THE AWAKENING
I. "A CLOUD NO BIGGER THAN A MAN'S HAND"
On March 10,1865, the Duc de Morny died. He had been the moving spirit
in the Mexican imbroglio, and it would be difficult to believe that the
withdrawal of the prompter did not have a weakening effect upon the
performance. His death, by removing one of the strongest influences in
favor of the intervention, not only in the Corps Legislatif and at
court, but in the financial world, was certainly one of the many
untoward circumstances which helped to hasten the end.
In France, the elections of 1863 and 1864 had added strength to the
opposition. It now insisted upon being heard. Not only had the
discussions of the budget in the Chamber of Deputies brought out with
painful clearness the weight of the burden assumed by France, but
private letters written by intelligent officers were gradually
enlightening public opinion upon the true condition of affairs in
Mexico. Some of these letters had even found their way to the Tuileries.
Public feeling was beginning to express in uncompromising tones the
conviction that the government must relinquish an onerous task, the
impossibility of accomplishing which was becoming patent. It was even
openly suggested that the Tuileries must combine with "Washington for
the purpose of establishing in Mexico a form of government acceptable to
the latter".*
* See "Revue des Deux Mondes," 1865, vol. lviii, p. 776; also vol. lvii,
pp. 768, 1018.
The writer of M. de Moray's obituary notice in the "Revue des Deux
Mondes"* boldly asked whether the duke, who was always fortunate, and to
whom success had become a habit, had not died opportunely. He left the
question for the future to decide. The answer was not long delayed.**
* Ibid., 1865, vol. lvi, p. 501.
** And yet M. Rouher, in April, 1865, speaking for the French government
in the Corps Legislatif, still affirmed that "France would continue to
protect Mexico until the full consolidation of its undertaking" (ibid,
vol. lvi, p. 1065).
The inauguration of the Mexican empire had been officially announced to
the chambers by the government in the following terms: "The results
obtained in 1862 and 1863 by our Corps Expeditionnaire in Mexico have,
in 1864, received a solemn consecration under the protection of the flag
of France. A regular government has been founded in that country,
heretofore for more than fifty years delivered up to anarchy and
intestine dissensions. In the beginning of the month of June the Emperor
Maximilian took possession of the throne, and, sustained by our army, he
inaugurated in all security an era of peace and prosperity for his new
country."
Jules Favre pertinently asked: "Since Maximilian is established; since
Maximilian is the Messiah announced in all time past; since he is really
the man both for the Indians and the Spaniards, who receive him with
acclamation; since he meets on his passage only with bouquets from the
senoritas--let our soldiers return. What have they to do in Mexico! They
are not needed, and can only be an obstacle in the way of that entire
unanimity of feeling that exists between the prince and the nation." He
stated that rumors were reaching France of fierce battles, of martial
law, of prisoners of war shot, of villages burned, holding up as an
example San Sebastian, in Sinaloa, a town of four thousand souls, which
had been entirely burned and destroyed by General Castagny during his
campaign against Romero and in the name of Emperor Maximilian,* and then
he proceeded to show the ghastly farce that had been enacted behind
these words, in the light cast upon it by the blaze of the ill-fated
town; "Why this discrepancy between the official statements as to the
pacification of Mexico, the unanimous consent to Maximilian's elevation
to the throne, and the facts, i.e., the country under martial law, and
the French army, marching, torch in hand, protecting one party and
punishing the other by the wholesale destruction of life and property?
Why did such contradiction exist between the official statements as to
universal suffrage, the freedom of the press, the unanimity of sentiment
in Mexico, and the fact that journalists were being brought, in the name
of the Emperor, before a council of war and condemned to various
penalties for having expressed their criticism of such wholesale
executions?"
* "Mexicans! I have come in the name of the Emperor Maximilian into the
state of Sinaloa, to establish peace therein, to protect property, and
to deliver you from the malefactors who oppress you under the mask of
liberty," said General Castagny in his proclamation.
He resumed by calling attention to the renewed postponement of the
ministry's promises with regard to the withdrawal of the army, and to
its broken pledge that it would retire when Maximilian's throne was
established and a proper impetus had been given to the work of
regeneration. For the accomplishment of these ends, said the orator, a
sacrifice of forty thousand men and a yearly expenditure of four or five
millions would be needed for ten years to come.
In words which now sound prophetic he eloquently referred to Napoleon I
and to his Spanish campaign, likewise undertaken under the pretense of
regenerating a nation. "The mighty man who had conceived such projects,"
he cried, "all know where they led him. On April 14, 1814, the sentence
of deposition thus expressed the motives of the Senate for deposing him:
'WHEREAS, Napoleon Bonaparte has undertaken a series of wars in
violation of Article L of the Constitution of the 22d Frimaire, year 8,
which provides that declarations of war must be proposed, discussed, and
promulgated like laws; WHEREAS, The liberty of the press, established
and consecrated as one of the rights of nations, has been constantly
subject to the arbitrary 164 censorship of the police,'" etc., and as he
closed his argument he said:
"After a thorough study of all the facts in the case, political,
military, and financial, it is impossible for any one seriously to
believe that the government of Maximilian can exist without our army.
With our army, I acknowledge it, his throne would rest upon an
agreement, it would last as long as our assistance should be extended to
it, but if you withdraw this assistance it is evident that it will be
overthrown. If, therefore, you wish to establish it firmly, our army
must remain in Mexico: the Chamber should understand this thoroughly."
Only thirteen members of the Chamber voted against the appropriation for
the maintenance of the Corps Expeditionnaire; but it has been pointed
out, and it is only fair to believe, that many voted for it who, as
Frenchmen, felt that the government, blameworthy as it might be, should
not be compelled suddenly to abandon an adventure in which the honor of
France was involved. French patience, however, was fast nearing its
limit, and when, in 1864, Maximilian accepted the crown, he must have
realized that French support could not be indefinitely counted upon.
The millions raised through the Mexican loans had been carelessly
administered and lavishly spent. What with the expenses of the court,
extensive alterations in the imperial residences, especially in
Chapultepec, and the outlay incidental to the pageants and ovations of
the Emperor's journeys in the provinces, the relief brought by the loans
had been brief.
Confidence was waning. The incapacity of Maximilian was becoming
generally recognized, and the difficulties inherent in the situation
were everywhere growing clearer.
Maximilian had alienated Borne, whose censure he had drawn upon himself
by his effort to conciliate the moderate party. He had aroused the
resentment of the priests and brought upon himself the remonstrances of
the bishops, and had set aside, or sent to foreign posts, the leaders of
the party to whom he owed his crown. Yet he had not succeeded in winning
over from the Liberal party any very important adhesions to his
government.
Cardinal Antonelli, in a letter dated December 27, 1864, after setting
forth the grievances of the holy see, stated that the Holy Father hoped
that Maximilian in abandoning the course marked out in his letter to the
minister, Senor Escudero, would "spare the holy see the necessity of
taking proper measures to set right in the eyes of the world the
responsibility of the august chief of the church--measures of which the
least, certainly, would not be the recall of the pontifical
representative in Mexico, in order that he may not remain there a
powerless spectator of the spoliation of the church and of the violation
of its most sacred rights."*
* "Diplomatic Correspondence," 1865, Part III, p. 623.
It is difficult to understand why Maximilian had not negotiated the
terms of a concordat with the holy see when he went to Rome to receive
the Pope's blessing before leaving Europe for his new dominions. The
adjustment of existing differences between church and state formed the
most urgent as well as the most vital issue to be met by the young
Emperor, as upon the settlement of the vexed question of ownership in
clergy property must depend the restoration of business confidence and
of prosperity in the empire. The pretensions advanced by the papal
nuncio sent by the Vatican to arrange for a concordat now proved so
exorbitant that Maximilian had been compelled to decline to consider
them, and he and the holy see had failed to come to terms. The final and
official rupture with Monsignor Meglia took place in December, 1864. It
was made public in a decree issued by Maximilian which proclaimed that
papal bulls should not receive exequatur until approved by the chief
executive.
The fact was that the party through which the French and Maximilian had
been called to Mexico was the unpopular retroactive party; that, in
order to exist, Maximilian had been obliged to recognize the measures
enacted against his own partizans by the national party; that in so
doing he had disappointed the priests; that in setting aside the leaders
of the clerical party he had estranged his strongest adherents; and all
this without making any serious headway with his antagonists, who would
have no emperor, no monarchy, no foreigner.
The success of the intervention was now clearly seen to depend upon a
war systematically conducted against an enemy that represented a
national sentiment.
On January 23, 1865, the governments of Chili, Bolivia, Salvador,
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela formed a defensive alliance against
exterior aggression and for the guaranty of their respective autonomy.
The treaty was signed in Lima by the representatives of the nations
interested.
But a far more serious danger was threatening the empire in the North.
On April 9, 1865, General Lee surrendered to the Federal army. The Civil
War in the United States was at an end, and the French were beginning to
understand that the Northern republic, whose unbroken unity stood
strengthened, could no longer remain a passive spectator of the struggle
taking place at its frontier.
The scene of military interest suddenly shifted to the Rio Grande, and
the incidents happening on the border deserved more attention than
Maximilian seemed at first inclined to bestow.
The interests of the national party were represented in Washington by
Senor Romero, who, with consummate tact and ability, made the most of
every opportunity. The service rendered by him to the cause of
republicanism and of Mexican independence was second to none in
importance. No detail seemed too trifling to be turned to account in his
effort to strengthen the Mexican cause with our government.
A rumor reached us that President Juarez had succeeded in raising a loan
in the United States. The ranks of the Liberal army were receiving
important reinforcements from the officers and men of General Banks's
command, who passed the border in large numbers to take part in the
attack of General Cortinas at Matamoros. Already, in January, 1865, the
impulse given to the Republican party in the North vibrated throughout
the land. Soon resistance everywhere appeared in arms once more. Both
General Mejia and Admiral Cloue, then in command of the French Gulf
Squadron, complained that the United States army afforded protection to
the Juarists.
Recruiting-offices had been opened in New York, which, although not
countenanced by the government, must have furnished valuable auxiliaries
to the Liberals. Alarming rumors reached France and Mexico with regard
to the extent of the movement.
On the other hand, the negotiations then being carried on between
Napoleon and Maximilian, with a view to securing the Mexican debt to
France by a lien upon the mines of Sonora, were causing uneasiness in
the United States, and gave rise to considerable diplomatic
correspondence.*
* See, in this connection, "Diplomatic Correspondence," 1865, Part III,
pp. 357-363, 417, and letter of Secretary Seward addressed to Mr.
Bigelow, February 17, 1865.
It required no wizard to foretell the issue. After the surrender of
General Lee, a Confederate army-corps, twenty-five thousand strong,
acting through General Slaughter, had opened negotiations with Marshal
Bazaine, with a view to passing the border and settling in northern
Mexico, provided suitable terms were granted by the Mexican government
to the new colonists. It was then becoming clear to many that the
halfway policy hitherto followed had led to nothing, and must result in
a useless sacrifice of life and millions unless a larger force were
maintained by the French in Mexico, or some barrier set up against the
naturally dominant position taken by the United States with regard to
Mexican affairs.
In June, 1865, Generals Kirby Smith, Magruder, Shelby, Slaughter,
Walker, A. W. Terrell of Texas, Governor Price of Missouri, General
Wilcox of Tennessee, Commodore Maury of Virginia, General Hindman of
Arkansas, Governor Reynolds of Georgia, Judge Perkins, Colonel Denis,
and Mr. Pierre Soule of Louisiana, Major Mordecai of North Carolina, and
others, had come to Mexico. With them had passed over the frontier
horses, artillery, everything that could be transported, including large
and small bands of Confederate soldiers, and some two thousand citizens
who left the United States with the intention of colonizing Sonora.
Confederate officers now flocked to Mexico with a view to making new
homes for themselves. Many of them were interested in special schemes by
which the agricultural wealth of the land might be made to yield its
treasure to the ruined but experienced Southern planters.
My mother being a Southern woman, and knowing some of their leaders, our
house soon became a center where they gathered in the evening and freely
discussed their hopes. Thus was added a new element to the already
motley assemblage which collected about us at that time. Truly a most
heterogeneous set! Confederate officers, members of the diplomatic
corps, newly fledged chamberlains and officials of the palace, the
marshal's officers,--Frenchmen, Austrians, Belgians, and a few
Mexicans,--would drop in, each group bringing its own interests, and,
alas! its animosities.
Laws against foreigners having been passed, no property could henceforth
be held by them unless they became naturalized. Some of the Confederate
refugees therefore became Mexican citizens, and took service under the
Mexican government. Governor Price, for instance, received authorization
to recruit the imperial army in the Confederacy. He and Governor Harris
of Tennessee and Judge Perkins of Louisiana were appointed agents of
colonization, and immediately set to work upon the survey of the region
lying between Mexico and Vera Cruz, with a view to furthering this
purpose. General Magruder, the ex-commander-in-chief of the Confederate
forces in Texas, having also become naturalized, was placed in charge of
the survey of the lands set aside for colonization as chief of the
Colonization Land Office. The government sold such land to colonists for
the nominal consideration of one dollar an acre, and allowed every head
of a family to purchase six hundred and forty acres upon a credit of
five years. A single man was allowed three hundred and twenty acres.
Not only the government, but large landowners, proposed such free
grants, and offered every inducement to settlers, if they would come and
develop the agricultural resources of the country. The first Confederate
settlement was established near Cordoba in the autumn of 1865.
Commodore Maury, now a naturalized Mexican citizen, had in September
been appointed imperial commissioner of immigration and councilor of
state. He opened an office in the Calle San Juan de Lateran, and was
authorized to establish agencies in the Southern States.* But the
indecision and weakness of Maximilian prevented his taking full
advantage of the opportunity then offered to strengthen the empire. The
delay caused by a vacillating policy discouraged the would-be colonists,
and before long the flood of immigration was checked.
* See decrees signed by Maximilian and the minister of the interior, D.
Luis Robles Pezuela, on September 24 and 27.
General Charles P. Stone had come to Mexico with a colonization scheme
of his own. He had, in 1859, made a survey of Sonora under the Jecker
contract. He now was on his way to look after some of the Jecker claims
when accident threw him on board of the steamer with Dr. William M.
Gwin, ex-senator for California. The two men at once came to an
understanding and joined forces.
In 1856 (December 19), two years after the filibustering expedition of
Count Raousset de Boulbon, the house of Jecker had obtained from the
Mexican government the right to survey the territories of Sonora and
southern California. The conditions were that one third of the unclaimed
land should become the property of the house of Jecker.
In 1859 the Liberal government had rescinded the grant, and this had
added one more grievance to those which the Swiss banker had brought up
against the administration of Juarez. No sooner had Sonora sent in its
adhesion to the empire than Jecker proposed to the French government to
make over his rights against a payment of two million dollars.
The plan was then to colonize Sonora and Lower California, establishing,
on behalf of France, a right to exploit the mines. The climate was
healthful, the land rich, the adventure tempting; but it had the great
drawback of running foul of the most acute Mexican susceptibilities. Not
only did such pretensions at that time excite the suspicions of the
Mexicans with regard to the disinterestedness of the French alliance,
but they were calculated to give umbrage to the United States
government.
As early as 1863, Napoleon III had discussed the possibility of
establishing in Sonora* a colony which should develop the mining and
agricultural wealth of the state. In exchange for a grant of unclaimed
national lands, these colonists were to pay a percentage of their
proceeds to France, as well as a tax to the Mexican government.
* Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa eventually were also included in the
scheme.
A colony of armed Confederates, inimical to the Federal government of
the United States, established between its dominions and the heart of
the Mexican empire, and backed by France, Austria, and Belgium, must
form a formidable bulwark in case of trouble between Mexico and its
Northern neighbor. There is small doubt that some such plan had formed a
part of the original "deal" proposed by Jecker to the French leaders.
In the spring of 1864 unauthorized attempts had been made by Californian
immigrants to land at Guaymas and settle upon certain lands granted them
by President Juarez. The marshal had sent French troops to protect the
province from such inroads, treating these intruders as squatters. This
had furnished a reason for the military occupation of Sonora; thus was
the first step taken in the realization of the project.
Such was, in rough outline, the position of the Sonora colonization
question when Dr. Gwin entered upon the scene. Upon his arrival in
Mexico, he applied at headquarters for an audience. The marshal,
although in full sympathy with the project, realized the danger of its
open discussion at that time. Maximilian and his advisers were opposed
to it. Much tact and secrecy seemed, therefore, necessary in the conduct
of negotiations having for their object the furtherance of so unpopular
a scheme. Dr. Gwin was too conspicuous a figure to pass unnoticed the
portals of the French headquarters. An informal interview was therefore
arranged.
We then lived at Tacubaya, a suburb of Mexico reached by the Paseo,
where the marshal rode every day for exercise. Our house was built at
the foot of a long hill, at the top of which stood a large old mansion,
the yellow coloring of which had won for it the name of the Casa
Amarilla. It had been rented by Colonel Talcott of Virginia, who lived
there with his family. Dr. Gwin was their guest; and it was arranged
that the marshal, when taking his usual afternoon ride with his
aide-de-camp, should call upon us one day, and leaving the horses in our
patio with his orderlies, should join us in a walk up the hill, casually
dropping in en passant at the Casa Amarilla.
The plan had the double advantage of being a simple one and of providing
the marshal, who did not speak English, with suitable interpreters. The
interview was a long one. The marshal listened to what the American had
to say. Indeed, there was little to be said on his own side, as the
Mexican ministry was absolutely opposed to the project, and any change
of policy must depend upon a change in the imperial cabinet.
His Excellency, however, seemed in high good humor. As we came out, he
merrily challenged us to run downhill, much to the astonishment of the
few leperos whom we happened to meet. The Mexican Indian is a sober,
rather somber creature, not given to levity; his amusements are of a
dignified, almost sad nature. He may be sentimental, bigoted, vicious,
cruel, but he is never vulgar, and is seldom foolish. Indeed, well might
they stare at us then, for it was no common sight in the lanes of
Tacubaya to see a commander-in-chief tearing downhill, amid peals of
laughter, with a party of young people, in utter disregard of age,
corpulence, and cumbersome military accoutrements!
The personality of Dr. Gwin was a strong one. A tall, broad, squarely
built man, with rough features which seemed hewn out of a block with an
ax, ruddy skin, and a wealth of white hair brushed back from his brow,
all combined to make him by far the most striking figure among the group
of Southern leaders then assembled in Mexico.
His own faith in the almightiness of his will influenced others, and in
this case brought him very near to success. He talked willingly and
fluently of his plans. Notwithstanding the decided opposition met with
on the part of the Mexican government, he then confidently expected to
be installed in the new colony by the opening of the year, and invited
his friends to eat their Christmas dinner with him there. He was
generous in sharing his prospects with them. We all were to be taken in
and made wealthy: every dollar invested was to return thousands, every
thousand, millions!
It was entertaining to hear him narrate his interviews at the Tuileries
with Napoleon III and the other great men of the day. His tone was that
of a potentate treating with his peers. He spoke of "my policy," "my
colony," "my army," etc.
In 1865 Dr. Gwin again went to Prance to confer with its ruler. Upon his
return to Mexico, he was regarded as the unofficial agent of the French
government. The Emperor had promised him every facility and assistance.
All that was now needed to make his dreams a brilliant reality was the
signature of Maximilian. He was full of glowing anticipations. But
Maximilian, who at the time was none too friendly to his allies, stood
firm.* However much the French might urge it, the national feeling was
already strongly arrayed against any plan involving the possible
alienation of any part of the Mexican territory. Moreover, it was
becoming obvious, from the various complications occurring upon the Rio
Grande, that the befriending of the Confederate refugees must henceforth
seriously add to the difficulty of obtaining the recognition of the
Mexican empire by the United States--an end which Maximilian had greatly
at heart, and one which, strangely enough, he never lost the hope of
accomplishing, so little did he, even after two years' residence in
Mexico, understand American conditions.
* Later he laid stress upon his attitude with regard to this. In the
memorandum written by him for the use of his lawyers at his trial in
vindication of his conduct, he urged as a claim to Mexican leniency his
firm resistance to French pretensions concerning the disposal of Sonora,
and his loyal effort to maintain the integrity of the Mexican territory,
and declared that this drew upon him the hostility of the French. See S.
Basch, "Erinnerungen aus Mexico." (This interesting document is not
given in the French edition.)
On June 26, 1865, Marshal Bazaine was married to Mlle. de la Pena. The
Emperor and Empress expressed a wish that the ceremony and wedding
breakfast should take place at the imperial palace. No effort was spared
by them to make the occasion a memorable one: Empress Charlotte bestowed
upon the bride a set of diamonds; the Emperor gave her as a dowry the
palace of San Cosme, a noble residence, valued at one hundred thousand
dollars, where the French had established their headquarters since the
beginning of the intervention. Every one was in good humor, many polite
assurances of appreciation and good will were exchanged on both sides,
and for a while it seemed as though harmony might be restored among the
leaders. But this pleasant state of affairs was of short duration. The
difficulties inherent in the situation were too conspicuous, and the
causes of ill feeling were too deeply laid, to be overcome by other than
superior men. Notwithstanding a superficial improvement in Mexican
conditions, it was becoming patent in the summer of 1865 that nothing
short of a miracle could save all concerned from disaster and
humiliation.
In those days, our social circle varied from year to year according to
the political and military conditions of the hour. Occasionally the
arrival of some distinguished newcomer on a special mission from abroad
would create a stir among us.
The advent, toward the close of the year 1865, of M. Langlais, the fifth
financier sent by Napoleon III to organize the finances of the empire,
caused considerable excitement and aroused the hopes of the court. His
appointment to succeed M. de Bonnefons had been heralded by the French
official papers with much pomposity.
He came ostensibly to act as minister of finance (without a portfolio),
at an enormous salary, and was supposed, by those who sent him, to take
the full direction of Mexican financial affairs.
He was a councilor of state, and was possessed large experience of
French politics. A ministerial official, methodical, precise, fresh from
the well-appointed offices of the French government, he arrived at Vera
Cruz just as a guerrilla band, after taking up the rails of the only
railway then laid upon Mexican soil, had attacked a train and massacred
its escort of French soldiers.
The poor man's stereotyped ideas of existence were considerably shaken
up by the occurrence; but he was a firm believer in his own capacity,
and was disposed to attribute the failures of his predecessors to their
inferiority to himself. He won the confidence and personal regard of the
young sovereigns, and unhesitatingly undertook to raise the public
revenue, then of eighty-four millions of dollars, to one hundred and
twenty millions. How far he might have gone toward fulfilling his
promise it is impossible to tell, for he died suddenly on February 23,
1866.*
* M. Langlais is stated to have said that he was working to give
Maximilian the chance to abdicate honorably; but the favor in which he
was held at court makes such a statement doubtful.
His death was a blow to the court, where he stood in high favor. The
Empress Charlotte especially is said to have detected in it the finger
of a fate adverse to the empire. This calamity was soon followed by
another, well calculated to cast the gloom of a dark shadow across the
path of the young princess.
Her father, King Leopold I, had died December 10, 1865. Upon his
accession to the throne, her brother, King Leopold II, sent a special
embassy to the court of Mexico to make an official announcement of his
reign. The ambassador, General Foury, arrived with his suite on February
14, 1866, and, having fulfilled his mission, departed on March 4. During
their brief visit to the capital, the Belgian envoys had been freely
entertained by society. It was, therefore, with a thrill of horror that,
on the day following their departure, the news came that their party had
been attacked and fired upon by highwaymen at Rio Frio, a few leagues
from the capital, and that Baron d'Huart, officier d'ordonnance of the
Count of Flanders, had been shot in the head and killed. Four other
members of the embassy were wounded. Consternation reigned at court. The
Emperor went to Rio Frio to see personally to the comfort of the wounded
and to bring back the body of Baron d'Huart, whose solemn obsequies were
conducted in the most impressive manner.
The news of this tragedy, when it reached Europe, must have cast a flash
of lurid light upon the true condition of the Mexican empire.
During the winter of 1866 Napoleon III sent Baron Saillard upon a
special mission to prepare Maximilian for the gradual withdrawal of the
French army, and to intimate to him that he must not depend upon a
continuance of present conditions. The envoy, however, failed to make
upon the prince the impression which it was intended that he should
make. Maximilian received him only twice, and rather resented his
warnings. His visit only added to the coldness of the young Emperor's
relations with the French.
Shortly afterward General Almonte was sent to France on a mission, the
object of which, was to influence Napoleon to continue his support. The
only result of his errand was a communication addressed to Maximilian,
dated May 31, 1866. In this Napoleon stated the situation with a
frankness the brutality of which aroused the indignation of the court of
Mexico. An onerous agreement was nevertheless arrived at, to which
necessity compelled Maximilian to subscribe (July 30). By this
agreement, half of the revenue derived from the customs of Tampico and
Vera Cruz was to be assigned to the French in payment of the debt until
the entire outlay made on behalf of the Mexican empire had been repaid.
The French, in return, promised to continue their support until November
1, 1867, and to withdraw their army in three detachments, the last of
which would embark on that date. The imperial government was thereby
deprived of half of its reliable revenue at a time when, in order to
maintain its existence under the present stress, large additional
resources should have been at its command.*
* See Appendix B.
The years 1865 and 1866 had been spent in administrative experiments. At
first French officers detached from the service were placed in the
various departments of the government as undersecretaries, in the hope
of bringing about an honest and efficient organization without giving
undue umbrage to the Mexicans. Members of the marshal's own household
served thus in the War Department and in the Emperor's military office.
But the efforts of the French to introduce regularity into the various
offices of the administration were so hampered that, even had the task
been an easy one, it is not likely that much could have been
accomplished. They had everything against them, even their allies and
the monarch whom they wished to serve.
When, however, in 1866, the situation was found to be desperate, the
Emperor, seriously alarmed, became more earnest and called the French to
the rescue. Colonel Loysel was made chief of the military office of the
Emperor, and the full control of the departments of War and of Finance
was given respectively to Colonel Osmont, the chief of staff of the
Corps Expeditionnaire, and to M. Friant, the chief of its commissariat.
But at this time there was not a dollar in the treasury; the sources of
imperial revenue were daily diminishing; and the expenses of the
government were now paid by the marshal out of the French treasury,
under his own responsibility. The hour had been allowed to go by when
organization was possible.
The marshal felt--and this feeling was shared by others--that neither
Colonel Osmont nor M. Friant should have accepted a position of trust
impossible to fill with credit at a time when France had resolved to
withdraw its support from Maximilian. Their action was attributed to
personal motives. The marshal declined to cooperate with or to help
them, and they became an additional source of trouble. Later on, when,
the Liberal cabinet having withdrawn, Maximilian once more turned to the
reactionary party and called to power the clericals, he retained the
above-mentioned Frenchmen in their departments. This affectation of
confidence only added to the general ill feeling.
Under the conditions of open hostility then existing between the French
and Mexican governments the interests of each were too wide apart for
such a connection to continue without danger. A request from the
commander-in-chief to MM. Osmont and Friant that they choose between
their present ministerial functions and their respective positions in
the Corps Expeditionnaire gave rise to a correspondence between the
marshal and the Emperor, in the course of which the aggressive
insistence of the latter compelled the former to refer the matter to the
home government.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys upheld the marshal. And well it was that he did, for
just then Mr. Seward, in a diplomatic note to M. de Montholon, under
date of August 16, 1866,* peremptorily called his attention to the fact
that the presence of the two French officers in the imperial cabinet was
calculated to interfere with the good relations existing between France
and the United States.
* "Diplomatic Correspondence," 1866, Part I, p. 381 et seq.
As a result of this communication, the marshal was censured by his
government for not having at once prevented the above-mentioned officers
from accepting their respective portfolios. The irritation on all sides
was painfully visible.
II. LA DEBACLE
Matamoros had fallen in July, 1866. Now, while preparing for the
difficult task of withdrawing his troops in the presence of an advancing
army, the marshal sought not only to obey the instructions of the home
government, but to serve the empire by concentrating its defense within
possible limits and by placing between it and the northern frontier a
natural barrier of wilderness in which "neither friend nor toe could
easily subsist."*
* Letter of Bazaine to Maximilian, Peotillos, August 12, 1866.
The movement was not only planned in order to facilitate the country's
defense against the Liberal forces, but also to guard against any
possible aggression on the part of its formidable Northern neighbor
after the withdrawal of the French army. This eminently prudent strategy
was, however, irritating to Maximilian, who complained of it in the
bitterest terms.
Article I of the preamble of the treaty of Miramar, signed in April,
1864, provided that "the French troops actually in Mexico shall, as soon
as possible, be reduced to a corps of twenty-five thousand men,
including the foreign legion." This corps was temporarily to remain in
order to protect the interests in which the French intervention had been
undertaken, but under the following conditions:
ARTICLE II. The French troops shall gradually evacuate Mexico as H. M.
the Emperor of Mexico shall be able to organize the troops necessary to
take their place.
ARTICLE III. The foreign legion in the service of France, composed of
eight thousand men, shall, however, remain for six years in Mexico after
all other French forces shall have been recalled under Article II. From
that date said legion shall pass into the service and pay of the Mexican
government, the Mexican government reserving unto itself the right to
shorten the duration of the employment in Mexico of the foreign legion.
Permission had been granted to French officers to take service in this
legion. Recruits were also expected from Europe, and twelve hundred
Austrians, on the eve of embarking at St. Nazaire, were stopped only by
the peremptory interference of the United States.* Various army-corps
had been formed, officered by foreigners, among whom were some good
French and Austrian officers. Much interest had at first been shown in
the scheme; and the new army, its recruits, its uniforms and equipment,
furnished society with a fruitful theme for conversation. For a time it
had seemed as though it might be possible to so strengthen the empire as
to enable it to stand without French official assistance. In 1866,
however, Napoleon formally instructed the marshal to advance no more
funds and to pay only the auxiliary troops. The Mexican army might
dissolve. The French, on withdrawing, would leave the Austro-Belgian
corps and the foreign legion,--i.e., some fifteen thousand men,--upon
which the empire must depend. Under the new arrangement the
Austro-Belgian soldiers were to receive the same pay as the
French,--that is, about one half the amount formerly paid them,--and
were once more placed under French control.**
* See "Diplomatic Correspondence," May, 1866, Part I, p. 305 et seq.
** Maximilian's proclamation to the auxiliary troops that they should
henceforth form one and the same division "with their companions in
arms" was dated May 19, 1866.
Dissatisfaction prevailed, and the very worst spirit was manifested on
all sides. After continued ill feeling, in August, 1866, Comte de Thun
sent in his resignation and returned to Europe, leaving Colonel
Kodolitch in command.
The Belgian corps mutinied, and the ringleaders having been discharged,
the disbanded men were incorporated into new mixed regiments.*
* Order given through General Neigre, July 8, 1866. The adjustment with
the Austrians was no easier. An effort was made to induce the French to
advance the pay for the auxiliary corps without proper accounts being
submitted. To this, of course, they could not consent; and it was
whispered that the affair resulted in the exposure of peculations on the
part of certain individuals, whose resignation from the service General
de Thun forthwith required. The better element of the Austrian army felt
deeply humiliated by the incident, and it led to undisguised bitterness
on all sides.
Meantime the Liberals were everywhere assuming an aggressive attitude.
Guadalajara had fallen into the hands of General Uraga.
About this time an important convoy from Matamoros, under the escort of
Colonel Olvera's Mexican force, sixteen hundred strong, and of an
Austrian regiment, was attacked by Liberal forces. The officer in charge
of the Austrian forces was then in the capital. The escort was
overwhelmed, routed, and almost annihilated, and the convoy fell into
the hands of the enemy. The Austrian officer had to bear the most severe
and unsparing criticism from the French. The night after the news of the
disaster had reached the capital he appeared at an evening gathering at
the house of Countess de N--, the wife of an officer on the marshal's
staff. As he entered, a perceptible shock was felt; electricity was in
the air; many turned away from him, and an officer remarked in audible
tones, as I asked the reason of the flutter: "O, ce n'est rien; c'est
seulement le colonel, . . . qui aime mieux s'amuser a Mexico que de se
battre a Matamoros."
It is more than likely that the officer, a man of proved courage, was
fully justified by circumstances known to himself and to his chiefs in
having left his post, but the spirit of antagonism then prevailing would
admit of no excuse. The ill feeling existing between the Emperor and the
marshal was fast spreading in every direction, and interfered even with
the pleasure of social intercourse; and yet all this time the Emperor
was writing to the marshal notes the tone of which was generally more
than courteous, and signed himself "votre tres affectionne."
The fall of Matamoros marked the beginning of the end.
While reviewing the peripetia of an episode in which ignoble intrigue
and treachery have so large a share, it is restful for a moment to pause
before the modest figure of General Mejia, whose loyalty was unflinching
to the bitter end. The brave Indian had for many months faithfully
defended this important post. As true to his flag as President Juarez
was to his, he himself had supplied the needs of his army, holding his
own and never murmuring until, almost forgotten by his government, he
was allowed to fall.
In July, 1866, Tampico and Monterey were, like Matamoros, lost to the
Imperialists. The revenue derived from the port of Tampico thereby
ceased altogether, and went to strengthen the national party. This event
caused a painful shock.
To us in Mexico there was no concealing the fact that the knell of the
Mexican empire had struck. Maximilian must fall. How? was the only
question.
When, in the course of the winter, the treasury being empty, he had
appealed to the French for relief, he had threatened to resign the
throne unless they would advance to his administration the funds
necessary for its support. The marshal had then, against the formal
orders of his own government, supplied the millions necessary to tide
over successive crises as they presented themselves; for it was clear
that unless funds were immediately forthcoming the empire must collapse.
The French government, however, had censured the marshal's conduct. His
situation was fast becoming an impossible one, and in order to obtain
security for the French outlay he ordered the seizure of the
custom-house of Vera Cruz. Maximilian was furious, and a rumor spread
that he was seriously considering his abdication. The Empress, who
strongly opposed his taking this step, suggested going abroad herself to
see what could be done to save the crown. All confidence was at an end
between the young monarchs and the marshal, whom they held responsible
for Napoleon's altered attitude. It seemed to them idle to trust to
written appeals the force of which must be counteracted by his
representations. A personal interview might, however, accomplish much.
The situation was reaching an acute crisis. Much bitter recrimination
had followed upon the disasters to the imperial forces in the North.
Nothing could be worse than the animus on both sides. Altogether,
imperial Mexico had become a seething caldron, in which the scum stood a
fair chance of rising to the top.
The imperial government, which during the first years of its existence
had shown so much jealousy of its own authority, now suddenly changed
its policy and sought to throw the whole weight of its responsibilities
upon the French. In August, 1866, Maximilian proposed to face the
uprising of the republicans throughout the empire, as well as to guard
against possible aggression on the part of the United States troops then
watching events across the Rio Grande, by declaring a state of siege
throughout the empire and by placing the whole executive power of each
state in the hands of a French officer. This he urged upon the marshal,
who courteously but firmly declined. It was impossible to tell where
such a course, if adopted, would lead the French. It must necessarily
carry with it serious consequences, the most obvious of which was a
probable war with Mexico's Northern neighbor, and there is little doubt
that this possibility prompted the suggestion.
Each side accused the other of duplicity with regard to the United
States. The Imperialists openly charged the French with delivering up
the empire to the republicans, while the French suspected the existence
of snares and intrigues set afoot for the purpose of bringing about such
complications as might force the French to retain an interest in Mexican
affairs. Moreover, attempts, not wholly unsuccessful, were made to sow
discord among the French themselves by taking advantage of individual
ambitions and of petty jealousies to increase existing difficulties.
The relations between General Douay, then in command of the second
division, and the quartier-general had never been cordial. On his way to
France, on leave of absence, he passed through the city, and had an
interview with Maximilian. This gave rise to much gossip. It was said
that General Douay favored a policy totally different from that lately
pursued by France, and that he approved of calling upon the French
government for reinforcements for the purpose of firmly maintaining the
empire; that he and Maximilian had arranged to bring pressure to bear
upon the Emperor Napoleon not only to continue but to increase his
support, and that Maximilian wished to see General Douay assume command
of the French army in the marshal's place.
All this came to nothing, but the relations of the Emperor with the
French headquarters were becoming more and more strained, and having
begun with political differences, the feud was assuming almost a
personal character.
Had Maximilian's grasp of the situation been stronger, he must have seen
that by firmly taking his stand upon his original agreement with France,
by refusing to consider the onerous terms substituted for those of the
treaty of Miramar by Napoleon in his communication of May 31,1866, and
by making then and there a public renunciation of his throne, based upon
the non-fulfilment of the terms of the convention, he must throw the
full responsibility of the denouement upon the Emperor of the French.*
* M. Rouher (July 10, 1866) announced to the Chamber of Deputies that
the government had reluctantly determined upon the evacuation of Mexico
by the army, owing to the inability of the Mexican government to observe
the conditions of the treaty of Miramar. See Domenech, "Histoire," etc.,
vol. iii., p. 349.
He had then his one chance to retire with dignity and honor from the
lamentable situation into which his youthful ambition and inexperience
had led him, at the same time revenging himself upon his disloyal ally
by exposing to the full light of day, and before the whole world, the
wretched conditions under which the empire had been erected.
By compromising and signing away half the revenues of his ports,* by
retaining the scepter upon terms that made the empire impossible, that
forced him down to the level of a mere leader of faction, and placed him
in contradiction to his own declared principles, he descended from his
imperial state, and forfeited, if not his crown, at least his right to
it, if judged by his own standard. He, moreover, lost his one chance of
seriously embarrassing his allies. At that time the army was scattered
in small detachments over the Mexican territory; terms had not yet been
made with the Liberal leaders; the sudden collapse of the empire must
have created dangers to the French, the existence of which would give
him a certain hold over them.
* Convention of Mexico, signed July 30, 1866, by M. Dano and Don Luis de
Arroyo.
But he was a weak man; the Empress clung to her crown; the great state
officials were interested in retaining their offices; he was surrounded
by evil or interested councilors; and instead of standing up firmly in
his false ally's path, he allowed him to brush past and to disregard
him.
In ancient Mexico, when, fortune having deserted a warrior, he fell into
the hands of his enemies, a victim doomed to sacrifice, a chance was,
under certain conditions, given him for his life. He was tied by one
foot, naked, to the gladiatorial stone, armed with a wooden sword, and
six warriors were, one after another, entered against him. If
extraordinarily skilful, strong, and brave, he might hold his own and
save his life; at least he might destroy some of his foes, and, falling
like a warrior, avoid being laid alive upon the sacrificial stone, where
his heart, torn out of his breast, must be held up, a bleeding sacrifice
to the fierce god of battles.
Maximilian was not strong enough for the unequal struggle at this
supreme moment, and he was laid upon the sacrificial stone.
Meanwhile the cloud "no bigger than a man's hand," which wise men had
from the first anxiously watched as it loomed upon the northern horizon,
had grown with alarming rapidity, and was now spreading black and
threatening over the whole sky.
Secretary Seward was prepared to enter upon the scene. Nothing could be
finer than the conduct of the American statesman throughout these
difficult transactions. Alone among the foreign leaders who had a share
in them, he followed a consistent policy from beginning to end, and his
diplomatic notes form a logical sequence. Quietly, steadily, he played
his part, to the greater credit and higher dignity of the nation whose
interests and honor were in his keeping.
The burden of the Civil War had for several years weighed him down; but
despite every effort of European diplomacy, the ship of state, steered
by a firm hand, was kept upon its course, avoiding every shoal, while
saving its strength for home defense. He never yielded a serious point,
never wavered in his adherence to the traditional American policy, and
stood by the legal republican government of Mexico even when, reduced to
the persons of the President and his minister, Lerdo de Tejada, it was
compelled to seek refuge at Paso del Norte. But when the surrender of
Lee's army left the Federal government free to act, sixty thousand men
were massed upon the frontier, and the American statesman at once grew
threatening.*
* See peremptory note of Secretary Seward to Mr. Bigelow, November 23,
1866 ("Diplomatic Correspondence," 1866, Part I, p. 366). See also
letter to the Marquis de Montholon, April 25, 1866.
In vain did Napoleon III plead for delay; in vain did he assure Mr.
Bigelow that a date had been fixed for the final recall of the army.
From Washington came the uncompromising words: No delay can be
tolerated; the intervention and the empire must come to an end at once.*
* On December 10, 1860, Mr. Seward officially expressed his opinion that
the traditional friendship with France would be brought into "imminent
jeopardy, unless France could deem it consistent with her interest and
honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico"
(letter of Seward to Bigelow, "Diplomatic Correspondence," 1866, Part
III, p. 429); and he declined the condition made by the Emperor that the
United States recognize the empire of Mexico as a de facto power. See
proclamation of President Johnson, August 18, 1866, declaring the
blockade of Matamoros issued by Maximilian null and void ("Diplomatic
Correspondence," 1866, Part I, p. 339).
Since accepting Napoleon's ultimatum, by the terms of which all French
assistance was to be withdrawn by November 1, 1867, Maximilian had made
no attempt to disguise his hostility to his allies.
The French government having formally declined to do more than pay the
auxiliary troops and the foreign legion, the distress was great, and the
Imperialists, on the verge of starvation, were frequently supplied in
the field by the French commissariat. Demoralization set in throughout
the imperial army. Whole garrisons, receiving no pay, left their posts
and turned highwaymen, even in the neighborhood of the capital.
Indeed, the desertions were now so frequent that the Liberals were able
to form a "foreign legion" with the deserters of various nationalities
who sought service under their flag.* Rats were leaving the sinking
ship.
* See "L'Ere Nouvelle" (Mexico), September 25, 1866.
In January, 1866, the imperial army, including the Austro-Belgian
legion, numbered 43,500 men. In October of the same year only 28,000
remained under arms. Many, of course, had fallen in the field, but
desertion was principally accountable for this shriveling of the Mexican
forces.
Permission had originally been granted French officers to take service
under the imperial flag. Various army-corps had been formed, which were
officered by Frenchmen as well as by Austrians and Belgians.
Theoretically, a year and a half was time enough to organize the new
foreign legion then well under way; but recruiting for the Mexican army
was now found to be, like all other experiments successively brought to
bear upon the problem, virtually impossible. Under the circumstances it
seemed folly for foreign officers to enlist in the newly organized
imperial regiments.
The marshal took it upon himself to withdraw the permission given some
time before to French officers to pass into the Mexican service. He has
been blamed for this, and accused of having deliberately hindered the
organizing of Mexican forces, thus hastening the ruin of the empire. But
no one not on the spot toward the close of the year 1866 can well
realize the atmosphere of general sauve qui peut that prevailed in
Mexico and affected all classes of society. The tide had turned. To all
who had anything to lose, the only course that seemed perfectly clear
was to get out of the country, leaving behind as little of their
belongings as possible. Indeed, M. de Hoorickx, who remained as charge
d'affaires after the departure of the Belgian minister, M. de Blondel,
told me that he also was doing all in his power to prevent his
countrymen from embarking upon such stormy seas.
Sober-minded Austrians, on their side, used their influence over their
more adventurous comrades to prevent their remaining under the altered
conditions.
And now the only hope of the empire rested upon the power of Empress
Charlotte to induce the courts of Austria, Belgium, Rome, and especially
the court of France, to grant a reprieve to the tottering empire by
lending it further support.
To defray the expenses of her journey, thirty thousand dollars were
taken from an emergency fund held as sacred for the repairs of the dikes
which defend Mexico against the ever-threatening floods from the lakes,
the level of which is higher than that of the city.
It soon was whispered among us that upon her arrival in Paris the
Empress had not spared the marshal, and that in her interview with
Napoleon III she not only had denounced him, but had asked his recall.
On September 16, 1866, the anniversary of the national independence was
celebrated with unusual state by the Emperor. The Te Deum was sung in
the cathedral, and a formal reception was held at the palace, where, for
the last time, a large crowd assembled. After this a meeting of the
council of state was held to discuss the situation.
The Liberals and Moderates had failed to strengthen the empire. As a
last resort, the Emperor turned once more to the reactionary party for
help. The Liberal ministers withdrew, and a new cabinet, composed of the
ultra-clerical party, was formed.
Thus, at the last hour, when, without funds and abandoned by his allies,
all were falling away from him, Maximilian cast his lot with the men
whom, when rich in money, armies, and allies, and the future promised
success, he had discarded as impossible to carry. In accepting their
help he was pledging himself to factional warfare, and was virtually
going back upon every declared principle which had formed the basis of
his acceptance of the crown.
But in fairness it may be said that the unfortunate prince was at this
time scarcely responsible for his actions. The situation was desperate.
He had neither the strength nor the coolness of judgment to face the
issue. His vacillating nature had been still further weakened by
intermittent fever, as well as by the events of this year, so fatal to
his house. The climate of Mexico did not suit him. What with malarial
fever and dysentery, as well as with distracting responsibilities and
cares, he was a physical wreck. Not only had he month after month felt
his hopes grow faint and his throne crumble under him; not only had he
every cause to lose faith in his star as well as in his own judgment:
but the cannon of Lissa must have vibrated with painful distinctness
through the innermost fibers of the Austrian admiral's heart, and his
personal interest in Austrian affairs must have caused him to dwell with
poignant regret upon his renunciation of his birthright, and his absence
from the larger stage upon which, but for his wild errand, he might then
have been playing a leading role.*
* See M. de Keratry, "L'Empereur Maximilien," p. 220.
The new clerical cabinet, as usual, promised to pacify the country, and
to find the funds indispensable for the purpose. This was the last card
of the reactionary party. Of all those involved in the issue, the
clerical leaders alone had everything to lose by the downfall of the
empire. Their personal interest in its prolongation was clear. With them
it was a matter, if not of life and death, at least of comparative
dignity and prosperity at home, or of exile and beggary abroad.
To place his fate in such hands was the last mistake of the Emperor.
Such interested advisers must endeavor to cut off his retreat, when to
remain must cost him his life.
The mission of the Empress abroad had, if anything, aggravated the
situation. It is said that, no doubt, under the influence of the
cerebral disturbance that soon afterward manifested itself, her
recriminations were so violent as to arouse a feeling of personal
resentment which destroyed all sympathy in Napoleon's heart. Already
weary of an undertaking which from beginning to end must reflect upon
his statesmanship, and which was fast becoming a reproach to the French
nation, he was even then negotiating with the United States for the
removal of his troops, and for the restoration of the republic.
Regardless of the onerous agreement which Maximilian only four months
before had been compelled to sign, the new minister of foreign affairs,
the Marquis de Moustier, on the occasion of his first reception to the
diplomatic corps, on October 11, told Mr. Bigelow that the Emperor would
recall the army shortly.* The minister of war had already signed a
contract with Pereire, the head of the Compagnie Transatlantique, for
the home passage of the last instalment of the army during the month of
March.
* See letter of Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward, October 12 ("Diplomatic
Correspondence," 1866, Part I, p. 360).
Of these fateful negotiations we, in Mexico, were then ignorant. We were
under the impression that strict compliance with the terms of the recent
agreement was the worst that could befall the empire. That these terms
would be strictly adhered to even seemed incredible to many. There were
optimists among us who thought that Napoleon's action was intended to
call forth docility on the part of Maximilian and of his Mexican
cabinet, and to bring them to terms. Thus it was that, although the
debacle was in reality hard upon us, it yet seemed sufficiently far off
not materially to affect our daily life. We therefore lightly skipped
over the thin ice of our present security, unmindful of what the
immediate future had in store for us.
III. COMEDY AND TRAGEDY
In the spring of 1866 our small circle was pleasantly enlarged by the
arrival of the Marquis de Massa. He was the younger son of the
celebrated Regnier, Duc de Massa, the able lawyer whose work upon the
Code Napoleon had led him to a dukedom under Napoleon the Great.
M. de Massa was endowed with more brilliancy than perseverance. He had
not passed through St. Cyr to enter the army, and had devoted much of
his youth to the systematic enjoyment of life. After some of his
illusions and most of his money had gone, he did as many Frenchmen of
good family had done before him--he enlisted in a crack cavalry regiment
of the Imperial Guard, where, after a while, thanks to mighty
protectors, he exchanged his worsted stripes for gold braid and the
single epaulet. He had come to Mexico in search of an excuse for rapid
promotion.
Similar cases were by no means infrequent then. Michel Ney, Duc
d'Elchingen, the grandson of the great marshal, when I met him in
Mexico, was sergeant or corporal in a regiment of chasseurs d'Afrique,
recognizable from his fellow-troopers only by his spotless linen.
Shortly after this he was promoted to a sublieutenancy. His promotion
was then rapid, and he did good service in the north; for although he
was no reader of books and was somewhat heavy of understanding, he was
as brave as his famous ancestor.*
* An officer wrote me during the Franco-Prussian war that at Rezonville,
in 1870, when brilliantly charging at the head of his men, Michel Ney,
then a colonel of dragoons, received three sabre-cuts over his head and
face, and after killing five Prussians rolled under his wounded horse.
He eventually recovered.
Count Clary, a cousin of Napoleon III, when I met him, had only recently
emerged from his worsted chrysalis;** and Albert Bazaine, the marshal's
own nephew, was impatiently waiting to be raised from the depressing
position of a piou-piou, that he might enjoy the full social benefits of
his relationship to the commander-in-chief.
* He was promoted to the rank of captain before the return of the French
army, and commanded a contre-guerilla known as the "Free Company of
Mexican partizans" (see D'Hericault, loc. cit., p. 79), which did brave
work in the state of Michoacan against the bands of General Regules and
others, and later in the neighborhood of Mexico, without ever exciting
the bitter hatred which the contreguerilla of Colonel Dupin, holding the
state of Vera Cruz, drew upon itself. (See "Queretaro," by Haus, p. 56.)
The position of these gentlemen in a capital where the army was, so to
speak, under arms, and where no civilian's dress, therefore, was allowed
to a soldier, was ambiguous and gave rise to amusing anomalies. For
instance, they, of course, could not be admitted to official balls or
entertainments where uniforms were de rigueur, as only officers were
invited. They paid calls, however, and thus mixed on neutral ground with
their officers; and so these nondescript military larvae managed to
enjoy life until the day came when they might become official
butterflies.
As for the Marquis de Massa, the day had long gone by when, driving in
his own trap to the gate of the Paris barracks after a night spent out
on leave through the leniency of General Floury, he set to work to curry
his own horse. His keen wit and happy repartee, his good-humored
sarcasm, and, above all, the magnetism of a personality that scorned
deceit and gave itself for no better or worse than it was, combined to
make him a favorite among the devotees of pleasure whom Napoleon III and
Empress Eugenie had gathered about them; and notwithstanding his empty
pockets, his roofless chateau in Auvergne, and his sparsely braided
sleeve, he was an habitue of the Austrian embassy and of the best salons
in Paris, and made for himself a conspicuous place in the innermost
circle of the court of Compiegne and the Tuileries. He had written a
number of light plays for the amateur stage of Parisian society, and his
dramatic efforts had been interpreted by players whose high-sounding
names might be found on pages of history.
His first attempt was the "Cascades de Mouchy," on December 9, 1863. The
representation was given at the Chateau de Mouchy, to which "all Paris"
traveled for the purpose. In the words of the "Figaro": "It was a
complete mobilization of Parisian society." The Duc de Mouchy, a man of
the old nobility, had recently married Princess Anna Murat; and the
actors as well as the audience represented the wit, talent, wealth, and
power of the Second Empire.
In collaboration with Prince de Metternich, then Austrian ambassador at
the court of the Tuileries, and an amateur musician of no mean order, he
had written the libretto of a ballet called "Le Roi d'Yvetot." This was
given on the professional stage, but met with little success, if
exception is made of the "first night," when again "all Paris" turned
out to see the prince lead the orchestra, and to applaud the brilliant
young author after the curtain fell.
In 1865 he wrote a revue, which was performed with great eclat before
the court at Compiegne. In this really clever piece the principal
occurrences of the year were touched upon and reviewed. The literary
event of 1865 in France had been the publication of Napoleon's work "Les
Commentaires de Cesar," and this the young courtier took as a title for
his play. Once again all the wit and beauty of the court of Eugenie
united to make the occasion a brilliant tribute to the imperial
historian. The Comte and Comtesse de Pourtales, the Marquis and Marquise
de Gallifet, the Duc and Duchesse de Mouchy, the Princesse de Sagan, the
Marquis de Caux (who afterward married Adelina Patti), the Princesse de
Metternich,--indeed, the elite of cosmopolis,--appeared upon the stage,
and in clever verse and epigrammatic song amusingly dealt with the
gossip of the day.
M. de Massa's success was mainly due to the good-natured independence of
his work. He told the truth to his audience, even though it might be
composed of the great of the land. He chaffed the women upon their
manners, and sometimes their morals, and the men upon their idleness and
their evil ways. He showed up the speculative fever which, like an
epidemic, had swept over the higher ranks of Parisian society under the
Second Empire.* No weakness could be sure of escaping his satire. But in
dealing with all this the scalpel of the cynic was concealed under the
graceful touch of the man of the world. He did not assume the tone of a
moralist or of a misanthrope. He was not even an observing spectator,
but a good-natured enfant du siecle, a sinner among sinners, for whom
life was one long comedy.
* For instance, one stanza sung by M. de St. Maurice:
"Tout les terrains, les canaux, les carrieres,
Depuis le fer jusqu'au moindre metal,
Les champs, les eaux, les forets, les bruyeres--
Tout represente un certain capital.
Vous le voyez la fievre est generale;
Tout est matiere a speculations . . .
Tout, en effet, excepte la morale
Qu'on n'a pas mise en actions."