JOSEPH ALBO (1380-1444)
Of the post-Maimonidean philosophers Crescas is the last who contributes
original views of philosophical value. Joseph Albo, of Monreal in
Aragon, is of little importance as a philosopher. He rehashes the
problems which occupied a Maimonides, a Gersonides and a Crescas, and
sides now with one, now with the other. He benefited by the writings of
his predecessors, particularly Maimonides, Crescas, and Simon
Duran;[403a] and the philosophical discussions in the last three
sections of his "Book of Roots" ("Sefer Ikkarim") give the impression of
an eclectic compilation in the interest of a moderate conservatism. The
style is that of the popularizer and the homilist; and to this he owes
his popularity, which was denied his more original teacher, Crescas.
But philosophy as such was not Albo's forte, nor was it his chief
interest. While it is true that all the Jewish thinkers of the middle
ages were for a great part apologetes, this did not prevent a Maimonides
or a Gersonides from making a really thorough and disinterested study of
science and philosophy; and often their scientific and philosophic
conviction was so strong that the _apologia_ was _pro philosophia sua_
rather than _pro Judaismo_. The central theme therefore in the majority
of Albo's philosophical predecessors was the equally metaphysical and
theological, of God and his attributes. These were proved by reason and
confirmed by Scripture and tradition. Judaism had to be formulated and
defended with a view not so much to the dangers threatening from
Christianity and Mohammedanism as to those endangering all religions
alike, namely, the opinions of science and philosophy as taught
especially by the Aristotelians. Hence Maimonides treated for the most
part of the same problems as the Mohammedan Mutakallimun before him, and
Thomas Aquinas the Christian had no scruple in making the Jewish
philosopher's method his own when he undertook to defend the Catholic
faith "contra Gentiles."
Different were the circumstances as well as the attitude of Joseph Albo.
The purely philosophic interest was not strong in his day. He was not
confronted by the necessity of proving the existence and incorporeality
of God by reason. No one doubted these things and they had been
abundantly written about in times gone by. In the interest of
completeness and for the benefit of those who were not trained in
technical philosophy, Albo found it desirable to restate the results of
previous discussions of these topics in a style more accessible to the
readers of his day. But the central interest in his age was shifted. It
was a time of religious disputations and forced conversions. Albo
himself had taken part in such a disputation held at Tortosa in 1413-14,
and he had to defend Judaism against Christianity. He had to show his
own people that Judaism was the true religion and Christianity spurious.
Hence it was religion as such he had to investigate, in order to find
what marks distinguished a divine law from a human, and a genuine divine
law from one that pretended to be such. To make this investigation
logically complete he had to show that there must be such a thing as a
divine law, and that no such law can be conceived without assuming
certain basal beliefs or dogmas. A discussion of religious dogma was
essential, for upon the nature of these fundamental beliefs depended
one's judgment of a given law and its character as divine or human,
genuine or spurious. Hence the title of Albo's treatise, "Book of
[religious] Roots [dogmas]." And while it is true that Maimonides, the
systematizer and codifier, could not fail to put down in his commentary
on the Mishna a list of articles of the Jewish creed, nothing is said of
this in his philosophical work, the "Guide of the Perplexed." With Albo
the establishment of the fundamental dogmas is the central theme.
At the same time Albo was anticipated even in this, his more original
contribution. Crescas, his teacher, had written, beside the "Or Adonai,"
a work against Christianity.[404] And in the "Or Adonai" itself he
devotes considerable space to the question of the fundamental dogmas of
Judaism, and takes occasion to criticize Maimonides for his faulty
method in the selection of the thirteen articles, on the ground that he
did not distinguish between what was fundamental and what was
derivative. This suggestion gave Albo his cue, which he developed in his
own way.[404a]
Human happiness, Albo tells us, depends upon theory and practice, as
Aristotle says. But the human mind is inadequate to know by itself the
truth touching these two. Hence there is need of something superior to
the human mind which will define right practice and the true ideas. This
can be only by divine guidance. Hence everyone must be able to tell the
divine legislation from those which are not divine. For this it is
necessary to know what are the principles without which a divine law
cannot exist. This is the purpose of the book, to explain the essential
principles of a divine law.[405]
A knowledge of the principles of religion would seem easy, for all
people profess some religion or other, and hence are presumed to know
upon what their religions are based. But this question has not been
treated adequately before, and there is no agreement among previous
writers about the number of the principles or their identity. Some say
there are thirteen (Maimonides), some say twenty-six, some six
(Crescas), without investigating what are the principles of divine
religion generally. For we must distinguish between the general
principles which pertain to divine legislation as such and hence are
common to all religions, and special principles which are peculiar to a
particular religion.
Seeing the importance of this subject, Albo continues, I undertook this
investigation. I came to the conclusion that there are three general
principles of divine religion, existence of God, Revelation, and Reward
and Punishment after death. Then there are special principles peculiar
to a particular religion. From the general principles ("Ikkarim") follow
particular or derivative principles ("Shorashim.")[406]
The investigation of the principles of religion is a delicate matter
because one is in danger of being reckoned an infidel if he denies what
is considered by others a fundamental dogma. Thus according to
Maimonides the belief in the Messiah is fundamental, and he who denies
it is a heretic and has no share in the world to come. And yet Rabbi
Hillel in the Talmud (Sanhedrin, 99a) said, "Israel need expect no
Messiah, for they had the benefit of one in the days of Hezekiah, King
of Judah." On the other hand, Maimonides does not regard creation _ex
nihilo_ as fundamental, whereas others do; and to their mind Maimonides
is open to the charge of unbelief.
The truth is that only he is an unbeliever who deliberately and
knowingly contradicts the Bible. A person who believes in the Bible but
is led mistakenly to misinterpret it, and denies real principles because
he thinks the Bible does not require us to believe them as principles,
or does not require us to believe them at all, is guilty of error and in
need of forgiveness, but is not a heretic.[407]
Having thus defined his attitude and purpose, Albo proceeds to criticize
the list of dogmas laid down by Maimonides and modified by Crescas, and
then defends his own view. A fundamental principle ("Ikkar," lit. root)
is one upon which something else depends and without which this latter
cannot exist. Maimonides counts thirteen principles of Judaism as
follows: (1) Existence of God, (2) Unity, (3) Incorporeality, (4)
Eternity, (5) He alone must be worshipped, (6) Prophecy, (7) Superiority
of the prophecy of Moses, (8) Revelation, (9) Immutability of the Law,
(10) God's Omniscience, (11) Reward and Punishment, (12) Messiah, (13)
Resurrection.[408] This list is open to criticism. If Maimonides
intended to admit strict principles only without which Judaism cannot
exist, we understand why he named (1), (6), (8), (10), (11), which are
general principles of any divine religion, and (7) and (9) as special
principles of Judaism. But we cannot see why he included (2) and (3).
For while they are true, and every Jew should believe them, Judaism can
be conceived as existing without them. It is still more strange that (5)
should be counted as a principle. To be sure, it is one of the ten
commandments, "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.... Thou shalt
not bow thyself down to them, nor serve them" ... (Exod. 20, 35), but
Judaism can be conceived to exist even with the belief in a mediator.
Similarly it is not clear why (13) should be considered as a fundamental
dogma. On the other hand, he omitted Tradition and Free Will as beliefs
essential to any divine religion.
If, in defence of Maimonides, we say that he intended to name not only
fundamental principles, but also true beliefs, whether fundamental or
derivative, then there are many others he might have mentioned, such as
creation _ex nihilo_, belief in miracles, that God rests in Israel
through the Torah, and so on.
Another writer counts twenty-six principles, including everything that
occurred to his mind, such as the attributes of eternity, wisdom, life,
power, will and others, counting paradise and hell as two, and other
absurd ideas. Others again,[409] criticizing Maimonides's principles,
reduce them to six, viz. (1) God's knowledge, (2) Providence, (3) Power,
(4) Prophecy, (5) Free Will, (6) Purpose, adding thereto the three
proved by Maimonides, God's existence, unity and incorporeality. The
objection to this list is that it does not contain the special dogmas of
Judaism, and does not give us a principle by which we can distinguish
between the genuine and spurious divine religion. For the dogmas named
in the above list give us the _necessary_ requirements for a divine law,
but not the _sufficient_. We may have all these principles and yet not
have a divine religion. As to Free Will and Purpose, they are essential
to divine legislation to be sure, but not _qua_ divine; they are also
essential to a conventional human law. Divine religion has a special
purpose peculiar to it.[410]
Having laid bare the defects in the attempts at a list of fundamental
dogmas of Judaism made by his predecessors, Albo categorically lays down
the following three principles as fundamental to divine religion: (1)
Existence of God, (2) Providence, and reward and punishment, (3)
Revelation.
To justify this statement Albo finds it necessary to make clear what is
meant by divine law or religion, and what relation it bears to other
laws, not divine. This necessitates an explanation of existing laws and
their motives and causes.
Animal life, we are told, may be divided into three classes according to
the mode of living adopted by each. Beasts of prey live separately and
not in groups. Mankind must live in communities, as one individual is
dependent upon the work of another, and social life is essential to
their existence. Intermediate between beast of prey and man are the
gregarious animals, which keep together not as a matter of necessity, as
is the case in man, but for convenience, for the sake of being together.
Man is social by nature; and in order to make communal life possible,
there must be some order in the community which prohibits violence,
robbery, and so on. This is known as "natural law." In addition to this
there are in many places "conventional laws," made by kings and
emperors, regulating more carefully and with greater detail than the
natural law the affairs of the members of the community.
But this is not all. There is still another kind of law due directly to
God's providence. The providence of God is seen even in the lower
animals, in the constitution of their bodies, not merely in matters
essential to the preservation of the animal, but also in the interest of
comfort and convenience, as for example the duplication of the sense
organs. It stands to reason therefore that there is a divine influence
which provides for man even to a greater degree. This providence may
extend only to one individual, but this person brings about the
perfection of the race; just as in the individual man the heart is
instrumental in giving life to all the other limbs. The law which is
promulgated through this person is a "divine law."
The term "law" ("Dat") applies to any system of directions embracing a
large aggregate of men, whether it contains many commands or one. There
are thus three kinds of law, natural, conventional and divine. Natural
law is the same for all persons, times and places. Conventional law is
ordered by a wise man or men in conformity with the necessity of the
persons, times and places, as the reason dictates, without special
divine suggestion. Divine law is ordered by God through a prophet. The
purpose of natural law is to remove wrong and promote right, keeping men
from robbery and theft so that society may be able to exist.
Conventional law goes further and tends to remove the unseemly and to
promote the becoming. Divine law has for its purpose to guide men to
true happiness, which is the happiness of the soul and its eternal life.
It points out the way to follow to reach this end, showing what is the
true good for man to pursue, and what is the real evil which one must
shun; though it also lays down the law of right and wrong like the other
two.[411]
The conventional law is inferior to the divine in a number of ways.
The conventional law only orders human conduct for the purpose of
improving social life, but does not concern itself with perfection in
theoretical speculation and knowledge, which leads the soul to eternal
life. The divine law embraces both the parts upon which human perfection
depends, conduct and theory. It embraces the becoming and unbecoming
(practice), and the true and untrue (theory). As the Psalmist has it,
"The Law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul" (Psal. 19, 8).
The conventional law, being human, cannot always decide with certainty
what is becoming and what unbecoming. It is liable to error. This is
particularly the case in matters of theory, such as the creation or
eternity of the world. The divine law gives us certainty in all things,
"The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple" (_ib._).
The person guided by the conventional law is not sure that he is always
guided aright; hence he cannot feel the satisfaction and the joy of the
man whose guide is the divine law, making him certain of being
right--"The precepts of the Lord are upright, rejoicing the heart"
(_ib._ 9).
The conventional law can give general rules only, but is unable to
advise in a particular case. So Aristotle in the Ethics points out that
virtue is a mean, but he cannot determine exactly the proper measure at
a given time. This is the function of the divine law--"The commandment
of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes" (_ib._).
The conventional law is subject to change in the course of time. Witness
the marriage of sisters in the early period of Adam and Abel. The divine
law alone does not change--"The fear of the Lord is pure, enduring for
ever" (_ib._ 10).
The conventional law cannot estimate exactly the merited amount and kind
of reward and punishment; whereas, "The ordinances of the Lord are the
truth; they are just altogether" (_ib._).[412]
Freedom and Purpose are principles of conventional law. Without freedom
there is no sense in giving orders. For this reason Freedom and Purpose
are not correctly given as fundamental dogmas of divine law, for while
the latter cannot get along without them, they are not peculiar to
divine law as such, but are common also to conventional law. This is why
Maimonides omitted Freedom in his creed. The same is true of Purpose in
general. The divine law, however, has a special purpose, perfection and
eternal life, hence Maimonides did include it in his list.[413]
The fundamental dogmas of divine law are, as we said before, Existence
of God, Revelation, Reward and Punishment. It is evident that there
cannot be a divine law without the first two. The third is also
necessary; for the purpose of divine law must be a perfection greater
than the conventional law can accomplish. This is eternal life, and is
signified by Reward and Punishment.
As all agree that the Law of Moses is divine, it is proper to use it as
a standard in order to discover what a divine law must have. Accordingly
if we examine the first four chapters of Genesis, we find the principle
of the existence of God in chapter one, describing creation. The second
and third chapters give evidence of revelation, or communication of God
with man for the purpose of directing his conduct. Finally in the Cain
incident in chapter four is illustrated the third dogma of Reward and
Punishment.[414]
Creation _ex nihilo_ is a true belief but not a fundamental principle.
For though the Aristotelian view of eternity is heretical, as it takes
away the possibility of miracles, nay even the possibility of Moses and
the Messiah (for these could exist only after the lapse of an infinite
number of individuals), one who believes like Plato in a primitive
matter is not necessarily in contradiction with the Biblical miracles,
for they were not _ex nihilo_[415] (_cf._ above, p. 358).
It is not sufficient to believe in the three principles mentioned to be
considered a believer and to be entitled to a share in the world to
come. One must believe also in the derivative principles following from
them. Thus from the existence of God follow his unity and
incorporeality. And if a man does not believe in incorporeality, he
disbelieves in the real nature of God, and it is as if he denied the
original principle.
The derivative principles ("Shorashim" = roots) are as follows. From
existence of God are derived four: (1) Unity, (2) Incorporeality, (3)
Independence of time, (4) Freedom from defects. From Revelation are
derived three: (1) God's knowledge, (2) Prophecy, (3) Authenticity of
God's messenger. From Reward and Punishment is derived one--Providence
in the sense of special Providence. In all there are eleven dogmas.[416]
A particular commandment of the Law is not reckoned either as a
fundamental principle or as a derivative. He who trangresses it is a
sinner and is punished for his misdeed, but is not a heretic who loses
his share in the world to come, unless he denies that the commandment in
question is from God. In that case he comes in the category of those who
deny revelation. Similarly the belief in tradition is not a principle
because it is a particular commandment. Unity of God is a principle
though it is apparently a special commandment, because the term unity
contains two concepts; first, that God is one and there is not another
like him; second, that being one and free from any multiplicity or
composition, he is the cause of all the multiplicity in the world. The
latter is not a particular commandment, but a principle derived from the
existence of God. The former is a particular commandment. If particular
commandments were regarded as principles, we should have as many
principles as there are commandments in the Bible.[417]
The above distinction between the two senses of the term unity, one of
which is rationally derived from the existence of God, whereas the other
not being so derivable is not a principle, and is given in the Bible as
a special commandment, is clearly due to Crescas, who after a few
attempts at proving the unity of God in the sense of excluding dualism,
gives it up as incapable of proof logically, and falls back upon the
testimony of Scripture, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is
One." The other sense of the word unity Crescas proves by reason. Hence
Albo counts it among the derivative principles (_cf._ above, p. 392).
If a particular commandment is not a principle, which means that a
fundamental or derivative dogma cannot itself be a commandment, but must
lie at the basis of all commandments, the question arises whence come
these principles, and who is to warrant their truth. In the sciences we
know that the basal principles of a given science are not proved in that
science itself, but are borrowed from another science in which they are
proved. Thus physics takes the concepts of substance and accident from
metaphysics. In turn the latter takes the idea of a first mover from
physics. Among the laws, too, the conventional law takes its principles,
freedom and purpose, from political philosophy. Whence does divine law
take its principles? The existence of God can be demonstrated
philosophically from premises going back to axioms and first principles.
But this is not true of Prophecy and Providence.
The answer Albo gives to this question is that of Judah Halevi and
Crescas. The principles of the divine law are known empirically, _i. e._,
by experience. Adam knew of the existence of God, of prophecy and
reward and punishment from personal experience. Similarly Noah and
Abraham. Nowadays we know the law by tradition, but the majority of the
principles thus known are so certain that there is neither difference of
opinion nor doubt entertained by anyone concerning them. Such is the
status for example of the principle of Revelation. Other principles
again, like the existence of God, are, as was said before, known by
theoretical speculation.[418]
To find out whether a religion professing to be of divine origin is
really so or not, it must be examined first with reference to the three
fundamental, and the other derivative principles. If it opposes them, it
is spurious and not genuine. If it is not opposed to the principles in
question, it must be further examined with a view to determining whether
the promulgator is a genuine messenger of God or not. And the test here
must be a direct one. Miracles and signs are no conclusive proof of
prophecy, and still less do they prove that the person performing them
is a messenger sent by God to announce a law. They merely show that the
person is considered worthy of having miracles performed through him,
provided the miracles are genuine and not performed through magic. The
test of the prophet and the messenger of God must be as direct as it was
in the case of Moses, where the people actually saw that he was
addressed by God and commissioned with a message for them.[419]
This opinion of Albo is clearly intended as a defence of Judaism against
Christianity's claim that Jesus performed miracles, a claim which the
Rabbis of the middle ages were inclined to recognize.
In addition to the three fundamental and eight derivative principles of
divine legislation, there are six dogmas, which every follower of the
Mosaic law must believe. They are (1) Creation _ex nihilo_, (2)
Superiority of Moses to other prophets, (3) Immutability of the Law, (4)
That human perfection can be attained by any one of the commandments of
the Law, (5) Resurrection, (6) Messiah.
Creation _ex nihilo_ is neither a fundamental nor a derivative principle
of religion generally or of Judaism specially because, as we saw before
(p. 413), they can exist without this dogma. At the same time it is a
truth which it behooves every religionist and particularly every Jew to
believe. It follows from the principle of the existence of God. If God
cannot create _ex nihilo_, there is a defect in him. For creation _ex
nihilo_ is admitted in a certain sense even by those who hold that the
world is eternal. They admit that God is the cause of everything else;
hence matter is his effect through the mediation of the separate
Intellect. But how can a separate Intellect be the cause of matter if
there is no creation _ex nihilo_. This is _ex nihilo_ as much as
anything can be. To say that we can find no reason why he should create
at a particular time rather than at another, and hence the world must be
eternal, is no argument; for this reasoning can apply only to action
from necessity. Voluntary action is just of this kind, that it takes
place at a particular time.
In the above argument for creation the reader will not fail to see
reminiscences of Maimonides as well as Crescas (_cf._ pp. 271 and 403).
The superiority of Moses to other prophets is not essential to Judaism,
nevertheless it behooves every Jew to believe it, as it is included in
the principle of Revelation, and the Bible tells us, "And there arose
not a prophet since then in Israel like unto Moses" (Deut. 34, 10).
The Immutability of the Law will be treated in detail later. Here it
will suffice to say that while it is not a _sine qua non_ of Judaism,
every Jew should believe it, as it is included in the derivative
principle of the Authenticity of God's messenger.
It stands to reason that human perfection can be attained by the
performance of any one of the commandments of the Law. For if it
requires the performance of all the commandments for this purpose, then
the Law of Moses makes it more difficult to reach perfection than the
previous laws, which is not in consonance with the statement of the
Rabbis that "God gave Israel so many laws and commandments because he
wished to make them meritorious" (Tal. Bab. Makkot, 23 b).
Resurrection will be treated more at length later. It must be believed
because it has been accepted by Israel and has come down to us by
tradition. The same thing applies to the belief in the Messiah. This is
also a traditional belief and is related to the principle of Reward and
Punishment, though it is not like the latter indispensable either to
religion in general or to Judaism in particular.[420]
The difference, it will be seen, between Albo and Maimonides in the
question of Jewish dogmas is simply one of classification and grading.
Albo includes in his enumeration all the thirteen dogmas of Maimonides
with the exception of the fifth, namely, that God alone be worshipped,
but instead of placing them all on the same level of importance as
equally essential to the structure of Judaism, as Maimonides apparently
intended, Albo divides them into three categories of descending rank as
follows: fundamental principles, derived principles, true beliefs. Of
Maimonides's list the last two, Messiah and Resurrection, belong to the
last category. None the less Albo believed strictly in both and held it
incumbent upon every Jew to believe in them. It was only a question of
the status of a person who mistakenly denies these true beliefs.
According to Maimonides, it would seem, he would be called a heretic and
be excluded from a share in the world to come equally with one who
denied the existence of God; whereas according to Albo a person so
guilty is a sinner and needs forgiveness, but is not a heretic. Of the
other eleven dogmas of Maimonides, (1), (8) and (11) are placed by Albo
in his first class, (2), (3), (4), (6) and (10) belong to the second
class, while (7) and (9) come under true beliefs along with Messiah and
Resurrection. The difference between the first and the second class is
purely logical and not practical. As we saw before (p. 413), one who
denies incorporeality (a principle of the second class) disbelieves in
the true nature of God, which is tantamount to denying the principle of
the existence of God.
Before concluding this general discussion of the fundamental dogmas of
religion and Judaism, Albo undertakes to answer two questions which must
have been near his heart, and which were on the tongues no doubt of a
great many honest people in those days of religious challenge and
debate. The first question is, Is it proper, or perhaps obligatory, to
analyze the fundamental principles of one's religion, to see if they are
true; and if one finds another religion which seems to him better, is
one permitted to adopt it in place of his own? Albo sees arguments
against both sides of the dilemma. If a man is allowed to analyze his
religion and to choose the one that seems best to him, it will follow
that a person is never stable in his belief, since he is doubting it, as
is shown by his examination. And if so, he does not deserve reward for
belief, since belief, as Albo defines it elsewhere (Pt. I, ch. 19),
means that one cannot conceive of the opposite being true. Again, if he
finds another religion which he thinks better and is allowed to exchange
his own religion for the new one, he will never be sure of any religion;
for he may find a third still better, and a fourth, and so on, and as he
cannot examine all the possible religions, he will remain without any
religious convictions.
On the other hand, if he is not allowed to investigate the foundations
of his belief, it follows either that all religions alike bring their
believer happiness, no matter how contradictory they are, which is
absurd; or God would seem unfair if only one religion leads its devotees
to happiness and no one is allowed to change his religion for one that
seems to him the true one.
The answer of Albo to this interesting question is characteristic. It
shows that he armored himself in advance, before he risked such a
delicate question. He makes it clear that it really does not expose to
any danger the religion of Judaism, the mother of the other two, which
they came to supersede. If all religions in the world, Albo tells us,
were opposed to one another, and regarded each other as untrue, the
above difficulty would be real. But it is not so. All religions agree in
respect to one of them that it is divine; but they say that it is
superseded. Hence every religionist who is not a Jew must investigate
his religion to see if it is justified in opposing the religion which is
acknowledged to be divine. Similarly the professor of the admittedly
divine religion should investigate to see if his religion is temporary
or eternal. In this investigation he must first see if the religion
conforms to the principles of divine religion above mentioned. If it
does this and in addition endeavors to order human affairs in accordance
with justice, and leads its devotees to human perfection, it is divine.
It is still, however, possible that it is the work of a wise man of good
character. It is therefore necessary to investigate the character of the
promulgator, to find out whether he is a genuine divine messenger or
not. This test, as was said above (p. 415), must be a direct test and
not an indirect.[421]
The other question is whether there can be more than one divine
religion. Apparently there can be only one, since the giver is one, and
the recipients are of one species. But in reality the receivers vary in
temperament according to difference in inheritance and environment.
Hence there may be a difference in the law according to the character of
the people for whom it is intended. Since, however, the difference is
due to the receiver and not to the giver, it must reside in those
elements which are dependent upon the receiver, _i. e._, in particulars
and details, not in the principles, fundamental or derived. So the
Noachite and the Mosaic laws differ only in details, not in fundamental
principles.[422]
We have now completed the exposition of the part of Albo's teaching that
may be called distinctly his own. And it seems he was aware that he had
nothing further to teach that was new, and would have been content to
end his book with the first part, of which we have just given an
account. But his friends, he tells us in the concluding remarks to the
first part of the "Ikkarim,"[423] urged him to proceed further and
discuss in detail the principles, fundamental and derived, the true
beliefs and the so-called "branches," which he barely enumerated in the
first part. He was persuaded by their advice and added the other three
sections, each devoted to one of the three fundamental dogmas and the
corollaries following from it. Here Albo has nothing new to teach. He
follows the beaten track, reviews the classic views of Maimonides, takes
advantage of the criticisms of Gersonides and Crescas, and settles the
problems sometimes one way sometimes another, without ever suggesting
anything new. Accordingly it will not be worth our while to reproduce
his discussions here. It will suffice briefly to indicate his position
on the more important problems.
The second section deals with the existence of God and the derived
principles and branches growing out from this root. In proving the
existence of God he refers to Maimonides's four proofs (_cf._ p. 257 ff.),
and selects the third and fourth as really valid and beyond
dispute. The first and second are not conclusive; the one because it is
based upon the eternity of motion, which no Jew accepts; the other
because the major premise is not true. It does not follow if one of the
two elements _a_, _b_, of a composite _a + b_ is found separately, that
the other must be found existing separately likewise.[424]
We have seen that from the principle of the existence of God follow four
derivative dogmas, unity, incorporeality, independence of time, freedom
from defects. We are now told that from these secondary roots issue a
number of branches. From Unity it follows that no attributes either
essential or accidental can be applied to God, such as wisdom, strength,
generosity, and so on, for they would cause multiplicity. From
incorporeality we infer that God is not subject to corporeal affections
like fear, sorrow, joy, grudge, and so on. Independence of time implies
infinite power and want of resemblance to other things. Freedom from
defect implies absence of such qualities as ignorance, weakness, and so
on.[425]
In the discussion of the divine attributes Albo has nothing new to
offer, but instead he argues forward and backward, now with Maimonides,
now against him, reproducing a good deal of Maimonides's classification,
embodying some material of Bahya on unity, and after this rambling and
not very consistent discussion, he comes to the conclusion that none but
active and negative attributes are applicable to God; and yet some
essential attributes too must be his, but these must be understood as
implying only the aspect of perfection, and not that other aspect of
attribute which is responsible for multiplicity.[426]
He asks the question so often asked before, How can multiplicity come
from unity? And after giving Ibn Sina's scheme of the emanation of the
Intelligences one after the other, and criticizing it in the manner of
Gazali and Maimonides, he gives his own solution that the variety and
multiplicity of the world tends to one end, which is the order of the
world. And thus are reconciled plurality and unity. (_cf._ Gersonides
above, p. 351).[427]
He discusses the question of angels or Intellects, gives the views of
the philosophers concerning their nature and number, each being the
effect of the superior and the cause of the inferior, and objects to
their idea on the ground that these cannot be the same as the Biblical
angels, who are messengers of God to mankind. He then gives his own view
that the number of angels is infinite, not as the philosophers say ten
or fifty, and that they are not related to each other as cause and
effect, but that though they are immaterial Intellects they are
individuated and differentiated according to the degree of understanding
they have of God.[428]
In discussing the second fundamental principle, Revelation, Albo argues
in the good old fashion that man is the noblest creature of the sublunar
world, and the most distinctive and noblest part of man--his form and
essence--is the theoretical reason. Hence the purpose of man must be the
realization of the theoretical intellect. At the same time, and with
little consistency, Albo takes the part of Judah Halevi and Crescas,
employing their arguments, without naming them, that the philosophers
and the philosophizing theologians are wrong who make human immortality,
perfection and happiness depend solely upon intellectual activity. He
comes to the conclusion, therefore, that spiritual understanding, which
gives perfection of soul when in combination with practice, is not
acquisition of ideas but the intention of doing the will of God in the
performance of good deeds, and not that of pleasure or reward.[429]
This being so, it becomes an important question what are the practices
which tend to human perfection, and what are those which tend the other
way. In general we may conclude, as like desires and rejoices in like,
that those deeds which give the soul pleasure before and after
performance are good and helpful, while those which cause subsequent
pain, regret and sorrow are bad, and tend away from the soul's
perfection.
But the criterion of pleasure and pain just suggested is not sufficient
as a guide in conduct, for a great deal depends upon a man's
temperament. What a hot-blooded man may commend and find pleasure in,
the phlegmatic temperament will object to, and will feel discomfort in
doing. Besides, as the good deed is always a mean between two extremes,
which it is hard to measure precisely; and as the good deed is that
which pleases God, and beyond generalities we cannot tell what does, and
what does not please God, since we do not know his essence, it was
necessary for man's sake that God should reveal his will to mankind
through a prophet. Thus Revelation is proved by reason.[430]
This leads to the problem of prophecy, one of the derivative principles
of Revelation. The divine influence from which man gets a knowledge of
the things pleasing and displeasing to God, he cannot obtain without the
divine will. Instead of magic, divination, and communication with evil
spirits and the dead, which the ancient heathen employed in order to
learn the future, God sent prophets to Israel, to tell the people of the
will of God. Foretelling the future was only secondary with them.
Prophecy is a supernatural gift, whether it takes place with the help of
the imagination or not. If it were a natural phenomenon dependent upon
the intellectual power of the individual and his faculty of imagination,
as the philosophers and some Jewish theologians think, there should have
been prophets among the philosophers.
Here again we see Albo adopt the view of Halevi and Crescas against the
intellectualism of Maimonides and Gersonides. His further classification
of the grades of prophecy is based upon Maimonides, though Albo
simplifies it. Instead of eleven Albo recognizes four grades in all,
including that of Moses. The great majority of mankind, he says, stop
with the ability to analyze, such as is exhibited in the analysis of
things into matter and form, and so on, though not all of them go so
far. But there are some few who go farther and are enabled to speak
words of wisdom and to sing praises to God without being able to account
for the power. This is the holy spirit ("Ruah ha-Kodesh"). Some go still
farther, and through the strength of their reason and imagination they
dream true dreams and receive prophecies; though, the imagination having
the upper hand, they struggle very hard and tremble and faint, almost
losing their soul. This is the first stage of prophecy. The second stage
is when the imagination and reason are equal. In that case there is no
struggle or fainting. Visions come to the prophet at night in dreams, or
in a revery at daytime. The forms that appear are not real, but the
meanings they convey are. Such are the figures of women, horses, basket
of summer fruit, and so on, in the visions of Zechariah and Amos. The
third stage is when the reason gets the better of the imagination and
there are no forms or images, but real essences and ideas, like the
visions of Ezekiel, which represent real things in the secrets of nature
and divinity. The prophet in this stage also hears an angel speaking to
him and giving him information of importance to himself or others. In
all these cases the will of God is essential. No preparation can replace
it. Finally the fourth stage is reached when the imagination does not
come into play at all. In this stage there is no angel or form, and the
message comes to the prophet at daytime while he is awake. He hears a
voice telling him what he desires to know; and whenever he chooses he
can summon this power. Moses alone attained to this final stage. Outside
of the prophets, the righteous and the pious have various degrees of
power according to the degree of their union with God. Some can in this
way influence the powers of nature to obey them, as a person can, by
thinking of food, make his mouth water. So they can by taking thought
cause rain and storm. Others can bring down fire from above and revive
the dead.
Through the influence of a prophet the gift of prophecy may sometimes
rest upon individuals who are themselves unprepared and unworthy.
Witness the revelation on Sinai where the entire people, six hundred
thousand in number, were endowed with the spirit of prophecy, and that
too of the highest degree, like Moses himself. The prophetic medium
reflects the spirit of prophecy on others as a smooth surface reflects
the light of the sun upon dark bodies. This is why prophecy is found
only in Israel and in Palestine, because the ark and the Tables of
Stone, upon which the Shekinah rests, reflect the divine spirit upon
those who are worthy and have in them something resembling the contents
of the ark, namely, the Torah and the commandments.[431]
Among the true beliefs we have seen (p. 416) that Immutability of the
Law is related to the principle of Revelation. Hence this is the place
to discuss this question. Can a divine religion change with time or not?
It would seem at first sight that it cannot. For the giver expresses his
will in the Law, and his will never changes. The receivers are the same,
_i. e._, the same nation, and a nation does not change. Finally the
purpose of the Law or religion is to give people true opinions, and
these never change.
And yet on further reflection there seems no reason why religion should
not change with the change of the recipient, as the physician changes
his prescription with the progress of the patient, and as a matter of
fact we find that the commandments given to Adam were different from
those given to Noah and to Abraham and to Moses. Adam was not allowed to
eat meat, Noah was. Abraham was commanded circumcision. High places were
at first permitted and later forbidden. Maimonides makes the
immutability of the Law a fundamental dogma, relying upon the
commandment, "Thou shalt not add thereto, and thou shalt not diminish
therefrom" (Deut. 13, 1). But in the first place the verse refers to
changes in the mode of observing the laws; and besides, it says nothing
about God himself changing the Law.
The phrases "an eternal statute," "throughout your generations," "it is
a sign for ever," are no proof of the eternity of the Law; for not all
commandments have these expressions attached, and this shows rather that
the others are subject to change. Besides, the expressions, "for
eternity," and so on, are not to be taken absolutely. They are often
used to express finite periods of time.
After the Babylonian Exile two changes were made. They changed the
characters in which the Bible was written, and the order and names of
the months, beginning with Tishri instead of Nisan. There is no reason,
therefore, why other laws might not change, too. We need not, then,
regard Immutability of the Law as a fundamental dogma with Maimonides.
Hasdai Crescas also classes it with true beliefs and not with
fundamental principles.
Albo resolves the problem as follows: A matter that is revealed by God
himself cannot be changed by a prophet unless it is changed by God
himself. The first two commandments, "I am the Lord thy God, &c.," and
"Thou shalt not have other gods, &c.," were heard by the people directly
from God without the intervention of Moses, hence they cannot be changed
by any prophet. It follows therefore that the three fundamental dogmas,
existence of God, Revelation and Reward and Punishment can never be
changed by a prophet, for they are implied in the first two
commandments, which were heard from God himself. The rest of the
commandments, as they were heard from God through the interpretation of
Moses, can be changed by a prophet as a temporary measure. The other
laws which were given by Moses may be changed by a later prophet even
permanently. But the prophet must be greater than Moses, and he must
show this by the greatness, number, publicity and permanence of his
miracles, which must excel those of Moses. He must likewise show that he
was sent by God to change the Law, as clearly as Moses proved that he
was sent to give it. But it is unlikely that any such prophet will come,
for the Torah says that there never was or will be any prophet like
Moses.[432]
Before discussing the third fundamental dogma, Albo finds it desirable
to dispose first of a few other problems implied by this dogma, one of
which, God's knowledge, was postponed to this place, though it is
connected with Revelation, because it cannot well be separated in
discussion from the problem of Freedom. Providence is the other related
problem, which is derived from the dogma of Reward and Punishment.
There is nothing that is new in Albo's treatment of knowledge and
Freedom. He insists like Maimonides that God must be omniscient, and on
the other hand the contingent cannot be denied, and neither can freedom.
He gives the stock arguments, which it is not necessary to reproduce at
this late hour. And his solution is that of Maimonides that in God human
freedom and divine Omniscience are reconcilable because God's knowledge
is not our knowledge.[433]
Nor is there anything original in Albo's discussion of the problem of
Providence. He recognizes with Maimonides and others that a strong
argument against special Providence is the observed inequality between
the destinies of men and their apparent merits. And he endeavors in the
well worn method to give reasons and explanations for this inequality
which will not touch unfavorably God's justice or his special
Providence. The reasons are such as we met before and we shall not
repeat them. Albo also gives a few positive arguments to prove the
reality of special Providence for man. He sees in various natural and
human phenomena evidence of deviation from the merely "natural" as
demanded by the principles of Aristotle's Physics or the laws of
uniformity. This shows special Providence. Thus the existence of dry
earth, the heaviest element, above water, cannot be accounted for by the
laws of Physics. The phenomenon of rain cannot be reduced to law, hence
it argues will and purpose and Providence. Admonition in dreams is
direct evidence of special Providence, and it is scarcely likely that
man, who has special equipment above the other animals in his reason,
should not also receive special care above that which the lower animals
have. Now they are protected in the species, hence man is provided for
as an individual.[434]
Having disposed of the auxiliary dogmas, Albo takes up the fundamental
principle of Reward and Punishment. He cites various opinions on the
subject, which are dependent upon the idea one entertains concerning the
nature of the soul. Thus if one holds that the human soul is not
different in kind from the animal soul, it follows that as there is no
reward and punishment for the animal, there is none for man. And if one
regards the human soul as merely a capacity or possibility of
intelligence he must necessarily conclude that the soul perishes with
the body and there is no spiritual reward and punishment after death.
The only reward there is must therefore be corporeal, during life. On
the other hand, our general experience, which brings before us many
cases of good men suffering and bad men enjoying prosperity, would seem
to argue against corporeal reward and punishment in this world. This
taken together with the philosophical opinion that the soul is an
immaterial and indestructible substance gives rise to the third view
that the only recompense is spiritual after death. None of these views
is satisfactory to Albo. The first two because they are based upon an
erroneous notion of the soul. All agree, philosophers as well as
theologians, that the human soul is different in kind from the soul of
the animal; and it is likewise admitted that the human soul is immortal.
His criticism of the third view so far as it is based upon the
intellectualist idea that the thing of highest value is intellectual
effort, and the only reward is immortality which intellectual activity
engenders, is similar to that of Halevi and Crescas in its endeavor to
refute this notion and to substitute for it the religious view that the
soul is an independent substance having a capacity for intelligence _in
God's service_. The degree in which a person realizes this service
determines his reward and punishment. The argument from experience Albo
does not answer here, but we may suppose he regards it as answered by
what he said in his discussion of Providence, where he tries to account
for the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous.
Albo's own view accordingly is that which he also attributes to the
Bible that there is a twofold reward, in this world and in the next.
There is still a difference of opinion concerning the nature of the true
and ultimate reward, whether it is given to the soul alone, or to body
and soul combined in resurrection. He quotes Maimonides's opinion, with
whom he agrees, that the real reward is purely spiritual enjoyed by the
soul alone. To be sure, after the coming of the Messiah the bodies of
the righteous will be resurrected to make known abroad God's wonders, or
to give these people bodily pleasure for the pain they suffered during
life, or to give them additional opportunity to acquire perfection so
that they may have a greater reward later. But this state of resurrected
life will last only for a time, and then all will die again, and the
souls will enjoy spiritual life forever.
The other opinion, held by Nachmanides, is that the real and ultimate
reward is that of body and soul united to everlasting life. Albo is not
satisfied with this view, his objections being among others that if only
the perfect are resurrected, the rest will remain without any reward at
all, not to mention the difficulty that it is not likely that the human
body--a perishable thing--will change into a matter that will last
forever.
As to the nature of reward and punishment after death, Albo tells us
that reward will consist in the soul's realization that its endeavors
in this world were correct, and in the next world it will be prepared to
join the spiritual beings, which will give it great joy. The erring soul
will find itself in a position where it will still desire the corporeal
pleasures of this world, but will not be able to have them for want of
corporeal organs. At the same time it will also entertain the other more
natural desire of a spiritual substance to join the other spiritual
beings in the other world. This feeling too it will not be able to
satisfy because of its want of perfection. This division of desires
unsatisfied will cause the soul excruciating torture, and this is its
punishment.[435]
CONCLUSION
Our task is done. We have now reached the limit we have assigned
ourselves. We have traced objectively and with greater or less detail
the rationalistic movement in mediæval Jewry from its beginnings in the
ninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and Rabbanites
to its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth century. We
have followed its ascending curve from Saadia through Gabirol, Bahya and
Ibn Daud to its highest point in Maimonides, and we likewise traced its
descent through Gersonides, Crescas and Albo. We took account of its
essential nature as being a serious and conscientious attempt to define
a Jewish _Weltanschauung_ in the midst of conflicting claims of
religions and philosophies. The Jewish sacred writings had to be studied
and made consistent with themselves in regard to certain ethical and
metaphysical questions which forced themselves upon the minds of
thinking men. In this endeavor it was necessary to have regard to the
system of doctrine that was growing up among their Mohammedan neighbors
and masters--itself inherited from Greece--and adjust its teachings to
those of Judaism. The adjustment took various forms according to the
temperament of the adjuster. It embraced the extremes of all but
sacrificing one of the two systems of doctrine to the other, and it
counted among its votaries those who honestly endeavored to give each
claim its due. The system of Judaism was the same for all throughout the
period of our investigation, excepting only the difference between
Karaites and Rabbanites. This was not the case with the system of
philosophic doctrine. There we can see a development from Kalam through
Neo-Platonism to Aristotelianism, and we accordingly classified the
Jewish thinkers as Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists or Aristotelians, or
combinations in varying proportions of any two of the three systems
mentioned.
It was not our province to treat of the mystic movement in mediæval
Jewry as it developed in the Kabbalistic works and gained the ground
yielded in the course of time by the healthier rationalism. To complete
the picture it will suffice to say that as the political and economic
conditions of the Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
deteriorated, and freedom and toleration were succeeded by persecution
and expulsion, the Jews became more zealous for their own spiritual
heritage as distinguished from foreign importations; philosophy and
rationalism began to be regarded askance, particularly as experience
showed that scientific training was not favorable to Jewish
steadfastness and loyalty. In suffering and persecution those who stuck
to their posts were as a rule not the so-called enlightened who played
with foreign learning, but the simple folk who believed in Torah and
tradition in the good old style. The philosophical and the scientific
devotees were the first to yield, and many of them abandoned
Judaism.[436] Thus it was that mysticism and obscurantism took the place
of enlightenment as a measure of self-defence. The material walls of the
Ghetto and the spiritual walls of the Talmud and the Kabbala kept the
remnant from being overwhelmed and absorbed by the hostile environment
of Christian and Mohammedan. The second half of the fourteenth, and the
fifteenth century were not favorable to philosophical studies among the
Jews, and the few here and there who still show an interest in science
and philosophy combine with it a belief in Kabbala and are not of any
great influence on the development of Judaism.
Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob (ab. 1440) author of a work entitled
"Emunot,"[437] is a strong opponent of Greek science and philosophy. He
is not content with attacking the lesser lights and extremists like
Albalag or Gersonides or Abraham ibn Ezra. He goes to the very
fountain-head of Jewish Aristotelianism and holds Maimonides responsible
for the heresies which invaded the Jewish camp. He takes up one doctrine
after another of the great Jewish philosopher and points out how
dangerous it is to the true Jewish faith. Judah Halevi and Nachmanides
represent to him the true Jewish attitude. The mysteries of the Jewish
faith are revealed not in philosophy but in the Kabbala, which
Maimonides did not study, and which he would not have understood if he
had studied it, for he had no Kabbalistic tradition.
Unlike Shemtob, his son Joseph ben Shemtob (d. 1480)[438] shows great
admiration for Aristotle and Maimonides. But he is enabled to do so by
lending credence to a legend that Aristotle in his old age recanted his
heretical doctrines, in particular that of the eternity of the world.
Joseph ben Shemtob made a special study of Aristotle's Ethics, to which
he wrote a commentary, and endeavored to show that the Stagirite's
ethical doctrines had been misunderstood; that the highest good of man
and his ultimate happiness are to be sought according to Aristotle not
in this world but in the next. It was likewise a misunderstanding, he
thinks, when Maimonides and others make Aristotle deny special
Providence. True science is not really opposed to Judaism. At the same
time he too like his father realizes the danger of too much scientific
study, and hence agrees with Solomon ben Adret that the study of
philosophy should be postponed to the age of maturity when the student
is already imbued with Jewish learning and religious faith.
The son of Joseph, bearing the name of his grandfather, Shemtob ben
Joseph (fl. ab. 1461-89), followed in his father's footsteps,[439] and
wrote a commentary on the "Guide of the Perplexed" of Maimonides, whom
he defends against the attacks of Crescas.
Isaac ben Moses Arama (1420-1494)[440] is the author of a
philosophico-homiletical commentary on the Pentateuch entitled, "Akedat
Yizhak," and a small treatise on the relations of philosophy and
theology. He was also interested in Kabbala and placed Jewish revelation
above philosophy.
Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1508),[441] the distinguished Jewish statesman
who went with his brethren into exile at the time of the expulsion of
the Jews from Spain in 1492, was a prolific writer on Biblical exegesis
and religious philosophy. Though a great admirer of Maimonides, on whose
"Guide" he wrote a commentary, and whose thirteen articles of the creed
he defended against the strictures of Crescas and Albo, he was
nevertheless an outspoken opponent of the rationalistic attitude and has
no phrases strong enough for such men as Albalag, Gersonides, Moses of
Narbonne and others, whom he denounces as heretics and teachers of
dangerous doctrines. He does not even spare Maimonides himself when the
latter attempts to identify the traditional "Maase Bereshit" and "Maase
Merkaba" with the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics (_cf._ above, p.
303 f.), and adopts Kabbalistic views along with philosophic doctrines.
He is neither original nor thoroughly consistent.
His son Judah Leo Abarbanel (1470-1530)[442] is the author of a
philosophical work in Italian, "Dialoghi di Amore," (Dialogues of Love),
which breathes the spirit of the Renaissance of the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries in Italy. It is under the influence of Plato and
Plotinus and identifies God with love, which is regarded as the
essential principle of all life and activity in the world, including
even the inorganic natural processes. There is no attempt made to
construct a Jewish philosophy, and though all evidence is against it,
some have made it out that Judah Abarbanel was a convert to
Christianity.
In the same country, in Italy, Judah ben Yechiel Messer Leon of
Mantua[443] (1450-1490) made a name for himself as a student of Cicero
and of mediæval Latin scholasticism. He wrote a rhetoric in Hebrew based
upon Cicero and Lactantius, and composed logical works based upon
Aristotle's Latin text and Averroes. As an original student of
philosophy he is of no importance.
Two members of the Delmedigo family of Crete, Elijah (1460-1498) and
Joseph Solomon,[444] are well known as students of philosophy and
writers on philosophical and scientific subjects.
Thus the stream of philosophical thought which rose among the Jews in
Babylonia and flowed on through the ages, ever widening and deepening
its channel, passing into Spain and reaching its high water mark in the
latter half of the twelfth century in Maimonides, began to narrow and
thin out while spreading into France and Italy, until at last it dried
up entirely in that very land which opened up a new world of thought,
beauty and feeling in the fifteenth century, the land of the
Renaissance. Jewish philosophy never passed beyond the scholastic stage,
and the freedom and light which came to the rest of the world in the
revival of ancient learning and the inventions and discoveries of the
modern era found the Jews incapable of benefiting by the blessings they
afforded. Oppression and gloom caused the Jews to retire within their
shell and they sought consolation for the freedom denied them without in
concentrating their interests, ideals and hopes upon the Rabbinic
writings, legal as well as mystical. There have appeared philosophers
among the Jews in succeeding centuries, but they either philosophized
without regard to Judaism and in opposition to its fundamental dogmas,
thus incurring the wrath and exclusion of the synagogue, or they sought
to dissociate Judaism from theoretical speculation on the ground that
the Jewish religion is not a philosophy but a rule of conduct. In more
recent times Jewry has divided itself into sects and under the influence
of modern individualism has lost its central authority making every
group the arbiter of its own belief and practice and narrowing the
religious influence to matters of ceremony and communal activity of a
practical character. There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but
there are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY[D]
GENERAL WORKS
SOLOMON MUNK, Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris 1859, pp.
461-511. A brief historical résumé of philosophical authors and books.
German translation by Beer, Philosophie und philosophische
Schriftsteller der Juden, Leipzig, 1852. English translation by Isidor
Kalisch, Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews, Cincinnati,
1881.
A. SCHMIEDL, Studien über jüdische, insonders jüdisch-arabische
Religionsphilosophie, Wien, 1869.
MORITZ EISLER, Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des
Mittelalters (3 parts), Wien, 1870-84.
DAVID KAUFMANN, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen
Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadia bis Maimuni, Gotha,
1877.
SIMEON BERNFELD, [Hebrew: Da'at Elohim, Toldot Hafilosofiya Hadatit
B'yisrael], Warsaw, 1897.
S. HOROVITZ, Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religions-Philosophen des
Mittelalters, von Saadia bis Maimuni, Breslau, 1898-1912 (includes so
far Saadia, Gabirol, Ibn Zaddik, Abraham ibn Daud).
J. POLLAK, "Entwicklung der arabischen und jüdischen Philosophie im
Mittelalter" in _Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. XVII
(1904), pp. 196-236, 433-459.
UEBERWEG-BAUMGARTNER, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. II,
10th ed., Berlin, 1915, pp. 385-403.
DAVID NEUMARK, Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters,
nach Problemen dargestellt, vol. I, Berlin, 1907, vol. II, part I,
Berlin, 1910.
IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, Die jüdische Philosophie in _Allgemeine Geschichte der
Philosophie_, von W. Wundt, etc. (Die Kultur der Gegenwart I, 5), pp.
70-77 (2nd ed., pp. 301-337).
KALAM IN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
MARTIN SCHREINER, Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur, Berlin, 1895.
ISAAC ISRAELI
JACOB GUTTMANN, Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon
Israeli, Münster i. W. 1911.
AL MUKAMMAS
ABRAHAM HARKAVY, in Russian periodical _Woskhod_, Sept. 1898.
SAADIA
JACOB GUTTMANN, Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, Göttingen, 1882.
D.J. ENGELKEMPER, Saadja Gaon's religionsphilosophische Lehre über die
heilige Schrift, übersetzt und erklärt, Münster, 1903.
JOSEPH AL BASIR
P. F. FRANKL, Ein Mu`tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10. Jahrhundert, Wien,
1872.
MIKSA KLEIN, Júszuf Al-Baszîr, Al-Kitâb Al-Mu[h.]tavî, Budapest, 1913.
ERNÖ MORGENSTERN, Júszuf Al-Baszîr, Al Kitâb Al Mu[h.]tavî, Budapest,
1913.
JESHUA BEN JUDAH
MARTIN SCHREINER, Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900.
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL
S. MUNK, Mélanges, etc., Paris, 1859, pp. 151-306.
SEYERLEN, in Zeller's Theologische Jahrbücher, vols. XV and XVI.
JACOB GUTTMANN, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn Gabirol, Göttingen,
1889.
DAVID KAUFMANN, Studien über Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899.
BAHYA IBN PAKUDA
DAVID KAUFMANN, "Die Theologie des Bachja Ibn Pakuda," in "Gesammelte
Schriften von David Kaufmann" (ed. Brann), vol. II, Frankfurt a. M.,
1910, pp. 1-98.
J. H. HERTZ, Bachya, The Jewish Thomas à Kempis, New York, 1898 (in
Sixth Biennial Report of the Jewish Theological Seminary Association).
PSEUDO-BAHYA
JACOB GUTTMANN, "Eine bisher unbekannte, dem Bachja ibn Pakuda
zugeignete Schrift," _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._, vol. XLI (1897),
p. 241 ff.
ABRAHAM BAR HIYYA
JACOB GUTTMANN, in _Monatschrift f. G. u, W. d. J_., 1900.
JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK
MAX DOCTOR, Die Philosophie des Joseph Ibn Zaddik, nach ihren Quellen,
insbesondere nach ihren Beziehungen zu den Lauteren Brüdern und zu
Gabirol untersucht, Münster, 1895.
LEOPOLD WEINSBERG, Der Mikrokosmos, ein angeblich im 12. Jahrhundert von
dem Cordubenser Joseph ibn Zaddik verfasstes philosophisches System,
nach seiner Echtheit untersucht, Breslau, 1888.
JUDAH HALEVI
AD. FRANKL-GRÜN, Die Ethik des Juda Halevi, Bilin, s. a.
DAVID KAUFMANN, Jehuda Halewi, Versuch einer Charakteristik, Breslau,
1877; reprinted in "Gesammelte Schriften" (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M.,
1910, vol. II, pp. 99-151.
DAVID NEUMARK, Jehuda Hallevi's Philosophy in its Principles,
Cincinnati, 1908.
JULIUS GUTTMANN, Das Verhältniss von Religion und Philosophie bei Jehuda
Halewi, in Israel Lewy's Festschrift (ed. Brann and Elbogen), Breslau,
1911, pp. 327-358.
ABRAHAM IBN EZRA
NACHMAN KROCHMAL, [Hebrew: More Nevochey Hazman], Warsaw, 1894, p. 266 ff.
DAVID ROSIN, Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham ibn Esras, in
_Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._ vols. XLII (1898) and XLIII (1899).
G. ORSCHANSKY, Abraham ibn Esra als Philosoph, Breslau, 1900.
ABRAHAM IBN DAUD
GUGENHEIMER, Die Religionsphilosophie des R. Abraham ben David ha-Levi
nach dessen noch ungedruckter Schrift Emuna Rama in ihrem inneren und
historischen Zusammenhange entwickelt, Augsburg, 1850.
JACOB GUTTMANN, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud aus
Toledo, Göttingen, 1879.
MAIMONIDES
M. JOEL, Die Religionsphilosophie des Mose ben Maimon, Breslau, 1876.
SIMON B. SCHEYER, Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, Frankfurt
a. M., 1845.
DAVID ROSIN, Die Ethik des Maimonides, Breslau, 1876.
MOSES BEN MAIMON, sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss,
heraus-gegeben von der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des
Judenthums, Band I, Leipzig, 1908.
LOUIS-GERMAIN LEVY, Maïmonide, Paris, 1911 (Les Grands Philosophes).
J. MÜNZ, Moses ben Maimon, sein Leben und seine Werke, Frankfurt a. M.,
1912.
M. JOEL, Verhältniss Albert des Grossen zu Moses Maimonides, Breslau,
1876.
JACOB GUTTMANN, Der Einfluss der Maimonidischen Philosophie auf das
christliche Abendland, in _Moses ben Maimon_ (see above), pp. 135-230.
DAVID KAUFMANN, Der "Führer" Maimûni's in der Weltliteratur, _Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. XI (1898), pp. 335-376; reprinted in
"Gesammelte Schriften" (ed. Brann), Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. II, pp.
152-189.
J. P. WICKERSHAM CRAWFORD, The _Vision Delectable_ of Alfonso de la
Torre and Maimonides' _Guide of the Perplexed_, Publications of the
Modern Language Association of America, XXVIII, 2 (1913), pp. 188-212.
ISAAC HUSIK, An Anonymous Medieval Christian Critic of Maimonides,
Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, vol. II, 1911, pp. 159-190.
GERSONIDES
M. JOEL, Lewi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph, Breslau, 1862.
_Isidore Weil_, Philosophie Religieuse de Levi ben Gerson, Paris, 1868.
BENZION KELLERMANN, Die Kämpfe Gottes von Lewi ben Gerson, Uebersetzung
und Erklärung des handschriftlich revidierten Textes, Erster Teil,
Berlin, 1914. Contains the German translation of the first book of the
"Milhamot Adonai." The translation is faulty in many places, as the
present writer has shown in an article entitled, "Studies in
Gersonides," which will appear in the _Jewish Quarterly Review_, New
Series, in the course of the year 1917.
HASDAI CRESCAS
_M. Joel_, Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren in ihrem
geschichtlichen Einflusse dargestellt, Breslau, 1866.
PHILIPP BLOCH, Die Willensfreiheit von Chasdai Kreskas, München, 1879.
JULIUS WOLFSOHN, Der Einfluss Gazâlî's auf Chisdai Crescas, Frankfurt
a. M., 1905.
DAVID NEUMARK, "Crescas and Spinoza," in Commemoration of the Fifth
Centenary of the Publication of the "Or Adonai"; in Year Book of the
Central Conference of American Rabbis, XVIII, 1908, pp. 277-318.
JOSEPH ALBO
SAMUEL BACK, Joseph Albo's Bedeutung in der Geschichte der jüdischen
Religionsphilosophie, Breslau, 1869.
JAULUS, in _Monatschrift f. G. u. W. d. J._, 1874, p. 462 ff.
A. TÄNZER, Die Religionsphilosophie Joseph Albo's nach seinem Werke
"Ikkarim" systematisch dargestellt und erläutert, Frankfurt a. M., 1896.
BIBLICAL EXEGESIS
W. BACKER, Die Bibelexegese der jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des
Mittelalters vor Maimûni, Budapest, 1892.
ID., Die Jüdische Bibelexegese vom Anfange des zehnten his zum Ende des
fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts, Treves, 1892, reprinted from Winter und
Wünsche, Die Jüdische Literatur seit Abschluss des Kanons, II, 239-339,
where a full bibliography is given.
ID., Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Bible Exegesis, §§ 14-16.
INFLUENCE OF JEWISH PHILOSOPHY ON SCHOLASTICISM
The works of Joel, Guttmann, Kaufmann, Crawford and Husik mentioned
above under Maimonides; and besides
JACOB GUTTMANN, Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum und
zur jüdischen Litteratur, Göttingen, 1891.
ID., Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren Beziehungen
zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Literatur, Breslau, 1902.
For further references see the notes.
[D] This bibliography contains a selection of the more important works
of exposition. For original sources see the notes.
NOTES
[Black figures denote the page, the light figures the notes]
=xv=, 1. See below, p. 395 ff.
=xvi=, 2. Talm. Bab. Hagiga 11b.
3. Ibid.
4. See Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, III, 2, 3d ed. p. 347;
Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 71, beginning.
=xvii=, 5. See Wenrich, De Auctorum Graecorum Versionibus et
Commentariis Syriacis, Arabicis, Armeniacis Persicisque, Leipzig, 1842,
p. 4 ff; De Boer, Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam, Stuttgart, 1901,
p. 17 ff (English translation by Jones, London, 1903, pp. 11-30). Duval,
La Littérature Syriaque 2nd ed., Paris, 1900, ch. XIV, § 2, p. 253 ff.
=xx=, 6. See Dieterici, Die Theologie des Aristotles (Arabic text),
Leipzig, 1882; German translation by the same, Leipzig, 1883.
7. See Bardenhewer, Die Pseudoaristotelische Schrift über das reine
Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis, Freiburg i. Br., 1882.
8. See Valentinus Rose, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 1883, p. 843.
9. See Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary upon the "Vetus Logica,"
Leyden, 1906, p. 11, 97 note.
=xxi=, 10. For the following sketch of the Kalam see Goldziher,
Vorlesungen über den Islam, Heidelberg, 1910, 100 ff, 127 f.
=xxiv=, 11. See below, p. 247.
=xxv=, 12. See Schreiner, Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur, Berlin,
1895, p. 3; ibid., Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900, p. 12
ff.
=xxvi=, 13. See L. Ginzberg, in Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v.
"Anthropomorphism."
14. See Talm. Bab. Berakot, 33b. [Hebrew: Modim Modim Mashtikin Oto]
15. See Talm. Bab. Megillah, 25b. [Hebrew: Hakol Beyidei Shamayim Chutz
Meyeriat Shamaim]
16. Schreiner, Studien über Jeschu`a ben Jehudah, p. 15 note 2.
17. See Bab. Talm. Pesakim, 54a, [Hebrew: Shiv'a Dvarim Nivreu Kodem
Shenivra Ha'olam Ve'eylu Hen Torah.... Torah Dechtiv (Mishley Khet) Hashem
Kanani Reyshit Darko.]
18. Schreiner 1. c. p. 12.
19. Ibid.
20. Schreiner, Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur, p. 3, 4.
=xxvii=, 21. Guide of the Perplexed, I, ch. 71.
22. See below, p. 246 ff.
23. See Goldziher, Vorlesungen über den Islam, p. 155 ff.
=xxviii=, 24. See Yahuda, Al-Hid[=a]ja `Il[=a] Far[=a]`id Al-Qul[=u]b
des Bachja ibn Joseph Ibn Paquda, Leyden, 1912, p. 53 ff.
=xxxvii=, 25. Cf. above, note 6.
=1=, 26. See Steinschneider, Die Hebräischen Uebersetzungen des
Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher, Berlin, 1893, § 479 and
notes.
=1=, 27. See Guttmann, Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts in
ihren Beziehungen zum Judenthum und zur jüdischen Literatur, Breslau,
1902, P. 55 ff.
28. Omnia Opera Ysaac, Lugduni, (Lyons), 1515.
=2=, 29. See [Hebrew: Igrot Harambam], ed. Amsterdam, p. 14b.
30. S. Fried, Das Buch über die Elemente ([Hebrew: Sefer Hayesodot]),
Drohobycz, 1900.
31. Published by Hirschfeld in "Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstag
Moritz Steinschneiders," Leipzig, 1896, PP. 131-141; cf. also pp. 233-4.
32. See note 28 and the two preceding notes.
=5=, 33. [Hebrew: Sefer Haruach V'hanefesh] published by Steinschneider in
the Hebrew periodical [Hebrew: Hakarmel] I, pp. 401-405. cf. Guttmann, Die
philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon Israeli, Münster i. W.,
1911, p. 31, note 1.
=10=, 34. Fried, [Hebrew: Sefer Hayesodot], p. 12f.
=17=, 35. Berlin, 1885, pp. 65, 77-83, 151-154.
36. See the Russian paper Woskhod, September, 1898.
=24=, 37. Arabic text edited by S. Landauer, Kit[=a]b al-Am[=a]n[=a]t
wa`l-I`tiq[=a]d[=a]t, Leyden 1880. The Hebrew translation of Judah ibn
Tibbon has been published in many editions. The references in the
following notes are to the Yozefov edition.
=25=, 38. Cf. below, p. 249 ff.
39. Pt. I, ch. 1, third argument, p. 58 of Yozefov edition.
40. Ibid., fourth argument, p. 59.
=26=, 41. Ibid., ch. 3, p. 63 ff.; cf. Guttmann, Die
Religionsphilosophie des Saadia, Göttingen, 1882, p. 45 f.
42. Pt. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-101.
43. Pt. VI, ch. 1, p. 149.
44. Pt. II, ch. 2, pp. 88-9.
=27=, 45. Introduction, pp. 38-39.
46. Ibid., p. 40.
=28=, 47. Ibid., pp. 43-48.
48. Ibid., p. 48.
49. p. 49
50. p. 51.
=29=, 51. Pt. I. Introduction, p. 54 f.
52. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 56.
=30=, 53. Ibid., p. 57.
54. Ibid., p. 58.
55. Ibid., p. 59.
=31=, 56. Ch. 2, p. 60 ff.
57. Ch. 3, third opinion, p. 66 ff.
=32=, 58. Ch. 4, pp. 80-82.
59. Pt. II, Introduction, p. 86.
60. Ibid., ch. 1, p. 88.
=33=, 61. Pt. I, ch. 3, fifth opinion, p. 68.
62. Pt. II, ch. 2, p. 89.
=34=, 63. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 91-93.
64. See Graf, Die Philosophie und Gotteslehre des Jahj[=a] ibn `Ad[=i]
und späteren Autoren, Münster, 1910, p. 32, note, p. 52.
=35=, 65. III, ch. 10, p. 122; V, ch. 8, p. 147; VII, ch. 2, p. 165.
66. II, chs. 9-12, pp. 95-102.
=37=, 67. VI, chs. 1-4, pp. 148-156.
=38=, 68. III chs. 1-3, pp. 104-110.
=40=, 69. Ibid., chs. 4-5, pp. 110-113.
70. Ch. 6, pp. 113-114.
71. Chs. 7-9, pp. 114-121.
=41=, 72. IV, pp. 124-136.
=42=, 73. V, chs. 1-3, pp. 136-140.
=43=, 74. IX, chs. 1-4, pp. 185-190.
=44=, 75. VI, ch. 8, pp. 160-162.
=45=, 76. VII, chs. 1-9, pp. 162-174.
77. VIII, pp. 175-185.
78. IX, chs. 5-11, pp. 190-197.
=46=, 79. X, pp. 197-215.
=48=, 80. The following sketch is based upon Frankl, Ein
Mu`tazilitischer Kalam aus dem 10ten Jahrhundert, Wien, 1872.
=55=, 81. The following sketch is based upon Schreiner, Studien über
Jeschu`a ben Jehuda, Berlin, 1900.
=60=, 82. [Hebrew: Igrot Harambam] (Letters of Maimonides), ed. Amsterdam,
p. 14b.
=61=, 83. See Munk, Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris, 1859,
p. 291 ff; Guttmann, Die Scholastik des Dreizehnten Jahrhunderts,
Breslau, 1902, pp. 60-85. _Id._, Die Philosophie des Salomon ibn
Gabirol, Göttingen, 1889, p. 54 ff. This last work and that of Munk
represent the best exposition and criticism of Gabirol's philosophy and
of his sources and influences.
=62=, 84. Cf. Baeumker, Avencebrolis Fons Vitæ, Münister, 1892-95,
Prolegomena.
=63=, 85. Jourdain, A., Recherches Critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des
traductions Latines d' Aristote, 2 ed. Paris, 1843, p. 197 note.
86. Munk, Mélanges, etc. (see note 83), contains the Hebrew extracts of
Falaquera. The Latin translation was published by Clemens Baeumker in
the Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. I,
pts. 2-4 (cf. above note 84). See also Seyerlen in Theologische
Jahrbücher, edited by Zeller, XV and XVI.
=64=, 87. Cf. Munk, Le Guide des Égarés, II, p. 25, note 1, end.
88. See Kaufmann, Studien über Salomon ibn Gabirol, Budapest, 1899.
89. Baeumker, Fons Vitæ, V, p. 313, 6.
=65=, 90. F. V. V, 333-335, Falaquera in Munk's Mélanges, V, §§ 67-69.
91. F. V. IV, 8 ff., Falaquera IV, § 1.
92. F. V. V, 296, 10.
93. F. V. IV, 243, 10.
94. F. V. III, p. 196, 5 ff., Falaq. III, § 10.
95. F. V. III, 208, 15; Falaq. III, § 44.
=67=, 96. F. V. III, 175, 10 ff.; Falaq. III § 27 ff.
97. F. V. IV, 211, 9 ff., 213, 17 ff., 217, II ff., 218, 18; Falaq. IV,
§§ 1-4 and ff.
98. F. V. V, 258, 19; 259, 1; 268, 8, 14, 15; 322, 12; Falaq. V, § 55.
=68=, 99. F. V. V, 306, 7 ff.; Falaq. V, § 34 ff.
100. F. V. V, 330, 15 ff.; Falaq. V, § 64 ff.
101. F. V. V, 326, 3 ff.; Falaq. V, § 60 ff.
=70=, 102. F. V. III, 204, 13 ff.; Falaq. III, § 37.
=71=, 103. S. Wise, "Improvement of the Moral Qualities," New York,
1901. (Columbia University Oriental Studies, vol. 1.)
=72=, 104. F. V. I, 4, 24 ff.; Falaq. I, § 2.
=78=, 105. See Munk, Mélanges, 166 ff.
=80=, 106. Yahuda, Prolegomena zu einer erstmaligen Herausgabe des
Kit[=a]b Al-Hid[=a]ja `Il[=a] Far[=a]`id Al-Qul[=u]b, Frankfurt a. M.,
1904, 12 ff.; _id._, Al-Hidaja `Il[=a] Faraid Al-Qul[=u]b des Bachja ibn
Joseph ibn Paq[=u]da, Leyden, 1912, 63 f.
107. Neumark, Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, I,
Berlin, 1907, 485-493.
=81=, 108. In his commentary on Deut. 32, 39. Cf. Yahuda, Prolegomena,
p. 12, note 2, where 35 should be corrected to 39.
109. Yahuda, Al-Hidaja, etc., p. 97.
=85=, 110. [Hebrew: Chovat Halevavot] (Duties of the Hearts) ed. Warsaw,
1875, Introduction, pp. 9-28.
=86=, 111. Ibid., Introduction, 28-37.
112. Yahuda, Al-Hid[=a]ja, pp. 53-112.
=88=, 113. Duties of the Hearts, I, chs. 1-6, pp. 41-58.
=89=, 114. Duties, I, ch. 6, pp. 57-8.
=92=, 115. Ibid., ch. 7, pp. 58-69.
=93=, 116. Ch. 8, pp. 69-72.
117. Ch. 9, pp. 72-76.
=95=, 118. Ch. 10, pp. 76-84.
=96=, 119. Guide of the Perplexed I, ch. 53.
120. Duties, ch. 1, p. 44.
121. Ibid., ch. 10, end, p. 92 f.
=97=, 122. Duties, II, pp. 95-137.
=99=, 123. III, pp. 138-197.
=101=, 124. IV, pp. 198-256.
125. Duties, 2nd volume, part V, pp. 3-35.
=102=, 126. VI, pp. 36-58.
=103=, 127. VII, pp. 58-82.
=104=, 128. VIII, pp. 82-126.
=105=, 129. IX, pp. 126-150.
130. X, pp. 151-168.
=106=, 131. Broydé, Les Reflexions sur l'âme par Bahya ben Joseph ibn
Pakouda, Paris, 1896; Hebrew title, [Hebrew: Sefer Torot Hanefesh].
132. Goldziher, Kit[=a]b Ma`[=a]n[=i] al-Nafs, Berlin, 1907.
133. See Guttmann in "Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des
Judenthums," XLI (1897), 241 ff.
=107=, 134. Arabic text, p. 41, 12 and 46, 2; Hebrew, p. 55, 1 and 61, 5.
135. Ch. 2, p. 4, 29 (Heb. p. 5, last line).
136. Ibid., p. 6, 1 (Heb. p. 7, 3).
137. Ibid., p. 5, 16 f. (Heb. 6, 16 f.).
138. Ibid., ch. 9, p. 34, 13 ff. (Heb. p. 44, 10).
139. Ch. 2, p. 6, 6 ff. (Heb. p. 7, 8 f.).
140. Ch. 12, p. 42, 23 (Heb. p. 56, 23).
=108=, 141. Chs. 1-2.
=111=, 142. Chs. 16-17.
143. Chs. 6 and 11-12.
=112=, 144. Ch. 2.
145. Ch. 9.
=113=, 146. Ch. 7.
147. Chs. 19 and 21.
=114=, 148. [Hebrew: Sefer Higayon Hanefesh], edited by Freimann,
Leipzig, 1860. German title, Sefer Hegjon ha-Nefesch.
=115=, 149. p. 2a.
150. Ibid., also 4b.
151. See, however, below, p. 119.
152. p. 2b.
=116=, 153. p. 1.
=117=, 154. pp. 1-2.
=118=, 155. pp. 4b-5a.
156. pp. 2b-4a.
=122=, 157. pp. 5b-8a.
158. p. 8b ff.
=123= 159. p. 11a.
160. pp. 10-12.
=124=, 161. p. 30b ff.
=125=,162. See Doctor, Die Philosophie des Joseph ibn Zaddik, Münster,
1895, pp. 1-3; Horovitz, Der Mikrokosmos des Joseph Ibn Saddik, Breslau,
1903, I-II.
163. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, XIII, ff.
164. Letters of Maimonides, ed. Amsterdam, 14b.
=126=, 165. Horovitz, Mikrokosmos, 7, 24-8, 2.
=127=, 166. Ibid., 44-46; 53-54; cf. below, p. 145.
167. Ibid., p. 37, 2 ff.; cf. below, p. 138.
=129=, 168. pp. 1-2.
=130=, 169. pp. 3-6.
=133=, 170. pp. 7-19.
=134=, 171. pp. 19-25.
=137=, 172. pp. 25-33.
=141=, 173. pp. 33-43.
=142=, 174. pp. 43-47.
=145=, 175. pp. 47-57
=146=, 176. pp. 57-58.
=149=, 177. pp. 59-79.
=150=, 178. Al-Chazari, I, 67, ed. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1887, p. 29, 24.
179. Ibid., p. 29, 19-20.
180. I, 63; II, 66; pp. 29 and 125.
=151=, 181. See Kaufmann, Jehuda Halewi in "Gesammelte Schriften,"
Frankfurt a. M., 1910, vol. 2, pp. 99-151.
=152=, 182. Al-Chazari IV, 13, 15; p. 253, 18 ff., 257, 6 ff.
=153=, 183. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen
Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters, Gotha, 1877, pp. 119-140.
=157=, 184. Al-Chazari I, 1-67, pp. 1-29.
=158=, 185. Ibid., 70 ff., p. 31 ff.
=159=, 186. II, 6; p. 75, 22 ff.
187. IX, 13; p. 253, 18 ff.
=160=, 188. IV, 3; p. 229, 10 ff.
189, Ibid., 15 ff.; p. 257, 6 ff.
=161=, 190. II, 2-4; pp. 71-75.
=163=, 191. I, 87 ff.; p. 39 ff.
=164=, 192. I, 99 ff.; p. 53 ff.
193. II, 10 ff.; p. 77 ff.
194. Ibid., 36 ff.; p. 103 ff.
=165=, 195. Ibid., 68 f.; p. 125 f.
=167=, 196. IV, 3 ff.; p. 237, 9 ff.
=168=, 197. II, 26, p. 95; 48, p. 107 f.
=169=, 198. Ibid., 50, p. 109, 24 f.; III, 1 ff., p. 141 ff.
=170=, 199. I, 109 ff.; p. 59 ff.
=173=, 200. V, 20 ff., p. 337 ff.
201. IV, 25, p. 267 ff.
202. Ibid., 27, p. 283 f.
=174=, 203. Ibid., 29 ff., p. 285 ff.
=175=, 204. See above, p. 8.
205. Zeitschrift der ~deutschen~ morgenländischen Gesellschaft, XXIX
(1875), pp. 335-418.
=177=, 206. V, 1 ff., p. 295 ff.
=179=, 207. IV, 25, p. 281, 24 ff.
=181=, 208. V, 12, p. 311 ff.
=182=, 209. Ibid., 14, p. 323 ff.
=183=, 210. Ibid., 16 ff., p. 331 ff.
211. Ibid., 22 ff., p. 357 ff.
=184=, 212. Quoted by Bacher in Jewish Encyclopedia, s. v. Ibn Ezra,
Abraham.
213. Published by Dukes in "Zion," II, Frankfurt a. M., 1842, pp.
117-123, 134-137, 157-159, 175. Cf. also Literaturblatt des Orients, X,
748, where Dukes publishes a brief passage from the "Arugat Habosem,"
not found in "Zion." He derived it from a different manuscript.
=187=, 214. Jesod Mora, published with German translation by M.
Creizenach, Frankfurt a. M., and Leipzig, 1840. Hebrew title [Hebrew:
Yisod Mora]. Sefer Ha-Schem, ed. Lippmann, 1834. Cf., Bacher, Jewish
Encyclopedia, s. v.
=189=, 215. [Hebrew: More Nevochey Hazman], Warsaw, 1894, ch. 17
([Hebrew: Chochmat Hamisken]), pp. 266 ff.
216. Die Religionsphilosophie Abraham Ibn Esra's, in "Monatschrift für
Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums," 42 and 43 (1898 and 1899).
=192=, 217. Ibid., 42 (1898), pp. 454-455.
=193=, 218. Commentary on Exod. 33, 21, towards the end of the long
excursus.
=195=, 219. Commentary on Exod. 20, 2.
220. Introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes.
=197=, 221. Emunah Ramah (Heb. title [Hebrew: Emunah Ramah]), published
with German translation by Simson Weil, Frankfurt a. M., 1852, p. 2
(Heb.).
222. Em. Ram., p. 83.
=198=, 223. See note 221.
224. Em. Ram., 2-3.
225. See note 221.
=199=, 226. See Horovitz, Ueber den Einfluss der griechischen
Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam, Breslau, 1909.
=200=, 227. But see below, p. 354, l. 31.
=202=, 228. Em. Ram., p. 1 ff.
=203=, 229. Ibid., 4.
=204=, 230. Al Gazali. Cf. Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des
Abraham ibn Daud aus Toledo, Göttingen, 1879, p. 117, note.
=205=, 231. Em. Ram., 44-46.
232. Ibid., 4-8.
=207=, 233. Ibid., 9-13.
=208=, 234. Ibid., 13-15.
=209=, 235. Ibid., 15-20.
=216=, 236. Em. Ram., 20-41.
237. Ibid., 41-43.
=220=, 238. Em. Ram., 44-51.
=221=, 239. Ibid., 51-57.
=223=, 240. Ibid., 57-69.
=224=, 241. Ibid., 69-70.
=226=, 242. Ibid., 70-75.
=228=, 243. Ibid., 75-81.
=230=, 244. Ibid., 93-98.
=232=, 245. See Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham Ibn Daud,
p. 220, note 2.
=235=, 246. Ibid., 98-104.
=236=, 247. [Hebrew: Be'oor Milot Ha'higayon], Breslau, 1828. For other
editions and interesting information concerning this treatise see
Steinschneider, Die Hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters, Berlin,
1893, § 251, and Die Arabische Literatur der Juden, Frankfurt a. M.,
1902, p. 208, 5.
248. Introduction to the eleventh chapter (ch. Helek) of the treatise
Sanhedrin.
=239=, 249. Letters of Maimonides, ed. Amsterdam, pp. 13b-14.
250. The Arabic text was published with a French translation and
extremely valuable notes by Solomon Munk, under the title, Le Guide des
Égarés, 3 volumes, Paris, 1856-66. English translation by M. Friedländer
in 3 vols., London, 1881-1885, re-issued in one volume, with omission of
notes, London, 1910. For other translations, editions and commentaries
see Kaufmann, "Der 'Führer' Maimûnis in der Weltliteratur," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie, XI (1898), pp. 335-376, republished in
Kaufmann's Gesammelte Schriften ed. Brann, vol. 2, Frankfurt a. M.,
1910, pp. 152-189. See also Friedländer's translation, London, 1910, p.
XXVII ff.
251. The Arabic text was published with a German translation by M. Wolff
under the title, Mûsâ Maimûni's Acht Kapitel, 2nd edition, Leyden, 1903.
Hebrew text with English translation by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, The Eight
Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics, New York, 1912 (Columbia University
Oriental Studies, vol. VII).
=240=, 252. Emunah Ramah, p. 81 ff.
=241=, 253. Guide, I, chs. 1, 3-16, 18-30, 37-45, 64-67, 70.
=243=, 254. Ibid., ch. 54.
255. III, 28.
256. I, 55.
=244=, 257. I, 32.
258. Ibid., ch. 33.
=245=, 259. Ch. 34.
260. Ch. 71.
=246=, 261. Ibid.
=247=, 262. Cf., however, above, p. xxv f. (the view that Kalam
originated in Judaism).
=248=, 263. Ch. 71.
=249=, 264. The following numbers do not correspond to those of
Maimonides.
=252=, 265. Guide, I, 73.
266. Ibid., 74.
=253=, 267. Ibid., 75.
268. Ibid., 76.
269. See below, p. 257.
270. Below, p. 259.
271. Above, p. 218.
272. Below, p. 258, last line, and 260.
=257=, 273. Guide II, Introduction.
=260=, 274. Ibid., ch. 1.
=261=, 275. Ch. 36.
=262=, 276. Ch. 46.
=264=, 277. Ibid., chs. 51-53.
=265=, 278. Chs. 55-58.
279. Ch. 61.
=268=, 280. See Munk, Guide des Égarés II, p. 69, note 1.
281. Guide II, chs. 3-6.