CHAPTER XI

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

I

STATE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

In the foregoing chapter I have traced the larger aspects of a

constructive relation between the national and democratic principles in

the field of foreign politics. The task remains of depicting somewhat in

detail the aspect which our more important domestic problems assume from

the point of view of the same relationship. The general outlines of this

picture have already been roughly sketched; but the mere sketch of a

fruitful general policy is not enough. A national policy must be

justified by the flexibility with which, without any loss of its

integrity, it can be applied to specific problems, differing radically

one from another in character and significance. That the idea of a

constructive relationship between nationality and democracy is flexible

without being invertebrate is one of its greatest merits. It is not a

rigid abstract and partial ideal, as is that of an exclusively socialist

or an exclusively individualist democracy. Neither is it merely a

compromise, suited to certain practical exigencies, between

individualism and socialism. Its central formative idea can lend itself

to many different and novel applications, while still remaining true to

its own fundamental interest.

Flexible though the national ideal may be, its demands are in one

respect inflexible. It is the strenuous and irrevocable enemy of the

policy of drift. It can counsel patience; but it cannot abide collective

indifference or irresponsibility. A constructive national ideal must at

least seek humbly to be constructive. The only question is, as to how

this responsibility for the collective welfare can at any one time be

most usefully redeemed. In the case of our own country at the present

time an intelligent conception of the national interest will counsel

patient agitation rather than any hazardous attempts at radical

reconstruction. No such reform can be permanent, or even healthy, until

American public opinion has been converted to a completer realization of

the nature and extent of its national responsibilities. The ship of

reform will gather most headway from the association of certain very

moderate practical proposals with the issue of a deliberate, persistent,

and far more radical challenge to popular political prejudices and

errors. It will be sufficient, in case our practical proposals seek to

accomplish some small measure both of political and economic

reconstruction, and in case they occupy some sort of a family relation

to plans of the same kind with which American public opinion is already

more or less familiar.

In considering this matter of institutional reform, I shall be guided

chiefly by the extent to which certain specific reforms have already

become living questions. From this point of view it would be a sheer

waste of time just at present to discuss seriously any radical

modification, say, of the Federal Constitution. Certain transformations

of the Constitution either by insidious effect of practice, by

deliberate judicial construction, or by amendment are, of course, an

inevitable aspect of the contemporary American political problem; but

all such possible and proposed changes must be confined to specific

details. They should not raise any question as to the fundamental

desirability of a system of checks and balances or of the other

principles upon which the Federal political organization is based. Much,

consequently, as a political theorist may be interested in some ideal

plan of American national organization, it will be of little benefit

under existing conditions to enter into such a discussion. Let it wait

until Americans have come to think seriously and consistently about

fundamental political problems. The Federal Constitution is not all it

should be, but it is better than any substitute upon which American

public opinion could now agree. Modifications may and should somehow be

made in details, but for the present not in fundamentals. On the other

hand, no similar sanctity attaches to municipal charters and state

constitutions. The ordinary state constitution is a sufficiently

ephemeral piece of legislation. State and municipal political forms are

being constantly changed, and they are being changed because they have

been so extremely unsatisfactory in their actual operation. The local

political machinery becomes, consequently, the natural and useful

subject of reconstructive experiments. A policy of institutional reform

must prove its value and gain its experience chiefly in this field; and

in formulating such a policy reformers will be placing their hands upon

the most palpable and best-recognized weakness in the American political

system.

A popular but ill-founded American political illusion concerns the

success of their state governments. Americans tend to believe that these

governments have on the whole served them well, whereas in truth they

have on the whole been ill served by their machinery of local

administration and government. The failure has not, perhaps, been as

egregious or as scandalous as has been that of their municipal

institutions; but it has been sufficiently serious to provoke continual

but abortive attempts to improve them; and it has had so many dangerous

consequences that the cause and cure of their inefficiency constitute

one of the most fundamental of American political problems. The

consequences of the failure have been mitigated because the weakness of

the state governments has been partly concealed and redeemed by the

comparative strength and efficiency of the central government. But the

failures have none the less been sufficiently distressing; and if they

are permitted to continue, they will compromise the success of the

American democratic experiment. The Federal government has done much to

ameliorate the condition of the American people, whereas the state

governments have done little or nothing. Instead of representing, as a

government should, the better contemporary ideals and methods, they have

reflected at best the average standard of popular behavior and at worst

a standard decidedly below the average. The lawlessness which so many

Americans bemoan in American life must be traced to the inefficiency of

the state governments. If the central government had shared this

weakness, the American political organism would have already dissolved

in violence and bloodshed.

The local authorities retain under the American Federal organization

many of the primary functions of government. They preserve order,

administer civil and criminal justice, collect taxes for general and

local purposes, and are directly or indirectly responsible for the

system of public education. If it can be proved that the state

governments have exercised any of these functions in an efficient

manner, that proof certainly does not lie upon the surface of the facts.

The provisions they have made for keeping order have been utterly

inadequate, and have usually broken down when any serious reason for

disorder has existed. A certain part of this violence is, moreover, the

immediate result of the failure of American criminal justice. The

criminal laws have been so carefully framed and so admirably expounded

for the benefit of the lawyers and their clients, the malefactors, that

a very large proportion of American murderers escape the proper penalty

of their acts; and these dilatory and dubious judicial methods are

undoubtedly one effective cause of the prevalence of lynching in the

South. There is more to be said in favor of our civil than of our

criminal courts. In spite of a good deal of corruption and of

subserviency to special interests, the judges are usually honest men and

good average lawyers; but the fact that they are elected for

comparatively short terms has made them the creatures of the political

machine, and has demoralized their political standards. They use court

patronage largely for the benefit of the machine; and whatever influence

they have in politics is usually exercised in favor of the professional

politician. If they do not constitute a positive weakness in the system

of local government, they are certainly far from constituting a source

of strength; and considering the extent to which our government is a

government of judges, they should exercise a far more beneficent

influence than they do.

Neither are the administrative and legislative responsibilities of the

states redeemed with any more success. The tax systems of the several

states are in a chaotic condition. Their basis consists of the old

property tax, which under its application to modern conditions has

become both unjust and unproductive, but which the state legislatures

seem to be wholly incapable of either abandoning or properly

transforming. In the matter of education the states have been, except in

the South, liberal; but they have not been as intelligent and

well-informed as they have been well-intentioned. The educational system

of the country is not only chaotic, but it is very imperfectly adapted

to the needs of an industrial and agricultural democracy. Finally, if

the legislatures of the several states have ever done anything to

increase respect for the wisdom and conservatism of American

representative government, it is certainly hard to discover indications

thereof. The financial and economic legislation of the states has

usually shown incompetence and frequently dishonesty. They have

sometimes been ready to repudiate their debts. In their relations to the

corporations they have occupied the positions alternately of

blackmailers and creatures. They have been as ready to confiscate

private property as they have to confer on it excessive privileges. If

the word "law" means something less majestic and authoritative to

Americans than it should, the mass of trivial, contradictory, unwise,

ephemeral, and corrupt legislation passed by the state legislatures is

largely responsible.

No doubt a certain part of this failure of the state governments is

irremediable as long as existing standards of public and private

morality prevail; but most assuredly a certain part is the direct result

of unwise organization. American state governments have been corrupt and

inefficient largely because they have been organized for the benefit of

corrupt and inefficient men; and as long as they continue to be

organized on such a basis, no permanent or substantial improvement can

be expected. Moreover, any reorganization in order to be effective must

not deal merely with details and expedients. It must be as radical as

are the existing disorganization and abuses. It must be founded on a

different relation between the executive and legislative branches and a

wholly different conception of the function of a state legislative body.

The demand for some such reorganization has already become popular,

particularly in the West. A generation or more ago the makers of new

state constitutions, being confronted by palpable proofs of the

inefficiency and corruption of the state governments, sought to provide

a remedy chiefly by limiting the power of the legislature. All sorts of

important details, which would have formerly been left to legislative

action, were incorporated in the fundamental law; and in the same spirit

severe restrictions were imposed on legislative procedure, designed to

prevent the most flagrant existing abuses. These prudential measures

have not served to improve the legislative output, and the reformers are

now crying for more drastic remedies. In the West the tendency is to

transfer legislative authority from a representative body directly to

the people. A movement in favor of the initiative and the referendum is

gaining so much headway, that in all probability it will spread

throughout the country much as the Australian ballot did over a decade

ago. But the adoption of the initiative and the referendum substitutes a

new principle for the one which has hitherto underlain American local

institutions. Representative government is either abandoned thereby or

very much restricted; and direct government, so far as possible, is

substituted for it. Such a fundamental principle and tradition as that

of representation should not be thrown away, unless the change can be

justified by a specific, comprehensive, and conclusive analysis of the

causes of the failure of the state governments.

The analysis upon which the advocates of the initiative and the

referendum base their reform has the merit of being obvious. American

legislatures have betrayed the interests of their constituents, and have

been systematically passing laws for the benefit of corrupt and special

interests. The people must consequently take back the trust, which has

been delegated to representative bodies. They must resume at least the

power to initiate the legislation they want; and no law dealing with a

really important subject should be passed without their direct consent.

Such an analysis of the causes of legislative corruption and

incompetence is not as correct as it is obvious. It is based upon the

old and baleful democratic tendency of always seeking the reason for the

failure of a democratic enterprise in some personal betrayal of trust.

It is never the people who are at fault. Neither is the betrayal

attributed to some defect of organization, which neglects to give the

representative individual a sufficient chance. The responsibility for

the failure is fastened on the selected individual himself, and the

conclusion is drawn that the people cannot trust representatives to

serve them honestly and efficiently. The course of reasoning is

precisely the same as that which prompted the Athenian democracy to

order the execution of an unsuccessful general. In the case of our state

legislatures, a most flagrant betrayal of trust has assuredly occurred,

but before inferring from this betrayal that selected individuals cannot

be trusted to legislate properly on behalf of their constituents, it

would be just as well to inquire whether individual incompetence and

turpitude are any sufficient reason for this particular failure of

representative institutions.

As a matter of fact they are no sufficient reason. When a large number

of individuals to whom authority is delegated exercise that authority

improperly, one may safely infer that the system is at fault as much as

the individual. Local American legislative organization has courted

failure. Both the system of representation and functions of the

representative body have been admirably calculated to debase the quality

of the representatives and to nullify the value of their work. American

state legislatures have really never had a fair opportunity. They have

almost from the beginning been deprived of any effective responsibility.

The state constitutions have gradually hedged them in with so many

restrictions, have gone so much into detail in respect to state

organization and policy that the legislatures really had comparatively

little to do, except to deal with matters of current business. They

offered no opportunity for a man of ability and public spirit. When such

men drifted into a local legislature, they naturally escaped as soon as

they could to some larger and less obstructed field of action. If the

American people want better legislatures, they must adopt one of two

courses. Either they must give their legislative bodies something more

and better to do, or else they must arrange so that these bodies will

have a chance to perform an inferior but definite service more capably.

The legislatures have been corrupt and incapable, chiefly because they

have not been permitted any sufficient responsibility, but this

irresponsibility itself has had more than one cause. It cannot be traced

exclusively to the diminished confidence and power reposed in

representative bodies by the state constitutions. Early in the

nineteenth century, the legislatures were granted almost full

legislative powers; and if they did not use those powers well, they used

them much better than at a later period. Their corruption began with the

domination of the political machine; and it is during the last two

generations that their powers and responsibilities have been more and

more restricted. They have undoubtedly been more corrupt and incompetent

in proportion as they have been increasingly deprived of power; but the

restrictions imposed upon them have been as much an effect as a cause of

their corruption. There is a deeper reason for their deficiencies; and

this reason is connected with mal-adaptation of the whole system of

American state government to its place in a Federal system. The Federal

organization took away from the states a number of the most important

governmental functions, and in certain respects absolutely subordinated

the state to the nation. In this way the actual responsibilities and the

powers of the state governments were very much diminished, while at the

same time no sufficient allowance for such a diminution was made in

framing their organization. Their governments were organized along the

same lines as that of an independent state--in spite of the fact that

they had abandoned so many of the responsibilities and prerogatives of

independence.

The effect of this mal-adaptation of the state political institutions to

their place in a Federal system has been much more important than is

usually supposed. The former were planned to fulfill a much completer

responsibility than the one which they actually possessed. The public

business of a wholly or technically independent state naturally arouses

in its citizens a much graver sense of responsibility than does the

public business of a state in the American Union. The latter retained

many important duties; but it surrendered, if not the most essential of

its functions, at least the most critical and momentous, while in the

exercise of the remainder it was to a certain extent protected against

the worst consequences of mistakes or perversities. It surrendered the

power of making peace or declaring war. Its relation to the other states

in the Union was strictly defined, so that it had no foreign policy and

responsibilities corresponding to its purely domestic ones. Its citizens

were aware that the protection of such fundamental institutions as that

of private property was lodged in the Federal government, and that in

the end that government had the power to guarantee them even against the

worst consequences of domestic disorder. Thus the state governments were

placed in the easy situation of rich annuitants, who had surrendered the

control of some political capital in order to enjoy with less care the

opportunities of a plethoric income.

The foregoing comment is not intended as any disparagement of a Federal

as contrasted with a centralized political system. Its purpose is to

justify the statement that, in a Federal system, local political

institutions should be adapted to their necessarily restricted

functions. The state governments were organized as smaller copies of the

central government, and the only alterations in the type permitted by

the Democrats looked in the direction of a further distribution of

responsibility. But a system which was adapted to the comprehensive task

of securing the welfare of a whole people might well fail as an engine

of merely local government,--even though the local government retained

certain major political functions. As a matter of fact, such has been

the case. The system of a triple division of specific powers, each one

of which was vigorous in its own sphere while at the same time checked

and balanced by the other branches of the government, has certain

advantages and certain disadvantages. Its great advantage is its

comparative safety, because under it no one function of government can

attain to any dangerous excess of power. Its great disadvantage consists

in the division of responsibility among three independent departments,

and the possibility that the public interest would suffer either from

lack of coöperation or from actual conflicts. In the case of the general

government, the comparative safety of the system of checks and balances

was of paramount importance, because the despotic exercise of its vast

powers would have wrecked the whole American political system. On the

other hand, the disadvantages of such a system--its division of

responsibility and the possible lack of coöperation among the several

departments--were mitigated to a considerable, if not to a sufficient,

extent. National parties came into existence with the function of

assuming a responsibility which no single group of Federal officials

possessed; and in their management of national affairs, the partisan

leaders were prompted by a certain amount of patriotism and interest in

the public welfare. Even at Washington the system works badly enough in

certain respects; but in general the dominant party can be held to a

measure of responsibility; and effective coöperation is frequently

obtained in matters of foreign policy and the like through the action of

patriotic and disinterested motives.

In the state governments the advantages of a system of checks and

balances were of small importance, while its disadvantages were

magnified. The state governments had no reason to sacrifice concentrated

efficiency to safety, because in a Federal organization the temporary

exercise of arbitrary executive or legislative power in one locality

would not have entailed any irretrievable consequences, and could not

impair the fundamental integrity of the American system. But if a state

had less to lose from a betrayal by a legislature or an executive of a

substantially complete responsibility for the public welfare, it was not

protected to the same extent as the central government against the

abuses of a diffused responsibility. In the state capitals, as at

Washington, the national parties did, indeed, make themselves

responsible for the management of public affairs and for the harmonious

coöperation of the executive and the legislature; but in their conduct

of local business the national parties retained scarcely a vestige of

national patriotism. Their behavior was dictated by the most selfish

factional and personal motives. They did, indeed, secure the coöperation

of the different branches of the government, but largely for corrupt or

undesirable purposes; and after the work was done the real authors of it

could hide behind the official division of responsibility.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, the partial failure of American

state governments is to be imputed chiefly to their lack of a

centralized responsible organization. In their case a very simple and

very efficient legislative and administrative system is the more

necessary, because only through such a machinery can the local public

spirit receive any effective expression. It can hardly be expected that

American citizens will bring as much public spirit to their local public

business as to the more stirring affairs of the whole nation; and what

local patriotism there is should be confronted by no unnecessary

obstacles. If a mistake or an abuse occurs, the responsibility for it

should be unmistakable and absolute, while if a reform candidate or

party is victorious, they should control a machinery of government

wholly sufficient for their purposes.

As soon as any attempt is made to devise a system which does concentrate

responsibility and power, serious difficulties are encountered.

Concentration of responsibility can be brought about in one of two

ways--either by subordinating the legislature to the executive or the

executive to the legislature. There are precedents both here and abroad

in favor of each of these methods, and their comparative advantages must

be briefly sketched.

The subordination of the executive to the legislature would conform to

the early American political tradition. We have usually associated

executive authority with arbitrary and despotic political methods, and

we have tended to assume that a legislative body was much more

representative of popular opinion. During or immediately succeeding the

Revolutionary War, the legislatures of the several states were endowed

with almost complete control--a control which was subject only to the

constitutional bills of rights; and it has been seriously and frequently

proposed to revive this complete legislative responsibility. Under such

a system, the legislature would elect the chief executive, if not the

judicial officials; and it would become like the British Parliament

exclusively and comprehensively responsible for the work of

government--both in its legislative and administrative branches.

The foregoing type of organization has so many theoretical advantages

that one would like to see it tried in some American states. But for the

present it is not likely to be tried. The responsibility of the

legislature could not be exercised without the creation of some

institution corresponding to the British Cabinet: and the whole tendency

of American political development has been away from any approach to the

English Parliamentary system. Whatever the theoretical advantages of

legislative omnipotence, it would constitute in this country a dangerous

and dubious method of concentrating local governmental responsibility

and power. It might succeed, in case it were accompanied by the adoption

of some effective measures for improving the quality of the

representation--such, for instance, as the abandonment of all existing

traditions necessitating the residence of the representative in the

district he represents. This American political practice always has and

always will tend to give mediocrity to the American popular

representation, but it corresponds to one of the most fundamental of

American political prejudices, and for the present its abandonment is

out of the question. The work of improving the quality of the average

American representative from a small district appears to be hopeless,

because as a matter of fact such small districts and the work imposed on

their representatives can hardly prove tempting to able men; and unless

the American legislator is really capable of becoming exceptionally

representative, the fastening of exclusive responsibility upon the state

legislatures could hardly result in immediate success. Its intrinsic

merits might carry it to ultimate success, but not until it had

transformed many American political practices and traditions.

The truth is, that certain very deep and permanent causes underlie

American legislative degeneracy. When the American legislative system

was framed, a representative assembly possessed a much better chance

than it does now of becoming a really representative body. It

constituted at the time an effective vehicle for the formation and

expression of public opinion. Public questions had not received the

complete ventilation on the platform and in the press that they obtain

at the present time; and in the debate of a representative assembly the

chance existed of a really illuminating and formative conflict of

opinion. Representatives were often selected, who were capable of adding

something to the candid and serious consideration of a question of

public policy. The need helped to develop men capable of meeting it.

Now, however, American legislatures, with the partial exception of the

Federal Senate, have ceased to be deliberative bodies. Public questions

receive their effective discussion in the press and on the platform.

Public opinion is definitely formed before the meeting of the

legislature; and the latter has become simply a vehicle for realizing or

betraying the mandates of popular opinion. Its function is or should be

to devise or to help in the devising of means, necessary to accomplish a

predetermined policy. Its members have little or no initiative and

little or no independence. Legislative projects are imposed upon them

either by party leaders, by special interests, or at times by the

executive and public opinion. Their work is at best that of

committee-men and at worst that of mercenaries, paid to betray their

original employers. A successful attempt to bestow upon legislative

bodies, composed of such doubtful material and subject to such equivocal

traditions anything resembling complete governmental responsibility,

would be a dangerous business. Legislatures have degenerated into the

condition of being merely agents, rather than principals in the work of

government; and the strength and the propriety of the contemporary

movement in favor of the initiative and the referendum is to be

attributed to this condition.

The increasing introduction of the referendum into the local political

organization is partly a recognition of the fact that the legislatures

have ceased to play an independent part in the work of government. There

is every reason to believe that hereafter the voters will obtain and

keep a much more complete and direct control over the making of their

laws than that which they have exerted hitherto; and the possible

desirability of the direct exercise of this function cannot be disputed

by any loyal democrat. The principle upon which the referendum is based

is unimpeachable; but a question remains as to the manner in which the

principle of direct legislation can be best embodied in a piece of

practical political machinery; and the attempt to solve this question

involves a consideration of the general changes in our system of local

government, which may be required, as a result of the application of the

new principle.

The necessary limits of this discussion forbid any exhaustive

consideration of the foregoing questions; and I must content myself with

a brief summary of the method in which the principle of direct

legislation can be made the part of an efficient local political system.

The difficulty is to find some means of distinguishing that part of the

legislative responsibility which should be retained by the people and

that part which, in order to be effectively redeemed, must be delegated.

Obviously the part to be retained is the function of accepting or

rejecting certain general proposals respecting state organization or

policy. An American electorate is or should be entirely competent to

decide whether in general it wishes gambling or the sale of intoxicating

liquors to be suppressed, whether it is willing or unwilling to delegate

large judicial and legislative authority to commissions, or whether it

wishes to exempt buildings from local taxation. In retaining the power

of deciding for itself these broad questions of public legislative

policy, it is exercising a function, adapted to the popular intelligence

and both disciplinary and formative in its effect on those who take the

responsibility seriously. Under any system of popular government--even

under a parliamentary system--such general questions are eventually

submitted to popular decision; and the more decisively they can be

submitted, the better. On the other hand, there is a large part of the

work of government, which must be delegated by the people to select

individuals, because it can be efficiently exercised only by peculiarly

experienced or competent men. The people are capable of passing upon the

general principle embodied in a proposed law; but they cannot be

expected to decide with any certainty of judgment about amendments or

details, which involve for their intelligent consideration technical and

special knowledge. Efficient law-making is as much a matter of

well-prepared and well-tempered detail as it is of an excellent general

principle, and this branch of legislation must necessarily be left to

experts selected in one way or another to represent the popular

interest. How can they best be selected and what should be their

functions?

An answer to these questions involves a consideration of the changes

which the referendum should bring with it in the whole system of local

government--an aspect of the matter which according to the usual

American habit has hitherto been neglected. In states like Oregon the

power of initiating and consummating legislation is bestowed on the

electorate without being taken away from the legislature; and a certain

share of necessary political business is left to a body which has been

expressly declared unworthy to exercise a more important share of the

same task. A legislative body, whose responsibilities and power are

still further reduced, will probably exercise their remaining functions

with even greater incompetence, and will, if possible, be composed of a

still more inferior class of legislative agents. If the legislature is

to perform the inferior but still necessary functions that will

necessarily remain in its hands, an attempt should certainly be made to

obtain a better quality of representation. No direct system of state

government can constitute any really substantial improvement on the

existing system, unless either the legislature is deprived of all really

essential functions, or the quality of its membership improved.

The legislature, or some representative body corresponding to it,

cannot, however, be deprived of certain really essential functions. The

task of preparing legislation for reference to the people, so that a

question of public policy will be submitted in a decisive and acceptable

form, belongs naturally to a representative body; and the same statement

is true respecting the legislative work essential to the administration

of a state's business affairs. The supply bills demand an amount of

inspection in detail, which can obtain only by expert supervision; and

so it is in respect to various minor legislative matters which do not

raise question of general policy but which amount to little more than

problems of local administrative detail. A representative body must be

provided which shall perform work of this kind; and again, it must be

said that existing legislatures would perform these more restricted

functions even worse than they have performed a completer legislative

duty. Their members are experts in nothing but petty local politics.

They are usually wholly incapable of drawing a bill, or of passing

intelligently on matters either of technical or financial detail. If

they represent anything, it is the interest of their district rather

than that of the state. The principle of direct legislation, in order to

become really constructive, must bring with it a more effective

auxiliary machinery than any which existing legislatures can supply.

The kind of machinery needed can be deduced from the character of the

work. The function of the representative body, needed under a system of

direct legislation, is substantially that of a legislative and

administrative council or commission. It should be an experienced body

of legal, administrative, and financial experts, comparatively limited

in numbers, and selected in a manner to make them solicitous of the

interests of the whole state. They should be elected, consequently, from

comparatively large districts, or, if possible, by the electorate of the

whole state under some system of cumulative voting. The work of such a

council would not be in any real sense legislative; and its creation

would simply constitute a candid recognition of the plain fact that our

existing legislatures, either with or without the referendum, no longer

perform a responsible legislative function. It would be tantamount to a

scientific organization of the legislative committees, which at the

present time exercise an efficient control over the so-called

legislative output. This council would mediate between the governor,

who administered the laws, and the people, who enacted them. It would

constitute a check upon the governor, and would in turn be checked by

him; while it would act in relation to the people as a sort of technical

advisory commission, with the duty of preparing legislation for popular

enactment or rejection.

But how would such specific legislative proposals originate? Before

answering this question let us consider how important bills actually

originate under the existing system. They are in almost every case

imposed upon the legislature by some outside influence. Sometimes they

are prepared by corporation lawyers and are introduced by the special

corporation representatives. Sometimes they originate with the party

"bosses," and are intended to promote some more or less important

partisan purpose. Sometimes they are drawn by associations of reformers,

and go to the legislature with whatever support from public opinion the

association can collect. Finally, they are frequently introduced at the

suggestion of the governor; and of late years during the growth of the

reform movement, the executive has in point of fact become more and more

responsible for imposing on the legislature laws desired or supposed to

be desired by the electorate. Of these different sources of existing

legislation, the last suggests a manner of initiating legislation, which

is most likely to make for the efficient concentration of governmental

responsibility. The governor should be empowered not merely to suggest

legislation to the council, but to introduce it into the council. His

right to introduce legislation need not be exclusive, but bills

introduced by him should have a certain precedence and their

consideration should claim a definite amount of the council's time. The

council would possess, of course, full right of rejection or amendment.

In the case of rejection or an amendment not acceptable to the governor

the question at issue would be submitted to popular vote.

The method of originating legislation suggested above is, of course,

entirely different from that ordinarily associated with the referendum.

According to the usual methods of direct legislation, any body of

electors of a certain size can effect the introduction of a bill and its

submission to popular vote; but a method of this kind is really no

method at all. It allows the electorate to be bombarded with a

succession of legislative proposals, turning perhaps on radical

questions of public policy like the single tax, which may be well or ill

drawn, which may or may not be living questions of the day, which may or

may not have received sufficient preparatory discussion, and which would

keep public opinion in a wholly unnecessary condition of ferment. Some

organized control over the legislative proposals submitted to popular

approval is absolutely necessary; and the sort of control suggested

above merely conforms to the existing unofficial practice of those

states wherein public opinion has been aroused. The best reform

legislation now enacted usually originates in executive mansions. Why

should not the practice be made official? If it were so, every candidate

for governor would have to announce either a definite legislative policy

or the lack of one; and the various items composing this policy would be

fully discussed during the campaign. In proposing such a policy the

governor would be held to a high sense of responsibility. He could not

escape from the penalties of an unwise, an ill-drawn, or a foolhardy

legislative proposal. At the same time he would be obliged constantly to

meet severe criticism both as to the principle and details of his

measures on the part of the legislative council. Such criticism would

fasten upon any weakness and would sufficiently protect the public

against the submission of unnecessary, foolish, or dangerous legislative

proposals.

I am aware, of course, that the plan of legislative organization,

vaguely sketched above, will seem to be most dubious to the great

majority of Americans, intelligently interested in political matters;

but before absolutely condemning these suggestions as wild or dangerous,

the reader should consider the spirit in which and the purpose for which

they are made. My intention has not been to prepare a detailed plan of

local governmental organization and to stamp it as the only one, which

is correct in principle and coherent in detail. In a sense I care

nothing about the precise suggestions submitted in the preceding

paragraphs. They are offered, not as a definite plan of local political

organization, but as the illustration of a principle. The principle is

that both power and responsibility in affairs of local government should

be peculiarly concentrated. It cannot be concentrated without some

simplification of machinery and without giving either the legislature or

the executive a dominant authority. In the foregoing plan the executive

has been made dominant, because as a matter of fact recent political

experience has conclusively proved that the executives, elected by the

whole constituency, are much more representative of public opinion than

are the delegates of petty districts. One hundred district agents

represent only one hundred districts and not the whole state, or the

state in so far as it is whole. In the light of current American

political realities the executive deserves the greater share of

responsibility and power; and that is why the proposal is made to bestow

it on him. The other details of the foregoing plan have been proposed in

a similar spirit. They are innovations; but they are innovations which

may naturally (and perhaps should) result from certain living practices

and movements in American local politics. They merely constitute an

attempt to give those ideas and practices candid recognition. No such

reorganization may ever be reached in American local government; and I

may have made essential mistakes in estimating the real force of certain

current practices and the real value of certain remedial expedients. But

on two points the argument admits of no concession. Any practical scheme

of local institutional reform must be based on the principle of more

concentrated responsibility and power, and it must be reached by

successive experimental attempts to give a more consistent and efficient

form to actual American political practices.

The bestowal upon an executive of increased official responsibility and

power will be stigmatized by "old-fashioned Democrats" as dangerously

despotic; and it may be admitted that in the case of the central

government, any official increase of executive power might bring with it

the risk of usurpation. The Constitution of the United States has made

the President a much more responsible and vigorous executive in his own

sphere of action than are the governors of the several states in theirs;

and he can with his present power exercise a tolerably effective control

over legislation. But the states, for reasons already given, are

protected against the worst possible consequences of illegal usurpation;

and in any event the people, in case their interests were threatened,

could make use of a simple and absolutely effective remedy. The action

of the governor or of any member of the legislative council could be

challenged by the application of the recall. He could be made to prove

his loyalty to the Constitution and to the public interest by the

holding of a special election at the instance of a sufficient number of

voters; and if he could not justify any possibly dubious practices, he

could be displaced and replaced. The recall is for this purpose a useful

and legitimate political device. It has the appearance at the first

glance of depriving an elected official of the sense of independence and

security which he may derive from his term of office; and unquestionably

if applied to officials who served for very short terms and exercised no

effective responsibility during service it would deprive them of what

little power of public service they possessed. On the other hand, it is

right that really responsible and vigorous officials serving for

comparatively long terms should be subjected to the check of a possible

recall of the popular trust.

No plan of political organization can in the nature of things offer an

absolute guarantee that a government will not misuse its powers; but a

government of the kind suggested, should it prove to be either corrupt

or incompetent, could remain in control only by the express acquiescence

of the electorate. Its corruption and incompetence could not be

concealed, and would inevitably entail serious consequences. On the

other hand, the results of any peculiar efficiency and political wisdom

would be equally conspicuous. Men of integrity, force, and ability would

be tempted to run for office by the stimulating opportunity offered for

effective achievement. Such a government would, consequently press into

its service whatever public-spirited and energetic men the community

possessed; and it would represent not an inferior or even an average

standard public opinion and ideas, but the highest standard which the

people could be made to accept. Provided only the voters themselves were

on the whole patriotic, well-intentioned, and loyal, it would be bound

to make not for a stagnant routine, but for a gradually higher level of

local political action.

II

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The foregoing discussion of the means which may be taken to make

American local governments more alive to their responsibilities has been

confined to the department of legislation. The department of

administration is, however, almost equally important; and some attempt

must be made to associate with a reform of the local legislature a

reform of the local administration. The questions of administrative

efficiency and the best method of obtaining it demand special and

detailed consideration. In this case the conclusions reached will apply

as much to the central and municipal as they do to the state

administrations; but the whole matter of administrative efficiency can

be most conveniently discussed in relation to the proper organization of

a state government. The false ideas and practices which have caused so

much American administrative inefficiency originated in the states and

thence infected the central government. On the other hand, the reform of

these practices made its first conquests at Washington and thereafter

was languidly and indifferently taken over by many of the states. The

state politicians have never adopted it in good faith, because real

administrative efficiency would, by virtue of the means necessarily

taken to accomplish it, undermine the stability of the political

machine. The power of the machine can never be broken without a complete

reform of our local administrative systems; and the discussion of that

reform is more helpful in relation to the state than in relation to the

central government.

Civil service reform was the very first movement of the kind to make any

headway in American politics. Within a few years after the close of the

War it had waxed into an issue which the politicians could not ignore;

and while its first substantial triumph was postponed until late in the

seventies, it has, on the whole, been more completely accepted than any

important reforming idea. It has secured the energetic support of every

President during the last twenty-five years; it has received at all

events the verbal homage of the two national parties; and it can point

to affirmative legislation in the great majority of the states. It meets

at the present time with practically no open and influential opposition.

Nevertheless, the "merit system" has not met the expectations of its

most enthusiastic supporters. Abuses have been abolished wherever the

reform has been introduced, but the abolition of abuses has not made for

any marked increase of efficiency. The civil service is still very far

from being in a satisfactory condition either in the central, state, or

municipal offices. Moreover, the passage of reform laws has not had any

appreciable effect upon the vitality or the power of the professional

politician. The machine has, on the whole, increased rather than

diminished in power, during the past twenty-five years. Civil service

reform is no longer as vigorously opposed as it used to be, because it

is no longer feared. The politicians have found that in its ordinary

shape it really does not do them any essential harm. The consequence is

that the agitation has drifted to the rear of the American political

battle, and fails to excite either the enthusiasm, the enmity, or the

interest that it did fifteen years ago.

Its partial failure has been due to the fact that the reformers merely

attacked one of the symptoms of a disease which was more deeply rooted

and more virulent than they supposed. They were outraged by the

appointment of administrative officials solely as a reward for partisan

service and without reference to their qualifications for their official

duties; and two means were devised to strike at this abuse. Lower

administrative officials were protected in their positions by depriving

their superiors of the power of removing them except for cause; and it

was provided that new appointments should be made from lists of

candidates whose eligibility was guaranteed by their ability to pass

examinations in subjects connected with the work of the office. These

were undoubtedly steps in a better direction; but they have failed to be

effective, because the attempt to secure a more meritorious selection of

public servants was not applied to higher grades of the service. At the

head of every public office was a man who had been appointed or elected

chiefly for partisan reasons; who served only for a short time; who

could become familiar with the work of his office, if at all, only

slowly; and who, because of his desire to be surrounded by his own

henchmen, was the possible enemy of the permanent staff. The civil

service laws have been designed, consequently, to a very considerable

extent for the purpose of protecting the subordinates against their

chiefs; and that is scarcely to be conceived as a method of organizing

administrative employees helpful to administrative efficiency. The

chiefs were allowed comparatively little effective authority over their

subordinates, and subordinates could not be held to any effective

responsibility. A premium was placed upon ordinary routine work which

observed carefully all the official forms, but which was calculated with

equal care not to task its perpetrators.

The American civil service will never be really reformed by the sort of

civil service laws which have hitherto been passed--no matter how

faithfully those laws may be executed. The only way in which

administrative efficiency can be secured is by means of an organization

which makes a departmental chief absolutely responsible for energetic

work and economical administration in his office; and no such

responsibility can exist as long as his subordinates are independent of

him. He need not necessarily have the power to discharge his

subordinates, except with the consent of a Board of Inspectors; but he

should have the power to promote them to positions of greater

responsibility and income, or to degrade them to comparatively

insignificant positions. Efficiency cannot be secured in any other way,

because no executive official can be held accountable for good work

unless his control over his subordinates is effective. So far as the

existing civil service laws in city, state, and the United States fail

to bestow full responsibility, coupled with sufficient authority, upon

departmental chiefs, they should be altered; and their alteration should

be made part of any plan of constructive reform in the civil service.

The responsibility of departmental chiefs and their effective authority

over their subordinates necessarily imply changes in the current methods

of selecting these officials. The prevailing methods are unwise and

chaotic. In some cases they are appointed by the chief executive. In

other cases they are elected. But whether appointed or elected, they are

selected chiefly for partisan service. They hold office only for a few

years. They rarely have any particular qualification for their work.

They cannot be expected either to take very much interest in their

official duties or use their powers in an efficient manner. To give such

temporary officeholders a large measure of authority over their

subordinates would mean in the long run that such authority would be

used chiefly for political purposes. Administrative efficiency,

consequently, can only be secured by the adoption of a method of

selecting departmental chiefs which will tend to make them expert public

servants rather than politicians. They must be divorced from political

associations. They must be emancipated from political vicissitudes. The

success of their career must depend exclusively upon the excellence of

their departmental work.

As long as these public servants are elected, no such result can be

expected. The practice of electing the incumbents of subordinate

executive positions inevitably invites the evasion of responsibility and

the selection of the candidate chiefly for partisan service. When such a

man stands for renomination or reëlection, his administrative efficiency

or inefficiency (unless the latter should chance to be particularly

flagrant) does not affect his chances. He is renominated in case he has

served his party well, or in case no one else who wants the job has in

the meantime served it better. He is reëlected in case his party happens

to have kept public confidence. Departmental chiefs can be made

responsible for their work only by being subordinated to a chief

executive whose duty it is to keep his eye on his subordinates and who

is accountable to the people for the efficient conduct of all the

administrative offices. The former, consequently, must be selected by

appointment, they must be installed in office for an indefinite period,

and they must be subject to removal by the chief executive. Those are

terms upon which all private employees serve; and on no other terms will

equally efficient results be obtained from public officials.

Under a democratic political system there is, of course, no way of

absolutely guaranteeing that any method of administrative organization,

however excellent in itself, will accomplish the desired and the

desirable result. Administrative authority must at some point always

originate in an election. The election can delegate power only for a

limited period. At the end of the limited period another executive will

be chosen--possibly a man representing a wholly different political

policy. Such a man will want his immediate advisers to share his

political point of view; and it is always possible that in electing him

the voters will make a mistake and choose an incompetent and

irresponsible person. An incompetent or disloyal executive could

undoubtedly under such a system do much to disorganize the public

service; but what will you have? There can be no efficiency without

responsibility. There can be no responsibility without authority. The

authority and responsibility residing ultimately in the people must be

delegated; and it must not be emasculated in the process of delegation.

If it is abused, the people should at all events be able to fix the

offense and to punish the offender. At present our administration is

organized chiefly upon the principle that the executive shall not be

permitted to do much good for fear that he will do harm. It ought to be

organized on the principle that he shall have full power to do either

well or ill, but that if he does do ill, he will have no defense against

punishment. The principle is the same as it is in the case of

legislative responsibility. If under those conditions the voters should

persist in electing incompetent or corrupt executives, they would

deserve the sort of government they would get and would probably in the

end be deprived of their vote.

A system of local government, designed for concentrating power and

responsibility, might, consequently, be shaped along the following

general lines. Its core would be a chief executive, elected for a

comparatively long term, and subject to recall under certain defined

conditions. He would be surrounded by an executive council, similar to

the President's Cabinet, appointed by himself and consisting of a

Controller, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Commissioner of Public

Works, and the like. So far his position would not differ radically from

that of the President of the United States, except that he would be

subject to recall. But he would have the additional power of introducing

legislation into a legislative council and, in case his proposed

legislation were rejected or amended in an inacceptable manner, of

appealing to the electorate. The legislative council would be elected

from large districts and, if possible, by some cumulative system of

voting. They, also, might be subject to recall. They would have the

power, dependent on the governor's veto, of authorizing the

appropriation of public money and, also, of passing on certain minor

classes of legislation--closely associated with administrative

functions. But in relation to all legislation of substantial importance

express popular approval would be necessary. The chief executive should

possess the power of removing any administrative official in the employ

of the state and of appointing a successor. He would be expected to

choose an executive council who agreed with him in all essential matters

of public policy, just as the President is expected to appoint his

Cabinet. His several councilors would be executive officials,

responsible for particular departments of the public service; but they

would exercise their authority through permanent departmental

chiefs--just as the Secretary of War delegates much of his authority to

a chief of staff, or an English minister to a permanent under-secretary.

The system could offer no guarantee that the subordinate departmental

chiefs would be absolutely permanent; but at all events they would not

be changed at fixed periods or for irrelevant reasons. They would be

just as permanent or as transient as the good of the service demanded.

In so far, that is, as the system was carried out in good faith they

would be experts, absolutely the masters of the technical business of

the offices and of the abilities and services of their subordinates. The

weak point in such administrative organization is undoubtedly the

relation between the members of the governor's council and their chiefs

of staff; but there must be a weak link in any organization which seeks

to convert the changing views of public policy, dependent upon an

election, into responsible, efficient, and detailed administrative acts.

If the system were not accepted in good faith, if in the long run it

were not carried out by officials, who were disinterestedly and

intelligently working in the public interest, it would be bound to fail;

but so would any method of political organization. This particular plan

simply embodies the principle that the way to get good public service

out of men is to give them a sufficient chance.

Under the proposed system the only powers possessed by the state

executive, not now bestowed upon the President of the United States,

would consist in an express and an effective control over legislation.

It would be his duty to introduce legislation whenever it was in his

opinion desirable; and in case his bills were amended to death or

rejected, it would be his right to appeal to the people. He would, in

addition, appoint all state officials except the legislative council,

and perhaps the judges of the highest court. On the other hand, he would

be limited by the recall and he could not get any important legislative

measure on the statute books except after severe technical criticism,

and express popular consent. He could accomplish nothing without the

support of public opinion; yet he could be held absolutely responsible

for the good government of the state. A demagogue elected to a position

of such power and responsibility might do a great deal of harm; but if a

democratic political body cannot distinguish between the leadership of

able and disinterested men and self-seeking charlatans, the loss and

perhaps the suffering, resulting from their indiscriminate blindness,

would constitute a desirable means of political education,--particularly

when the demagogue, as in the case under consideration, could not really

damage the foundations of the state. And the charlatan or the

incompetent could be sent into retreat just as soon as exposed. The

danger not only has a salutary aspect, but it seems a small price to pay

for the chance, thereby afforded, for really efficient and responsible

government. The chief executive, when supported by public opinion, would

become a veritable "Boss"; and he would inevitably be the sworn enemy of

unofficial "Bosses" who now dominate local politics. He would have the

power to purify American local politics, and this power he would be

obliged to use. The logic of his whole position would convert him into

an enemy of the machine, in so far as the machine was using any

governmental function for private, special, or partisan purposes. The

real "Boss" would destroy the sham "Bosses"; and no other means, as yet

suggested, will, I believe, be sufficient to accomplish such a result.

After the creation of such a system of local government the power of the

professional politician would not last a year longer than the people

wanted it to last. The governor would control the distribution of all

those fruits of the administrative and legislative system upon which the

machine has lived. There could be no trafficking in offices, in public

contracts, or in legislation; and the man who wished to serve the state

unofficially would have to do so from disinterested motives. Moreover,

the professional politician could not only be destroyed, but he would

not be needed. At present he is needed, because of the prodigious amount

of business entailed by the multiplicity of elective officials. Somebody

must take charge of this political detail; and it has, as we have

already remarked, drifted into the hands of specialists. These

specialists cannot be expected to serve for nothing. Their effort to

convert their work into a means of support is the source of the greater

part of the petty American political corruption; and such corruption

will persist as long as any real need exists for the men who live upon

it. The simplest way to dispense with the professional politician is to

dispense with the service he performs. Reduce the number of elective

officials. Under the proposed method of organization the number of

elections and the number of men to be elected would be comparatively

few. The voter would cast his ballot only for his local selectmen or

commissioners, a governor, one or more legislative councilmen, the

justices of the state court of appeals, and his Federal congressman and

executive. The professional politician would be left without a

profession. He would have to pass on his power to men who would be

officially designated to rule the people for a limited period, and who

could not escape full responsibility for their public performances.

I have said that no less drastic plan of institutional reorganization

will be sufficient to accomplish the proposed result; and a brief

justification must be afforded for this statement. It was expected, for

instance, that the secret Australian ballot would do much to undermine

the power of the professional politician. He would be prevented thereby

from controlling his followers and, in case of electoral trades, from,

"delivering the goods." Well! the Australian ballot has been adopted

more or less completely in the majority of the states; and it has

undoubtedly made open electoral corruption more difficult and less

common than it once was. But it has not diminished the personal and

partisan allegiance on which the power of the local "Boss" is based; and

it has done the professional politician as little serious harm as have

the civil service laws. Neither can it be considered an ideal method of

balloting for the citizens of a free democracy. Independent voting and

the splitting of tickets is essential to a wholesome expression of

public opinion; but in so far as such independence has to be purchased

by secrecy its ultimate value may be doubted. American politics will

never be "purified" or its general standards improved by an independence

which is afraid to come out into the open; and it is curious that with

all the current talk about the wholesome effects of "publicity" the

reformed ballot sends a voter sneaking into a closet in order to perform

his primary political duty. If American voters are more independent than

they used to be, it is not because they have been protected by the state

against the penalties of independence, but because they have been

aroused to more independent thought and action by the intrusion and the

discussion of momentous issues. In the long run that vote which is

really useful and significant is the vote cast in the open with a full

sense of conviction and responsibility.

Another popular reforming device which belongs to the same class and

which will fail to accomplish the expected result is the system of

direct primaries. It may well be that this device will in the long run

merely emphasize the evil which it is intended to abate. It will tend to

perpetuate the power of the professional politician by making his

services still more necessary. Under it the number of elections will be

very much increased, and the amount of political business to be

transacted will grow in the same proportion. In one way or another the

professional politician will transact this business; and in one way or

another he will make it pay. Under a system of direct primaries the

machine could not prevent the nomination of the popular candidate

whenever public opinion was aroused; so it is with the existing system.

But whenever public interest flags,--and it is bound to flag under such

an absurd multiplication of elections and under such a complication of

electoral machinery,--the politicians can easily nominate their own

candidates. Up to date no method has been devised which would prevent

them from using their personal followers in the primary elections of

both parties; and no such method can be devised without enforcing some

comparatively fixed distinction between a Republican and a Democrat, and

thus increasing the difficulties of independent voting. In case the

number of elective officials were decreased, as has been proposed above,

there would be fewer objections to the direct primary. Under the

suggested method of organization each election would become of such

importance that public opinion would be awakened and would be likely to

obtain effective expression; and the balloting for the party candidates

would arouse as much interest, particularly in the case of the dominant

party, as the final election itself. In fact, the danger would be under

such circumstances that the primaries would arouse too much interest,

and that the parties would become divided into embittered and

unscrupulous factions. Genuinely patriotic and national parties may

exist; but a genuinely patriotic faction within a party would be a

plant of much rarer growth. From every point of view, consequently, the

direct primary has its doubtful aspects. The device is becoming so

popular that it will probably prevail; and as it prevails, it may have

the indirect beneficial result of diminishing the number of regular

elections; but at bottom it is a clumsy and mechanical device for the

selection of party candidates. It is merely one of the many means

generated by American political practice for cheapening the ballot. The

way to make votes important and effective is not to increase but to

diminish their number.

A democracy has no interest in making good government complicated,

difficult, and costly. It has, on the contrary, every interest in so

simplifying its machinery that only decisive decisions and choices are

submitted to the voter. Every attempt should be made to arouse his

interest and to turn his public spirit to account; and for that reason

it should not be fatigued by excessive demands and confused by

complicated decisions. The cost of government in time, ability,

training, and energy should fall not upon the followers but upon the

leaders; and the latter should have every opportunity to make the

expenditure pay. Such is the object of the foregoing suggestions towards

reconstruction which, radical as they may seem, have been suggested

chiefly by an examination of the practical conditions of contemporary

reform. Only by the adoption of some such plan can the reformers become

something better than perpetual moral protestants who are fighting a

battle in which a victory may be less fruitful than defeat. As it is,

they are usually flourishing in the eyes of the American people a flask

of virtue which, when it is uncorked, proves to be filled with oaths of

office. The reformers must put strong wine into their bottle. They must

make office-holding worth while by giving to the officeholders the power

of effecting substantial public benefits.

III

POSSIBILITIES OF EFFECTIVE STATE ACTION

The questions relating to the kind of reforms which these reorganized

state governments might and should attempt to bring about need not be

considered in any detail. In the case of the states institutional

reconstruction is necessarily prior to social reconstruction; and the

objects for which their improved powers can be best used need at present

only be indicated. These objects include, in fact, practically all the

primary benefits which a state ought to confer upon its citizens; and it

is because the states have so largely failed to confer these primary

benefits that the reconstruction necessarily assumes a radical

complexion. It is absurd to discuss American local governments as agents

of individual and social amelioration until they begin to meet their

most essential and ordinary responsibilities in a more satisfactory

manner.

Take, for instance, the most essential function of all--that of

maintaining order. A state government which could not escape and had the

courage to meet its responsibilities would necessarily demand from the

people a police force which was really capable of keeping the peace. It

could not afford to rely upon local "posses" and the militia. It would

need a state constabulary, subject to its control and numerous enough

for all ordinary emergencies. Such bodies of state police, efficiently

used, could not only prevent the lawlessness which frequently

accompanies strikes, but it could gradually stamp out lynch law.

Lynching, which is the product of excited local feeling, will never be

stopped by the sheriffs, because they are afraid of local public

opinion. It will never be stopped by the militia, because the militia is

slow to arrive and is frequently undisciplined. But it can be stopped by

a well-trained and well-disciplined state constabulary, which can be

quickly concentrated, and which would be independent of merely local

public opinion. When other states besides Pennsylvania establish

constabularies, it will be an indication that they really want to keep

order; and when the Southern states in particular organize forces of

this kind, there will be reason to believe that they really desire to do

justice to the negro criminal and remove one of the ugliest aspects of

the race question.

A well-informed state government would also necessarily recognize the

intimate connection between the prevention of lynching and the speedy

and certain administration of criminal justice. It would seek not merely

to stamp out disorder, but to anticipate it by doing away with the

substantial injustice wrought by the procedure of the great majority of

American criminal courts. It is unnecessary to dwell at any length upon

the work of reorganization which would confront a responsible state

government in relation to the punishment and the prevention of crime,

because public opinion is becoming aroused to the dangers which threaten

American society from the escape of criminals and the lax and sluggish

administration of the criminal laws. But the remark must be made that

our existing methods of framing, executing, and expounding criminal laws

are merely an illustration of the extent to which the state governments,

under the influence of traditional legal and political preconceptions,

have subordinated the collective social interest to that of the possible

individual criminal; and no thorough-going reform will be possible until

these traditional preconceptions have themselves been abandoned, and a

system substituted which makes the state the efficient friend of the

collective public interest and the selected individual.

Assuming, then, that they use their increased powers more effectually

for the primary duty of keeping order, and administering civil and

criminal justice, reforming state governments could proceed to many

additional tasks. They could redeem very much better than they do their

responsibility to their wards--the insane and the convicted criminals.

At the present time some states have fairly satisfactory penitentiaries,

reformatories, and insane asylums, while other states have utterly

unsatisfactory ones; but in all the states both the machinery and the

management are capable of considerable improvement. The steady increase

both of crime and insanity is demanding the most serious consideration

of the whole problem presented by social dereliction--particularly for

the purpose of separating out those criminals and feeble-minded people

who are capable of being restored to the class of useful citizens. In

fact a really regenerated state government might even consider the

possible means of preventing crime and insanity. It might have the

hardihood to inquire whether the institution of marriage, which would

remain under exclusive state protection, does not in its existing form

have something to do with the prevalence and increase of insanity and

crime; and it might conceivably reach the conclusion that the enforced

celibacy of hereditary criminals and incipient lunatics would make for

individual and social improvement even more than would a maximum

passenger fare on the railroads of two cents a mile. Moreover, while

their eyes were turned to our American success in increasing the social

as well as the economic output, they might pause a moment to consider

the marvelous increase of divorces. They might reflect whether this

increase, like that of the criminals and the insane, did not afford a

possible subject of legislation, but I doubt whether even a regenerate

state government would reach any very quick or satisfactory conclusions

in respect to this matter. Public opinion does not appear to have

decided whether the social fact of divorce abounding is to be considered

as an abuse or as a fulfillment of the existing institution of marriage.

Neither need the pernicious activity of such a government cease, after

it has succeeded in radically improving its treatment of the criminal

and its lunatics, and in possibly doing something to make the American

home less precarious, if less cheerful. It might then turn its attention

to the organization of labor, in relation to which, as we shall see

presently, the states may have the opportunity for effective work. Or an

inquiry might be made as to whether the educational system of the

country, which should remain under exclusive state jurisdiction, is well

adapted to the extremely complicated purpose of endowing its various

pupils with the general and special training most helpful to the

creation of genuine individuals, useful public servants, and loyal and

contented citizens of their own states. In this matter of education the

state governments, particularly in the North, have shown abundant and

encouraging good will; but it is characteristic of their general

inefficiency that a good will has found its expression in a

comparatively bad way.

It would serve no good purpose to push any farther the list of excellent

objects to which the state governments might devote their liberated and

liberalized energies. We need only add that they would then be capable,

not merely of more efficient separate action, but also of far more

profitable coöperation. In case the states were emancipated from their

existing powerless subjection to individual, special, and parochial

interests, the advantages of a system of federated states would be

immediately raised to the limit. The various questions of social and

educational reform can only be advanced towards a better understanding

and perhaps a partial solution by a continual process of

experimentation--undertaken with the full appreciation that they were

tentative and would be pushed further or withdrawn according to the

nature of their results. Obviously a state government is a much better

political agency for the making of such experiments than is a government

whose errors would affect the population of the whole country. No better

machinery for the accomplishment of a progressive programme of social

reform could be advised than a collection of governments endowed with

the powers of an American state, and really desirous of advancing

particular social questions towards their solution. Such a system would

be flexible; it would provoke emulation; it would encourage initiative;

and it would take advantage of local ebullitions of courage and insight

and any peculiarly happy local collection of circumstances. Finally, if

in addition to the merits of a system of generous competition, it could

add those of occasional consultation and coöperation, such as is implied

by the proposed "House of Governors," the organization for social reform

would leave little to be desired. The governors who would meet in

consultation would be the real political leaders of their several

states; and they should meet, not so much for the purpose of agreeing

upon any single group of reforming measures, as for the purpose of

comparing notes obtained under widely different conditions and as the

result of different legislative experiments. Just in so far as this

mixture of generous competition and candid coöperation was seeking to

accomplish constructive social purposes, for which the powers of the

states, each within its geographical limits, were fully adequate, just

to that extent it could hardly fail to make headway in the direction of

social reform.

If the state governments are to reach their maximum usefulness in the

American political system, they must not only be self-denying in respect

to the central government, but generous in respect to their

creatures--the municipal corporations. There are certain business and

social questions of exclusively or chiefly local importance which should

be left to the municipal governments; and it is as characteristic of the

unregenerate state governments of the past and the present that they

have interfered where they ought not to interfere as that they have not

interfered where they had an excellent opportunity for effective action.

A politically regenerated state would guarantee in its constitution a

much larger measure of home rule to the cities than they now enjoy,

while at the same time the reformed legislative authority would endeavor

to secure the edifying exercise of these larger powers, not by an

embarrassing system of supervision, but by the concentration of the

administrative power and responsibility of the municipal authorities. I

shall not attempt to define in detail how far the measure of home rule

should go; but it may be said in general that the functions delegated or

preserved should so far as possible be completely delegated or

preserved. This rule cannot be rigidly applied to such essential

functions of the state governments as the preservation of order and the

system of education. The delegation of certain police powers and a

certain control over local schools is considered at present both

convenient and necessary, although in the course of time such may no

longer be the case; but if these essential functions are delegated, the

state should retain a certain supervision over the manner of their

exercise. On the other hand, the municipality as an economic and

business organism should be left pretty much to its own devices; and it

is not too much to say that the state should not interfere in these

matters at all, except under the rarest and most exceptional conditions.

The reasons for municipal home rule in all economic and business

questions are sufficiently obvious. A state is a political and legal

body; and as a political and legal body it cannot escape its appropriate

political and social responsibilities. But a state has in the great

majority of cases no meaning at all as a center of economic organization

and direction. The business carried on within state limits is either

essentially related by competition to the national economic system,--or

else it is essentially municipal in its scope and meaning. Of course,

such a statement is not strictly true. The states have certain essential

economic duties in respect to the conservation and development of

agricultural resources and methods and to the construction and

maintenance of a comprehensive system of highways. But these legitimate

economic responsibilities are not very numerous or very onerous compared

to those which should be left to the central government on the one hand

or to the municipal governments on the other. A municipality is a living

center of economic activity--a genuine case of essentially local

economic interests. To be sure, the greater part of the manufacturing or

commercial business transacted in a city belongs undubitably to the

national economic system; but there is a minor part which is exclusively

local. Public service corporations which control franchises in cities do

not enter into inter-state commerce at all--except in those unusual

cases (as in New York) where certain parts of the economic municipal

body are situated in another state. They should be subject,

consequently, to municipal jurisdiction and only that. The city alone

has anything really important to gain or to lose from their proper or

improper treatment; and its legal responsibility should be as complete

as its economic localization is real.

There is no need of discussing in any detail the way in which a

municipal government which does enjoy the advantage of home rule and an

efficient organization can contribute to the work of national economic

and social reconstruction. Public opinion is tending to accept much more

advanced ideas in this field of municipal reform than it is in any other

part of the political battle-field. Experiments are already being tried,

looking in the direction of an increasingly responsible municipal

organization, and an increasing assumption by the city of economic and

social functions. Numerous books are being written on various aspects of

the movement, which is showing the utmost vitality and is constantly

making progress in the right direction. In all probability, the American

city will become in the near future the most fruitful field for

economically and socially constructive experimentation; and the effect

of the example set therein will have a beneficially reactive effect upon

both state and Federal politics. The benefits which the city governments

can slowly accomplish within their own jurisdiction are considerable.

They do not, indeed, constitute the exclusive "Hope of Democracy,"

because the ultimate democratic hope depends on the fulfillment of

national responsibilities; and they cannot deal effectively with certain

of the fundamental social questions. But by taking advantage of its

economic opportunities, the American city can gradually diminish the

economic stress within its own jurisdiction. It has unique chance of

appropriating for the local community those sources of economic value

which are created by the community, and it has an equally unique

opportunity of spending the money so obtained for the amelioration of

the sanitary, if not of the fundamental economic and social, condition

of the poorer people.

There is, finally, one fundamental national problem with which the state

governments, no matter to what extent they may be liberated and

invigorated, are wholly incompetent to deal. The regulation of commerce,

the control of corporations, and the still more radical questions

connected with the distribution of wealth and the prevention of

poverty--questions of this kind should be left exclusively to the

central government; or in case they are to any extent allowed to remain

under the jurisdiction of the states, they should exercise such

jurisdiction as the agents of the central government. The state

governments lack and must always lack the power and the independence

necessary to deal with this whole group of problems; and as long as they

remain preoccupied therewith, their effective energy and good intentions

will be diverted from the consideration of those aspects of political

and social reform with which they are peculiarly competent to deal. The

whole future prosperity and persistence of the American Federal system

is bound up in the progressive solution of this group of problems; and

if it is left to the conflicting jurisdictions of the central and local

governments, the American democracy will have to abandon in this respect

the idea of seeking the realization of a really national policy.

Justification for these statements will be offered in the following

chapter.