JOSEPH IBN ZADDIK
Little is known of the life of Joseph ben Jacob ibn Zaddik. He lived in
Cordova; he was appointed _Dayyan_, or Judge of the Jewish community of
that city in 1138; and he died in 1149. He is praised as a Talmudic
scholar by his countryman Moses ibn Ezra, and as a poet by Abraham ibn
Daud and Harizi, though we have no Talmudic composition from his pen,
and but few poems, whether liturgical or otherwise.[162] His fame rests
on his philosophical work, and it is this phase of his career in which
we are interested here. "Olam Katon" or "Microcosm" is the Hebrew name
of the philosophical treatise which he wrote in Arabic, but which we no
longer possess in the original, being indebted for our knowledge of it
to a Hebrew translation of unknown authorship.[163] Maimonides knew
Joseph ibn Zaddik favorably, but he was not familiar with the
"Microcosm." In a letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, the translator of his
"Guide of the Perplexed," Maimonides tells us that though he has not
seen the "Olam Katon" of Ibn Zaddik, he knows that its tendency is the
same as that of the Brothers of Purity (_cf._ above, p. 60).[164] This
signifies that its trend of thought is Neo-Platonic, which combines
Aristotelian physics with Platonic and Plotinian metaphysics, ethics and
psychology.
An examination of the book itself confirms Maimonides's judgment. In
accordance with the trend of the times there is noticeable in Ibn Zaddik
an increase of Aristotelian influence, though of a turbid kind; a
decided decrease, if not a complete abandonment, of the ideas of the
Kalam, and a strong saturation of Neo-Platonic doctrine and point of
view. It was the fashion to set the Kalam over against the philosophers
to the disadvantage of the former, as being deficient in logical
knowledge and prejudiced by theological prepossessions. This is attested
by the attitude towards the Mutakallimun of Judah Halevi, Maimonides,
Averroes. And Ibn Zaddik forms no exception to the rule. The
circumstance that it was most likely from Karaite writings, which found
their way into Spain, that Ibn Zaddik gained his knowledge of Kalamistic
ideas, was not exactly calculated to prepossess him, a Rabbanite, in
their favor. And thus while we see him in the manner of Saadia and Bahya
follow the good old method, credited by Maimonides to the Mutakallimun,
of starting his metaphysics with proofs of the world's creation, and
basing the existence of God, his unity, incorporeality and other
attributes on the creation of the world as a foundation, he turns into
an uncompromising opponent of these much despised apologetes when he
comes to discuss the nature of God's attributes, of the divine will, and
of the nature of evil. And in all these cases the target of his attack
seems to be their Karaite representative Joseph al-Basir, whose
acquaintance we made before (p. 48 ff.).
He laid under contribution his predecessors and contemporaries, Saadia,
Bahya, Pseudo-Bahya, Gabirol; and his sympathies clearly lay with the
general point of view represented by the last, and his Mohammedan
sources; though he was enough of an eclectic to refuse to follow
Gabirol, or the Brethren of Purity and the other Neo-Platonic writings,
in all the details of their doctrine; and there is evidence of an
attempt on his part to tone down the extremes of Neo-Platonic tendency
and create a kind of level in which Aristotelianism and Platonism meet
by compromising. Thus he believes with Gabirol that all things corporeal
as well as spiritual are composed of matter and form;[165] but when it
comes to defining what the matter of spiritual things may be, he tells
us that we may speak of the genus as the matter of the species--a
doctrine which is not so Neo-Platonic after all. For we do not have to
go beyond Aristotle to hear that in the definition of an object, which
represents its _intelligible_ (opposed to sensible) essence, the genus
is like the matter, the difference like the form. Of the universal and
prime matter underlying all created things outside of God, of which
Gabirol says that it is the immediate emanation of God's essence and
constitutes with universal form the Universal Intelligence, Ibn Zaddik
knows nothing. Nor do we find any outspoken scheme of emanation, such as
we see in Plotinus or with a slight modification in the cyclopoedia of
the Brethren of Purity, or as it is presupposed in the "Fons Vitæ" of
Gabirol. Ibn Zaddik does refer to the doctrine of the divine Will, which
plays such an important rôle in the philosophy of Gabirol and of the
Pseudo-Empedoclean writings, which are supposed to have been Gabirol's
source.[166] But here, too, the negative side of Ibn Zaddik's doctrine
is developed at length, while the positive side is barely alluded to in
a hint. He takes pains to show the absurdity of the view that the divine
will is a momentary entity created from time to time to make possible
the coming into being of the things and processes of our world--a view
held by the Mutakallimun as represented by their spokesman al-Basir, but
when it comes to explaining his own view of the nature of the divine
will, and whether it is identical with God or not, he suddenly becomes
reticent, refers us to the writings of Empedocles, and intimates that
the matter is involved in mystery, and it is not safe to talk about it
too plainly and openly. Evidently Ibn Zaddik was not ready to go all the
length of Gabirol's emanationism and Neo-Platonic mysticism.
The Aristotelian ideas, of which there are many in the "Microcosm," are
probably not derived from a study of Aristotle's works, but from
secondary sources. This we may safely infer from the way in which he
uses or interprets them. An Aristotelian definition is a highly
technical proposition in which every word counts, and requires a
definition in turn to be understood. In the Aristotelian context the
reader sees the methodical derivation of the concept; and the several
technical terms making up the definition are made clear by illustrative
examples. Aside from the context the proposition is obscure even in the
original Greek. Now conceive an Arabic translation of an Aristotelian
definition taken out of its context, and you do not wonder that it is
misunderstood; particularly when the interpreter's point of view is
taken from a school of thought at variance with that of Aristotle. This
is exactly what happens to Ibn Zaddik. He quotes approvingly Aristotle's
definition of the soul, and proceeds to interpret it in a manner not
intended by the author of the "De Anima."[167] If he had read the
context he could not have misunderstood the definition as he did.
Unlike his predecessors, Ibn Zaddik did not confine himself to a special
topic in philosophy or to the metaphysical aspects of Judaism. Isaac
Israeli and Gabirol discuss special questions in Physics and Metaphysics
without bringing them into relation with Judaism or the text of the
Bible. Saadia takes cognizance of philosophical doctrine solely with a
view to establishing and rationalizing Jewish dogma, and only in so far
as it may thus be utilized. Bahya and Abraham bar Hiyya confine their
philosophical outlook within still narrower limits, having Jewish ethics
as their primary concern. All of the latter make a feature of Biblical
interpretation, which lends to their work the Jewish stamp and to their
style the element of homeliness and variety. To this they owe in a
measure their popularity, which, however, cannot be said for Abraham bar
Hiyya, whose "Hegyon ha-Nefesh" was not printed until the second half of
last century. The "Microcosm" of Ibn Zaddik is the first compendium of
science, philosophy and theology in Jewish literature. And yet it is a
small book; for Ibn Zaddik does not enter into lengthy discussions, nor
does he adorn his style with rhetorical flourishes or copious quotations
from Bible and Talmud. The "Olam Katon" is clearly meant for beginners,
who require a summary and compendious view of so much of physics,
psychology, metaphysics and ethics as will give them an idea of the
position of man in the world, and his duties, theoretical and practical,
in this life, that he may fulfil his destiny for which he was created.
It is very possible that Ibn Zaddik modelled his work on the
Encyclopædia of the Brethren of Purity, leaving out all that he regarded
as unessential or objectional and abridging the rest.
Accordingly, the "Microcosm" is divided into four parts. The first part
treats of what is called in the Aristotelian classification of the
sciences Physics, _i. e._, the principles and constitution of the
corporeal world and its processes. The second treats of man, including
anthropology and psychology. The third is devoted to a discussion of the
existence, unity, incorporeality and other attributes of God, based upon
the doctrine of the creation of the world. This bears the stamp of the
Kalam, and is indebted to the writings of Saadia, Bahya and Joseph
al-Basir. It covers the topics usually treated by the Mutakallimun in
the division of their works, known by the name of "Bab al Tauhid,"
treatise on Unity. The fourth part corresponds to the "Bab al Adi" of
the Kalam, _i. e._, the second division of Kalamistic works devoted to
theodicy, or vindication of God's justice in his dealings with mankind.
Hence it includes theological questions of an ethical nature, like
freedom of the will, reasons for divine worship, the nature of reward
and punishment, and so on.
The book was written, Ibn Zaddik tells us, in answer to the question of
a pupil concerning the meaning of such terms as "perfection" and
"permanent good," used by philosophers. They are not of this world these
men say, and yet every man of intelligence should seek them. This is a
very difficult subject, made more so by the small number of persons
engaged in its study. Particularly in our own generation is this true,
that the value of knowledge and investigation is not recognized. People
are Jews in name only, and men only in outward appearance. Former ages
were much superior in this regard.
Two fundamental requisites are necessary for the knowledge of our
subject. They are the knowledge of God, and performance of his will. For
this purpose we must understand the works of the philosophers. But these
in turn require a knowledge of the preliminary sciences of arithmetic,
geometry, music, astronomy, and logic. This takes a long time and is
likely to weary the student, especially the beginner. I have therefore
made it my purpose to show how a man can know himself, for from a
knowledge of self he will come to a knowledge of all. Man is called
"Microcosm," a world in miniature, because he has in him represented all
the elements of the universe. His body resembles the corporeal world;
his rational soul the spiritual world. Hence the importance of knowing
himself, and hence the definition of philosophy as a man's _knowledge of
himself_. Philosophy is the science of sciences and the end thereof,
because it is the path to a knowledge of the Creator.[168]
Here we see at the outset Ibn Zaddik's Neo-Platonic tendency to make a
short cut to knowledge through the study of man instead of the painful
and laborious mastery of the preliminary sciences. And so it was that
the Neo-Platonists added little to Aristotle's study of nature,
concentrating their attention upon the intelligible or spiritual world.
The first thing we must do then is to show that the human body is
similar to the corporeal world. This will require an analysis of the
structure of the latter. But before examining the _objects_ of
knowledge, we must say a word about the process of knowing. Man
perceives things in two ways--through sense and through intellect. His
senses give him the accidents of things, the shell or husk, so to speak.
He perceives color through sight, sound through hearing, odor through
smell, and so on. It takes reason to penetrate to the essence of an
object. Take as an example a book. The sense of sight perceives its
color, and through the color its form. This is then apprehended by the
power of imagination or representation. The latter in turn hands it over
to the cogitative power of the rational soul, from the reflection of
which results the spiritual reality of the object, which is its
knowledge. So we see that the reason knows the essence and reality of a
thing, whereas the senses know only its husk and its accidents. This
same thing is stated by the philosopher in another form. The senses, he
says, know only the particular, the universal can be known by the
intellect only. This is because the soul is fine and penetrating, while
the body is gross, and can reach the surface only.
We may also classify knowledge from another point of view as necessary
(or immediate), and demonstrated (or mediate). Necessary knowledge is
that which no sane man can deny. Such knowledge may be of the senses, as
the sight of the sun or the sound of thunder; or it may be of the
reason, such as that the whole is greater than its parts. We may then
enumerate four kinds of things known directly without the help of other
knowledge, (1) The percepts of the senses. (2) Truths generally admitted
by reason of their self-evidence. (3) Traditional truths, _i. e._,
truths handed down by a reliable and wise man, or by a community worthy
of credence. (4) First principles or axioms. These four can be easily
reduced to two; for traditional truths ultimately go back to the
testimony of the senses; while first principles or axioms are included
in self-evident propositions. We thus have two kinds of necessary or
immediate knowledge, the data of sense, and self-evident propositions.
The latter kind is superior to the former, because man shares sense
knowledge with the lower animals; whereas rational propositions are
peculiar to him alone.
Demonstrated knowledge is built upon necessary knowledge, and is derived
from it by means of logical inference.[169]
We may now proceed to discuss the principles of the corporeal world.
Matter is the foundation and principle of a thing. All things, natural
as well as artificial, are composed of matter and form. Wood is the
common matter of chair and bed. Their forms are different. So the common
matter of the four elements is the prime matter endowed with the form of
corporeality, _i. e._, with the capacity of filling place. This form of
corporeality makes the prime matter corporeal substance. Matter is
relative to form, form is relative to matter.
Spiritual things also have matter and form. In corporeal artificial
things like ring or bracelet, the matter is gold, the form is the form
of ring or bracelet, the efficient cause is the art of the goldsmith,
the final cause or purpose is the adornment. In spiritual things we may
compare genus to matter, species to form, specific difference to
efficient cause, the individual to the final cause.
Everything exists either by itself (_per se_) or in something else.
Matter exists by itself, form exists in something else, in matter.
Matter is potentially substance; after it assumes a form it becomes
actual substance. In reality there is no matter without form, but in
thought we can remove the form and leave the matter.
Substance may be described as that which bears opposite and changing
qualities. No substance can be the opposite of another substance through
its substantiality, but through its accidents; for opposition resides in
quality. Matter receiving form is substance. Absolute substance is
simple and spiritual, for it cannot be perceived through the five
senses. When the philosophers say that all body is substance, and that
the individual is a substance, they use substance in contradistinction
to accident, meaning that the individual exists by itself, and needs not
another for its existence, unlike accidents, which must have something
to exist in.
This absolute substance, which is simple and spiritual, seems to be
identical with Gabirol's "substantia quæ sustinet decem prædicamenta,"
the substance which supports the ten categories. Gabirol means by it
that which remains of a corporeal substance when we take away from it
everything that qualifies it as being here or there, of a particular
nature or size, in a given relation, and so on.
The expression corporeal world includes the celestial spheres and all
which is under them. To be sure, the body of the sphere is different
from the other bodies in matter and form and qualities. It consists of a
fifth nature, different from the four elements. It is not cold, or it
would move downward like earth and water. It is not warm, or it would
move upward like air and fire. It is not wet, for it would then roll
like the waves of the sea. Nor is it dry, for it would condense and not
move at all. Not being any one of these qualities, which constitute our
four elements, the sphere is not a composite of them either; for the
simple is prior to the composite, and we cannot regard the elements of
the sublunar world as prior and superior to the spheres.
The sphere is neither light nor heavy. For light and heavy are relative
terms. An object is heavy when out of its natural place, light when in
its natural place. Thus a stone is heavy when it is away from the earth,
which is its natural place, but is light when it comes to rest where it
belongs. The sphere is never out of its place or in its place, as it
moves constantly in a circle. Hence it is neither light nor heavy.
Ibn Zaddik's definition of light and heavy as being relative, and
dependent on the relation of the object to its natural place is
peculiar, and would lead him to say that fire and air are also heavy
when out of their natural place, which is outside of, and above earth
and water. But this does not seem in consonance with the Aristotelian
use of these terms. According to Aristotle an object is heavy if its
tendency is to move to the centre of the world; it is light if it moves
away from the centre to the circumference. Hence earth and water are
heavy, fire and air are light. The natural place of a body or element is
that to which it has a tendency to move, or in which it has a tendency
to rest, when left to itself. Hence a body will always move to its
natural place when away from it and under no restriction; and its
heaviness or lightness does not change with its position.
To continue, the sphere moves in a circle, the most perfect of all
motions, having neither beginning nor end. It is more perfect than all
bodies, and the knowledge of God is not hidden from it as it is hidden
from us. Whatever moves in a circle must move around a body at rest; for
if it moves around another moving body, this second body must have
another body around which it moves, and this third body another, and so
on _ad infinitum_, which is impossible. Hence the sphere moves around a
body at rest. This is the earth.
The four elements of the sublunar world are, fire, air, water, earth. In
their purity these elements have neither color nor taste, nor odor nor
any other sensible property. For the elements are simple bodies, whereas
the sensible qualities are the result of the composition of the
elements. If air had color, we should see it as we see all colored
things; and all other things would appear to us in the color of air, as
is the case when we look through a colored glass. The same argument
applies to water.
The elements change into each other. We see water changing under the
effect of heat into vapor, and the vapor condenses again under the
influence of cold and changes back to water, namely, rain. Air changes
into fire when flint strikes iron. Fire cannot exist here unless it has
something to take hold of; otherwise it changes into air. Earth and
water change into each other very slowly, because earth is hard to
change.
The basis of the four elements is a substance filling place as a result
of its assuming the form of corporeality, _i. e._, extension in three
directions. Filling place, it moves; moving, it becomes warm. When its
motion is completed, it necessarily comes to rest and becomes cold. Heat
and cold are the active powers, wet and dry are the passive qualities,
wet being associated with heat, dry with cold. The mixture of these
qualities with the corporeal basis results in the four elements.
The three natures, mineral, plant, animal are composed of the four
elements. When a seed is put in the ground it cannot grow without water,
and sunshine and air. These form its food, and food is assimilated to
the thing fed. Our bodies are composed of the four elements, because
they are nourished by plants. The general process of the sublunar world
is that of genesis and dissolution. The genesis of one thing is the
dissolution of another. The dissolution of the egg is the genesis of the
chicken; the dissolution of the chicken is the genesis of the four
elements; for in the living being the elements are potential, and they
become actual when the animal dies. This continuous process of genesis
and dissolution proves that this world is not permanent, for the basis
of its processes is change.[170]
The human body corresponds to the corporeal world, and is similar to it
in its nature and matter. Man's body is subject to genesis and decay
like other objects. It is composed of the elements and returns to them.
It has in it the nature of minerals, plants and animals. It has the
power of growth, sustenance and reproduction like plants. Man is like
animal in having motion and sensation. He has the spirited power and the
appetitive like other animals. His body is perfect because it has
resemblances to all kinds of plants and animals. His body as a whole
resembles great trees, his hair is like grass and shrubs. Animals have
various qualities according to the relation of the animal soul to the
body. Thus the lion has strength, the lamb meekness, the fox shrewdness,
and so on. Mankind includes all of these qualities. In the same way
various animals have various instincts resembling arts, such as the
weaving of the spider, the building of the bird and the bee, and so on.
They also subsist on various foods. Man alone combines all arts and all
kinds of food.
The human body has three dimensions like inanimate bodies. It is also
similar to the bodies of plants and animals, and at the same time is
distinguished alone among animals by its erect position. This is due to
the fact that man's nature is proportionate, and his body is purer and
finer than other bodies. Thus we see when oil is pure, its flame rises
in a straight line; when the oil is impure the flame is not straight.
Another thing proving that man's nature is superior to that of other
animals is that the latter live in that element which is akin to their
constitution--fish in water, birds in air, quadrupeds on land. Man alone
can inhabit all three. Another reason for man's erect position is that
he is a plant originating in heaven. Hence his head, which is the root,
faces heaven.[171]
Man has three souls, a plant soul, an animal soul and a rational soul.
He must have a plant soul to account for the fact that man grows like
other plants and dies like them. For if he can grow without a plant
soul, plants can do the same. And if this too is granted, then there is
no reason why mountains and stones should not grow also. Again, if man
can grow without a plant soul, he can live without an animal soul, and
know without a rational soul, which is absurd.
The faculty of the vegetative soul is the appetitive power, whose seat
is in the liver. Its subordinate powers are those of nutrition and
growth. Through it man feels the need of food and other natural desires.
He has this in common with the lower animals. It is the first power that
appears in man while he is still in his mother's womb. First comes the
power which forms the combined seed of the male and the female into a
human being in its proper form and nature. In doing this it requires the
assistance of the "growing" power, which begins its activity as soon as
the first member is formed, and continues until the period of youth is
completed. This power in turn needs the assistance of the nourishing
power, which accompanies the other two from the beginning of their
activity to the end of the person's life. All this constitutes the plant
soul, and it must not be supposed that these powers are separated from
one another, and that one is in one place and another in another place.
_They are all spiritual powers derived from the universal powers in the
upper world._
When the form of the being is complete, the animal soul makes its
appearance. This soul is carried in the spirit of the animal or man,
which is found in the pure blood of the arteries. There are two
membranes in every artery, making two passages, one for blood and the
other for the spirit or wind. The seat of the animal soul is in the
heart, and it is borne in the pure red blood. This is why we see in the
heart two receptacles; in one is spirit, in the other, blood. Hence
after death we find congealed blood in the one, while the other is
empty. Death happens on account of the defective "mixture" of the heart.
This means that the four humors of which the body is composed, namely,
blood, yellow and black gall and phlegm, lose the proper proportionality
in their composition, and one or other of them predominates. An animal
does not die unless the mixture of the heart is injured, or the heart is
wounded seriously. Death is also caused by disease or injury of the
brain. For the brain is the origin of the nerves which control the
voluntary activities by means of contraction and expansion. If the chest
does not contract, the warm air does not come out; if it does not
expand, the cold air does not come in; and if the air does not come in
or out, the heart loses its proportionality, and the animal dies. The
functions of the animal soul are sensation and motion. This motion may
be active as well as passive. The active motions are those of the
arteries, and the expansion and contraction of the chest which results
in respiration. The passive motions give rise to the emotions of anger,
fear, shame, joy, sorrow.
Anger is the motion of the spirit within the body toward the outside,
together with the blood and the humors. This is found in animals also.
Fear is the entrance of the soul within, leaving the surface of the
body, and causing the extremities to become cold. Shame is a motion
inward, and forthwith again outward. Sorrow is caused in the same way as
fear, except that fear is sudden, while sorrow is gradual. This is why
fear sometimes kills when the body is weak. Joy is motion outward. Joy
may kill too, when it is very great, and the person is weak and without
control. Joy is of the nature of pleasure, except that pleasure is
gradual, while joy is sudden.
Pain is that feeling we have when we are taken out of our natural state
and put into an unnatural. Pleasure is felt when we are restored to the
natural. Take, for example, the heat of the sun. When a person is
exposed to it, the sun takes him out of his natural state. Heat is then
painful, and pleasure is produced by the thing which restores him to his
natural state; in this case a cold spring and a drink of cold water.
Similarly a person walking in the snow and cold air feels pain by reason
of the cold taking him out of his natural state. Heat then gives him
pleasure by restoring him. The same thing applies to hunger and thirst,
sleeping and waking, and other things which give us pleasure and pain.
Without pain there is no pleasure, and the pleasure varies in accordance
with the antecedent pain.
Life is the effect of the animal soul. The disappearance of the effect
does not necessarily involve the disappearance of the cause, as the
disappearance of the smoke does not require the cessation of the fire.
Death means simply the separation of the soul, not the destruction
thereof. It does not follow because the human soul remains after the
death of the body, that the soul of the ox and the ass continues
likewise, for the two souls are different. Animals were created for the
sake of man, whereas man exists for his own sake. Moreover, man's life
is ultimately derived from his rational soul. For if the animal soul of
man were the ultimate source of life, the rational soul too would be
dependent for its life upon the former, and hence would be inferior to
it, which is absurd. It remains then that the _rational soul gives
existence to the animal soul in man_.
Sleep is the rest of the senses, as death is their entire cessation. The
purpose of sleep is to give the brain rest so that the "spirit" of the
soul should not be dissolved and the "mixture" of the body injured
suddenly and cause death. The heart rests continually between
contraction and expansion, hence it needs no special rest at night.
Waking is the activity of the senses and the exercise of their functions
to satisfy the desires of the body. The motions of the soul in the
waking state are in the interest of the needs of the body. During sleep
the soul looks out for itself, for its better world, being then free
from the business of the body. If it is pure and bright, and the body
is free from the remnant of food, and the thought is not depressed by
sorrow and grief--then the soul is aroused in its desire for the future,
and beholds wonderful things.[172]
No one can deny that man has a rational soul because speech is an
attribute which man has above all other animals. The soul is not a
corporeal thing, for if it were it would have to occupy place like body,
and would have color and form and other qualities like body. Moreover,
it would require something else to give it life like body. In other
words, the soul would require another soul, and that soul another soul,
and so on _ad infinitum_, which is impossible. Hence the soul is not a
corporeal thing.
Nor can we say that the soul is _in_ the body. For if it were, it would
itself be body; since only body can fill the empty place in another
body, as water fills a jar.
The soul is a substance and not an accident. An accident is a quality
which makes its appearance in something else, and has no permanence. If
then the rational soul is an accident of the body, it has no permanence,
and man is sometimes rational and sometimes not. This is absurd, for in
that case there could be no purpose in giving him commandments and
statutes.
There are inseparable accidents to be sure, like the color of the
Ethiopian's skin. But in that case we know the color is an accident
despite its inseparability, from the fact that in other things color is
an accident and may be removed. This will not apply to the reason. For
we do not find anything in which reason is a removable accident. The
moment you remove reason, you remove man, for reason is essential to
man. The fact that as a result of an injury a man may lose his reason is
no argument against us, for this happens only when an injury is
inflicted on the brain, which is the reason's instrument. This accounts
for the fact, too, that men in good health if given henbane to drink
lose their reason, because the drink affects the brain. On the other
hand, we see that those afflicted with a certain disease of the
intestines, which causes their death, are more rational and brighter at
the time of death than ever before, showing that the soul cannot be an
accident depending upon the "mixture" of the body.
To regard the soul as an accident, while the body is a substance, would
make the soul inferior to the body. This is absurd. For we have the
body in common with the beasts; whereas it is in virtue of the reason
that we are given commandments, and reward and punishment in the world
to come.
If the soul is neither a corporeal thing nor an accident of body, it
must be a spiritual substance. And the best definition of the soul is
that of Aristotle, who says it is _a substance giving perfection to a
natural organic body, which has life potentially_. Every phrase in this
definition tells. "Substance" excludes the view that the soul is an
accident. "Giving perfection" signifies that the soul is that which
makes man perfect, bringing him to the next world, and being the purpose
not merely of his creation and the composition of his body, but of the
creation of matter as well. "Natural organic body" indicates that the
body is an organon, or instrument in the function of the soul, the
latter using the body to carry out its own purposes. The rational soul
is like a king; the animal soul is like an official before the king,
rebuking the appetitive soul.
In the discussion of the last paragraph we have a good example of the
uncritical attitude of Ibn Zaddik toward the various schools of
philosophical thought, particularly those represented by Plato and
Aristotle. This attitude is typical of the middle ages, which appealed
to authority in philosophy as well as in theology, and hence developed a
harmonistic attitude in the presence of conflicting authorities. Aided
by their defective knowledge of the complete systems of the ancient
Greek philosophers, by the difficulties and obscurities incident to
translations from an alien tongue, and by the spurious writings
circulating in the name of an ancient Greek philosopher, the precise
demarcation of schools and tendencies became more and more confused, and
it was possible to prove that Plato and Aristotle were in entire
agreement. Thus Ibn Zaddik has no scruple in combining (unconsciously,
to be sure) Platonic and Neo-Platonic psychology with the Aristotelian
definition representing quite a different point of view. The one is
anthropological dualism, regarding the soul as a distinct entity which
comes to the body from without. The other is a biological monism, in
which the soul is the reality of the body, the essence of its
functioning, which makes the potentially living body an actually living
body. We cannot enter here into a criticism of the elements of the
Aristotelian definition of the soul as rendered and interpreted by Ibn
Zaddik, but will merely say that it misses completely the meaning of
Aristotle, and shows that Ibn Zaddik did not take it from the "De Anima"
of Aristotle, but found it without its context in some Arabic work.
To return from our digression, the three souls, Ibn Zaddik tells us, are
spiritual powers; every one of them is a substance by itself of benefit
to the body. The rational soul gets the name soul primarily, and the
others get it from the rational soul. The _Intellect_ is called soul
because the rational soul and the Intellect have a common matter. And
hence when the soul is perfected it becomes intellect. This is why the
rational soul is called potential intellect. The only difference between
them is one of degree and excellence. The world of Intellect is
superior, and its matter is the pure light, Intellect in which there is
no ignorance, because it comes from God without any intermediate agency.
Here we see just a touch of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation, of
which the Universal Intellect is the first. But it is considerably toned
down and not continued down the series as in Plotinus or the Brethren of
Purity.
The accidents of the soul are spiritual like the soul itself. They are,
knowledge, kindness, goodness, justice, and other similar qualities.
Ignorance, wrong, evil, and so on, are not the opposites of those
mentioned above, and were not created with the soul like the others.
They are merely the absence of the positive qualities mentioned before,
as darkness is the absence of light. God did not create any defect, nor
did he desire it. Evil is simply the result of the incapacity of a given
thing to receive a particular good. If all things were capable of
receiving goods equally, all things would be one thing, and the Creator
and his creatures would be likewise one. This was not God's purpose.
There is a tacit opposition to the Mutakallimun in Ibn Zaddik's
arguments against the view that the soul is an accident, as well as in
his statement in the preceding paragraph that the bad qualities and evil
generally are not opposites of the good qualities and good respectively,
but that they are merely privations, absences, and hence not created by
God. This is a Neo-Platonic doctrine. Pseudo-Bahya, we have seen (p. 108
f.), and Abraham bar Hiyya (p. 123 f.) adopt the Kalamistic view in the
latter point, and solve the problem of evil differently.
The function of the rational soul is knowledge. The rational soul
investigates the unknown and comprehends it. It derives general rules,
makes premises and infers one thing from another. Man alone has this
privilege. It is in virtue of the rational soul that we have been given
commandments and prohibitions, and become liable to reward and
punishment. Brute animals have no commandments, because they have no
reason. The soul has reason only potentially, and man makes it actual by
study. If the reason were actual originally in the soul, there would be
no difference between the soul's condition in its own world and in this
one; and the purpose of man, which is that he may learn in order to
choose the right way and win salvation, would have no meaning.
The existence of many individual souls, all of which have the soul
character in common, shows that there is a universal soul by virtue of
which all the particular souls exist. This division of the universal
soul into many individual souls is not really a division of the former
in its essence, which remains one and indivisible. It is the bodies
which receive the influence of the universal soul, as vessels in the sun
receive its light according to their purity. Hence the existence of
justice and evil, righteousness and wrong. This does not, however, mean
to say that the reception of these qualities is independent of a man's
choice. Man is free to choose, and hence he deserves praise and blame,
reward and punishment.
The rational soul is destined for the spiritual world, which is a pure
and perfect world, made by God directly without an intermediate agency.
It is not subject to change or defect or need. God alone created this
spiritual world to show his goodness and power, and not because he
needed it. The world is not like God, though God is its cause. It is not
eternal _a parte ante_, having been made out of nothing by God; but it
will continue to exist forever, for it cannot be more perfect than it
is. It is simple and spiritual. This applies also to the heavenly
spheres and their stars.
Man is obliged to reason and investigate, as all nations do according to
the measure of their capacities. No animal reasons because it has not
the requisite faculty. But if man should neglect to exercise the power
given him, he would lose the benefit coming therefrom and the purpose of
his existence. There would then be no difference between him and the
beast.
The first requisite for study and investigation is to deaden the animal
desires. Then with the reason as a guide and his body as a model, man
acquires the knowledge of the corporeal world. From his rational soul he
comes to the knowledge of the existence of a spiritual world. Finally he
will learn to know the Creator, who is the only real existent, for
nothing can be said truly to exist, which at one time did not exist, or
which at some time will cease to exist. When a man neglects this
privilege which is his of using his reason, he forfeits the name man,
and descends below the station of the beast, for the latter never falls
below its animal nature.
It is very important to study the knowledge of God, for it is the
highest knowledge and the cause of human perfection. The prophets are
full of recommendations in this regard. Jeremiah says (31, 33), "They
shall all know me, from the least of them even unto their greatest."
Amos (5, 6) bids us "Seek for the Lord and you shall live." Hosea
likewise (6, 3) recommends that "We may feel it, and strive to know the
Lord."[173]
The first loss a man suffers who does not study and investigate is that
he does not understand the real existence of God, and imagines he is
worshipping a body. Some think God is light. But this is as bad as to
regard him body. For light is an accident in a shining body, as is
proved by the fact that the air receives the light of the sun, and later
it receives the shadow and becomes dark. And yet these people are not
the worst by any means, for there are others who do not trouble to
concentrate their minds on God, and occupy their thoughts solely with
the business and the pleasures of this world. These people we do not
discuss at all. We are arguing against those who imagine they are wise
men and students of the Kalam. In fact they are ignorant persons, and do
not know what logic is and how it is to be used.
Before giving our own views of the nature and existence of God, we must
refute the objectionable doctrines of these people. Joseph al-Basir in a
work of his called "Mansuri" casts it up to the Rabbanites that in
believing that God descends and ascends they are not true worshippers of
God. But he forgets that his own doctrines are no better. Anyone who
believes that God created with a newly created will and rejects by means
of a newly created rejection has never truly served God or known him.
Just as objectionable is their view that God is living but not with life
residing in a subject, powerful but not with power, and so on. We shall
take up each of these in turn.
The Mutakallimun refuse to believe that God's will is eternal, for fear
of having a second eternal beside God. And so they say that whenever God
wills, he creates a will for the purpose, and whenever he rejects
anything he creates a "rejection" with which the objectionable thing is
rejected. But this leads them to a worse predicament than the one from
which they wish to escape, as we shall see. If God cannot create
anything without having a will as the instrument in creating, and for
this reason must first create a will for the purpose--how did he create
this will? He must have had another will to create this will, and a
third will to create the second, and so on _ad infinitum_, which is
absurd. If he created the first will without the help of another will,
why not create the things he wanted outright without any will? Besides,
in making God will at a given time after a state of not willing, they
introduce change in God.
As for the other dictum, that God is "living but not with life,"
"powerful but not with power," "knowing but not with knowledge," and so
on; what do they mean by this circumlocution? If they say "living" to
indicate that he is not dead, and add "but not with life," so as to
prevent a comparison of him with other living things, why not say also,
"He is body, but not like other bodies"? If the objection to calling him
body is that body is composite, and what is composite must have been
composed by someone and is not eternal, the same objection applies to
"living." For "living" implies "breathing" and "possessed of sensation,"
hence also composite and created. If they reply, we mean life peculiar
to him, we say why not also body peculiar to him? You see these people
entangle themselves in their own sophisms, because they do not know what
demonstration means.[174]
Having disposed of the errors of the Mutakallimun, we must now present
our own method of investigation into the nature of God. To know a thing,
we investigate its four causes--material, formal, efficient and final.
What has no cause but is the cause of all things, cannot be known in
this way. Still it is not altogether unknowable for this reason. Its
essence cannot be known, but it may be known through its activities, or
rather effects, which suggest attributes. We cannot therefore know
concerning God _what_ he is, nor _how_ he is, nor _on account of what_,
nor _of what kind_, nor _where_, nor _when_. For these can apply only to
a created thing having a cause. But we can ask concerning him, _whether_
he is; and this can best be known from his deeds.
We observe the things of the world and find that they are all composed
of substance and accident, as we saw before (p. 131). These are
correlative, and one cannot exist without the other. Hence neither
precedes the other. But accident is "new" (_i. e._, not eternal), hence
so is substance. That accident is new is proved from the fact that rest
succeeds motion and motion succeeds rest, hence accidents constantly
come and go and are newly created.
Now if substance and accident are both new there must be something that
brought them into being unless they bring themselves into being. But the
latter is impossible, for the agent must either exist when it brings
itself into being, or not. If it exists it is already there; if it does
not exist, it is nothing, and nothing cannot do anything. Hence there
must be a being that brought the world into existence. This is God.
God is one, for the cause of the many must be the one. If the cause of
the many is the many, then the cause of the second many is a third many,
and so on _ad infinitum_; hence we must stop with the one. God is to the
world as unity is to number. Unity is the basis of number without being
included in number, and it embraces number on all sides. It is the
foundation of number; for if you remove unity, you remove number; but
the removal of number does not remove unity. The one surrounds number on
all sides; for the beginning of number is the one, and it is also the
middle of number and the end thereof. For number is nothing but an
aggregate of ones. Besides, number is composed of odds and evens, and
one is the cause of odd as well as even.
If there were two eternal beings, they would either coincide in all
respects, and they would be one and not two. Or they would differ. In
the latter case, the world is either the work of both or of one only.
If of both, they are not omnipotent, and hence not eternal. If of one
only, then the other does not count, since he is not eternal, and there
is only one.
By saying God is one we do not mean that he comes under the category of
quantity, for quantity is an accident residing in a substance, and all
substance is "new." What we mean is that the essence of God is true
unity, not numerical unity. For numerical unity is also in a sense
multiplicity, and is capable of multiplication and division. God's unity
is alone separate and one in all respects.
God is not like any of his creatures. For if he were, he would be
possessed of quality, since it is in virtue of quality that a thing is
said to be like another, and quality is an accident contained in a
substance.
God is self-sufficient and not in need of anything. For if he needed
anything at all, it would be first of all the one who created him and
made him an existent thing. But this is absurd, since God is eternal. We
might suppose that he needs the world, which he created for some
purpose, as we sometimes make things to assist us. But this, too, is
impossible. For if he were dependent upon the world for anything, he
could not create it. It is different with us. We do not create things;
we only modify matter already existing.
Again, if God created the world for his own benefit, then either he was
always in need of the world, or the need arose at the time of creating.
If he was always in need of the world, it would have existed with him
from eternity, but we have already proved that the world is not eternal.
If the need arose in him at the time of creation, as heat arises in a
body after cold, or motion after rest, then he is like created things,
and is himself "new" and not eternal. To say the need was always there,
and yet he did not create it until the time he did would be to ascribe
inability to God of creating the world before he did, which is absurd.
For one who is unable at any given time, cannot create at all. It
remains then that he does not need anything, and that he created the
world by reason of his goodness and generosity and nothing else.
The question of God's will is difficult. The problem is this. If God's
will is eternal and unchanging, and he created the world with his will,
the world is eternal. If we say, as we must, that he created the world
after a condition of non-creation, we introduce a change in God, a
something newly created in him, namely, the will to create, which did
not exist before. This is a dilemma. My own view is that since God's
creating activity is his essence, and his essence is infinite and
eternal, we cannot say he created _after_ a condition of non-creation,
or that he willed _after_ a condition of non-willing, or that he was
formerly not able. And yet we do not mean that the world is eternal. It
was created a definite length of time before our time. The solution of
the problem is that time itself was created with the world; for time is
the measure of motion of the celestial sphere, and if there are no
spheres there is no time, and no before and after. Hence it does not
follow because the world is not eternal that _before_ its creation God
did not create. There is no _before_ when the world is not.
We objected to the view of the Mutakallimun (p. 142), who speak of God
creating a will on the ground that if he can create a will directly he
can create the world instead. Our opinion is therefore that God's will
is eternal and not newly created, for the latter view introduces
creation in God. There is still the difficulty of the precise relation
of the will to God. If it is different from God we have two eternals,
and if it is the same as God in all respects, he changes when he
creates. My answer is, it is not different from God in any sense, and
there is no changing attribute in God. But there is a subtle mystery in
this matter, which it is not proper to reveal, and this is not the place
to explain it. The interested reader is referred to the book of
Empedocles and other works of the wise men treating of this subject
(_cf._ above, p. 64).
God created the world out of nothing, and not out of a pre-existent
matter. For if the matter of the world is eternal like God, there is no
more reason for supposing that God formed a world out of it than that it
formed a world out of God.
The world is perfect. For we have repeatedly shown that its creation is
due entirely to God's goodness. If then it were not perfect, this would
argue in God either ignorance or niggardliness or weakness.[175]
Most of the ancients avoided giving God attributes for fear of making
him the bearer of qualities, which would introduce plurality and
composition in his essence. The proper view, however, is this. As God's
essence is different from all other essences, so are his attributes
different from all other attributes. His attributes are not different
from him; his knowledge and his truth and his power are his essence. The
way man arrives at the divine attributes is this. Men have examined his
works and learned from them God's existence. They then reflected on this
existent and found that he was not weak; so they called him strong. They
found his works perfect, and they called him wise. They perceived that
he was self-sufficient, without need of anything, and hence without any
motives for doing wrong. Hence they called him righteous. And so on with
the other attributes. All this they did in order that people may learn
from him and imitate his ways. But we must not forget that all these
expressions of God's attributes are figurative. No one must suppose that
if we do not say he has life, it means he is dead. What we mean is that
we cannot apply the term living to God literally, in the sense in which
we apply it to other living things. When the Bible does speak of God as
alive and living, the meaning is that he exists forever. The philosopher
is right when he says that it is more proper to apply negative
attributes to God than positive.[176]
Taking a glance at Ibn Zaddik's theology just discussed in its essential
outlines, we notice that while he opposes vigorously certain aspects of
Kalamistic thought, as he found them in al-Basir, the Karaite, his own
method and doctrine are not far removed from the Kalam. His proof of the
creation of the world from its composite character (substance and
accident) is the same as one of Saadia, which Maimonides cites as a
Kalamistic proof. We have already spoken of the fact that the method of
basing one's theology upon the creation of the world is one that is
distinctive of the Kalam, as Maimonides himself tells us. And this
method is common to Saadia, Bahya and Ibn Zaddik. In his discussion of
the attributes Ibn Zaddik offers little if anything that is new. His
attitude is that in the literal and positive sense no attribute can be
applied to God. We can speak of God negatively without running the risk
of misunderstanding. But the moment we say anything positive we do
become thus liable to comparing God with other things; and such
circumlocutions as the Kalamistic "Living without life," and so on, do
not help matters, for they are contradictory, and take away with one
hand what they give with the other. The Biblical expressions must be
taken figuratively; and the most important point to remember is that
God's essence cannot be known at all. The manner in which we arrive at
the divine attributes is by transferring them from God's effects in
nature to his own essence. All this we have already found in Bahya much
better expressed, and Bahya is also without doubt the source of Ibn
Zaddik's discussion of God's unity.
We must now review briefly the practical part of Ibn Zaddik's philosophy
as it is found in the fourth part of the "Microcosm." In the manner of
Bahya he points out the importance of divine service and obedience to
the commandments of God, viewing man's duties to his maker as an
expression of gratitude, which everyone owes to his benefactor. Like
Bahya he compares God's benefactions with those of one man to another to
show the infinite superiority of the former, and the greater duty which
follows therefrom.
The commandments which God gave us like the act of our creation are for
our own good, that we may enjoy true happiness in the world to come. As
it would not be proper to reward a person for what he has not done, God
gave man commandments. The righteous as well as the wicked are free to
determine their own conduct, hence reward and punishment are just.
Like Saadia and Bahya before him, Ibn Zaddik makes use of the
distinction (or rather takes it for granted) between rational and
traditional commandments; pointing out that the latter also have a cause
and explanation in the mind of God even though we may not know it. In
some cases we can see the explanation ourselves. Take for instance the
observance of the Sabbath. Its rational signification is two-fold. It
teaches us that the world was created, and hence has a Creator whom we
worship. And in the second place the Sabbath symbolizes the future
world. As one has nothing to eat on the Sabbath day unless he has
prepared food the day before, so the enjoyment of the future world
depends upon spiritual preparation in this world.
In his conduct a man must imitate God's actions by doing good and mercy
and kindness. Without the knowledge of God a person's good deeds are of
no account and no better than the work of idolaters. In fact it is not
possible to do good deeds without a knowledge of God, for he is the
source of all good, and there is no true good without him. When a fool
is seen with good qualities such as mercy and benevolence, they are due
to the weakness of his animal soul, the spirited part of his nature.
Similarly if this fool abstains from pleasures, it is because of the
weakness of his appetitive soul.
Thus we see that knowledge comes first in importance; for knowledge
leads to practice, and practice brings reward in the world to come. As
the purpose of man's creation is that he may enjoy the future life,
wisdom or knowledge is the first requisite to this great end.
The four principal qualities constituting goodness or virtue are (1)
knowledge of God's attributes; (2) righteousness or justice; (3) hope;
(4) humility. All other good qualities are derived from these. Jeremiah
names some of them when he says (9, 23), "I am the Lord who exercise
kindness, justice and righteousness on the earth; for in these things I
delight, saith the Lord." Similarly Zephaniah (2, 3) bids us, "Seek ye
the Lord, all ye meek of the earth, who have fulfilled his ordinances;
seek righteousness, seek meekness."
The four qualities of wisdom or knowledge, righteousness, hope and
humility are without doubt modified descendants of the four Platonic
virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, which we still find in
their original form and in their Platonic derivation and psychological
origin in Pseudo-Bahya (_cf._ above p. 111).
Reward and punishment of the real kind, Ibn Zaddik thinks, are not in
this world but in the next. In this way he accounts for the fact of the
prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the righteous. Another
proof that this world cannot be the place of final reward and punishment
is that pleasure in this world is not a real good, but only a temporary
respite from disease. Pain and pleasure are correlative, as we saw
before (p. 136). In fact pleasure is not a good at all; for if it were,
then the greater the pleasure, the greater the good, which is not true.
Reward in the next world is not a corporeal pleasure at all.
The evil which happens to the righteous in this world is often a natural
occurrence without reference to reward and punishment, and may be
compared to the natural pleasures which men derive from the sense of
sight and the other senses, and which have nothing to do with reward and
punishment. Sometimes, too, this evil is inflicted upon the good man to
forgive his sins. Real reward and punishment are in the future life,
and as that life is spiritual, the reward as well as the punishment is
timeless.
The Mutakallimun think that animals and little children are also
rewarded in the next world for ill treatment, suffering and death which
are inflicted upon them in this world. So we find in Joseph al Basir's
Mansuri. But this is absurd. If the killing of animals is a wrong, God
would not have commanded us to do it, any more than he ordered us to
kill human beings in order that he may reward them later. Moreover, we
should then deserve punishment for killing animals if that is wrong, and
there would follow the absurdity that God commanded us to do that for
which we deserve punishment. Besides, if the animals deserve reward and
punishment, they should have been given commandments and laws like
ourselves. If this was not done because animals are not rational, reward
and punishment are equally out of place for the same reason.
When the soul leaves the body in death, if she exercised her reason in
the pursuit of knowledge, she will continue her existence forever in the
upper world. This is her happiness, her reward and her paradise, namely,
to cleave to her own world, and to shine with the true light emanating
from God directly. This is the end of the human soul. But if she did not
exercise her reason and did not pursue right conduct, she will not be
able to return to the spiritual world, for she will have lost her own
spirituality. She will be similar to the body, desiring this world and
its pleasures. Her fate will be to revolve forever with the sphere in
the world of fire, without being able to return to her world. Thus she
will be forever in pain, and homeless.
When the Messiah comes, the pious men of our nation, the Prophets, the
Patriarchs and those who died for the sanctification of the name, _i. e._,
the martyrs, will be brought back to life in the body, and will
never die again. There will be no eating and drinking, but they will
live like Moses on the mountain basking in the divine light. The wicked
will also be joined to their bodies and burned with fire.[177]