BY G. STANLEY HALL

THE exact sciences consist of a body of truth which all accept, and to which

all experts strive to contribute. Philosophy, however, like religion, has

always been broken into sects, schools or parties, and the body of truth

which all accept in these fields is relatively far less, and the

antagonistic views far greater. Normal psychology, which a few decades ago,

started out to be scientific with the good old ideal of a body of truth

semper ubique et ad omnibus, is already splitting into introspectionists,

behaviorists, genetic, philosophical and other groups, while in the new

Freudian movement, Adler and Jung are becoming sectaries, the former drawing

upon himself the most impolitic and almost vituperative condemnation of the

father of psychoanalysis. With this latter schism we are not here concerned,

but we are deeply concerned with the more general relations between the

psychologists of the normal and those of the abnormal; with a very few

negligible exceptions psychoanalysis has hardly ever had a place on the

program of our American Psychological Association, and the normal has had

little representation in your meetings and publications. This I deem

unfortunate for both, for unsatisfactory as this sadly needed rapprochement

is on the continent, it is far more so here. That the normalists in this

country so persistently ignore the unique opportunity to extend their

purview into the psychopathological domain at the unique psychological

moment that the development of Freudianism has offered, is to me a matter of

sad disappointment and almost depression. In reading a plea for Freud in our

association of normalists, I am a vox clamantis in deserto and can evoke no

response, and even the incursions of psychoanalysis into the domain of

biography, myth, religion and dreams, have not evoked a single attempt at

appreciation or criticism worthy of mention by any American psychologist of

the normal. I have sought in various ways the causes of this reticence, not

to say ignorance. While I received various answers, the chief one was to the

effect that the alleged hypertrophy of sex in its gross pathological forms,

and the conviction of the kind and degree of sex consciousness found in the

many hundreds of analyzed cases, are so unique and constitute the very

essence of the neurotic and psychotic cases, and conscious and unconscious

sex factors are slight or absent in most normal cases, that these patients

and their doctors alike are sex-intoxicated, and that the Freudian

psychology applies only to perverts and erotomania or other abnormal cases.

To ascribe all this aversion to social or ethical repression is both shallow

and banousic, for the real causes are both manifold and deeper. They are

part of a complicated protest of normality, found in all and even in the

resistance of subjects of analysis, which is really a factor which is basal

for self-control of the varying good sides of which Freudians tell us

nothing. The fact is that there are other things in the human psyche than

sex, and its ramifications. Hunger, despite Jung, fear despite Sadger, and

anger despite Freud, are just as primary, aboriginal and independent as sex,

and we fly in the face of fact and psychic experience to derive them all

from sex, although it is freely granted that in morbid cases each may take

on predominant sex features. In what follows I can only very briefly hint at

the way in which some of the Freudian mechanisms are applied to one of the

emotions, viz., anger.

Anger in most of its forms is the most dynamogenic of all the emotions. In

paroxysms of rage with abandon we stop at nothing short of death and even

mutilation. The Malay running amuck, Orlando Furioso, the epic of the wrath

of Achilles, hell-fire, which is an expression of divine wrath, are some

illustrations of its power. Savages work themselves into frenzied rage in

order to fight their enemies. In many descriptions of its brutal aspects,

which I have collected, children and older human brutes spit, hiss, yell,

snarl, bite noses and ears, scratch, gouge out eyes, pull hair, mutilate sex

organs, with a violence that sometimes takes on epileptic features and which

in a number of recorded cases causes sudden death at its acme, from the

strain it imposes upon the system. Its cause is always some form of

thwarting wish or will or of reduction of self-feeling, as anger is the acme

of self-assertion. The German criminalist, Friedrich, says that probably

every man might be caused to commit murder if provocation were sufficient,

and that those of us who have never committed this crime owe it to

circumstances and not to superior power of inhibition. Of course it may be

associated with sex but probably no human experience is per se more

diametrically opposite to sex. Some temperaments seem to crave, if not need,

outbreaks of it at certain intervals, like a well-poised lady, so

sweet-tempered that everybody imposed on her, till one day at the age of

twenty-three she had her first ebullition of temper end went about to her

college mates telling them plainly what she thought of them, and went home

rested and happy, full of the peace that passeth understanding. Otto Heinze,

and by implication Pfister, think nations that have too long or too

assiduously cultivated peace must inevitably sooner or later relapse to the

barbarisms of war to vent their instincts for combat, and Crile thinks anger

most sthenic, while Cannon says it is the emotion into which most others

tend to pass. It has of course been a mighty agent in evolution, for those

who can summate all their energies in attack have survived. But few if any

impulsions of man, certainly not sex, have suffered more intense, prolonged

or manifold repressions. Courts and law have taken vengeance into their

hands or tried to, and not only a large proportion of assaults, but other

crimes, are still due to explosions of temper, and it may be a factor in

nearly every court case. Society frowns on it, and Lord Chesterfield says

the one sure and unfailing mark of a gentleman is that he never shows

temper. Its manifestations are severely tabooed in home and school. Religion

teaches us not to let the sun go down upon our wrath and even to turn the

other cheek, so that we go through life chronically afraid that we shall

break out, let ourselves go, or get thoroughly mad, so that the moment we

begin to feel a rising tide of indignation or resentment (in the

nomenclature of which our language is so very rich, Chamberlain having

collected scores of English expressions of it), the censorship begins to

check it. In many cases in our returns repression is so potent from long

practice, that the sweetest smile, the kindest remarks or even deeds are

used either to veil it to others, or to evict it from our own consciousness,

or else as a self-inflicted penance for feeling it, while in some tender

consciences its checked but persistent vestiges may become centers of morbid

complexes and in yet other cases it burrows and proliferates more or less

unconsciously, and finds secret and circuitous ways of indulgence which only

psychoanalysis or a moral or religious confessional could trace.

I. Anger has many modes of Verschiebung, both instinctive and cultivated.

One case in our returns carries a bit of wood in his vest-pocket and bites

it when he begins to feel the aura of temper. Girls often play the piano

loudly, and some think best of all. One plays a particular piece to divert

anger, viz., the "Devil's Sonata." A man goes down cellar and saws wood,

which he keeps for such occasions. A boy pounds a resonant eavespout. One

throws a heavy stone against a white rock. Many go off by themselves and

indulge in the luxury of expressions they want none to hear. Others take out

their tantrum on the dog or cat or perhaps a younger child, or implicate

some absent enemy, while others curse. A few wound themselves, and so on,

till it almost seems, in view of this long list of vicariates, as if almost

any attack, psychic or physical, might thus be intensified, and almost

anything or person be made the object of passion. Be it remembered, too,

that not a few look, do, think, feel their best under this impulsion.

II. Besides these modes of Abreagierung there are countless forms of

sublimation. In anger a boy says: I will avenge myself on the bully who

whipped me and whom I cannot or will not whip, by besting him in his

studies, class-work, composition, or learn skilful stunts that he cannot do,

dress, or behave better, use better language, keep better company, and thus

find my triumph and revenge. A man rejected or scorned by a woman sometimes

makes a great man of himself, with the motivation more or less developed to

make her sorry or humiliated. Anger may prompt a man to go in to win his

enemy's girl. A taunt or an insult sometimes spurs the victim of it to

towering ambition to show the world and especially the abuser better, and to

be able to despise him in return; and there are those who have been thus

stung to attempt greatness and find the sweetest joy of success in the

feeling that by attaining it they compensate for indignities they suffered

in youth. In fact, when we analyze ambition and the horror of

Minderwertigkeit that goes with it, we shall doubtless find this factor is

never entirely absent, while if we were to apply the same pertinacity and

subtlety that Jung in his "Wandlungen" has brought to bear in working over

the treacherous material of mythology, we might prove with no less

verisimilitude than he has shown the primacy of the libido that in the

beginning was anger, and that not Anaxagoras' love or the strife of

Heraclitus was the fons et origo of all things, that the Ichtrieb is basal,

and that the fondest and most comprehensive of all motives is that to excel

others, not merely to survive, but to win a larger place in the sun, and

that there is some connection between the Darwinian psychogenesis and Max

Stirner and Nietzsche, which Adler has best evaluated.

III. Anger has also its dreams and reveries. When wronged the imagination

riots in fancied humiliation and even tortures of an enemy. An object of

hate may be put through almost every conceivable series of degradation,

ridicule, exposure and disgrace. He is seen by others for what our hate

deems him to be. All disguises are stripped off. Children sometimes fancy a

hated object of anger flogged until he is raw, abandoned by all his friends,

an outcast, homeless, alone, in the dark, starving, exposed to wild animals,

and far more often more prosaic fancies conceive him as whipped by a parent

or stronger friend, or by the victim himself later. Very clever strategies

are thought out in detail by which the weaker gets even with or vanquishes

the stronger, and one who suffers a rankling sense of injustice can hardly

help day-dreaming of some form of comeuppance for his foe, although it takes

years to do it. In these reveries the injurer in the end almost always gives

up and sues for mercy at the feet of his quondam victim. So weird and

dramatic are these scenes often that to some minds we must call anger and

hate the chief springs of the imagination. A pubescent girl who was deeply

offended went off by herself and held an imaginary funeral of her enemy,

hearing in fancy the disparaging remarks of the bystanders, and when it was

all over and the reaction came, she made up with the object of her passion

by being unusually sweet to her and even became solicitous about her health

as fearing that her revery might come true. We all too remember Tolstoi's

reminiscences when, having been flogged by his tutor, he slunk off to the

attic, weeping and broken-hearted, and finally after a long brooding

resolved to run away and become a soldier, and this he did in fancy,

becoming corporal, lieutenant, captain, colonel. Finally came a great

battle where he led a desperate charge that was crowned with victory, and

when all was over and he stood tottering, leaning on his sword, bloody and

with many a wound, and the great Czar of all the Russias approached, saluted

him as saviour of his fatherland and told him to ask whatever he wanted and

it was his, replied magnanimously that he had only done his duty and wanted

no reward. All he asked was that his tutor might be brought up and his head

cut off. Then the scene changed to other situations, each very different,

florid with details, but motivated by ending in the discomfiture of the

tutor. In the ebb or ambivalent reaction of this passion he and the tutor

got on better.

IV. Richardson has collected 882 cases of mild anger, introspected by

graduate students of psychology, and finds not only over-determination,

anger fetishes and occasionally anger in dreams with patent and latent

aspects and about all the Freudian mechanisms, but what is more important,

finds very much of the impulsion that makes us work and strive, attack and

solve problems has an element of anger at its root. Life is a battle and for

every real conquest man has had to summate and focus all his energies, so

that anger is the acme of the manifestation of Schopenhauer's will to live,

achieve and excel. Hiram Stanley rather absurdly described it as an epoch

when primitive man first became angry and fought, overcoming the great

quaternary carnivora and made himself the lord of creation. Plato said

anger was the basis of the state, Ribot made it the establisher of justice

in the world, and Bergson thinks society rests on anger at vice and crime,

while Stekel thinks that temper qualities should henceforth be treated in

every biography and explored in every case that is psychoanalyzed. Hill's

experiments with pugilism, and Cannon's plea for athletics as a legitimate

surrogate for war in place of James' moral substitute, Frank Howard's

opinion that an impulse that Darwin finds as early as the sixth week and

hardly any student of childhood later than the sixth month, and which should

not be repressed but developed to its uttermost, although carefully directed

to worthy objects, are all in point. Howard pleads for judicious scolding

and flogging, to be, done in heat and not in cold blood, and says that there

is enough anger in the world, were it only rightly directed, to sweep away

all the evils in it. In all these phenomena there is no trace of sex or any

of its symbols, and sadism can never explain but must be explained by it. My

thesis is, then, that every Freudian mechanism applies to anger as truly as

it does to sex. This by no means assumes the fundamental identity of every

feeling-emotion in the sense of Weissfeld's very speculative theory.

In this very slight paper I am only trying to make the single point which I

think fear and sympathy or the gregarious or social instinct would still

better illustrate, although it would require more time, that the movement

inaugurated by Freud opens up a far larger field than that of sex. The

unconscious that introspectionists deny, (asserting that all phenomena

ascribed to it are only plain neural mechanisms, and therefore outside the

realm of psychology,) the feelings which introspection can confessedly never

tell much about and concerning which our text-books in psychology still say

so little: studies in these fields are marking a new epoch, and here the

chief merit of Freudism is found.

The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Volume 10 · 第 28 / 162 题