back, first to the embankment and
then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors."
One is not surprised to find the following in the report of Colonel
William Blaisdell, 11th Massachusetts:--
"I was greatly amazed to find that the regiment had been sent to
engage a force of more than five times its numbers, strongly posted
in thick woods and behind heavy embankments, and not a soldier to
support it in case of disaster."
Hooker's third brigade, under Colonel Joseph B. Carr, earlier in the day
had relieved part of Schurz's troops, and after, as he reports, fighting
two hours and expending most of his ammunition, was in turn relieved by
the second brigade, under General Nelson Taylor. When Grover was driven
back, Taylor's left regiment was broken by the rush of fugitives; the
enemy poured through the gap, giving an enfilade and reverse fire, and
taking many prisoners, among them General Taylor's aides, Lieutenants
Tremain and Dwight.
"Finding my line," says Taylor, "completely flanked and turned, and
in danger of being entirely cut off, I gave the order to fall back,
which was done in as good order as could be, situated as we were.
The loss on this occasion was not as large as I had reason to
apprehend, yet it was considerable."
Scarce had these broken troops emerged from the woods and reformed in
the open ground in rear, when General Reno led up his first brigade,
under Colonel James Nagle, to a second attack on the same position from
which Grover had been repulsed. This consisted of only three
regiments,--48th Pennsylvania, 6th New Hampshire, and 2d Maryland. This
also was a gallant and determined assault. Again the enemy was forced
back from the railroad, but again his rear lines rushed forward, flanked
Nagle on the left, and drove him back with a loss of five hundred and
thirty-one.
Kearny was holding the right with Robinson's brigade, while Poe's
brigade was guarding his right flank, with his skirmishers extending to
and across Bull Run, and Birney's brigade was supporting both. Now,
after the crash of musketry of Reno's attack had all died away, and his
troops were all out of the woods, Kearny makes his attack. Reinforcing
Robinson with one of Poe's and four of Birney's regiments, and throwing
forward his right, wheeling to the left until his lines are nearly
athwart the railroad, he charges along it to the left, driving the enemy
in great disorder. But his attacking force lacks weight; the charge
comes to a stand. They are assailed by two brigades from Ewell, those of
Lawton and Early, outflanked, overpowered, and are forced back to the
position from which they started; many of them, however, in broken and
disordered crowds, run out of the woods farther to the left, near the
same place where appeared Hooker's and Reno's fugitives so recently.
Eight regiments only out of Kearny's fifteen make this attack. His loss
was about six hundred. Nothing but the timely counter-charge of Lawton
and Early saved Hill.
The rattle of musketry is still echoing in the forest, and Kearny's
fugitives are pouring out upon the open, when an officer in hot haste
conveys Pope's order to General Stevens to advance into the woods and
attack. The only troops left him are the regiment and a half withdrawn
from Groveton, only seven hundred strong. Without an instant's delay,
the troops take their muskets from the stacks, double-quick across the
open ground, and form line at the edge of the woods. Kearny himself
rides over to the little force just forming, and, at his request,
Captain Stevens stops a moment to write an order or message for him, for
he has but one arm. The scanty line enters and sweeps through the woods,
encounters the enemy now holding the railroad, delivers and receives for
fifteen minutes, which seem hours, a heavy musketry fire, and then, with
the enemy swarming past both flanks, is forced back through the woods to
the open ground, where the men at once halt and reform. Both the
regimental commanders and Colonel Leasure, commanding the brigade, were
severely wounded, and the loss was about two hundred. General Stevens's
horse was shot under him, and also that of his orderly. It was remarked
that when his troops emerged out of the woods, almost the last one was a
short man in a general's uniform, followed by a tall orderly bearing a
saddle on his shoulder.
With this attack the fighting on the right came to an end for the day.
The possession of the woods along the railroad was relinquished to the
enemy. A strong skirmish line held the edge of, and to the right a good
part of, the timber. The troops were posted in rear in good positions
for the night, the scattered commands being collected. General Stevens's
brigades were gotten together after some search, and the division was
posted in the woods a quarter of a mile to the right and a little to the
rear of the place where Leasure's brigade formed for the attack. The
following incident, which illustrates the evil effects of scattering
commands, is related in the history of the 79th Highlanders by Captain
William T. Lusk, one of the general's aides:--
"I was directed to find Farnsworth; was sent by Sigel to Schurz, and
by Schurz to Schimmelfennig. The gallant German, when at last found,
exclaimed, 'Mein Gott! de troops, dey all runned avay, and I guess
your men runned avay, too!' General Stevens was indignant, and used
some pretty strong language, when I carried back this report, and
ordered me to find the missing regiments, and not to return until I
brought them with me. I started, therefore, for the old railroad
embankment. Luckily, I found Farnsworth just on the edge of the
woods. He said he was waiting for orders, but had none since I left
him in the morning."
But the day was not to close without one more useless slaughter of brave
troops. McDowell brought King's division along the Sudley road nearly to
the pike, by half past four, passing without notice, at Newmarket, the
old Warrenton turnpike, which here forked from the Sudley road and led
to the unoccupied gap between Porter and Reynolds, to the very position
where he told Porter he would put King. Pope first directed the division
over to the right, where his attacks by detachments were being so
disastrously repulsed, and finally, just as it reached the pike, ordered
McDowell to push it up the road in pursuit of the enemy, declaring that
he was in full retreat. McDowell gave the order and the encouragement.
Gibbon's brigade, which had suffered so severely in the fight the
previous night, was placed in support of batteries on the Rosefield
ridge. The other three brigades, under Hatch (King being sick), fired by
the lying promises of success, which were strengthened by the tremendous
outbursts of musketry and roar of guns on the right wing, where they
were told Jackson was being driven, hastened up the road with high
hopes. Near Groveton, about dusk, they deployed,--Hatch's brigade on the
right of the road, Doubleday on the left, Patrick in reserve,--and
pushed on with great confidence. But Longstreet, who all the afternoon
had held his hand, notwithstanding Lee's wish to attack, was at that
very moment advancing Hood's division, supported by Evans's brigade and
Wilcox's division, with Hunton's brigade of Kemper's division on Hood's
right. The opposing forces encountered a short distance in front of
Groveton, but the disparity in numbers was too great for the Union
troops. The fight was furious but brief. Their left was outflanked and
broken, and both brigades were driven back with heavy loss, including
one gun. Patrick in some degree checked the enemy, who pursued
considerably to the rear of Groveton. Night put a stop to the unequal
struggle.
This ended the fighting of the 29th. The Union arms were outnumbered and
repulsed in every encounter, and lost ground on both wings. Sigel's
dilatory and timid advance consumed the morning hours until, with
Longstreet's arrival, the chance of attacking Jackson's right was lost.
Sigel, too, may be censured for his importunate and unsoldierly demands
for aid which so frittered away the weight of the right wing. But Pope
on his arrival could have rectified this. Pope, and Pope alone, ordered
the hasty and disconnected attacks of the afternoon, wasting the blood
and impairing the _morale_ of his best troops. The four divisions of
Stevens, Reno, Kearny, and Hooker numbered forty-three regiments, 17,000
effective, as fine troops as ever marched under the stars and stripes,
and as well commanded. Had Pope, disregarding the clamors of Sigel and
Schurz, arrayed these splendid troops in battle order on his right, and
hurled them in one combined attack upon the enemy, pushing into the
fight also Schurz and Milroy and twenty of the guns that were idling in
the centre upon the ridge, Jackson would surely have been driven back
upon Longstreet. The battle would then have raged on the heights beyond
Groveton, the scene of Gibbon's fight; and here Longstreet, with the
advantages of position and greatly superior numbers, might have
retrieved the day, or at least stayed farther Union advance, even though
Schenck and Reynolds attacked his right with their utmost vigor. In such
a battle Porter might possibly have turned the scale; but his troops,
only partly deployed and stretching back along the road for three miles,
were not in hand for prompt aggressive movement.
All that afternoon Lee was master of the situation. His army was united.
Pope's was divided; over twenty thousand of his troops out of reach and
beyond his control. If Lee had struck with his right wing, Schenck and
Reynolds, who alone confronted it, could not long have resisted the
overpowering numbers, and Pope would have been driven across Bull Run.
Porter could never have prevented the disaster. He could not have thrown
his troops into the fight in time, unready as they were, and especially
if the ground on his right was broken, difficult, and impenetrable, as
he claimed, but mistakenly. It was Longstreet's slow-paced caution that
saved Pope that afternoon.
On McDowell's arrival on the field Pope learned of Porter's inaction,
and immediately sent him a positive order to attack, which reached him
at too late an hour to be executed. Pope thereupon sent him an order to
march to the battlefield.
Early in the morning of the next day, the 30th, General Stevens went
over to Pope's headquarters, which were a short distance in the rear,
and there found assembled Pope, McDowell, Heintzelman, Reno, and other
general officers. Pope was confident that the enemy had retreated during
the night, and, greatly to General Stevens's astonishment, some of the
others coincided in that opinion. He, however, strongly expressed the
contrary view, whereupon Pope directed him to push a strong skirmish
line into the woods in his front and try the enemy. Accordingly Captain
John More, of the 79th Highlanders, one of the best and bravest officers
in the division, with one hundred men of his regiment, skirmished into
the woods and attacked the enemy with great spirit; but after half an
hour's sharp firing Captain More was brought out shot through the body,
and a third of his men were killed or wounded. No impression was made on
the enemy. General Early, who commanded a brigade in Ewell's division,
says in his report: "During the course of the morning the skirmishers
from my brigade repulsed a column of the enemy which commenced to
advance." The Highlanders were withdrawn, and the result of their effort
immediately reported to General Pope, but it had no effect upon his
opinionated mind. By his positive assertions of driving the enemy and of
his having retreated, he had imbued McDowell and Heintzelman largely
with his own views. Thus filled with Pope's ideas, and having little
personal observation of the previous day's battle, they hastily rode
along the right wing, and came back and corroborated the mistaken views
of the infatuated commander. One circumstance there was which lent color
to them, and that was that during the night both Jackson and Longstreet
drew back to their main line those troops that, in the eagerness of
combat, had pushed beyond it. Yet there was scarcely a man in all the
Union army, except the army and two corps commanders, who did not
bitterly realize that they had been worsted the day before, and who did
not feel sure that the enemy was still in front, stronger and readier
than ever to renew the battle.
Ricketts's division reached the field the previous evening. In the
morning two brigades were placed on the extreme right, relieving some of
Kearny's troops, and the other two brigades were left in reserve near
the centre. Apparently no opportunity of dividing and scattering
commands was to be lost. About nine A.M. Porter arrived with his troops,
except Griffin's brigade of Morell's division and Martin's battery,
which by some error had retired to Centreville. The forenoon wore away
without demonstration beyond considerable artillery firing. No
reconnoissance in force was attempted.
At length at noon Pope issued an order, the most astonishing in its
fatuity ever given on a battlefield:--
HEADQUARTERS NEAR GROVETON, August 30, 1862, 12 M.
SPECIAL ORDERS, NO. --. The following forces will be immediately
thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously
during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the
command of the pursuit.
Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton
turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and
Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the
Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Major General Heintzelman.
The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by
Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be
made. The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton
turnpike.
By command of MAJOR-GENERAL POPE,
GEORGE D. RUGGLES,
_Colonel and Chief of Staff_.
The enemy he thus ordered pursued were at that moment, as they had been
since noon the previous day, all up, posted in strong position, flushed
with success, confident in themselves, well rested, and not inferior in
numbers. And their skillful leader was only waiting the opportune moment
to launch the mighty thunderbolt of war he so ably wielded. Such was the
situation. But nothing had any effect upon the mind of the infatuated
commander; the bloody repulses of the previous day, the loss of ground
on both wings, the information thrust upon him by McDowell, Porter,
Ricketts, and Reynolds that Longstreet's advance had passed Gainesville
before nine o'clock the previous morning, over twenty-four hours before,
and that his forces had confronted Porter and Reynolds all the afternoon
before,--all, all was disregarded, and Pope, impervious alike to reason
and to facts, without a reconnoissance save the spirited push of the
hundred Highlanders, gave the fatal order fraught with disaster to his
army, and the acme of his own fatuity and incompetence.
But the officers charged with the execution of the order never attempted
to carry it out according to its terms. With the exception perhaps of
McDowell, they knew too well that it was an order impossible to execute.
Ricketts, already in contact with the hostile line, reported that the
enemy had no intention of retreating, and was ordered to hold his
position. Porter made no effort to "push up the Warrenton turnpike,
followed by the divisions of King and Reynolds." The pursuit feature of
the order was ignored by all, and instead of it a strong column of
attack was organized against Jackson's centre. This was composed of
Porter's troops and King's division, under Porter's command, and was
slowly formed behind the screen of woods in advance of the right centre
of the Union lines. Stevens's division, two brigades of Ricketts's
division, and Kearny held the lines on the right. In rear of Porter and
King, and in rear of the centre, were placed Hooker's, Reno's, and two
brigades of Ricketts's division, and all of Sigel's corps except
McLean's brigade, which held the left, south of the pike, in front of
the Chinn Hill. Reynolds with his small division extended the line on
McLean's left. Extending from Rosefield for a long distance toward the
right, on the crest of the ridge, was planted a long row of
artillery,--forty guns at least,--as near together as they could be
handled, while other batteries were in rear, unable to find a place in
the line. A few batteries occupied positions in advance of this ridge,
and exchanged incessant fire with the enemy's guns across the wide, open
ground. Thus Pope bunched nearly his whole army in the centre, leaving
his right weak, and his left wing a mere handful.
[Illustration: SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN, SECOND DAY, AUGUST 30, 1862
Positions at 4 P.M., and successive positions
on left]
While Porter was slowly forming his column, his skirmishers pushed
forward over the open ground nearly to Groveton. Reynolds, too, advanced
his skirmishers on the left through the skirt of woods near Groveton,
south of the pike, and discovered the enemy's skirmishers extending far
to his left and rear, "evidently masking a column of the enemy formed
for attack on my left flank, when our line should be sufficiently
advanced." So important was this discovery deemed by Reynolds that he
galloped instantly to Pope and reported it. How the information was
received is graphically told by General Ruggles, Pope's chief of staff,
in a letter to General Porter, which the author is permitted to use:--
"At two P.M. or thereabouts, Reynolds came dashing up, his horse
covered with foam, threw himself out of the saddle, and said,
'General Pope, the enemy is turning our left.' General Pope replied,
'Oh, I guess not!' Reynolds rejoined, 'I have considered this
information of sufficient importance to run the gauntlet of three
rebel battalions to bring it to you in person. I had thought you
would believe _me_.' Thereupon General Pope turned to General John
Buford and said, 'General Buford, take your brigade of cavalry and
go out and see if the enemy _is_ turning our left flank.' Reynolds
then said, 'I go back to my command.'"
How clearly this incident reveals the infatuated, dogged state of mind
that possessed Pope!
It is after four P.M. when Porter gives the order to advance. The first
and third brigades of Morell's division in columns, under Butterfield,
are in front, Sykes's regulars are in support. King's division, under
Hatch, advances on the right of Butterfield in a column seven lines
deep, with intervals of fifty yards between the lines. Sweeping through
the woods, they come in sight of the railroad embankment and the wooded
hill beyond it. Instantly the whole side of the hill and edges of the
woods swarm with men before unseen. Says General Warren in his report:
"The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails." A terrific
musketry is poured upon the advancing column, while a storm of shell and
shrapnel smite its flank with most deadly fire from the batteries on the
ridge to the left front. With hearty cheers, the advancing troops
desperately charge the embankment and railroad cut on the right of it,
and when repulsed, charge again, and then cling to their ground and open
steady musketry. All in vain. Longstreet throws two more batteries
forward on the ridge, and fatally enfilades the struggling troops.
"Butterfield's troops are torn to pieces," says Sykes. In half an hour
all is over, the repulse is complete, and the shattered troops move
sullenly back, bearing out many wounded. In that short time they have
lost 700 men.
General Stevens, having formed his divisions in three lines, each a
brigade, moves forward through the woods on the right of Porter's
column, and, without waiting for orders, attacks simultaneously with
him, at once becomes furiously engaged, and suffers heavy loss,
including Colonel Farnsworth, who is severely wounded. General Stevens
maintains this contest until Porter's column is repulsed, when he
withdraws his command to the first ridge in rear of the woods, posting
his lines just behind the crest, with skirmishers holding the edge of
the woods.
Porter's attack, made nearly at the same point as Grover's, did not
penetrate the enemy's position so deeply. With only 2500 men, the latter
broke two lines and swept eighty yards beyond the embankment, while
Porter with 12,000 men did not carry the embankment. But how different
the conditions under which he attacked,--the enemy in stronger force,
better prepared, and Longstreet's terrible artillery tearing to pieces
the flank of the columns! And is not something due the _morale_ of his
troops, which was almost systematically broken by the blunders and
disasters of this unhappy campaign? With what confidence could King's
division be expected to charge, which, after marching all day Thursday,
sustained the fierce and stubborn fight near Groveton with Jackson's two
divisions, then moved away at midnight, abandoning their wounded and the
field they had so bravely won; then marching all the next day, with
occasional halts, until at dusk they were brought upon the field, and,
deceived with false hopes of success, were dashed against overpowering
masses of the enemy almost on the scene of their recent battle, and only
twelve hours after it, and were broken and driven back with disaster;
and the third day--Saturday--were exposed to shell fire for several
hours, while slowly taking place in the attacking column, knowing full
well that they were about to be hurled against the very centre and
strongest part of the enemy's position, from which every attack of the
previous day had been met with bloody repulse,--"Where even privates
realized," says Colonel Charles W. Roberts, commanding Morell's first
brigade, "that they were going into the jaws of death itself"? Clearly,
this was not such an attack as these troops would have made if in their
normal condition, and with any hopes of success. And their able
commander did not drive it home with the full weight and vigor of one
who, confident of success, puts in the last man and the last effort.
Sykes's division was not brought up to renew the charge upon the
railroad, for Porter, seeing that success was hopeless, wisely used it
to cover the falling back of Butterfield and Hatch.
The enemy's reports bear abundant witness to the gallantry and severity
of Porter's charge, which shook Jackson so that even he called aloud for
assistance. In his report he says:--
"The Federal infantry, about four o'clock in the evening, moved from
under cover in the woods and advanced in several lines, first
engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and
left. In a few minutes our entire line was engaged in a fierce and
sanguinary struggle. As one line was repulsed, another took its
place and pressed forward, as if determined, by force of numbers and
fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and
well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the
commanding general for reinforcements."
Says Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, who commanded the second brigade of
Ewell's division:--
"Before the railroad cut, the fight was most obstinate. I saw a
Federal flag hold its position for half an hour within ten yards of
the flag of one of the regiments in the cut, and go down six or
eight times; and after the fight one hundred dead were lying within
twenty yards from the cut, some of them within two feet of it. The
men fought until their ammunition was exhausted, and then threw
stones. Lieutenant Lewis Randolph killed one with a stone, and I saw
him after the fight with his skull fractured."
With Porter's repulse comes Lee's opportunity, the opening for which he
has so coolly waited the better part of two days. Longstreet,
anticipating the order to advance, throws forward his whole wing in one
of those overwhelming attacks for which he became famous. At first there
seems to be almost nothing to oppose the avalanche. Pope has just
ordered Reynolds's division to the right of the pike to aid in
protecting Porter's withdrawal, although more than half the army was
bunched together there in the centre, and Meade's and Seymour's brigades
and Ransom's battery have taken the new position. Colonel G.K. Warren,
of Sykes's division, without waiting for orders, seeing Hazlett's
battery, which was well advanced on the pike, uncovered by Reynolds's
movement, has just hurried his little brigade of two regiments, 5th and
10th New York, over to the left of the road to support the battery, when
the storm bursts upon him. Furiously assailed in front, masses of the
enemy come swarming through the woods on his left and rear, and it is
only by breaking to the rear that any escape capture. His loss is four
hundred and thirty-one, but the few minutes he holds back the enemy
saves the guns. Reynolds's remaining brigade, under Anderson, with three
batteries, in the act of moving to the right as ordered, is suddenly
assailed with fury and forced to turn and fight where it stands, and now
bears the brunt of the onslaught. Under cover of the woods, the enemy
has completely turned the flank of all the Union positions, as Reynolds
had told Pope only an hour before, and now strikes them with heavy
masses of infantry on both front and left. After a gallant resistance
Anderson is forced back, with the loss of four guns of Kerns's battery
and the caissons of Cooper's. McLean, who sees with amazement Reynolds's
division move away, leaving him to hold the hill alone, at once deploys
his brigade, facing westward, and receives the attack. He now changes
front to the left, and in a magnificent charge drives back the flanking
forces of the enemy, but has to offer his right in the movement to the
deadly enfilade fire from his former front, and he, too, bravely
struggling, is borne back over the Chinn Hill. Meantime the generals in
the centre are making frantic efforts to hurry troops over to the left.
General Zealous B. Tower, distinguished for his gallantry in the Mexican
war, one of the ablest officers of the army, leads the two reserve
brigades of Ricketts across the pike and up the Chinn Hill, where McLean
is being overborne; but, before he can reach a good position, his men
are falling by scores, he is stricken down with a severe
wound,--disabled for life and his career in the field closed,--and ere
long his brigades are driven back. Colonel Koltes, of Sigel's corps,
leading his brigade to the same position, is killed, and his troops,
too, are forced back. General Schenck, leading reinforcements to McLean,
is wounded. The enemy have driven the last defenders from the Chinn Hill
and plateau, and their exultant lines go sweeping on to complete the
victory. But Reynolds, with Meade's and Seymour's brigades, and Milroy
with his brigade, are now formed in line upon the slope of the Henry
Hill, along or near the Sudley road, and throw back the charging
Confederates with deadly fire, and soon Sykes's regulars, Buchanan's and
Chapman's brigades, and Weed's battery reinforce the hard-pressed and
struggling line, extending it farther to the left and rear. The enemy
cannot break it, but his fire fast thins its ranks, and his flanking
movement and deadly enfilade still continue. At last night is at hand,
and the fury of his attack abates. The defenders, spent with heavy loss
and the hard struggle, now fall back; but General Reno has just led his
second brigade and Graham's battery up the hill, and forms his three
regiments, 21st Massachusetts, 51st Pennsylvania, and 51st New York,
around its crest in a thin line facing both the Chinn Hill and the
woods on the left, with the guns in the intervals between the regiments.
In this position he repulses after dark two attacks of Wilcox's troops,
the last efforts of Longstreet's mighty onslaught. After nine o'clock,
after the fighting had ceased, he quietly retires from the hill and
marches to Centreville.
In the centre Jackson's right followed up Porter's retreating troops
sharply; but the fire of the numerous guns searching all the open ground
there, and the firm attitude of our troops, kept them at bay. But when
the Chinn Hill was lost, and the enemy's fire from there smote the
troops of Sigel holding the centre near the pike, they were forced to
fall back to the ridge, where they took up a new position behind the
Sudley road.
As soon as Longstreet's attack was well in progress, all the rebel guns
upon the high ridge were turned upon our right, for they dared not
continue firing upon the left and centre for fear of injuring their own
troops now swarming onward against the Union positions, and the
concentric fire of forty guns now pounded with a perfect hail of shot
and shell the Union troops and batteries on that wing. The men there lay
hugging the ground in rear of the guns, partially sheltered by the low
ridges, while the artillery fired with its utmost rapidity upon the
rebel lines of battle emerging over the distant ridge and advancing down
the slope until lost to view in the woods, or beneath the smoke which
now hung over the lower ground. They swept onward in splendid order, not
in one or two long lines, but regiment after regiment, separately, with
blood-red colors proudly borne aloft and pointed forward, like wave
after wave of ocean after a storm, rolling onward with resistless
majesty and power. From the great battery in our centre belched a mighty
and continuous roar and volume of thunder, and dense clouds of dusky,
sulphurous smoke rolled over the landscape in front; while beyond it,
on the left, but apparently beneath its folds, rose the incessant
clatter and crackle of musketry, with now and again the heavier, sharper
noise of great volleys, telling of the dreadful struggle raging there.
Surely there are no sights and sounds more terrible than those of a
great battle.
When this scene of pandemonium was at its height, General Stevens
quietly remarked to General Ricketts, as they stood near one of our
batteries watching the fight on the left front: "If we can hold the
right here, the enemy must be repulsed, for General Pope has nearly all
his troops over there, and can certainly repel any attack on his left."
Soon after this General Reno was standing with General Stevens near the
same point. The battery had ceased firing, for the enemy's infantry were
no longer visible. Suddenly a tall young fellow, in a Union sergeant's
uniform, came running up the slope from the woods two hundred yards in
front, and cried out, "Don't fire on that regiment; it is the 26th New
York. It has been in the woods, and is just coming out. Don't fire!
Don't fire!" All looked, and there, at the edge of the woods, was a line
of troops in blue uniforms just forming. General Reno turned to General
Stevens, as if in doubt; but Captain Stevens, knowing that the enemy's
skirmishers held the edge of the woods ever since ours were drawn in,
impulsively called out to the battery, "Fire! They are rebels! Fire!"
The guns instantly fired upon them, and as quickly they disappeared,
melted, into the woods. The sergeant, too, had disappeared, when we
turned to find him, having made good use of his long legs to rejoin his
companions when his bold ruse failed.
A little later, when the great struggle on the left was still raging, a
mounted officer came galloping at high speed down to the line and
delivered an order from General Pope to retreat. "General Pope orders
the right wing to fall back at once. The enemy has turned the left, and
if it remains half an hour longer, it will be cut off and captured."
With this, back he raced, faster, if possible, than he came. Very
deliberately and quietly General Stevens gave the necessary orders,
cautioning his colonels against haste or flurry. One by one the guns
ceased firing, and were limbered up and taken to the rear. When the last
one had gone, the infantry rose to their feet, and marched back in usual
marching column. Out of the woods in front the enemy were swarming like
angry bees in clouds of skirmishers, and beginning to push up the slope.
By the time our troops had moved two hundred yards back from the little
ridge or roll of ground they had just left, the enemy came pouring over
it in considerable numbers. But General Stevens had thrown his two rear
regiments in line, and they opened with a well-aimed volley, which
instantly cleared the ridge of the pursuers. The regiments promptly
resumed the retreat, and four hundred yards farther back filed past two
more of General Stevens's regiments, which in like manner stood in line
ready to repel too hot a pursuit. At this moment General Kearny came
from the right at the head of a small force, apparently a regiment,
passing along the rear side of a point of woods which extended to near
where General Stevens's line stood. Just then the enemy began firing out
of this cover. Instantly Kearny fronted his scanty force into line and
dashed it into the woods; but quickly a sharp volley resounded in the
timber, and his men came running out, and continued to the rear, pursued
by the enemy's skirmishers in equal disorder. Upon these the waiting
line poured a deliberate volley, and back they went running into the
woods. The troops, after administering this sharp rebuff, filed off to
the rear unmolested, and moved over a prominent ridge a thousand yards
back, along the crest of which was drawn up in line a part of Ricketts's
division, apparently a brigade. It was now fast growing dark. General
Stevens, knowing that the pike would be crowded with retreating troops,
wished to cross Bull Run somewhere above the bridge, and sent for Major
Elliott, of the Highlanders, who was at the first battle of Bull Run,
and might know of some practicable ford. This proved to be the case; and
after some little delay the division, guided by Major Elliott, crossed
at Locke's or Red House Ford, and moved by a cross-road to the pike,
where, finding the main road jammed full of troops and artillery flowing
past in a dense column, General Stevens bivouacked till morning, when he
moved to Centreville.
While the division was waiting on the ridge behind Ricketts's troops,
they opened with a sudden volley, as startling as unexpected, in the
darkness. The enemy, pursuing, were advancing up the hill when this
volley stopped them, and, falling back to the foot of the ridge, they
lay there all night. Ricketts's brigade immediately moved off to the
left by a farm road to a ford a short distance above the bridge, where
they crossed. Soon after these troops had filed away in the darkness,
General Stevens sent Lieutenant Heffron, one of his aides, to the crest
which they had just left, telling him to observe, try if he could see or
hear the enemy, and come back and report. After sufficient time had
elapsed for Heffron to have performed the duty, he sent Captain Stevens
on a similar errand, for his column was not quite ready to move; owing
to delay in finding out about the ford, and there was nothing between it
and the enemy. He, too, rode back to the crest, gazed into the darkness,
listened intently, without catching sight or sound, and started to ride
down the front of the ridge to make sure of the enemy's position, when
the reflection that Heffron had probably done that very thing and had
not returned caused him to turn back and rejoin his command, the rear of
which was just moving off. Heffron had ridden down the slope and into
the enemy's line at its foot, and was captured.
At this time two brigades of Kearny's division, which, being more in
rear than Ricketts's, had moved back before him, were on or in front of
the ridge, only a musket-shot to the left of the enemy lying at its
foot, each force ignorant of the other's presence, and remained there
until ten P.M., when they retreated by the same route as Ricketts. Poe's
brigade, on the extreme right, fell back, and recrossed the run by the
same ford as General Stevens's division, and before it. Thus the troops
of the right wing made good their retreat in perfect order and without
loss, except that of some guns of Ricketts.[20]
General Pope in his report, after claiming that he repulsed the enemy at
all points, states that he gave the order to withdraw to Centreville
after eight o'clock at night. No doubt he did give such an order at that
time, but he suppresses all mention of the orders he gave to retreat and
fall back long before that time, when he saw his left being turned and
overpowered, and, his presumptuous confidence knocked out of him,
thought more of saving part of his army than of repelling the enemy. And
then it was, about six P.M., that so many troops were hurried off the
field in retreat to Centreville, among them Nagle's brigade, of Reno's
division, two brigades of Hooker's, King's division, and some of Sigel's
troops in the centre, and the whole of the right wing; and then, too, it
was that he dispatched the order to General Banks at Bristoe Station to
destroy the public property and retreat to Centreville. At that time
the head of Franklin's corps of the Army of the Potomac was up to the
stone bridge on its march to reinforce Pope, and might have been used to
maintain his battle. But that commander already had more men on the
field than he was capable of using. Under the leadership of a Sheridan,
a Grant, a Meade, or a Thomas, his gallant army would never have
retreated from the field, and might have inflicted a deadly blow upon
its antagonist. How bravely and even desperately the Union troops fought
is best attested by the Confederate reports, and the nine thousand
Confederate losses in killed and wounded. The Union loss, including that
of the 28th, amounted to fourteen thousand. That at the end of the
battle there was disorder and demoralization among some commands it were
idle to deny, but it has been grossly exaggerated.
NOTE.--General Pope's reports are very erroneous and misleading; the
histories of the battle, following his statements, scarce less so.
He and they habitually speak of corps when only brigades were
engaged, and give all his dispositions and movements an aspect of
forethought and order the reverse of the fact. It is only by careful
study of the reports of division, brigade, and regimental
commanders, and of the dispatches on the field, that the shifting
struggle can be traced out. _War Records_, vol. xii., Report and
Testimony in Review of Fitz-John Porter Case.
FOOTNOTES:
[20] The reports of Jackson and his subordinates indulge in much
exaggeration as to driving the Union forces in their front, but
Longstreet, with more truth, states in his book, p. 189, that
"Jackson failed to pull up even on the left."