BAHYA IBN PAKUDA
All that is known of the life of Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakuda is that he
lived in Spain and had the office of "Dayyan," or judge of the Jewish
community. Not even the exact time in which he lived is yet determined,
though the most reliable recent investigations make it probable that he
lived after Gabirol and was indebted to the latter for some of his views
in philosophy as well as in Ethics.[106] So far as traditional data are
concerned we have equally reliable, or rather equally unreliable
statements for regarding Bahya as an older contemporary of Gabirol
(eleventh century), or of Abraham ibn Ezra (1088-1167). Neither of these
two data being vouched for by any but their respective authors, who
lived a long time after Bahya, we are left to such indirect evidence as
may be gathered from the content of Bahya's ethical work, the "Duties of
the Hearts." And here the recent investigations of Yahuda, the latest
authority on this subject and the editor of the Arabic text of Bahya's
masterpiece (1912), force upon us the conclusion that Bahya wrote after
Gabirol. Yahuda has shown that many passages in the "Duties of the
Hearts" are practically identical in content and expression with similar
ideas found in a work of the Arab philosopher Gazali (1059-1111). This
leaves very little doubt that Bahya borrowed from Gazali and hence could
not have written before the twelfth century.
To be sure, there are arguments on the other side, which would give
chronological priority to Bahya over Gabirol,[107] but without going
into the details of this minute and difficult discussion, it may be said
generally that many of the similarities in thought and expression
between the two ethical works of Gabirol and Bahya rather point in favor
of the view here adopted, namely, that Bahya borrowed from Gabirol,
while the rest prove nothing for either side. In so far as a reader of
the "Duties of the Hearts" recognizes here and there an idea met with in
Gabirol's "Fons Vitæ," there can scarcely be any doubt that the latter
is the more original of the two. Gabirol did not borrow his philosophy
or any part thereof from Bahya. Despite its Neo-Platonic character the
"Fons Vitæ" of Gabirol is the most independent and original of Jewish
mediæval productions. The "Duties of the Hearts" owes what originality
it has to its ethics, which is the chief aim of the work, and not at all
to the introductory philosophical chapter. As we shall see later, the
entire chapter on the existence and unity of God, which introduces the
ethical teachings of Bahya, moves in the familiar lines of Saadia, Al
Mukammas, Joseph al Basir and the other Jewish Mutakallimun. There is
besides a touch of Neo-Platonism in Bahya, which may be due to Gabirol
as well as to Arabic sources. That Bahya did not borrow more from the
"Fons Vitæ" than he did is due no doubt to the difference in temperament
between the two men. Bahya is not a mystic. Filled as he is with the
spirit of piety and warmth of heart--an attitude reflected in his style,
which helped to make his work the most popular moral-religious book in
Jewish literature--there is no trace of pantheism or metaphysical
mysticism in his nature. His ideas are sane and rational, and their
expression clear and transparent. Gabirol's high flights in the "Fons
Vitæ" have little in common with Bahya's modest and brief outline of the
familiar doctrines of the existence, unity and attributes of God, for
which he claims no originality, and which serve merely as the background
for his contribution to religious ethics. That Bahya should have taken a
few leading notions from the "Fons Vitæ," such as did not antagonize his
temperament and mode of thinking, is quite possible, and we shall best
explain such resemblances in this manner.
As Abraham ibn Ezra in 1156 makes mention of Bahya and his views,[108]
we are safe in concluding that the "Duties of the Hearts" was written
between 1100 and 1156.
As the title of the work indicates, Bahya saw the great significance of
a distinction made by Mohammedan theologians and familiar in their
ascetic literature, between outward ceremonial or observance, known as
"visible wisdom" and "duties of the limbs," and inward intention,
attitude and feeling, called "hidden wisdom" and "duties of the
hearts."[109] The prophet Isaiah complains that the people are diligent
in bringing sacrifices, celebrating the festivals and offering prayer
while their hands are full of blood. He informs them that such conduct
is an abomination to the Lord, and admonishes them to wash themselves,
to make themselves clean, to put away the evil of their deeds from
before God's eyes; to cease to do evil; to learn to do well, to seek for
justice, to relieve the oppressed, to do justice to the fatherless, to
plead for the widow (Isa. 1, 11-17). This is a distinction between
duties to God and duties to one's fellow man, between religious ceremony
and ethical practice. Saadia makes a further distinction--also found in
Arabic theology before him--between those commandments and prohibitions
in the Bible which the reason itself approves as right or condemns as
wrong--the rational commandments--and those which to the reason seem
indifferent, and which revelation alone characterizes as obligatory,
permitted or forbidden--the so-called "traditional commandments."
Bahya's division is identical with neither the one nor the other.
Ethical practice may be purely external and a matter of the limbs, quite
as much as sacrifice and ceremonial ritual. On the other hand, one may
feel profoundly moved with the spirit of true piety, love of God and
loyalty to his commandments in the performance of a so-called
"traditional commandment," like the fastening of a "mezuzah" to the
door-post. Bahya finds room for Saadia's classification but it is with
him of subordinate importance, and is applicable only to the "duties of
the limbs." Among these alone are there some which the reason unaided by
revelation would not have prescribed. The "duties of the heart" are all
rational. Like all precepts they are both positive and negative.
Examples of positive duties of the heart are, belief in a creator who
made the world out of nothing; belief in his unity and incomparability;
the duty to serve him with all our heart, to trust in him, to submit to
him, to fear him, to feel that he is watching our open and secret
actions, to long for his favor and direct our actions for his name's
sake; to love those who love him so as to be near unto him, and to hate
those who hate him. Negative precepts of this class are the opposites of
those mentioned, and others besides, such as that we should not covet,
or bear a grudge, or think of forbidden things, or desire them or
consent to do them. The common characteristic of all duties of the heart
is that they are not visible to others. God alone can judge whether a
person's feeling and motives are pure or the reverse.
That these duties are incumbent upon us is clear from every point of
view. Like Saadia Bahya finds the sources of knowledge, particularly of
the knowledge of God's law and religion, in sense, reason, written law
and tradition. Leaving out the senses which are not competent in this
particular case, the obligatory character of the duties of the heart is
vouched for by the other three, reason, law, tradition.
From reason we know that man is composed of soul and body, and that both
are due to God's goodness. One is visible, the other is not. Hence we
are obliged to worship God in a two-fold manner; with visible worship
and invisible. Visible worship represents the duties of the limbs, such
as prayer, fasting, charity, and so on, which are carried out by the
visible organs. The hidden worship includes the duties of the heart, for
example, to think of God's unity, to believe in him and his Law, to
accept his worship, etc., all of which are accomplished by the thought
of the mind, without the assistance of the visible limbs.
Besides, the duties of the limbs, the obligation of which no one doubts,
are incomplete without the will of the heart to do them. Hence it
follows that there is a duty upon our souls to worship God to the extent
of our powers.
The Bible is just as emphatic in teaching these duties as the reason.
The love of God and the fear of God are constantly inculcated; and in
the sphere of negative precepts we have such prohibitions as, "Thou
shalt not covet" (Exod. 20, 17); "Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor
bear any grudge" (Lev. 19, 18); "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy
heart" (ib. 17); "You shalt not go astray after your own heart" (Num.
15, 39); "Thou shalt not harden thy heart nor shut thy hand from thy
needy brother" (Deut. 15, 7), and many others.
Rabbinical literature is just as full of such precepts as the Bible, and
is if possible even more emphatic in their inculcation. Witness such
sayings as the following: "Heaven regards the intention" (Sanh. 106b):
"The heart and the eye are two procurers of sin" (Jer. Berak. 1), and
many others, particularly in the treatise Abot.
The great importance of these duties is also made manifest by the fact
that the punishment in the Bible for unintentional misdeeds is more
lenient than for intentional, proving that for punishment the mind must
share with the body in the performance of the deed. The same is true of
reward, that none is received for performing a good deed if it is not
done "in the name of heaven."
They are even more important than the duties of the limbs, for unlike
the latter the obligation of the duties of the heart is always in force,
and is independent of periods or circumstances. Their number, too, is
infinite, and not limited, as are the duties of the limbs, to six
hundred and thirteen.
And yet, Bahya complains, despite the great importance of these duties,
very few are the men who observed them even in the generations preceding
ours, not to speak of our own days when even the external ceremonies are
neglected, much more so the class of precepts under discussion. The
majority of students of the Torah are actuated by desire for fame and
honor, and devote their time to the intricacies of legalistic discussion
in Rabbinic literature, and matters unessential, which are of no account
in the improvement of the soul; but they neglect such important subjects
of study as the unity of God, which we ought to understand and
distinguish from other unities, and not merely receive parrot fashion
from tradition. We are expressly commanded (Deut. 4, 39), "Know
therefore this day, and reflect in thy heart, that the Eternal is the
God in the heavens above, and upon the earth beneath: there is none
else." Only he is exempt from studying these matters whose powers are
not adequate to grasp them, such as women, children and simpletons.
Moreover Bahya is the first, he tells us, among the post-Talmudical
writers, to treat systematically and _ex professo_ this branch of our
religious duties. When I looked, he says, into the works composed by the
early writers after the Talmud on the commandments, I found that their
writings can be classified under three heads. First, exposition of the
Torah and the Prophets, like the grammatical and lexicographical
treatises of Ibn Janah, or the exegetical works of Saadia. Second, brief
compilations of precepts, like the works of Hefez ben Yazliah and the
responsa of some geonim. Third, works of a philosophico-apologetic
character, like those of Saadia, Al Mukammas and others, whose purpose
it was to present in an acceptable manner the doctrines of the Torah, to
prove them by logical demonstration, and to refute the criticisms and
erroneous views of unbelievers. But I have not seen any book dealing
with the "hidden wisdom."[110]
Here we see clearly the purpose of Bahya. It is not the rationalization
of Jewish dogma that he is interested in, nor the reconciliation of
religion and philosophy. It is the purification of religion itself from
within which he seeks to accomplish. Sincerity and consistency in our
words and our thoughts, so far as the service of God is concerned, is
the fundamental requirement and essential value of the duties of the
heart. To be sure this cannot be attained without intelligence. The
knowledge of God and of his unity is a prerequisite for a proper
understanding and an adequate appreciation of our religious duties.
Philosophy therefore becomes a necessity in the interest of a purer and
truer religion, without reference to the dangers threatening it from
without.
Having found, he continues in the introduction to the "Duties of the
Hearts," that all the three sources, reason, Bible and tradition,
command this branch of our religious duties, I tried to think about them
and to learn them, being led from one topic to another until the subject
became so large that I feared I could not contain it all in my memory. I
then determined to write the subject down systematically in a book for
my own benefit as well as for the benefit of others. But I hesitated
about writing it on account of my limitations, the difficulty of the
subject and my limited knowledge of Arabic, the language in which I
intended writing it because the majority of our people are best familiar
with it. But I thought better of it and realized that it was my duty to
do what I could even if it was not perfect; that I must not yield to the
argument springing from a love of ease and disinclination to effort; for
if everyone were to abstain from doing a small good because he cannot do
as much as he would like, nothing would ever be done at all.
Having decided to compose the work, he continues, I divided the subject
into ten fundamental principles, and devoted a section of the book to
each principle. I endeavored to write in a plain and easy style,
omitting difficult expressions, technical terms and demonstrations in
the manner of the dialecticians. I had to make an exception in the first
section dealing with the existence and unity of God, where the sublet of
the subject required the employment of logical and mathematical proofs.
For the rest I made use of comparisons or similes, adduced support from
the Bible and tradition, and also quoted the sages of other
nations.[111]
We have already seen in the introduction that Bahya was indebted for his
ideas to the ascetic and Sufic literature of the Arabs, and Yahuda, who
is the authority in this matter of Bahya's sources, has shown recently
that among the quotations of the wise men of other nations in Bahya's
work are such as are attributed by the Arabs to Jesus and the gospels,
to Mohammed and his companions, to the early caliphs, in particular the
caliph Ali, to Mohammedan ascetics and Sufis.[112]
In selecting the ten general and inclusive principles, Bahya lays down
as the first and most fundamental the doctrine of the deity, or as it is
called in the works of the Kalam, the Unity. As God is a true unity,
being neither substance nor accident, and our thought cannot grasp
anything except substance or accident, it follows that we cannot know
God as he is in himself, and that we can get a conception of him and of
his existence from his creatures only. The second section is therefore
devoted to an examination of creation. Then follow in order sections
treating of the service of God, trust in God, action for the sake of God
alone, submission to God, repentance, self-examination, separation from
the pleasures of the world, love of God.
In his discussion of the unity of God, Bahya follows the same method as
Saadia, and the Kalam generally, _i. e._, he first proves that the world
must have been created; hence there must be a creator, and this is
followed by a demonstration of God's unity. The particular arguments,
too, are for the most part the same, as we shall see, though differently
expressed and in a different order. The important addition in Bahya is
his distinction between God's unity and other unities, which is not
found so strictly formulated in any of his predecessors, and goes back
to Pseudo-Pythagorean sources in Arabian literature of Neo-Platonic
origin.
In order to prove that there is a creator who created the world out of
nothing we assume three principles. First, nothing can make itself.
Second, principles are finite in number, hence there must be a first
before which there is no other. Third, every composite is "new," _i. e._,
came to be in time, and did not exist from eternity.
Making use of these principles, which will be proved later, we proceed
as follows: The world is composite in all its parts. Sky, earth, stars
and man form a sort of house which the latter manages. Plants and
animals are composed of the four elements, fire, air, water, earth. The
elements again are composed of matter and form, or substance and
accident. Their matter is the primitive "hyle," and their form is the
primitive form, which is the root of all forms, essential as well as
accidental. It is clear therefore that the world is composite, and
hence, according to the third principle, had its origin in time. As,
according to the first principle, a thing cannot make itself, it must
have been made by some one. But as, in accordance with the second
principle, the number of causes cannot be infinite, we must finally
reach a first cause of the world before which there is no other, and
this first made the world out of nothing.
Before criticising this proof, from which Bahya infers more than is
legitimate, we must prove the three original assumptions.
The proof of the first principle that a thing cannot make itself is
identical in Bahya with the second of the three demonstrations employed
by Saadia for the same purpose. It is that the thing must either have
made itself before it existed or after it existed. But both are
impossible. Before it existed it was not there to make itself; after it
existed there was no longer anything to make. Hence the first
proposition is proved that a thing cannot make itself.
The proof of the second proposition that the number of causes cannot be
infinite is also based upon the same principle as the fourth proof in
Saadia for the creation of the world. The principle is this. Whatever
has no limit in the direction of the past, _i. e._, had no beginning,
but is eternal a _parte ante_, cannot have any stopping point anywhere
else. In other words, we as the spectators could not point to any
definite spot or link in this eternally infinite chain, because the
chain must have traversed infinite time to reach us, but the infinite
can never be traversed. Since, however, as a matter of fact we can and
do direct our attention to parts of the changing world, this shows that
the world must have had a beginning.
A second proof of the same principle is not found in Saadia. It is as
follows: If we imagine an actual infinite and take away a part, the
remainder is less than before. Now if this remainder is still infinite,
we have one infinite larger than another, which is impossible. If we say
the remainder is finite, then by adding to it the finite part which was
taken away, the result must be finite; but this is contrary to
hypothesis, for we assumed it infinite at the start. Hence it follows
that the infinite cannot have a part. But we can separate in thought out
of all the generations of men from the beginning those that lived
between the time of Noah and that of Moses. This will be a finite number
and a part of all the men in the world. Hence, as the infinite can have
no part, this shows that the whole number of men is finite, and hence
that the world had a beginning.
This proof is not in Saadia, but we learn from Maimonides ("Guide of the
Perplexed," I, ch. 75) that it was one of the proofs used by the
Mutakallimun to prove the absurdity of the belief in the eternity of the
world.
The third principle is that the composite is "new." This is proved
simply by pointing out that the elements forming the composite are prior
to it by nature, and hence the latter cannot be eternal, for nothing is
prior to the eternal. This principle also is found in Saadia as the
second of the four proofs in favor of creation.[113]
We have now justified our assumptions and hence have proved--what?
Clearly we have only proved that this _composite_ world cannot have
existed _as such_ from eternity; but that it must have been composed of
its elements at some point in time past, and that hence there must be a
cause or agency which did the composing. But there is nothing in the
principles or in the demonstration based upon them which gives us a
right to go back of the composite world and say of the elements, the
simple elements at the basis of all composition, viz., matter and form,
that they too must have come to be in time, and hence were created out
of nothing. It is only the composite that argues an act of composition
and elements preceding in time and by nature the object composed of
them. The simple needs not to be made, hence the question of its having
made itself does not arise. It was not made at all, we may say, it just
existed from eternity.
The only way to solve this difficulty from Bahya's premises is by saying
that if we suppose matter (or matter and form as separate entities) to
have existed from eternity, we are liable to the difficulty involved in
the idea of anything having traversed infinite time and reached us;
though it is doubtful whether unformed matter would lend itself to the
experiment of abstracting a part as in generations of men.
Be this as it may, it is interesting to know that Saadia having arrived
as far as Bahya in his argument was not yet satisfied that he proved
creation _ex nihilo_, and added special arguments for this purpose.
Before proceeding to prove the unity of God, Bahya takes occasion to
dismiss briefly a notion which scarcely deserves consideration in his
eyes. That the world could have come by accident, he says, is too absurd
to speak of, in view of the evidence of harmony and plan and wisdom
which we see in nature. As well imagine ink spilled by accident forming
itself into a written book.[114] Saadia also discusses this view as the
ninth of the twelve theories of creation treated by him, and refutes it
more elaborately than Bahya, whose one argument is the last of Saadia's
eight.
In the treatment of creation Saadia is decidedly richer and more
comprehensive in discussion, review and argumentation. This was to be
expected since such problems are the prime purpose of the "Emunot
ve-Deot," whereas they are only preparatory, though none the less
fundamental, in the "Hobot ha-Lebabot," and Bahya must have felt that
the subject had been adequately treated by his distinguished
predecessor. It is the more surprising therefore to find that in the
treatment of the unity of God Bahya is more elaborate, and offers a
greater variety of arguments for unity as such. Moreover, as has already
been said before, he takes greater care than anyone before him to guard
against the identification of God's unity with any of the unities,
theoretical or actual, in our experience. There is no doubt that this
emphasis is due to Neo-Platonic influence, some of which may have come
to Bahya from Gabirol, the rest probably from their common sources.
We see, Bahya begins his discussion of the unity of God, that the causes
are fewer than their effects, the causes of the causes still fewer, and
so on, until when we reach the top there is only one. Thus, the number
of individuals is infinite, the number of species is finite; the number
of genera is less than the number of species, until we get to the
highest genera, which according to Aristotle are ten (the ten
categories). Again, the causes of the individuals under the categories
are five, motion and the four elements. The causes of the elements are
two, matter and form. The cause of these must therefore be one, the will
of God. (The will of God as immediately preceding universal matter and
form sounds like a reminiscence of the "Fons Vitæ".)
God's unity is moreover seen in the unity of plan and wisdom that is
evident in the world. Everything is related to, connected with and
dependent upon everything else, showing that there is a unitary
principle at the basis.
If anyone maintains that there is more than one God, the burden of proof
lies upon him. Our observation of the world has shown us that there is a
God who made it; hence one, since we cannot conceive of less than one;
but why more than one, unless there are special reasons to prove it?
Euclid defines unity as that in virtue of which we call a thing one.
This means to signify that unity precedes the unitary thing by nature,
just as heat precedes the hot object. Plurality is the sum of ones,
hence plurality cannot be prior to unity, from which it proceeds. Hence
whatever plurality we find in our minds we know that unity precedes it;
and even if it occurs to anyone that there is more than one creator,
unity must after all precede them all. Hence God is one.
This argument is strictly Neo-Platonic and is based upon the idealism of
Plato, the notion that whatever reality or attributes particular things
in our world of sense possess they owe to the real and eternal types of
these realities and attributes in a higher and intelligible (using the
term in contradistinction to sensible) world in which they participate.
In so far as this conception is applied to the essences of things, it
leads to the hypostatization of the class concepts or universals. Not
the particular individual whom we perceive is the real man, but the
typical man, the ideal man as the mind conceives him. He is not a
concept but a real existent in the intelligible world. If we apply it
also to qualities of things, we hypostatize the abstract quality. Heat
becomes really distinct from the hot object, existence from the existent
thing, goodness from the good person, unity from the one object. And a
thing is existent and one and good, because it participates in
Existence, Unity and Goodness. These are real entities, intelligible
and not sensible, and they give to our world what reality it possesses.
Plotinus improved upon Plato, and instead of leaving these Ideas as
distinct and ultimate entities, he adopted the suggestion of Philo and
gathered up all these intelligible existences in the lap of the
universal Reason, as his ideas or thoughts. This universal Reason is in
Philo the _Logos_, whose mode of existence is still ambiguous, and is
rather to be understood as the divine mind. In Plotinus it is the first
stage in the unfoldment of the Godhead, and is a distinct _hypostasis_,
though not a person. In Christianity it is the second person in the
Trinity, incarnated in Jesus. In Israeli, Gabirol and the other Jewish
Neo-Platonists, it occupies the same place as the _Nous_ in Plotinus. In
Bahya, whose taint of Neo-Platonism is not even skin deep, there is no
universal Reason spoken of. But we do not really know what his ideas may
have been on the subject, as he does not develop them in this direction.
To return to Bahya's arguments in favor of the unity of God, we proceed
to show that dualism would lead to absurd conclusions. Thus if there is
more than one creator, they are either of the same substance or they are
not. If they are, then the common substance is the real creator, and we
have unity once more. If their substances are different, they are
distinct, hence limited, finite, composite, and hence not eternal, which
is absurd.
Besides, plurality is an attribute of substance, and belongs to the
category of quantity. But the creator is neither substance nor accident
(attribute), hence plurality cannot pertain to him. But if he cannot be
described as multiple, he must be one.
If the creator is more than one, it follows that either each one of them
could create the world alone, or he could not except with the help of
the other. If we adopt the first alternative, there is no need of more
than one creator. If we adopt the second, it follows that the creator is
limited in his power, hence, as above, composite, and not eternal, which
is impossible. Besides, if there were more than one creator, it is
possible that a dispute might arise between them in reference to the
creation. But all this time no such thing has happened, nature being
always the same. Hence God is one. Aristotle also agrees with us, for he
applies in this connection the Homeric expression, "It is not good to
have many rulers, let the ruler be one" (Iliad, II, 204; Arist.,
Metaphysics, XII, ch. 10, p. 1076a 4).[115]
So far as Bahya proves the unity of God he does not go beyond Saadia,
some of whose arguments are reproduced by him, and one or two of a
Neo-Platonic character added besides. But there is a decided advance in
the analysis which follows, in which Bahya shows that there are various
kinds of unity in our experience, and that the unity of God is unique.
We apply the term one to a class, a genus, a species, or an individual.
In all of these the multiplicity of parts is visible. The genus animal
contains many animals; the species man embraces a great many individual
men; and the individual man consists of many parts and organs and
faculties. Things of this sort are one in a sense and many in a sense.
We also apply the term one to an object in which the multiplicity of
parts is not as readily visible as in the previous case. Take for
example a body of water which is homogeneous throughout and one part is
like another. This too is in reality composed of parts, matter and form,
substance and accident. It is in virtue of this composition that it is
subject to genesis and decay, composition and division, union and
separation, motion and change. But all this implies plurality. Hence in
both the above cases the unity is not essential but accidental. It is
because of a certain appearance or similarity that we call a thing or a
class one, which is in reality many.
Another application of the term one is when we designate by it the basis
of number, the numerical one. This is a true one, essential as
distinguished from the accidental referred to above. But it is mental
and not actual. It is a symbol of a beginning which has no other before
it.
Finally there is the real and actual one. This is something that does
not change or multiply; that cannot be described by any material
attribute, that is not subject to generation and decay; that does not
move and is not similar to anything. It is one in all respects and the
cause of multiplicity. It has no beginning or end, for that which has is
subject to change, and change is opposed to unity, the thing being
different before and after the change. For the same reason the real one
does not resemble anything, for resemblance is an accident in the
resembling thing, and to be possessed of accidents is to be multiple.
Hence the true one resembles nothing. Its oneness is no accident in it,
for it is a purely negative term in this application. It means not
multiple.[116]
We have now shown that there is a creator who is one, and on the other
hand we have analyzed the various meanings of the term one, the last of
which is the most real and the purest. It remains now to show that this
pure one is identical with the one creator. This can be proved in the
following way. The world being everywhere composite contains the one as
well as the many--unity of composition, plurality of the parts composed.
As unity is prior by nature to plurality, and causes do not run on to
infinity (see above, p. 87), the causes of the world's unity and
multiplicity cannot be again unity and multiplicity of the same kind
forever. Hence as multiplicity cannot be the first, it must be
unity--the absolute and true unity before which there is no other, and
in which there is no manner of multiplicity. But God is the one cause of
the universe, as we have shown, hence God and this true unity are the
same.
We can show this also in another way. Whatever is an accidental
attribute in one thing is an essential element in some other thing. Thus
heat is an accidental attribute in hot water. For water may lose its
heat and remain water as before. It is different with fire. Fire cannot
lose its heat without ceasing to be fire. Hence heat in fire is an
essential element; and it is from fire that hot water and all other hot
things receive their heat. The same thing applies to the attribute of
unity. It is accidental in all creatures. They are called one because
they combine a number of elements in one group or concept. But they are
really multiple since they are liable to change and division and motion,
and so on. Hence there must be something in which unity is essential,
and which is the cause of whatsoever unity all other things possess. But
God is the cause of the universe, hence he is this true and absolute
unity, and all change and accident and multiplicity are foreign to
him.[117]
This unity of God is not in any way derogated from by the ascription to
him of attributes. For the latter are of two kinds, "essential" and
"active." We call the first essential because they are permanent
attributes of God, which he had before creation and will continue to
have when the world has ceased to be. These attributes are three in
number, Existing, One, Eternal. We have already proved every one of
them.
Now these attributes do not imply change in the essence of God. They are
to be understood in the sense of denying their opposites, _i. e._, that
he is not multiple, non-existent or newly come into being. They also
imply each other as can easily be shown, _i. e._, every one of the three
implies the other two. We must understand therefore that they are really
_one_ in idea, and if we could find one term to express the thought
fully, we should not use three. But the three do not imply multiplicity
in God.
The "active" are those attributes which are ascribed to God by reason of
his actions or effects on us. We are permitted to apply them to him
because of the necessity which compels us to get to know of his
existence so that we may worship him. The Biblical writers use them very
frequently. We may divide these into two kinds: First, those which
ascribe to God a corporeal form, such as (Gen. 1, 27), "And God created
man in his image," and others of the same character. Second, those
attributes which refer to corporeal movements and actions. These have
been so interpreted by our ancient sages as to remove the corporeality
from God by substituting the "Glory of God" for God as the subject of
the movement or act in question. Thus, (Gen. 28, 13) "And behold the
Lord stood above it," is rendered by the Aramaic translator, "and behold
the _glory of God was present_ above it." Saadia deals with this matter
at length in his "Emunot ve-Deot," in his commentary on Genesis, and on
the book "Yezirah." So there is no need of going into detail here. We
are all agreed that necessity compels us to speak of God in corporeal
terms so that all may be made to know of God's existence. This they
could not do if the prophets had spoken in metaphysical terms, for not
everyone can follow such profound matters. But having come to the
knowledge of God in this simpler though imperfect way, we can then
advance to a more perfect knowledge of him. The intelligent and
philosophical reader will lose nothing by the anthropomorphic form of
the Bible, for he can remove the husk and penetrate to the kernel. But
the simple reader would miss a very great deal indeed if the Bible were
written in the language of philosophy, as he would not understand it and
would remain without a knowledge of God.
Despite its predominant anthropomorphism, however, the Bible does give
us hints of God's spirituality so that the thoughtful reader may also
have food for _his_ thought. For example, such expressions as (Deut. 4,
15), "Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner
of form on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the
midst of the fire," and many others are meant to spur on the
discriminating reader to further thought. The same applies to all those
passages in which the word "name" is inserted before the word God as the
object of praise to indicate that we do not know God in his essence. An
example of this is, "And they shall bless the name of thy glory" (Neh.
9, 5). For the same reason the name of God is joined in the Bible to
heaven, earth, the Patriarchs, in such phrases as the God of the
heavens, the God of Abraham, and so on, to show that we do not know
God's essence but only his revelation in nature and in history. This is
the reason why after saying to Moses, "I am sent me unto you" (Ex. 3,
14), he adds (ib. 15), tell them, "the God of your fathers, the God of
Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob sent me unto you." The
meaning is, if they cannot understand God with their reason, let them
know me from history and tradition.[118]
In Bahya's treatment of the divine attributes we already have in brief
the main elements which Maimonides almost a century later made classic,
namely, the distinction between essential and active attributes, and the
idea that the former are to be understood as denying their opposites,
_i. e._, as being in their nature not positive but negative. The outcome
therefore is that only two kinds of attributes are applicable to God,
negative and those which are transferred or projected from the effects
of God's activity as they are visible in nature. Saadia had already made
the distinction between essential and active attributes, but it was
quite incidental with him, and not laid down at the basis of his
discussion, but casually referred to in a different connection. Al
Mukammas speaks of negative attributes as being more applicable to God
than positive, as Philo had already said long before. But the
combination of these two, negative and active, as the only kinds of
divine attributes is not found in Jewish literature before Bahya.
It is worth noting also that Bahya does not lay down the three
attributes, Power, Wisdom and Life as fundamental or essential in the
manner of the Christians, the Arab Mutakallimun, and the Jewish Saadia.
Bahya, as we have seen, regards as God's essential attributes,
existence, unity, eternity. Herein, too, he seems to anticipate
Maimonides who insists against the believers in essential attributes
that the attributes, living, omnipotent, omniscient, having a will, are
no more essential than any other, but like the rest of the qualities
ascribed to God have reference to his activity in nature.[119]
We have now gone through Bahya's philosophical chapter giving us the
metaphysical basis of his ethico-religious views. That his purpose is
practical and not theoretical is clear from his definition of what he
calls the "acknowledgment of the unity of God with full heart," not to
speak of the title of the book itself, the meaning of which we explained
at the beginning of this section, and the nine chapters in Bahya's work
following upon the first, which constitute its real essence and purpose.
To acknowledge the unity of God with full heart means, he tells us, that
one must first know how to prove the existence and unity of God, to
distinguish God's unity from every other, and then to make his heart and
his tongue unite in this conception.[120] It is not a matter of the
intellect merely, but of the heart as affecting one's practical conduct.
The adequacy of the conception is destroyed not merely by thinking of
God as multiple, or by worshiping images, sun, moon and stars; it is
made null and void likewise by hypocrisy and pretence, as when one
affects piety before others to gain their favor or acquire a reputation.
The same disastrous result is brought about by indulging the low
physical appetites. Here the worship of the appetites is brought into
competition and rivalry with devotion to the one God.[121]
Our object being to trace the philosophical conceptions in mediæval
Jewish literature, we cannot linger long in the study of the rest of
Bahya's masterpiece, which is homiletical and practical rather than
theoretic, and must content ourselves with a very brief résumé of its
principal contents.
In studying the nature and attributes of God we reached the conclusion
that while a knowledge of him is absolutely necessary for a proper mode
of life, we cannot form an idea of him as he is in himself, and are left
to such evidence as we can gather from the world of which he is the
author. It becomes our duty, therefore, to study nature, as a whole and
in its parts, conscientiously and minutely, in order to realize clearly
the goodness and wisdom of God as exhibited therein. For various reasons
we are apt to neglect this study and miss the insight and benefits
arising therefrom. Chief among these hindering circumstances are our
excessive occupations with the pleasures of this world, and the
accidents and misfortunes to which mortal is heir, which blind him to
his real good, and prevent him from seeing the blessing in disguise
lurking in these very misfortunes.
But it is clear that man has a duty to study the divine goodness and
wisdom as exhibited in nature, else of what use is his faculty of reason
and intelligence, which raises him above the beast. If he neglects it,
he places himself below the latter, which realizes all the functions of
which it is capable. Bible and Talmud are equally emphatic in urging us
to study the wonders of nature.
The variety of natural phenomena and the laws they exhibit give evidence
of the personality of God and the existence of his will. A being without
will, acting by necessity of nature, acts with unswerving uniformity.
Heaven and earth, plant and animal, all creatures great and small, bear
witness, in their structure and relations, in their functions and mutual
service and helpfulness, to the wisdom and goodness of God. Above all is
this visible in man, the highest of earthly beings, the microcosm, the
rational creature, the discoverer and inventor of arts and sciences. In
the laws and statutes which were given to him for the service of God,
and in the customs of other nations which take the place of our divine
law, we see God's kindness to man in securing his comfort in this world
and reward in the next.
Pride is the great enemy of man, because it prevents him from
appreciating what he owes to God's goodness. Pride makes him feel that
he deserves more than he gets, and blinds him to the truth.[122]
We all recognize the duty of gratitude to a fellow man who has done us a
favor, although all such cases of benefit and service between man and
man, not excepting even the kindness of a father to his child, will be
found on examination to be of a selfish nature. The benefit to self may
not in all cases be conscious, but it is always there. It is a father's
nature to love his child as part of himself. Moreover, these human
favors are not constant, and the person benefited stands comparatively
on the same level of existence and worth as his benefactor. How much
greater then is the duty incumbent upon us to appreciate God's favors
which are not selfish, which are constant, and which are bestowed by the
greatest of all beings upon the smallest of all in respect of physical
strength.
The only way in which man can repay God for his kindness, and show an
appreciation thereof is by submitting to him and doing those things
which will bring him nearer to God. In order to realize this it is
necessary to abandon the bad qualities, which are in principle two, love
of pleasure and love of power. The means enabling one to obtain this
freedom are to abstain from too much eating, drinking, idling, and so
on, for the first, and from too much gossip, social intercourse, and
love of glory for the second. It may be difficult to do this, but one
must make up one's mind to it, like the invalid who is ready to lose a
limb in order to save his life.
The problem of free will is perplexing indeed and interferes with the
proper attitude toward God and his worship. The best way out of the
difficulty is to act as if we were free, and on the other hand to have
confidence in God as the author of everything.
We have seen that the reason bids us recognize our duty to God in return
for his goodness to us. At the same time we are not left to the
suggestions and promptings of the reason alone. We have a positive law
prescribing our conduct and the manner and measure of expressing our
gratitude to God. This is made necessary by the constitution of man's
nature. He is a composite of body and spirit. The former is at home in
this lower world and is endowed with powers and qualities which tend to
strengthen it at the expense of the spirit, a stranger in this world.
Hence the necessity of a positive law to cure the spirit from the ills
of the body by forbidding certain kinds of food, clothing, sexual
indulgence, and so on, which strengthen the appetites, and commanding
such actions as prayer, fasting, charity, benevolence, which have the
opposite tendency of strengthening the reason.
The positive law is necessary and useful besides because it prescribes
the middle way, discouraging equally the extremes of asceticism and of
self-indulgence. It regulates and defines conduct, and makes it uniform
for old and young, intelligent and unintelligent. It institutes new
occasions of worship and thanksgiving as history reveals new
benefactions of God to his people in various generations. The law also
contains matters which the reason alone would not dictate, and of which
it does not understand the meaning. Such are the "traditional
commandments." The reason why the law prescribes also some of the
principles of the "rational commandments" is because at that time the
people were so sunk in their animal desires that their minds were
weakened, and there was need of putting both classes of commandments on
the same level of positive prescription. But now the intelligent person
observes them in accordance with their distinct origin, whereas the
masses simply follow the law in both.
The admonition of the positive law serves as an introduction to the
suggestions of our own reason and prepares the way for the latter. The
first is absolutely necessary for the young, the women and those of weak
intellectual power. To worship God not merely because the law prescribes
it, but because reason itself demands it denotes a spiritual advance,
and puts one in the grade of prophets and pious men chosen of God. In
this world their reward is the joy they feel in the sweetness of divine
service; in the next world they attain to the spiritual light which we
cannot declare or imagine.[123]
One of the duties of the heart is to trust in God. Apart from the Bible
which commands us to have trust in God, we can come to the same
conclusion as a result of our own reflection. For in God alone are
combined all the conditions necessary to confidence. He has the power to
protect and help us, and the knowledge of our needs. He is kind and
generous and has a love for us and an interest in our welfare, as we
have shown in a previous discussion. Trust in God is of advantage
religiously in giving a person peace of mind, independence and freedom
to devote himself to the service of God without being worried by the
cares of the world. He is like the alchemist who changes lead into
silver, and silver into gold. If he has money he can make good use of it
in fulfilling his duties to God and man. If he has not, he is grateful
for the freedom from care which this gives him. He is secure against
material worries. He does not have to go to distant lands to look for
support, or to engage in hard and fatiguing labor, or to exploit other
people. He chooses the work that is in consonance with his mode of
life, and gives him leisure and strength to do his duty to God and man.
The suffering of the good and the prosperity of the bad, which
apparently contradicts our conclusion, is a problem as old as the world,
and is discussed in the Bible. There is no one explanation to cover all
cases, hence no solution is given in the Bible. But several reasons may
be brought forward for this anomaly. The righteous man may suffer by way
of punishment for a sin he has committed. He may suffer in this world in
order that he may be rewarded in the next. His suffering may be an
example of patience and goodness to other people; especially in a bad
generation, to show off their wickedness by contrast with his goodness.
Or finally the good man may be punished for not rebuking his generation
of evil doers. In a similar way we may explain the prosperity of the
wicked.
Trust in God does not signify that one should neglect one's work, be
careless of one's life, health and well-being, or abandon one's effort
to provide for one's family and dependents. No, one must do all these
things conscientiously, at the same time feeling that if not for the
help of God all effort would be in vain. In the matter of doing one's
duty and observing the commandments, whether of the limbs or the heart,
trust in God can apply only to the last step in the process, namely, the
realization in practice. He must trust that God will put out of the way
all obstacles and hindrances which may prevent him from carrying out his
resolutions. The choice and consent must come from a man's own will,
which is free. The most he may do is to trust that God may remove
temptations.
While it is true that good deeds are rewarded in this world as well as
in the next, a man must not trust in his deeds, but in God. It may seem
strange that there is no reference in the Bible to reward in the
hereafter. The reasons may be the following. Not knowing what the state
of the soul is without the body, we could not understand the nature of
future reward, and the statement of it in the Bible would not have been
a sufficient inducement for the people of that time to follow the
commandments. Or it is possible that the people knew by tradition of
reward after death, hence it was not necessary to specify it.
As knowledge of nature and of God leads to trust in him, so ignorance
leads away from it. It is as with a child, who develops in his manner of
trusting in things; beginning with his mother's breast and rising
gradually as he grows older and knows more, until he embraces other
persons and attains to trust in God.[124]
We said before (p. 83) that the duties of the limbs are imperfect unless
accompanied by the intention of the heart. A man's motive must be
sincere. It must not be his aim to gain the favor of his fellowmen or to
acquire honor and fame. The observance of the prescribed laws must be
motived by the sole regard for God and his service. This we call the
"unity of conduct." The meaning is that a man's act and intention must
coincide in aiming at the fulfilment of God's will. In order to realize
this properly one must have an adequate and sincere conception of God's
unity as shown above; he must have an appreciation of God's goodness as
exhibited in nature; he must submit to God's service; he must have trust
in God alone as the sole author of good and evil; and correspondingly he
must abstain from flattering mankind, and must be indifferent to their
praise and blame; he must fear God, and have respect and awe for him.
When he is in the act of fulfilling his spiritual obligations, he must
not be preoccupied with the affairs of this world; and finally he must
always consult his reason, and make it control his desires and
inclinations.[125]
Humility and lowliness is an important element conducive to "unity of
conduct." By this is not meant that general helplessness in the face of
conditions, dangers and injuries because of ignorance of the methods of
averting them. This is not humility but weakness. Nor do we mean that
timidity and loss of countenance which one suffers before a superior in
physical power or wealth. The true humility with which we are here
concerned is that which one feels constantly before God, though it shows
itself also in such a person's conduct in the presence of others, in
soft speech, low voice, and modest behavior generally, in prosperity as
well as adversity. The truly humble man practices patience and
forgiveness; he does good to mankind and judges them favorably; he is
contented with little in respect to food and drink and the needs of the
body generally; he endures misfortune with resignation; is not spoiled
by praise, nor irritated by blame, but realizes how far he is from
perfection in the one case, and appreciates the truth of the criticism
in the other. He is not spoiled by prosperity and success, and always
holds himself under strict account. God knows it, even if his fellowmen
do not.
Humility, as we have described it, is not, however, incompatible with a
certain kind of pride; not that form of it which boasts of physical
excellence, nor that arrogance which leads a man to look down upon
others and belittle their achievements. These forms of pride are bad and
diametrically opposed to true humility. Legitimate mental pride is that
which leads a person blessed with intellectual gifts to feel grateful to
God for his favor, and to strive to improve his talents and share their
benefits with others.[126]
Humility is a necessary forerunner of repentance and we must treat of
this duty of the heart next. It is clear from reason as well as from the
Law that man does not do all that is incumbent upon him in the service
of God. For man is composed of opposite principles warring with each
other, and is subject to change on account of the change of his mental
qualities. For this reason he needs a law and traditional custom to keep
him from going astray. The Bible also tells us that "the imagination of
the heart of man is evil from his youth" (Gen. 8, 21). Therefore God was
gracious and gave man the ability and opportunity to correct his
mistakes. This is repentance.
True repentance means return to God's service after having succeeded in
making the reason the master of the desires. The elements in repentance
are, (1) regret; (2) discontinuance of the wrong act; (3) confession and
request for pardon; (4) promise not to repeat the offence.
In respect to gravity of offence, sins may be divided into three
classes: (1) Violation of a positive commandment in the Bible which is
not punished by "cutting off from the community." For example, dwelling
in booths, wearing fringes, and shaking the palm branch. (2) Violation
of a negative commandment not so punished. (3) Violation of a negative
commandment the penalty for which is death at the hands of the court,
and being "cut off" by divine agency; for example, profanation of the
divine name or false oath. In cases of the first class a penitent is as
good as one who never sinned. In the second class he is even superior,
because the latter has not the same prophylactic against pride. In the
third class the penitent is inferior to the one who never sinned.
Another classification of offences is in two divisions according to the
subject against whom the offence is committed. This may be a human
being, and the crime is social; or it may be God, and we have sin in the
proper sense of the term. Penitence is sufficient for forgiveness in the
latter class, but not in the former. When one robs another or insults
him, he must make restoration or secure the pardon of the offended party
before his repentance can be accepted. And if the person cannot be
found, or if he died, or is alive but refuses to forgive his offender,
or if the sinner lost the money which he took, or if he does not know
whom he robbed, or how much, it may be impossible for him to atone for
the evil he has done. Still if he is really sincere in his repentance,
God will help him to make reparation to the person wronged.[127]
Self-examination is conducive to repentance. By this term is meant
taking stock of one's spiritual condition so as to know the merits one
has as well the duties one owes. In order to do this conscientiously a
man must reflect on the unity of God, on his wisdom and goodness, on the
obedience which all nature pays to the laws imposed upon it, disregard
of which would result in the annihilation of all things, including
himself. A man should review his past conduct, and provide for his
future life, as one provides for a long journey, bearing in mind that
life is short, and that he is a stranger in this world with no one to
help him except the goodness and grace of his maker. He should cultivate
the habit of being alone and not seek the society of idlers, for that
leads to gossip and slander, to sin and wrong, to vanity and neglect of
God. This does not apply to the company of the pious and the learned,
which should be sought. He should be honest and helpful to his friends,
and he will get along well in this world. All the evils and complaints
of life are due to the fact that people are not considerate of one
another, and everyone grabs for himself all that he can, more than he
needs. One should examine anew the ideas one has from childhood to be
sure that he understands them in the light of his riper intellect. He
should also study again the books of the Bible and the prayers which he
learned as a child, for he would see them now in a different light. He
must try to make his soul control his body, strengthening it with
intellectual and spiritual food for the world to come. These efforts and
reflections and many others of a similar kind tend to perfect the soul
and prepare it to attain to the highest degree of purity, where the evil
desire can have no power over her.[128]
In self-examination temperance or abstemiousness plays an important
rôle. Let us examine this concept more closely. By abstemiousness in the
special sense in which we use it here we do not mean that general
temperance or moderation which we practice to keep our body in good
order, or such as physicians prescribe for the healthy and the sick,
bidding them abstain from certain articles of food, drink, and so on. We
mean rather a more stringent abstemiousness, which may be called
separation from the world, or asceticism. We may define this to mean
abstention from all corporeal satisfactions except such as are
indispensable for the maintenance of life.
Not everyone is required to practice this special form of temperance,
nor is it desirable that he should, for it would lead to extinction of
the human race. At the same time it is proper that there shall be a few
select individuals, ascetic in their habits of life, and completely
separated from the world, to serve as an example for the generality of
mankind, in order that temperance of the more general kind shall be the
habit of the many.
The object of God in creating man was to try the soul in order to purify
it and make it like the angels. It is tried by being put in an earthy
body, which grows and becomes larger by means of food. Hence God put
into the soul the desire for food, and the desire for sexual union to
perpetuate the species; and he made the reward for the satisfaction of
these desires the pleasure which they give. He also appointed the "evil
inclination" to incite to all these bodily pleasures. Now if this "evil
inclination" gets the upper hand of the reason, the result is excess and
ruin. Hence the need of general abstemiousness. And the ascetic class
serve the purpose of reinforcing general temperance by their example.
But in the asceticism of the few there is also a limit beyond which one
should not go. Here too the middle way is the best. Those extremists who
leave the world entirely and live the life of a recluse in the desert,
subsisting on grass and herbs, are farthest from the middle way, and the
Bible does not approve of their mode of life, as we read in Isaiah (45,
18) "The God that formed the earth and made it; he that hath
established it,--not in vain did he create it, he formed it to be
inhabited." Those are much better who without leaving for the desert
pass solitary lives in their homes, not associating with other people,
and abstaining from superfluities of all kinds. But the best of all are
those who adopt the mildest form of asceticism, who separate from the
world inwardly while taking part in it outwardly, and assisting in the
ordinary occupations of mankind. These are commended in the Bible.
Witness the prayer of Jacob (Gen. 28, 20), the fasting of Moses forty
days and forty nights on the mount, the fasting of Elijah, the laws of
the Nazirite, Jonadab ben Rechab, Elisha, prescriptions of fasting on
various occasions, and so on.[129]
The highest stage a man can reach spiritually is the love of God, and
all that preceded has this as its aim. True love of God is that felt
toward him for his own sake because of his greatness and exaltation, and
not for any ulterior purpose.
The soul is a simple spiritual substance which inclines to that which is
like it, and departs from what is material and corporeal. But when God
put the soul into the body, he implanted in it the desire to maintain
it, and it was thus affected by the feelings and desires which concern
the health and growth of the body, thus becoming estranged from the
spiritual.
In order that the soul shall attain to the true love of God, the reason
must get the upper hand of the desires, all the topics treated in the
preceding sections must be taken to heart and sincerely and
conscientiously acted upon. Then the eyes of the soul will be opened,
and it will be filled with the fear and the love of God.[130]