BATTLE OF JAMES ISLAND
Meantime Benham was chafing at the helpless and ignominious position in
which he found himself. At the head of twelve thousand fine troops,
within six miles of Charleston, he was confronted by a formidable line
of works, and had received positive orders from Hunter not to fight a
battle. For several days he contemplated a movement towards the enemy's
right, and issued some preliminary orders to that end. General Stevens
thought an attempt should have been made in that direction as soon as
Wright's division arrived. General Wright agreed that, if any part of
the line was to be attempted, it should be the right. Both judged the
left impracticable, resting as it did on the water, and covered by the
advanced flanking fort at Secessionville.
General Hunter returned to Hilton Head for a short visit. In his
absence, in an evil hour General Benham took it into his head that he
might take the Secessionville fort. Its guns were shelling our pickets,
and even the commanding general himself, when he ventured within range.
They could almost reach Wright's camp. He resolved upon this attempt as
precipitantly, and as regardless of the difficulties, as was his wont.
On the evening of the 15th be summoned his subordinate commanders on
board his headquarters steamer. There assembled Generals Stevens,
Wright, and Williams. Captain Percival Drayton, commanding the naval
force, was also present. To them Benham announced his decision: General
Stevens to assault the fort before daylight with his division, Wright
and Williams to support, the navy to coöperate. This announcement,
coming at nine o'clock at night, for such an attack before daylight the
next morning, without any previous notice or chance for preparation,
must have taken them aback.
General Wright couched an emphatic protest in the diplomatic form of
questions to General Stevens:--
"Have you impaired the strength of the enemy's works at
Secessionville by the firing of your battery?"
"Not in the least," replied General Stevens; "I have driven the
enemy from his guns by my fire, and I can do it again, but as soon
as the fire ceases he returns. I have not dismounted a gun, and we
shall find him in the morning as strong as ever."
"Do you know of any instance where volunteer troops have
successfully stormed works as strong as those which defend the
approach to Secessionville?"
"I know of no such instance."
"Have you any reason to believe that the result in the present case
will be different in its character from what it has invariably been
heretofore?"
"I have no reason to expect a different result. It is simply a bare
possibility to take the work."
"There, general," said General Wright, turning to Benham, "you have
my opinion."
In this General Williams concurred.
General Stevens states in a letter to General Hunter, written on July 8,
soon after the battle:--
"I then proceeded to state with all possible emphasis my objections
to this morning attack. I urged that it should be deferred to a much
later period in the day; that we should first shake the _morale_ of
the garrison, and endeavor to weaken its defenses by a continuous
fire of the battery and of our gunboats; that in the mean time we
should carefully survey the ground and prepare our troops, and make
the attack when the battery and gunboats had had the desired effect.
I closed by saying that under such circumstances I could do more
with two thousand men than I could with three thousand men in the
way he proposed. General Wright, moreover, warned General Benham
that his orders were in fact orders to fight a battle. In this
General Williams and myself in express terms concurred. General
Benham, however, overruled all our objections, and premptorily
ordered the attack to be made.
"I assured him, as did the other gentlemen, that he should rely upon
my promptitude and activity in obeying his orders, but I considered
myself as obeying orders to which I had expressed the strongest
possible objections, and I therefore determined there should not be
the least want of energy or promptitude on my part."
With this the conference broke up, and the officers hastened ashore to
their respective commands to prepare for the arduous task of the morrow.
General Stevens at once ordered his troops to be in readiness at the
advanced camps, two miles from the river, at two A.M., with sixty rounds
of ammunition and twenty-four hours' cooked rations. Captain Strahan's
company, I, 3d Rhode Island, was detailed from Wright's division to
relieve the detachment of Roundheads in the three-gun battery. Over
three hundred of that regiment were out on the widely extended picket
line. Ordered to assemble and join their regiment, only one hundred and
thirty of the number succeeded in reaching it in time to take part in
the action, and then only after it had come under fire, so scanty and
inadequate was the time allowed for preparation. Two companies of the
28th Massachusetts were on fatigue duty and had to be left behind. The
7th Connecticut, moreover, had been on severe fatigue duty the three
previous nights, and were much jaded.
At the hour fixed, the troops were at the appointed place. Before 3.30
A.M. the column was advanced two miles farther to the outer pickets, and
was arranged in the following order:--
Lieutenant Benjamin R. Lyons, aide-de-camp, with a negro guide, led the
storming party, which consisted of two companies of the 8th Michigan,
commanded respectively by Captains Ralph Ely and Richard N. Doyle,
followed by Captain Alfred F. Sears's company, E, Serrell's New York
engineers.
Then followed Fenton's first brigade, comprising the 8th Michigan,
Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Graves; the 7th Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel
Joseph R. Hawley; and the 28th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel
McClellan Moore.
Then Rockwell's battery of four guns.
Then Colonel Leasure's second brigade, consisting of the Highlanders,
Lieutenant-Colonel David Morrison; the Roundheads, Major David A. Lecky;
and the 46th New York, Colonel Rudolph Rosa.
Captain L.M. Sargent, with his Company H, 1st Massachusetts cavalry,
twenty-eight men, brought up the rear.
The attacking column numbered not exceeding 2900 officers and men, as
shown by the following return:--
Officers. Men. Total.
General and staff 9 6 15
First brigade:--
8th Michigan 25 509 534
7th Connecticut 25 573 598
28th Massachusetts 20 416 436
Second brigade:--
79th Highlanders 24 460 484
100th Pennsylvania 21 230 251
46th New York 22 452 474
Rockwell's battery, four guns 4 73 77
Sears's company, E, 1st New York engineers 2 59 61
Sargent's company, H, 1st Mass. cavalry 2 28 30
--- ---- ----
Aggregate 154 2806 2960
[Illustration: BATTLE OF JAMES ISLAND, JUNE 16, 1862]
General Stevens gave the most explicit orders, reiterated in person to
the several commanders, that the troops were to preserve strict silence,
no stop to be made after passing the enemy's pickets; to form forward
into line on reaching the fields in front of the fort; regiment to
follow regiment and storm the work; not to fire a shot but rely
exclusively on the bayonet, the muskets to be loaded but not capped. The
idea impressed upon all was simply to assault the work in column of
regiments, without an instant's pause after alarming the enemy's
pickets, and take it with the bayonet.
Just before four A.M. the column moved forward on the road already
described, and crossed the marsh by the causeway. Here a section of
Rockwell's guns dropped out, and fell in again behind the second
brigade. No opposition was encountered until the first house beyond our
lines was reached, when the enemy's pickets fired, wounding five men of
the storming party, and fled; but an officer and three men of their
number were captured. The road was found blocked with felled timber, but
the column without any delay advanced through the fields alongside the
road until past the obstruction, and reached the open fields in front of
the fort at 4.15 A.M., just as day was breaking. The storming party and
the 8th Michigan filed into the field through an opening in the hedge
and ditch which bordered the road, formed forward into line without a
pause, and advanced steadily in excellent order over the uneven, deeply
furrowed ground, soon surmounted the second ditch and hedge, and swept
onward across the field next the work. The enemy were seen hastily
forming on the parapet; their commander, Colonel Lamar, rushing to the
gun half dressed, fired the great columbiad, heavily charged with grape,
which tore a great gap through the advancing line, and they immediately
opened with a storm of grape and canister from the guns, and a rapid and
deadly fire of musketry along the whole front. Closing their ranks
without break or pause, the gallant Michiganders pushed on, the
storming party forty yards in advance, strewing the ground at every step
with their dead and wounded. As they reached the ditch, Lieutenant Lyons
dashed forward crying, "Come on, boys!" was the first man across the
ditch, and fell half way up the parapet with a shattered arm. Many of
the brave fellows who survived the murderous fire resolutely pressed on,
gained the parapet, and poured their fire into the defenders behind it,
who visibly gave back. Captain Reed, of the 1st South Carolina
artillery, was killed at the gun he was serving by a Union captain, who
was in turn immediately shot down. But the enemy rallied, the supports
in the grove of pines in rear of the work poured in a deadly fire, and
the brave stormers on the parapet, too few in number, soon melted away.
The few survivors were forced to give back, and, throwing themselves on
the ground, sheltered themselves as best they could behind the cotton
ridges, from which they opened a fire on the fort with their muskets.
Meantime the 7th Connecticut and 28th Massachusetts, following close
upon the 8th Michigan, turned into the field, deployed in like manner,
and moved forward. Unfortunately they inclined a little to the left, and
after crossing the second hedge the heavy grape and canister and
musketry of the fort cut them up severely, and drove them still farther
to the left, where they became disordered, and entangled in the bushes
and broken ground bordering the marsh on that side. Lieutenant-Colonel
Hawley tried to straighten out his regiment, setting up his colors in
the field, and moved it to the rear and to the right, when he was
ordered by Colonel Fenton to move still farther to the right, and
advance again on the fort. The 28th Massachusetts, although considerably
scattered, moved forward under cover of the bushes until they
encountered an inlet of the marsh and the abattis of slashed trees,
when they fell back under cover.
By this time Leasure's brigade was up, and, directed by General Stevens
in person, advanced straight on the fort, regiment after regiment,
deploying as they advanced. The Highlanders moved forward in fine order,
followed by the Roundheads, taking ground a little more to the left.
Crossing the second hedge, they came under the terrible fire of canister
which struck the left of the Highlanders and the centre of the
Roundheads, literally cutting the latter in two. The Highlanders pushed
steadily forward, supported by the right wing of the Roundheads, passing
the 7th Connecticut as Hawley was endeavoring to lead it to the right as
directed by Fenton, struck the work at the angle on its left (our
right), and, led by the gallant Morrison, plunged across the ditch, and
clambered up the steep parapet; many of the defenders ran back, and
again the fort seemed won. But again the musketry from the sharpshooters
on the flanks and rear cut down the brave Scotsmen; a bullet grazed
Morrison's temple, inflicting a serious wound, and he and the half score
survivors of the brave band that so gallantly gained the parapet were
forced to leap down again. But they did not return empty handed.
Morrison brought out a prisoner at the muzzle of his revolver. The
capture of another was even more daring. A rebel soldier sprang upon the
parapet in his eagerness, and aimed his musket at one of the assailants,
scrambling up the steep and lofty bank, but the Highlander, making a
tremendous leap, dashed aside the weapon, seized his antagonist in his
arms, and rolled with him to the bottom of the ditch, where he was
forced to surrender.
While the Highlanders were thus storming the work, the left wing of the
Roundheads, with some of the Highlanders, cut off and driven to the left
by the terrible hail which smote them, yet pushed determinedly on. They
ran over or through the 7th Connecticut as that regiment was moving out
into the field, as already narrated, throwing it into some confusion,
and dashed themselves against the fort. But here the front was well
protected by abattis, and afforded no opening. The Reed battery raked
them terribly. The men fell by scores, the line lost its impetus, and
the survivors threw themselves on the ground behind the cotton-ridges
for shelter.
The 46th New York was double-quicked the last half mile of the road,
conducted across the first field and through the farther hedge, and
ordered forward. Its course, like that of the 7th Connecticut and 28th
Massachusetts, bore too much to the left, and like them it became
entangled in the bushes on that side. Here portions of the 7th
Connecticut and 28th Massachusetts, retreating, broke through the 46th,
carrying back fifty men of that regiment. There they stayed, suffering
considerably from grape, until the advanced regiments moved back, when
they also withdrew to the hedge.
While the attack was making, Rockwell planted three guns of his battery
well forward and to the left in the first field, and maintained as
constant a fire of shells upon the fort as the movement of our troops
admitted. His fourth gun was posted on the road to guard the left rear.
Captain Sears aided Rockwell's guns across the hedge and ditch and high
ridges, and later cleared out the felled trees from the road in rear.
General Stevens, from his position in the first field, had a clear view
of every movement. Lieutenant Lyons and other wounded officers brought
discouraging reports. Seeing plainly that the assailants were all driven
from the parapet, and that the attacking force was completely scattered
and had in a manner disappeared, he was satisfied the attack had failed.
With instant decision he ordered the troops to fall back, and reform
behind the hedges. Captain Stevens was sent with the order. On reaching
the front of the fort not a line, or semblance of one, could be seen,
except about forty men standing in the field within a hundred yards of
the work. Besides the dead and wounded, the ground was covered with
blue-clad men, crouching down between the ridges, many of whom were
firing on the work. A heavy hail of musketry came from it, or from the
pine grove and cover behind it. The guns fired only at intervals.
Captain Stevens did not see a mounted officer, nor a single color,
except perhaps one with the scanty line referred to, nor a single man
running away. Riding to this line, he found Lieutenant-Colonel Hawley
and two officers on the right of it, endeavoring to cheer on the men.
The line had stopped. The men were dropping fast, some stricken down,
others voluntarily for shelter in the deep furrows; two were knocked
over within arm's length as he delivered the order.
Hawley at once about-faced his line and moved back. Then a most
remarkable sight was observed. The men of his regiment, lying between
the ridges, rose to their feet, and hastened to form on either flank of
the line, which rapidly grew and lengthened out as it withdrew. Then
another and another and another line rose out of the ground in like
manner, and in a few minutes the four regiments, which had so gallantly
dashed themselves against the fort, were moving back in four well-formed
lines with colors flying, and men rising from all parts of the field and
running to form on their respective regiments; but, alas, how reduced
and scanty were they as compared with the strong, brave regiments which
so proudly entered that fatal field barely a half hour before, where six
hundred brave men now lay weltering in their blood!
The withdrawn regiments were halted behind the second hedge and
straightened out. As soon as the troops could be seen moving back,
Captain Strahan opened on the fort. Two of his guns were soon disabled,
and he lost a sergeant killed, but with the remaining gun he kept up a
well-directed and regular fire until the close of the battle. The
gunboats Ellen and Hale, moving up Big Folly Creek, now began throwing
shells at the long range of over two miles, some of which fell in the
fields, greatly endangering our own men; but, guided by the signal
officers, Lieutenant Henry S. Tafft on shore and Lieutenant O.H. Howard
on the Ellen, the subsequent fire was more accurately directed upon the
fort. The distance, however, was too great, and the shells too few, to
produce much effect.
According to the plan, while General Stevens's division was assaulting
the fort, Wright and Williams, moving together from Grimball's, were to
act as a support to the former, protecting his left and rear from an
attack by the enemy from his main line. Williams's brigade comprised
five companies of the 3d Rhode Island, the 3d New Hampshire, six
companies of the 97th Pennsylvania, and a section of Battery E, 3d
United States artillery.
Wright had of his own division, of Chatfield's brigade, two companies of
the 6th Connecticut and eight companies of the 47th New York; and of
Walsh's brigade, six companies of the 45th Pennsylvania, three companies
of Serrell's New York engineers, and besides these the other two
sections of Hamilton's battery, E, and two squadrons of the 1st
Massachusetts cavalry. These organizations were mere skeletons, and
numbered about two thousand seven hundred effective. The remaining
troops were left on picket, and to guard the camps.
Wright moved soon after three A.M. to, and formed under cover of, the
woods one mile in front of his camp. Hearing a few shots on his right
front, he rightly judged that Stevens's column was advancing, and at
once moved forward. By this time daylight was upon him. Now he was
joined by General Benham, who assumed command, leaving Wright
responsible for only his own skeleton division. Moving rapidly to the
front, Wright soon placed his troops in position fronting the enemy's
main line, and maintained substantially this position until ordered to
withdraw, throwing the 47th New York to the left, and advancing a
section of Hamilton's battery, which opened a sharp fire.
Before reaching this position General Benham received a message from
General Stevens asking immediate support, and ordered Williams to move
forward and report to him. Reaching the field just as the assaulting
column was falling back and reforming behind the hedges, and ordered by
General Stevens to push in on his left, and do the best in concert with
him that the ground would admit of, Williams threw the 3d New Hampshire
forward beyond, or on our left of the marsh and inlet which covered the
flank of the fort on that side, with the view of taking it in flank, and
supported it with the battalion of the 3d Rhode Island. The 97th
Pennsylvania he posted on the left of General Stevens's reforming
regiments. The two former advanced with great bravery and steadiness, so
far that they actually poured a telling fire into the flank of the fort,
and the garrison was manifestly shaken. For half an hour they maintained
the contest, sustaining unflinchingly a severe fire from the fort and
the 4th Louisiana battalion, which hastened to reinforce it, raked by
the Reed battery on the left and smitten in the rear by Boyce's field
battery. The 3d Rhode Island was thrown to the left against the latter.
It encountered three companies of the 24th South Carolina, drove them
back, and struck the 25th and 1st South Carolina, which supported
Boyce's guns, and were protected by a patch of felled timber, and
maintained an unequal contest with them until ordered to withdraw.
Meantime General Stevens, with the greatest possible rapidity, was
advancing his regiments as fast as reorganized to the farther hedge, the
one nearest the fort, where they found cover in the ditch. The sun had
cleared away the morning clouds, and now shone bright and clear. It was
a beautiful and inspiriting sight to see each regiment move forward
across the wide field in well-dressed line with colors flying, unheeding
the shell and grape which hurtled past or overhead. Rockwell dashed his
guns up to the same line nearly, and in the open field maintained a
rapid and steady fire on the fort, only five hundred yards distant.
Strahan plied his single gun, and the occasional heavy shells from the
gunboats burst over the work with a deeper roar. Sharpshooters, as well
as the advanced men who still clung close up to the fort, kept the
parapet tolerably clear, but the fort was no whit silenced. The grape
fell in frequent showers. Notwithstanding the severe losses the men were
not discouraged, but were as determined and confident as before.
Stimulated by the volleys and cheers of Williams's troops, they were
ready, nay eager, to be led to the assault the second time. General
Stevens sent word to Benham that his whole division was in the advanced
position, reformed and ready, and that he would attack again as soon as
Williams's movement produced its effect.
Just as he was about to give the order to advance, the firing on the
left slackened and ceased, and Williams's troops were seen moving back.
Benham, as hasty and ill judged in abandoning the field as he was
precipitate and obstinate in ordering the assault, had ordered them to
retreat. On the left were heard the rebel cheers. In front the fort
redoubled its fire.
Soon afterwards General Benham ordered General Stevens to withdraw his
column to camp. Wright and Williams had already fallen back. The former
is particular to state in his report that "the withdrawal from the field
of both columns was ordered by General Benham." General Stevens withdrew
his forces without loss and unopposed. Even the advanced men were all
brought off. Lieutenant H.G. Belcher, of the 8th Michigan, took them the
order, and, working over singly to the left, they got under cover of the
bushes on that side and thus withdrew. The enemy attempted no pursuit,
and by ten A.M. the entire force was back in camp.
Thus ended the battle of James Island or Secessionville, the culmination
of crass obstinacy and folly. Benham, who, deaf to the orders of his
commander, deaf to the warnings of Wright, deaf to Stevens's earnest
entreaties to be allowed to attack later in the day and after due
preparation, had so rashly and obstinately forced the fight,--this very
Benham shrank from the shock of battle, and ordered the retreat when
victory was within his grasp.
The enemy's forces upon James Island were commanded by General N.G.
Evans, and numbered certainly not less than 9000 effective. Colonel T.G.
Lamar commanded the fort and was severely wounded. He had two companies,
B and I, of his own regiment, the 1st South Carolina artillery, the 1st
South Carolina or Charleston and 9th South Carolina or Pee Dee
battalions, four officers and one hundred picked men of the 22d South
Carolina, and three officers and presumably the crew of the floating
battery, which had been withdrawn from the fire of the three-gun battery
a few days before. All these commands must have numbered at least 800,
although Colonel Lamar reports that his force did not exceed 500 until
reinforced. He was soon reinforced by the 4th Louisiana battalion,
numbering 250, and later by the balance of the 22d South Carolina, so
that he must have had at least 1500 men before the action closed. The
losses in these commands amounted to 172, of which the original garrison
suffered 144, an unusually heavy loss behind strong works, viz.:
Charleston battalion, 42; 1st South Carolina artillery, 55; Pee Dee
battalion, 29; detachment 22d South Carolina, 18; total, 144. The loss
of the 1st South Carolina artillery, 55, would indicate that more than
two companies were in the fort.
Colonel Lamar reports that he was expecting an attack, having a
detachment at each gun, and the alarm was given when the pickets were
driven in; yet the assaulting column advanced so rapidly that it was
within seven hundred yards when he reached the battery, and much nearer
when in person he fired the 8-inch columbiad heavily charged with grape,
which he says broke the leading regiment, cutting it completely in two.
The other Confederate troops engaged were the 1st, 24th, and 25th South
Carolina, Boyce's field battery, and Company H, 1st South Carolina
artillery, which manned the Reed battery. General Evans ordered up the
47th and 51st Georgia to support his right. His force, engaged and on
the field, numbered 4500 effective, besides which were plenty of other
troops available on the main works.
The Confederate loss all told was 204.
The Union loss aggregated 685, of which Stevens's column suffered 529;
Williams's brigade, 152; Wright's division, four.
The 8th Michigan lost 185 out of 534, or thirty per cent.; 13 out of 22
officers who went into the fight, including every officer of the
storming party, were killed or wounded. The Highlanders lost 110 out of
484, notwithstanding which they withdrew in good order, and brought off
60 of their wounded, some of their dead, and their two prisoners. These
losses would have been much greater had it not been for the partial
shelter afforded by the cotton-ridges, and the fire of the men behind
them, which kept down that of the fort. But the loss of the garrison is
unparalleled behind such works, and shows the desperate nature of the
fighting.
The nearest parallel to this assault afforded by the war was that on
Fort Saunders at Knoxville, where the Highlanders had their revenge.
They manned the exposed salient of the fort when Longstreet tried to
carry it by storm, November 29, 1863. This work was not so strong either
in profile or position as Fort Lamar. It was subjected to a severe
shelling and fire of sharpshooters, and then three veteran brigades,
fifteen regiments, rushed upon both faces of the salient angle. The
Highlanders and Benjamin's Battery E, of the 2d artillery, repulsed
every attack. No enemy raised his head above the parapet and lived. And
in the midst of the fight, amid the noise and fury of battle, as the
Highlanders plied their muskets and rolled by hand 20-pounder shells
with fuses cut short and lighted into the ditch, filled with the
struggling mass of men, the Highlanders grimly passed the word along the
line, "Remember James Island! Remember James Island!"
The Highlanders here lost four killed and five wounded. The entire loss
in the fort was inconsiderable. The enemy lost 813 men, three flags, and
600 small-arms. This would seem almost incredible, were it not attested
by the official reports, both Union and Confederate.
Why the assault failed, it is not far to seek. The principal cause was
the strength of the work, manned as it was by a resolute garrison, and
the destructive fire of its heavy guns. Although the alarm was given by
the outposts nearly a mile from the work, the column reached it upon the
heels of the fleeing picket, and was actually within five hundred yards
before the first gun could be fired. But this gun, an 8-inch columbiad
charged with grape, shattered the centre of the leading regiment,
cutting it completely in two. Then the canister from the big howitzer
and other guns doubly decimated them, yet the brave fellows gained the
parapet. Had the next two regiments, the 7th Connecticut and 28th
Massachusetts, following close upon the Michiganders as ordered, joined
them at this instant, the work would undoubtedly have been taken. But
they were green troops, never having been under fire; the 28th, indeed,
was fresh from home, and under the terrible storm of grape and canister
they were beaten to the left, and entangled in the bushes and broken
bank there. Although Lieutenant-Colonel Hawley lost no time in
disentangling his regiment and moving it out into the field and again
forward, it is significant, and well shows the difficulty of handling
green troops under fire, that the Highlanders rushed past the right of
the 7th Connecticut, and the Roundheads broke through or ran over its
centre, and both assaulted the fort and were repulsed--nearly all who
reached the parapet being killed, and the remainder forced to give
back--by the time the Connecticut regiment had advanced to within a
hundred yards of the work, where Hawley received the order to withdraw.
Certainly the rapid advance and onset of the Michiganders, Highlanders,
and Roundheads were all that men could do. Their loss was so great and
the parapet so difficult that not enough men could surmount it to be
able to hold it; but the chief reason for the failure was the deadly
fire from the woods and cover behind the fort. The work was fairly
stormed, but the stormers, too few to hold it, were destroyed by the
deadly fire from its rear.
These three regiments had already smelt powder, and had been well
drilled and disciplined by General Stevens. The others, new and
inexperienced, could not be expected to equal them, yet they evinced no
lack of bravery.
General Stevens says in his report:--
"I must confess that the coolness and mobility of all the troops
engaged on the 16th surprised me, and I cannot but believe, had
proper use been made of the artillery, guns from the navy, and our
own batteries, fixed and field; had the position been gradually
approached and carefully examined, and the attack made much later in
the day, when our batteries had had their full effect, all of which,
you will recollect, was strongly urged by me upon General Benham the
evening of the conference,--the result might have been very
different."[18]
General Stevens commends the gallantry of his troops in strong terms,
and the brave and efficient service of his staff, already mentioned, of
Lieutenant Orrin M. Dearborn, of the 3d New Hampshire, aide in place of
Lieutenant Cottrell, who, having been promoted captain, had command of
his company, and of Lieutenant Jefferson Justice, of the Roundheads,
acting division quartermaster, who served upon the field as his aide.
Lieutenant Lyons, who so bravely led the stormers, died of his wound in
hospital at Hilton Head soon afterwards.
For his wrong-headed and disobedient conduct Benham was placed under
arrest by General Hunter and sent North. His appointment as
brigadier-general was revoked by the President. Later, by unwearied
importunity and the pressure of influence, he managed to get himself
reinstated, but never again was he trusted with the lives of brave men.
FOOTNOTES:
[18] See _Rebellion Records_, vol. xiv.; _History of the 79th
Highlanders_, by William Todd; Major Pressley, in _Southern
Historical Society Papers_, vol. xvi., Major John Johnson's
_Defense of Charleston Harbor_.