WAGING THE WAR ON THE SOUND
The force thus speedily raised was organized into three battalions,
designated the Northern, Southern, and Central, each of which elected
its major, and the two latter were subsequently formed into a single
command by the election of Shaw as lieutenant-colonel.
The Northern battalion, under the command of Major J.J.H. Van Bokkelen,
consisted of companies C, Captain Daniel Smalley; H, Captain R.V.
Peabody; and I, Captain Samuel D. Howe. The Central battalion, under
Major Gilmore Hays, comprised companies B, Captain A.B. Rabbeson; C,
Captain B.L. Henness; E, Captain C.W. Riley; F, Captain C.W. Swindal;
the Pioneer Company, Captain White; and the train guard, Captain Oliver
Shead. The Southern battalion included the Washington Mounted Rifles,
Major H.J.G. Maxon; Company D, Captain Achilles; J, Captain Bluford
Miller; and K, Captain Francis M.P. Goff, all under the command of Major
Maxon. The Southern battalion and Captain Henness's Company C were
mounted, most of the volunteers furnishing their own horses. The others
served as infantry. Besides these, Company A, of forty-two men, Captain
Edward Lander (chief justice of the Territory), was raised at Seattle,
and garrisoned that place.
The plan of campaign was to guard the line of the Snohomish River with
the whole available force of the Northern battalion, to move with the
Central battalion at once into the heart of the enemy's country with
one hundred days' supplies, to operate with the Southern battalion east
of the Cascades, and to combine all the operations by a movement from
the Sound to the interior, or from the interior to the Sound, according
to circumstances.
The most favorable and commonly used passes across the Cascades were at
the head of the Snohomish and its southern branch, the Snoqualmie; about
and opposite the mouth of the river were a good part of the Sound
Indians; it was here that the council of Mukilteo was held, at which
twenty-three hundred Indians were present, and across the Sound, nearly
opposite, was collected the greatest number of non-hostiles. The
occupation of the line of the Snohomish, therefore, was a move of the
first strategic importance as shutting the door against the incursions
of the Yakimas, and cutting off the tribes on the Sound from access to
the back country and intercourse with them and other hostiles.
It was determined to occupy the country permanently by roads and
blockhouses, by which, together with the stockades and blockhouses which
the encouraged settlers were building and holding at many points, to
circumscribe the hostile resorts and coverts, and open up the trackless
back country. Indian auxiliaries were to be used as the best means of
preserving their doubtful fidelity, and of using their knowledge of the
country to search out and hunt down the hostiles.
[Illustration: THEATRE OF INDIAN WAR OF 1855-56 ON PUGET SOUND AND WEST
OF CASCADE MOUNTAINS]
This plan the governor early communicated to Lieutenant-Colonel Silas
Casey (major-general in the Civil War), then commanding at Steilacoom,
and invited and secured his coöperation therewith. So desirous was he to
insure coöperation between the regular and volunteer forces that,
waiving etiquette, he twice visited Casey in person; and early in
February he again made the arduous journey to Vancouver, and by
personal conference with Colonel George Wright, who commanded the
regular troops both on the river and the Sound, sought to arrange
harmonious and combined action between their respective forces,
returning to Olympia by the 17th. During the war the governor spared no
pains to consult with the regular officers and secure their concert of
action with him, and this end he brought about quite fully with Casey,
and partially with Wright, notwithstanding both officers were under the
strictest injunctions from Wool not to recognize the volunteer forces in
any way. The letter which Governor Stevens wrote to General Wool on
reaching Walla Walla gave very fully the results of his knowledge of the
country and the Indians, and his views and suggestions in regard to
prosecuting the war, which, if adopted or heeded by the prejudiced
commander, would have brought the contest to an end in a few months.
After announcing his safe arrival, and giving a brief account of the
numbers and dispositions of the Indian tribes, he describes the features
of the Walla Walla, Palouse, Spokane, and Yakima countries which a
military mail should know for planning the movement of troops, namely,
roads, river crossings, grass, wood, depth of snow, etc., sending also a
map.
The governor recommended Wool to occupy the Walla Walla valley with all
his available force in January, establishing a depot camp there, and a
line of barges on the Columbia between the mouth of the Des Chutes and
old Fort Walla Walla, to bring up supplies; in February to cross Snake
River with 500 men and strike the Indians on the Palouse, where the
hostiles driven out of the valley were congregated; to follow up this
blow by sending a column of 300 men up the left bank of the Columbia
towards the Okinakane River (Okanogan), while 200 remained to guard the
line of the Snake, and keep the Indians from doubling back. The effect
of these movements would be to drive these hostiles across the Columbia
into the Yakima country, when the troops north of the Snake were to
follow them, and all the troops south of that stream, who had been
holding the river crossings and depot camps, were to unite, cross the
Columbia at the mouth of the Snake, and move up the Yakima valley, and
with the other column put the Indians to their last battle, for the
effect of these movements would be to drive the enemy into a corner from
which he could not easily escape. Moreover, and this was of the first
importance, this plan would interpose the troops between the hostile and
friendly tribes. Simultaneous movements against the Yakimas and north of
Snake River would throw the hostiles upon the Spokanes, and might cause
them to take up arms. About 800 effective troops would be required.
There were already 500 mounted Oregon volunteers in the Walla Walla
valley, and Wool had, or would soon have, 500 to 600 regulars available.
In the last paragraph of this letter the governor stated:--
"In conclusion, it is due to frankness that I should state that I
have determined to submit to the department the course taken by the
military authorities in disbanding the troops raised in the
Territory of Washington for my relief. No effort was made, although
the facts were presented both to Major-General Wool and Major Rains,
to send me assistance. The regular troops were all withdrawn into
garrison, and I was left to make my way the best I could, through
tribes known to be hostile. It remains to be seen whether the
commissioner selected by the President to make treaties with the
Indians in the interior of the continent is to be ignored, and his
safety left to chance."
On finding that General Wool had left so hastily for San Francisco the
governor sent a copy of this memoir to Colonel Wright, with a letter,
dated February 6, urging him to send at least two companies of the
troops at Vancouver to the Sound, and to push his troops against the
Indians east of the mountains.
But instead of profiting by the valuable information and sound views
given him by Governor Stevens, Wool sarcastically replied that he had
neither the resources of a Territory nor the treasury of the United
States at his command. Instead of making use of, or coöperating with,
the Oregon volunteers already in the Walla Walla valley, he denounced
them as making war upon friendly Indians, and declared that, with the
additional force recently arrived at the Dalles and Vancouver, he could
bring the war to a close in a few months, provided the extermination of
the Indians was not determined upon, and the volunteers were withdrawn
from the Walla Walla valley. He filled the greater part of a long letter
with denunciations of outrages by whites upon Indians in southern
Oregon, and of the Oregon volunteers and of Governor Curry. He declared
that two companies he had just sent to the Sound, with three already
there, making five in all, under Lieutenant-Colonel Casey, would be a
sufficient force to suppress the outbreak in that region. He concluded
by saying:--
"In your frankness and determination to represent me to the
department, I trust you will be governed by truth, and by truth
only. I disbanded no troops raised for your relief; and your
communication gave me the first intelligence that any were raised
for such a purpose."
The bad blood and duplicity of this communication was the more
inexcusable from the facts that it was on the requisition of his own
officers that the Washington volunteers had been raised and mustered
into the United States service, that he made no complaint whatever
against them or the people of that Territory, and that his last
assertion was a downright falsehood. Even after receiving the full and
valuable memoir which Governor Stevens sent him, he declared in official
communications: "I have been kept wholly ignorant of the state of the
country, except through the regular officers of the army."
On March 15 Wool made another flying visit to Vancouver, thence by
steamer to Steilacoom, where he tarried but a single day, conferred with
and instructed Colonel Casey, rebuked him for coöperating with the
volunteers, and hurried away without deigning to notify the governor of
his presence. The latter, on hearing that he had left Vancouver for the
Sound, immediately dispatched Adjutant-General Tilton to Steilacoom with
a letter to Wool, stating:--
"He is instructed to advise you of the plan of operations which I
have adopted, the force in the field, and the condition of the
country. I have to acquaint you of my desire to coöperate with you
in any plans you may think proper to adopt, and I shall be pleased
to hear from you in reference to the prosecution of the campaign."
But Wool had left before Tilton could reach him.
The first and only result of Wool's flying visit was manifested next day
in a formal demand by Colonel Casey on Governor Stevens for two
companies of volunteers to be mustered into the United States service,
and placed under his orders. He stated in conclusion:--
"I received yesterday an accession of two companies of the 9th
infantry. With this accession of force and the two companies of
volunteers called for, I am of the opinion that I shall have a
sufficient number of troops to protect this frontier without the aid
of those now in the service of the Territory."
This demand was made just after the volunteers had defeated the
hostiles, as will soon be narrated.
Thus, instead of the coöperation which he so earnestly sought with the
regular service, he was coolly required by the commanding general to
disband thirteen companies of white troops and four bodies of Indian
auxiliaries, abandon his posts and blockhouses defending the settlements
and in the enemy's country, leave the door of the Snohomish open for the
Yakima emissaries to strike the reservations and the settlements,--in a
word, give up his whole campaign at the moment when he had inflicted a
severe defeat upon the enemy, and, fully prepared, was on the eve of
following it up with his whole force, all posted in the very positions,
and furnished with the needed supplies, which he had secured by so much
labor and foresight, and to leave the defense of this extended and
exposed frontier to an officer whose force would consist of only five
companies of regulars and two of volunteers,--seven in all,--and whose
most extended operations thus far had never gone beyond fifteen miles
from his headquarters at Fort Steilacoom. This artful and impudent
request of Wool--for Colonel Casey made it by his instructions--was
instantly rejected by the governor with the scorn it deserved; and in a
letter to Wool, dated March 20, he administered a well-deserved
castigation to that ill-disposed officer:--
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,
OLYMPIA, March 20, 1856.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN E. WOOL,
_Commanding Pacific Division_.
_Sir_,--I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
communication of the 12th of February, and to state generally in
answer thereto that the events of the past four weeks, in connection
with your own official course, afford satisfactory evidence that the
most objectionable positions of your letter have been abandoned, and
that you have finally been awakened to the true condition of the
Indian war, and are seeking to make some amends for the unfortunate
blunders of the past. You have probably learned how much you have
been misled in your views of the operations of the Oregon
volunteers, and how much unnecessary sympathy you have wasted on
the infamous Pu-pu-mox-mox. For your own reputation I have felt pain
at the statement made in your letter to me, for I am an
authoritative witness in the case; and in the letter which submitted
your own action in refusing to send me succor, I have presented
briefly the facts, showing the unmitigated hostility of that chief.
I assert that I can prove by incontrovertible evidence that
Pu-pu-mox-mox had been hostile for months; that he exerted his
influence to effect a general combination of the tribes; that he
plundered Walla Walla and the settlers of the valley, distributing
the spoils to his own and the neighboring tribes as war trophies;
that he rejected the intercession of the friendly Nez Perces to
continue peaceful; that he had sworn to take my life and cut off my
party; that he and the adjoining tribes of Oregon and Washington had
taken up their military position as warriors at the proper points of
the Walla Walla valley,--and all this before the volunteers of
Oregon moved upon him....
That some turbulent men of the Oregon volunteers have done injury to
the friendly Cuyuses is unquestionable, and it is reprobated by the
authorities and citizens of both Territories. It has, however, been
grossly exaggerated. Had, sir, the regulars moved up to the Walla
Walla valley, as I most earnestly urged both Major Rains and Colonel
Wright both by letter and in person, these Indians would have been
protected. The presence of a single company would have been
sufficient. The responsibility, if evil follows, will attach, sir,
to you, as well as to the volunteers.
In your letter of the 12th of February you state: "I have recently
sent to Puget Sound two companies of the 9th infantry. These, with
the three companies there, will give a force of nearly or quite four
hundred regulars, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Casey. This force,
with several ships of war on the Sound, to which will be added in a
few days the United States steamer Massachusetts, it seems to me, if
rightly directed, ought to be sufficient to bring to terms two
hundred Indian warriors. Captain Keyes, in his last report, says
there are not quite two hundred in arms in that region."
Here you have expressed a very confident opinion. You thought proper
to quote Captain Keyes as to the number of Indians, but you found
it did not suit your purpose to refer to the requisitions he had
made upon you for six additional companies, two of which only had
been sent forward; nor could you find time to refer to the fact that
Colonel Casey had recommended that, after the war was over, eight
companies should be permanently stationed there for the protection
of the Sound.
You think volunteers entirely unnecessary, although after having
received from the executive information as to the condition of the
country. It is now March, a month later, and you send two companies
of regulars, and direct Colonel Casey to call upon me for two
additional companies of volunteers.
Thus you have practically acknowledged that you were wrong, and that
I was right; and thus I have your testimony as against yourself in
vindication of the necessity of my calling out volunteers. As
regards this call for volunteers, it is presumed that Colonel Casey
informed you that the whole available force of the Sound country was
bearing arms, and that the great proportion of them were actively
engaging the enemy; that, organized in two battalions, the Northern
battalion occupied the line of the Snohomish, where they were
establishing blockhouses and closing the passes of the Snoqualmie.
That the Central battalion was occupying the military road over the
Nahchess, in relation to which road and its military bearing your
aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Arnold, will be able to give you full
information; and that on both lines decisive blows had been struck;
and also that it was beyond the ability of our citizens to raise an
additional company of even fifty men to honor your requisition.
I have a right to hold you to a full knowledge of our condition
here. If you say you were misinformed, then you are not fit for your
position, and should give place to a better man. If you were
informed, then your measures as a military man manifest an
incapacity beyond example.
Therefore the call on me for two companies of volunteers is a call
upon me to withdraw the troops now in the field with sixty to eighty
days' provisions, after decisive blows have been struck, and when
everything is ready to strike a, and perhaps _the_, decisive blow to
end the war.
I am, sir, too old a soldier ever to abandon a well-considered plan
of campaign, or to do otherwise than to press forward with all my
energies in the path marked out, promising, as it does, the speedy
termination of the war; and, sir, I am too wary a man not to detect
the snare that has been laid for me. You never expected, sir, that
the requisition would be complied with. You knew that it was a
practical impossibility; but, not having the courage to acknowledge
your errors, it was resorted to in the hope that my refusing your
requisition might enable you to occupy my vantage-ground, and throw
me on the defensive. I hold you, sir, to the facts and necessity of
the case, clearly demonstrating by your own confession the propriety
of my course, and the necessity on my part of a steady adherence to
it.
You have referred to the atrocities committed upon the friendly
Indians by the whites. I know nothing of what has occurred in
southern Oregon; but I have to state that no man, to my knowledge,
in the Territory of Washington advocates the extermination of the
Indians. The authorities here have not only used every exertion to
protect them, but their exertions have been completely successful.
Did you learn, sir, in your brief visit to the Sound, that nearly
four thousand Indians--friendly Indians--had been moved from the war
ground on the eastern shore of the Sound and its vicinity to the
adjacent islands, and have for nearly five months been living in
charge of local agents? That not an Indian in the whole course of
the war has been killed by the whites except in battle? That where a
military commission, composed of a majority of volunteer officers,
tried some months since eight Indians, only one was convicted, and
that the sentence of death passed upon him has not yet been
executed? It is the good conduct of our people, sir, that has so
strengthened the hands of the authorities as to enable them to
control these friendly Indians, and to prevent any considerable
accessions to the ranks of the hostiles.
I have recently heard from the Nez Perces, the Coeur d'Alenes, and
the Spokanes. The former are firm in their allegiance; but the
Spokanes urge me to have a military force on the great prairie
between them and the hostile Indians, so these latter may not be
driven to their country, and thus incite their young men to war. The
letter of Garry, chief of the Spokanes, is a most earnest and
plaintive call for help, so his hands may be strengthened in keeping
his people to their plighted faith; and the coincidence is
remarkable, that this Indian chief, a white man in education and
views in life, should have asked me to do the very thing I have
urged upon you; for you will remember, in my memoir I urge that the
troops, in operating against the Indians, should be interposed
between the friendly and hostile tribes to prevent those now
friendly from joining in the war. I have, sir, studied the character
of these Indians, and my views as to the influence upon the friendly
Indians of the mode of carrying on the war against the hostiles are
confirmed by the only educated Indian of either Oregon or
Washington, and the head chief of the tribe in reference to which I
made the recommendation and felt the most solicitude.
It seems to me that the present condition of things imposes upon you
the necessity of recognizing the services of the volunteers of the
two Territories now in the field, and of your doing everything to
facilitate their operations. But if you waste your exertions in the
fruitless effort to induce either the authorities to withdraw their
troops, to abandon their plan of campaign in order to comply with
your requisition, or to meet your peculiar notions, I warn you now,
sir, that I, as the governor of Washington, will cast upon you the
whole responsibility of any difficulties which may arise in
consequence, and that by my firm, steady, and energetic course, and
by my determination to coöperate with the regular service, whatever
may be the provocation to the contrary, I will vindicate the justice
of my course, and maintain my reputation as a faithful public
servant. I warn you, sir, that, unless your course is changed, you
will have difficulties in relation to which your only salvation will
be the firm and decided policy of the two Territories whose services
you have ignored, whose people you have calumniated, and whose
respect you have long since ceased to possess.
Can you presume, sir, to be able to correct your opinions by a hasty
visit to the Sound for a few days? And do you expect, after having
taken my deliberate course, that I shall change my plans on a simple
intimation from you, without even a conference between us? Were you
desirous, sir, to harmonize the elements of strength on the Sound,
you would have seen that it was your duty at least to have informed
me of your presence, and to have invited me to a conference.
Whilst in the country, in the fall and winter, you complained that
the authorities of the two Territories did not communicate with you.
Why did you not inform me of your presence in the Sound on your
arrival at Steilacoom? I learned of your probable arrival by simply
learning on Saturday morning by my express of your having left
Vancouver, and I immediately dispatched the chief of my staff to
wait upon you with a letter. But you were gone; and whether you did
not know the courtesy due the civil authorities of the Territory,
who had taken the proper course to place themselves in relations
with you, or whether you were unwilling to meet a man whose safety
you had criminally neglected, and whose general views you have been
compelled to adopt, is a matter entirely immaterial to me.
What, sir, would have been the effect if Governor Curry had not made
the movement which you condemn, and my party with the friendly Nez
Perces had been cut off? Sir, there would have been a hurricane of
war between the Cascades and Bitter Root, and three thousand
warriors would now be in arms. Every tribe would have joined,
including the Snakes, and the spirit of hostility would have spread
east of the Bitter Root to the upper Pend Oreilles.
I believe, sir, I would have forced my way through the five or six
hundred hostiles in the Walla Walla valley with fifty-odd white men
and one hundred and fifty Nez Perces. Would you have expected it?
Could the country expect it? And what was the duty of those having
forces at their command? Governor Curry sent his volunteers and
defeated the enemy. You disbanded the company of Washington
Territory volunteers raised expressly to be sent to my relief.
I have reported your refusal to send me succor to the Department of
War, and have given some of the circumstances attending that
refusal. The company was under the command of Captain William McKay.
Before your arrival there was a pledge that it should be mustered
into the regular service and sent to my assistance. Major Rains
informs me that he did everything in his power to induce you to send
it on. William McKay informs me that he called on you personally,
and that you would do nothing. I am informed that your aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant Arnold, endeavored to get you to change your
determination. What was your reply? "Governor Stevens can take care
of himself. Governor Stevens will go down the Missouri. Governor
Stevens will get aid from General Harney. If Governor Stevens wants
aid, he will send for it." These were your answers, according to the
changing humor of the moment.
And now, sir, in view of your assertion that you disbanded no troops
raised for my relief, and that my communication gave you the first
intelligence that any were raised for that purpose, I would commend
the chalice to your own lips, "that I trust you will be governed"
hereafter "by the truth, and the truth only."
I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ISAAC I. STEVENS,
_Governor, Washington Territory_.
Unable to answer this letter, which so clearly exposed and justly
rebuked his reprehensible course and conduct, Wool returned it, with a
note from his aide stating that it was done by his order. In response
the governor, in a final letter to Wool, remarks of this act:--
"It can only be construed as evincing a determination on your part
to have no further official communication with the executive of the
Territory of Washington, at the very time when, from the
circumstances of the case and the nature of their respective duties,
there should, and must often be, such communications.
"It is a matter which is not to be decided by personal feeling, but
by consideration of public duty, which alone should govern public
acts. I shall therefore continue in my official capacity to
communicate with the major-general commanding the Department of the
Pacific whenever, in my judgment, duty and the paramount interests
of the Territory shall demand such communication to be made, casting
upon that officer whatever responsibility before the country and his
superiors may attach to his refusal to receive such communications.
My duty shall be done. Let others do their duty."
The governor was always of the opinion, the result undoubtedly of what
he was told by other officers, that, in disbanding the troops raised for
his relief, Wool was actuated by resentment at his, the governor's,
manly declaration in San Francisco, when, disgusted at Wool's
self-laudation and disparagement of a greater commander, he said that
"every officer knew, and history would record, that General Taylor won
the battle of Buena Vista." However that may be, after the caustic
letter given above, Wool's malice knew no bounds. He redoubled his
accusations of making war upon friendly Indians, gathered up and sent on
to the War Department in his official reports newspaper slanders against
the governor, and even declared that he was crazy. He reiterated his
orders to his subordinates to have nothing to do with the territorial
volunteers or authorities, and finally went to the length of directing
his officers to disarm the volunteers, if practicable. No attempt was
ever made in that direction.
Early in February Pat-ka-nim, with eighty Snohomish braves, accompanied
by Colonel Simmons, pushed up the Snohomish and against the hostiles on
Green River under Leschi, the Nisqually chief, and defeated them in a
sharp fight, inflicting a loss of five killed and six wounded, besides
two taken and executed.
As fast as organized, the Northern battalion was advanced on the line of
the Snohomish, where it built blockhouses and a camp known as Fort
Tilton below the Snoqualmie Falls, and Fort Alden above them, and
scouted the surrounding country. This battalion also established a
blockhouse, with a garrison of fifteen men, at Bellingham Bay, and with
blockhouses on Whitby Island and at Point Wilson, near Port Townsend,
and a service of small vessels and canoes, kept watch over the lower
Sound.
The Central battalion, having been assembled on Yelm prairie, twenty
miles east of Olympia, and constructed there Fort Stevens, moved to and
built Camp Montgomery, twelve miles back of Steilacoom, February 19 to
23; the post and ferry at the emigrant crossing of the Puyallup, 25th to
29th; and the post and blockhouses, named Fort Hays, on Connell's
prairie, on White River, by March 2; and later two blockhouses at the
crossing of that river, named Forts Pike and Posey. Small garrisons held
this line of blockhouses; roads were cut and opened through the forest;
and a train of thirty ox-teams, three yoke each, bought, hired, or
impressed from the settlers, hauled out a hundred days' supplies.
Captain Henness's mounted rangers cheerfully dismounted, and, leaving
their horses at Yelm prairie, advanced on foot. The governor visited
Camp Montgomery on the 28th, pressing forward the movement.
Captain Sidney S. Ford, with a force of friendly Chehalis Indians,
scouted the lower Puyallup. Lieutenant-Colonel Casey advanced a
detachment of regulars to the Muckleshoot prairie, eight miles below
Connell's prairie, where they built a blockhouse named Fort Slaughter.
The government vessels on the Sound were the war steamer Massachusetts,
Captain Samuel Swartwout, which remained mostly in Seattle harbor, where
she relieved the Decatur; the Coast Survey steamer Active, Captain James
Alden; and the revenue cutter Jefferson Davis, a sailing vessel, Captain
William C. Pease. These officers were ever ready to aid in the defense
of the settlements by every means in their power. They furnished
ammunition, transported volunteers and supplies, and cruised the Sound
to overawe the northern Indians.
On March 2 two white men were killed by Indians within a few miles of
Olympia; Indians were seen and stock was driven off at other points; a
band of savages under Qui-e-muth were discovered in the Nisqually
bottom; and it appeared that, while the troops were pushing out, the
Indians were coming in behind them to raid the settlements. Unwilling to
arrest the forward movement, the governor immediately ordered Maxon's
company, of the Southern battalion, over to the Sound from Vancouver,
and soon after brought over the rest of the battalion. By a special war
notice he also called a hundred more men from the already denuded
settlements, and, with the few that were able to respond, strengthened
the exposed points.
On March 6 Colonel Casey's troops on Muckleshoot prairie had a sharp
fight with the enemy. On the 10th Major Hays, with 110 men of his
Central battalion, fought the principal and decisive battle of the war
on the Sound, known as the battle of Connell's prairie. It was brought
on by the Indians, who, emboldened by their previous successes, fought
for five hours with a confidence and stubbornness that enabled the
volunteers to inflict severe losses upon them. They were finally routed
by a charge on their left flank by Captains Swindal and Rabbeson, and a
simultaneous attack in front by Captains Henness and White, with a loss
of twenty-five or thirty killed and many wounded. They even abandoned
their war-drum in their flight. Major Hays, who handled his command with
skill and judgment as well as courage, reported that they numbered at
least two hundred warriors. It afterwards appeared that their numbers
were much larger, and that they were aided in the fight by a hundred
Yakima warriors.
The fruits of Governor Stevens's thorough preparations were now
manifested by incessant blows and untiring, unsparing warfare. The
Indians were allowed no respite from attack, and could find no refuge,
even in the densest swamps and thickets. The Central battalion sent out
strong parties to beat up the country of the White, Green, Cedar, and
Puyallup rivers to the base of the mountains. Major Van Bokkelen, with
Captain Smalley's Company G, forty-six men, and seventy-six of
Pat-ka-nim's braves, swept the forests from the Snohomish to Connell's
prairie, thence up the mountain to the Nahchess Pass, thence northward
along the foot of the range to his own northern line, and thence into
and over the Snoqualmie passes. Captain Sidney Ford with his Chehalis
Indians, and agent Wesley Gosnell with a party of friendly, or pretended
friendly, Indians from the Squaxon reservation--own brothers to the
hostiles these--scoured the swamps and bottoms of the Puyallup and
Nisqually; Lieutenant Pierre Charles, with a force of Cowlitz and
Chehalis Indians, scouted up the Cowlitz and Newarkum rivers, and
captured a number of the enemy. The ladies of Olympia, under the lead of
Mrs. Stevens, made blue caps with red facings, with which these red
allies were equipped, to distinguish them from their hostile kindred.
Another company was called out and organized among the settlers of the
Cowlitz plains under Captain E.D. Warbass, which built a blockhouse on
Klikitat prairie, twelve miles higher up the Cowlitz, and also kept
scouting parties constantly on the move. Major Maxon and his company
scouted and searched the whole length of the Nisqually valley far into
the range, leaving their horses and plunging into the tangled forests on
foot, and on one of their scouts killed eight and brought in fourteen
captives of the enemy. Miller's and Achilles's companies joined in the
work, while Goff was sent back to the river to increase his strength to
a hundred, and, with another company to be raised there,--N, Captain
Richards,--to rendezvous at the Dalles in readiness for operations in
the upper country.
The governor urged Captain Swartwout to unite with Captain Lander's
company, by furnishing a detachment and boats from the Massachusetts, in
routing out the Indians who infested the shores of Lake Washington; and
when the naval officer declined, Captains Howe and Peabody led
detachments of the Northern battalion from the Snohomish down through
the unknown and trackless forest, and beat up the shores of the lake.
Lander's Company A was posted on the Duwhamish River, a few miles from
Seattle, where it built a blockhouse, and from which point Lieutenant
Neely led a party in a canoe expedition up Black River into the lake,
and fell upon a camp of the hostiles just after it had been abandoned,
which was found filled with remains of cattle, stores, and goods
recently plundered from Seattle and the settlers. Colonel Casey, after
being reinforced by the two companies brought over from Vancouver,
established a post higher up on White River, from which, and from his
post on Muckleshoot prairie, parties scouted the surrounding forest.
Every blockhouse with its little garrison, every armed train and express
and canoe, as well as the numerous scouting parties, was constantly
watching and searching for hostile Indians, and, worse than all, their
own kindred, of whom Shaw declared "blankets will turn any Indian on the
side of the whites," now joined in the hunt, and, stimulated by rewards
offered for the heads of the hostile chiefs and warriors, showed the way
to all their secret haunts and trails. The tide had, indeed, turned,
after two months of this unrelenting warfare, and nearly every tribe on
the Sound now freely proffered its assistance. The northern Indians,
also, tendered their services, which were declined, excepting eight men,
who joined the Northern battalion, and proved themselves uncommonly
brave, strong, and hardy soldiers.
Thus the whole tangled region, with its dense forests and almost
impenetrable swamps, from the Snohomish to the Cowlitz, nearly two
hundred miles, was beaten up, the Indian resorts and hiding-places
searched out, and their trails discovered and explored, especially those
across the mountain passes, many of which were now for the first time
made known to the whites. The whole policy and plan of campaign were
Governor Stevens's, and the execution almost entirely the work of his
brave and patriotic volunteers. The governor had, indeed, brought about
a real concert of action with Colonel Casey by his frank and considerate
treatment of that officer, but the regular forces kept within a very
short tether of Fort Steilacoom.
It was in the midst of the rainy season that this aggressive campaign
was waged. So impracticable and unwise was it deemed by the brave and
excellent Major Hays that he remonstrated with the governor against
exposing the volunteers to such hardships, and, finding him inexorable,
resigned rather than undertake it, as also did two officers of his
former company. Amid constant rains and swollen streams the volunteers
thridded the dripping forests, where every shaken bough drenched the
toiling soldiers with another shower-bath, following some dim trail, or
oftener cutting or forcing their way through the trackless woods,--heavy
packs of blankets and rations on their backs, the axe in one hand and
the rifle in the other. Scarcely would they return from one scout when
they would be ordered out again. To every demand the volunteers
responded with the greatest alacrity, spirit, and fortitude. The mounted
men without a murmur left their horses and took to the woods as foot
scouts. The Southern battalion, enlisting with the expectation of
campaigning on the plains of the upper country, instantly and without a
murmur obeyed the order summoning them to the Sound, to the discomforts
and hardships of the rains and forests and swamps. The settlers freely
turned out with their teams of oxen, and the storekeepers furnished
blankets, clothing, shoes, and provisions to the extent of their
ability.
On March 26, just as the campaign was well under way, the Yakimas and
Klikitats swooped down upon the Cascades portage on the Columbia, which
was left insufficiently guarded by Colonel Wright with a force of only
nine regular soldiers in a blockhouse, and massacred nineteen settlers,
and killed one soldier and wounded two others. Colonel Wright, who was
at the Dalles preparing an expedition for the Yakima country,
immediately proceeded to the Cascades with a strong force of regular
troops, and the Indians disappeared. Satisfied that the friendly Indians
in that vicinity were implicated in the attack, he caused ten of them,
including the chief, to be summarily tried by military commission and
hanged, an act which, if committed by the territorial authorities or
volunteers, would have caused redoubled denunciations on the part of
Wool and his parasites, but which, done by this regular officer, excited
no comment. This affair at the Cascades is also of interest as being
General P.H. Sheridan's début in the art of war.
The massacre at the Cascades excited new alarm among the settlers about
Vancouver and along the Columbia. To reassure them, and keep them from
abandoning their farms, the governor called out another company of
volunteers under Captain William Kelly, known as the Clark County
Rangers, caused several new blockhouses to be built, and had the rangers
constantly patrol the settlements. It was at this time, and largely in
consequence of the Cascades massacre, that he called out Captain
Warbass's company, for he deemed it essential that the settlers should
not again abandon their farms. He also wrote Colonel Wright proposing a
"thorough understanding between the regular and volunteer service, so
their joint efforts may be applied to the protection of the settlements
and the prosecution of the war," in order that no force need be wasted,
and inviting his suggestions to that end. But Colonel Wright, although
personally ready to coöperate like Colonel Casey, was under the
strictest orders from Wool in no way to recognize the volunteers. In his
reply to the governor he simply stated what he was doing, and proposing
to do, without venturing any suggestions. In truth, between the governor
and his volunteers, who were so efficiently protecting the settlements
and attacking the common foe, on the one hand, and his irate commanding
general, who had positively ordered him to ignore the territorial
authorities and forces, on the other, Colonel Wright was in something of
a quandary, and it must be confessed that he conducted himself with no
little diplomatic skill.
For two months after the fight of Connell's prairie, Governor Stevens
kept his whole force thus incessantly searching the forests and hunting
down the hostiles with unrelenting vigor. The Indians, thrown completely
on the defensive, did not commit another depredation after the Cascades
disaster on all that long line of exposed and scattered settlements.
They were driven and chased from resort to resort; their most hidden
camps and caches of provisions were discovered and destroyed; many were
killed or captured; and by the middle of May over five hundred came in
and gave themselves up, while the guilty chiefs and warriors fled across
the Cascades and sought refuge among their Yakima kindred. The
surrendered were placed on the reservations with the friendly Indians,
except a number of suspected murderers, who were tried by military
commissions; but very few were found guilty for lack of evidence, and
they were also sent to join their people on the reservations. It was not
the governor's policy to punish them for taking part in the war, or
fights only, but he deemed it essential to the future peace of the
country that the murderers of settlers and chief instigators of the
outbreak should be punished, and believed that if they were allowed to
escape scot free they would stir up trouble again.
Thus the war west of the Cascades was ended by the complete surrender or
flight of the hostiles.
In June the posts and blockhouses built by the volunteers on Puyallup
and White rivers, Connell's prairie, and Camp Montgomery were turned
over to the regulars, and the volunteers who were not required for an
expedition east of the Cascades were disbanded in July.
After the suppression of hostilities on the Sound, becoming satisfied
that the reservations set apart at the treaty of Medicine Creek were
inadequate for the Nisquallies and Puyallups, Governor Stevens held a
council with these Indians on Fox Island on August 4, and arranged with
them to give them, in place of those established by the treaty, a larger
reservation for the former tribe on the Nisqually River, a few miles
above its mouth, embracing some excellent bottom land, and for the
latter twenty-one thousand acres of the finest alluvial land at the
mouth of the Puyallup River. At the same time a smaller reservation was
given the Duwhamish Indians on the Muckleshoot prairie. The Puyallup
reservation included thirteen donation claims taken by white settlers,
but the governor had these appraised by a commission which he appointed
for the purpose, and its awards, amounting to some five thousand
dollars, were paid by Congress. On his recommendation the President, by
executive order, promptly established the new reservations, in pursuance
of the sixth article of the treaty, which empowered him to take such
action. The Indians have remained in undisturbed possession of them ever
since. When the Northern Pacific Railroad Company fixed its terminus at
Tacoma in 1874, it cast covetous eyes upon this noble tract of land
situated across the bay, right opposite the proposed city, and the
author, then its attorney in Washington Territory, was instructed to
examine and report upon the validity of the Indian title to it. His
report satisfied the officers of the company that the right of the
Indians to their reservation was indisputable.
Much of the success attending Governor Stevens's prosecution of the
Indian war was due to the able and energetic men he called to his aid as
staff officers. He especially commended General W.W. Miller as having
imparted "extraordinary efficiency to the quartermaster's and commissary
department, the most difficult of all,--which, generally kept distinct,
was a single department in our service,--reflecting the highest capacity
and devotion to the public service upon its chief and subordinate
officers." It was General Miller who collected, largely by impressment,
organized, and led out into the Indian country the large ox-train which
hauled out three months' supplies for the volunteers in the beginning of
the campaign, without which it could not have been waged. He was
distinguished by remarkable sound sense and judgment, and the governor
counseled with and relied upon him more than any other. And after the
Indian war General Miller was his closest friend in the Territory. The
governor also took occasion to make special acknowledgment to General
Tilton for his services as adjutant-general, where his military
experience was of great value. It is much to be regretted that the
limits of this work preclude the detailed mention of their services,
which they so well merit; but the remarkable success of their
departments is their best encomium.