WAR, REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION
The outbreak of war came at a time when Magyar oppression of the
nationalities was approaching a crisis. The Hungarian Government felt
and feared the danger which was already looming on the horizon. They
felt the ground trembling under their feet, despite every effort to
reduce the subject races to passive obedience to their will. Of all the
influences which urged the Central Empires to select 1914 as the year
in which to launch their long-meditated plans, that of the Magyars was
the most potent. The result of a war in which Germans and Magyars were
allied would be the final submission of the Slav races of Hungary under
the Magyar yoke.
So firmly was the idea of Magyar domination fixed in the minds of the
ruling classes of Hungary that in a sense they regarded the War as a
defensive measure. They had undertaken the struggle in order to defend
the place which they had usurped and which threatened to be taken away
from them. The German conception of _Mitteleuropa_ offered them a means
of reasserting their supremacy. In exchange for their compliance, they
would be awarded an important position in the great scheme, and would
secure the assistance of the all-powerful German Empire in an enlarged
policy of subjection of the subject races. Oskar Jaszi, in an article
published in May 1916 in _Wirtschaftszeitung der Zentralmachte_,
elaborated this idea. “_The uneasiness and the fears felt by 10
millions of Magyars in the face of an equal number of non-Magyars who
necessarily feel themselves drawn in spite of themselves towards their
kindred beyond the frontiers is understandable. If the 60 million
Germans, politically and economically united, are indeed anxious to
superintend the peaceful economic and political development of a nation
of 120 millions, it is easy to understand that we should succeed in
breaking the teeth of national hatreds.... A rich and well-organised
Hungary would be for Central Europe the surest route towards the
Balkans.... Central Europe under German hegemony, the Balkans under the
protection of Hungary, such is the dawn of the new era._”
With such a rosy prospect before her, Hungary was not disposed to
wait for victory before putting into effect improved measures for the
disciplining of the minorities. These measures grew steadily more
strict as the War continued. In 1916 the Hungarian Parliament contained
413 deputies, exclusive of the 40 deputies from Croatia-Slavonia. Of
these 405 were Magyar, and only 8 of other nationalities. On a basis
of representation by population, the proportion should have been 215
Magyars to 198 of other nationalities. The subject races being thus
denied a voice in the affairs of their country, the way was clear for
the introduction of any repressive measures which might be thought
necessary. In February 1917 a Bill was brought in by the Opposition for
the adoption of universal suffrage. The franchise question had been
for many years a burning one in Hungarian politics, and it might have
been thought that the Government would have been glad to have settled
it in this way in order to conciliate the mass of the people, who had
already shown signs of restlessness. But fear of the minorities stood
in the way. Count Tisza opposed it vehemently. “_Universal suffrage
is a national danger_,” he said. “_Racial tendencies must be resisted
even if the wheel of universal history passes over the body of him who
resists. Trifling as may be my strength, I shall employ it to save
the nation from any thoughtless extension of the franchise._” That he
had the opinion of the majority of the House with him is proved by
an incident which occurred about the same time. Deputy Juriga, who
was one of the eight non-Magyar members, asked permission to read a
letter in Slovak, which the party he represented had written, thanking
the Minister of Education for having allowed, as a war-time measure,
the Slovak language to be taught in secondary schools as an optional
subject. His request was drowned by cries of “Nothing but Magyar!” to
which he retorted that quotations in French or English, the languages
of the enemy, were allowed in the House, but that Slovak, the language
of a part of Hungary, was forbidden.
The sentiments of Parliament were reflected in the actions of the local
administrative authorities. In October 1917 the Lord Lieutenant of
Nyitra, a county of Slovakia, in the course of a public speech, put
the matter as bluntly as possible. “The Slovaks must not forget that
they live in the Magyar State, and that they must not demand anything
which conflicts with Magyar aspirations. Learn Magyar, all of you,
this is the best advice I can give you, for Magyar is a universal
language. Of what use would Slovak schools be to you? They are useless.
_The main thing is for you to guard against all ideas of separation,
for the moment I perceive anywhere the slightest tendency towards
upsetting the existing state of affairs I shall make the Slovaks feel
my power_ and shall punish them with the utmost severity. I recognise
the need for a policy of agreement and counsel, but this must be in
exclusive accord with the Magyar spirit. Our sole ideal must be the
Unitary Magyar State. He who opposes it will be punished mercilessly.
_I repeat, I shall punish all who do not act as the Magyar State
wishes._”[19]
Two months previously the _Pesti Hirlap_ (August 19, 1917) had put the
Magyar attitude in a nutshell: “_It is necessary to put an end to all
bargaining with the nationalities. Hungary must be rendered Magyar._”
As soon as he came back to office, Count Apponyi set to work to give
expression to this desire. He ordered the closing of the Rumanian
elementary schools and forbade the use of the Slovak language as a
medium of religious instruction, which was the only subject in which
it was used in the schools. But this was not enough. Dr. Roland von
Hegedüs, of the University of Budapest, urged on the Government the
adoption of a novel agrarian policy. “The State cannot in future leave
the land in the frontier regions in the hands of proprietors whom, as
the War has taught us, it is impossible to trust from the military
point of view,” he declared. “In future the State cannot leave the
land in the hands of the non-Magyar nationalities. The State must
adopt an agrarian policy which will permit it to exercise a right of
option in the frontier districts and of furthering in them the process
of national assimilation.” Something of the kind had already been
suggested. On June 14, 1917 the _Szegedi Naplo_, in the course of an
article entitled _The Democratisation of Hungary_, had suggested a
scheme of wholesale deportations. Having proved statistically that
the non-Magyar nationalities occupied mainly the frontier districts,
the article went on to explain that as some sort of democratic reform
was necessary, but would be a source of danger to the Magyar State,
it would be a good plan to remove the non-Magyar nationalities from
the territories which they at present occupied, to scatter them over
the centre of the kingdom, and to replace them by good and faithful
Magyars. If this policy were carried out simultaneously with the
reform of the Electoral Law, even the most extended suffrage would not
be a menace to the Magyar State. The _Pesti Hirlap_ referred to the
matter on August 4, 1917 in the course of an article entitled _Magyar
Colonisation_. In the work of strengthening the Magyar nation, the
principal parts must be undertaken by the Ministers of Agriculture and
Education. The duty of the latter was to suppress non-Magyar education
in the schools and to enforce the Magyar language. The former must,
at the end of the War, initiate a national and colonising policy.
He must set himself to the task of readjusting the ethnographic map
of the country. Backed by public education given solely in Magyar,
a policy of colonisation would serve to diminish the menace of the
nationalities, which split up into Magyar islands the continuity of the
great anti-Slav ocean. This policy was the only hope of upholding the
national unity and territorial integrity of the State.
It was not long before the suggestions bore fruit. On October 25th
the Parliament of Budapest approved a Bill presented by Mezossy, a
member of the Government. He explained the purport of his Bill to a
representative of the _Pesti Hirlap_, which paper published it next
day. “In the first half of the War the melancholy fact was realised
that in the most fertile regions of southern Hungary the land was in
the hands of an unreliable population.... The same was apparent in
the north.... The land in these threatened regions should be in the
hands of men worthy of confidence. In order to achieve this end, the
transfer of ownership of land will be regulated by the consent of the
authorities. Not only the transfer of land, but the lease of it as
well will depend on the authorities. The duration of a lease will not
exceed ten years. In the last resort, the Minister of Agriculture will
examine any particular case should there be any complaint. I can assure
everybody that I shall use this right for the sole advantage of the
national agrarian policy of Magyarism.”
In Austria, Mezossy’s measure was criticised as savouring of barbarism,
but in Hungary, the Magyar spirit regarded it as insufficient. On
November 28th, the _Pesti Hirlap_ returned to the charge. “The State
should have unlimited rights of expropriation in order to be able to
parcel out and colonise the land. A sane allocation of land to the
Magyar nation, which alone sustains the State, must be contrived.
In the south, the Serbs occupy the best land; in Transylvania, the
Rumanians. Thus the decree of Mezossy is merely a beginning. We
demand that this policy be continued on a large scale. So long as the
Government retains the power to do so, it should endeavour to make the
Magyars the masters of Hungarian soil.” In the programme produced by
the reconstructed Cabinet at the end of January 1918, Wekerle showed
himself not unmindful of this advice. He declared that measures would
be taken in the interests of the definite safeguarding of the ideals
of the nation and the State. By that it must be understood that he
would do all in his power to assure to the Magyar nation the exercise
of all its prerogatives. Of these the most important was the right
of expropriation. In the matter of agrarian policy Magyar interests
demanded first of all that the land should be in Magyar hands. This
end could be achieved, without infringing the sacred rights of private
ownership, by the application of the right of expropriation.
By this time it was clear that if the Central Empires won the War the
non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary would be subjected to a period of
oppression even more drastic than they had hitherto experienced. On
the other hand, even the Magyar Jingoes realised that the loss of the
War would mean the dismemberment of their much-vaunted “Unitary Magyar
State.” Germany, the predominant partner, was their one hope, and
during the whole of the War the Magyars did their best to support her
by every means in their power, particularly in the matter of the supply
of foodstuffs, even to the detriment of Austria. At the time of the
campaign in the Carpathians, the Magyars realised that the future of
Hungary was in the balance, and at the same time they were careful to
send only Croatian and Slovak regiments into the front line. This was
throughout the policy of the Magyars, to oppose to their Slav enemies
the hated and despised nationalities of Slav origin, in the pious hope
that they would mutually destroy one another and so leave the coveted
districts at the disposal of the Magyar nation. It was proved by Deputy
Jerzabek that among the nations of the Dual Monarchy the Magyars had
suffered the smallest number of casualties. This may be taken as
another proof of Magyar skill in inducing others to pull the chestnuts
out of the fire for them, while substituting for the traditional valour
of the race of Arpad a noisy bluster and a virulent abuse of the
Entente nations.[20]
When President Wilson first formulated his famous Fourteen Points, the
Magyar Press rejected them unanimously as the product of an utterly
unpractical point of view. Count Czernin declared, on the subject
of self-determination, that the Monarchy would decide for itself
the details of its internal affairs, and would not brook outside
interference. Up to the last moment the attitude of Hungary was one
of stiff-necked obstinacy. The Magyar ruling class did not care what
lessons the War might have taught; their whole policy was still
concentrated upon securing for themselves the best possible terms and
the largest possible area upon which to batten.
But the population of Hungary was utterly war-weary, even the military
caste was for the moment incapable of being goaded into further
effort. The _coup d’état_ of November, by which Hungary declared
herself a Republic, was inspired by the desire to make a display of
sympathy with the principles of democracy which had won the War. The
Republic of Hungary might escape the punishment hanging over the
heads of autocratic Germany and Austria; it might even hope that the
arbiters of peace would be moved to restore to it the allegiance of
the nationalities, who had already expressed their desires in no
uncertain terms. But Karolyi, the first President, although even
at the time he probably honestly believed that the introduction of
democracy was Hungary’s only hope of salvation, was a weak man,
unhappily placed between the socialistic demands of the disfranchised
proletariat and the oligarchic dreams of the ruling class, who,
although they had retired from the stage, remained very close behind
the scenes. It is doubtful whether any man could have stemmed the
Bolshevist flood which already threatened the nation; the inability of
Karolyi to do so was proved almost immediately. Instead of devoting
all his energies to framing a constitution for the purely Magyar
districts of Hungary, which it was evident were all that would be
left to her, and so endeavouring to satisfy the democratic instincts
of the working classes, awakened by the War to the sense of their
political importance, he wasted valuable time in launching plaintive
denunciations of the wrong that had been done to the “thousand-year
old Magyar State,” and in intrigue directed towards reversing what was
already in effect a _fait accompli_.
Success in these directions could not be achieved by force of arms;
in the eyes of the old ruling classes there remained only the forces
of misrepresentation. Unscrupulous propaganda might yet save the day
that political incompetence had lost. The _Pesti Hirlap_ voiced the
prevailing panic. “In the three coming months we have to concentrate
all our efforts on the work abroad; no matter how much it costs,
whether it is one million or 100,000 millions, it is worth it. _Every
article written in French, English or Italian will save for us one
square kilometre of Hungarian territory. It will be the duty of a
clever manager to spread into the circle of our enemies what the staff
of writers will prepare. It is necessary to send into every foreign
country Magyar Socialists who speak foreign languages fluently._” To
uphold their nationality in foreign countries was surely a novel rôle
for “Socialists.” We may suspect the Socialists of the _Pesti Hirlap_
of skin-deep convictions only.
The methods of Magyar propaganda will be dealt with in a later chapter.
For the present it is sufficient to say that the most determined
attempts were made to seduce the inhabitants of the new States from
their allegiance. The agents employed in this campaign were the
officials of the old Magyar regime, who for the most part had been
left at their posts. The _Slovensky Vychod_ of February 27, 1919 said
of these men: “The new regime does not please them at all; for until
now they had been the supreme masters of the ‘stupid’ Slovaks. Under
the Magyar regime they took bribes from everybody who merely made
inquiries of the administration. Under the new order of things this
sort of corruption is not allowed. A certain number of these Magyar
officials have been dismissed the service because they refused to
recognise the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak State in Slovakia, but
they have remained within the borders of the State and have thus been
enabled to continue their subversive activity.” Side by side with these
attempts, the Magyars used every means of influencing foreign opinion
in their favour. The Karolyi regime was made to appear as the dawn
of democracy in Hungary, a sort of millennium in which all citizens
enjoyed the most unfettered freedom; the argument being that the
non-Magyar nationalities should be induced to return to the fold for
their own sakes as much as for that of Hungary.
But Karolyi’s People’s Republic was short-lived. His failure to
influence the Entente in favour of Hungary discredited him in the eyes
of the ruling classes; his flirtations with Communism, undertaken
in the attempt to gain popularity for his regime in the eyes of the
proletariat, had afforded opportunities to the followers of Lenin
of which they were not slow to take advantage. Despite the efforts
of Oskar Jaszi, his Government had failed to win the nationalities,
and by March 1919 he perceived that he was friendless within Hungary
and without. The power slipped from his hands into those of a Soviet
Republic under the presidency of Alexander Garbai, the existence of
which was proclaimed on March 21st. Karolyi disappeared from the stage
of Hungarian politics, in his exit accusing the Entente of planning to
make Hungary a base of military operations against the Bolsheviks of
Russia.
For rather more than four months Hungary was given over to the rule of
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, and became the scene of famine
and bloodshed. Bela Kun, the true leader of the new revolution, had
declared in February that he had brought with him from Russia a sum
of 300,000 crowns with which to overthrow Karolyi’s People’s Republic
and replace it by Soviet rule. Hungary was admirably situated to form
the focus of the World Revolution. It lay in the centre of Europe,
surrounded by States suffering in greater or less degree from the
exhaustion of the War and the fierce cross-currents of reconstruction.
Let Bolshevism but gain a firm foothold in Hungary, so Lenin and his
supporters argued, and it could not fail to spread until it covered the
face of Europe.
For a time Bolshevism dominated the country and succeeded in organising
a by no means despicable Red Army with which it attacked the Czechs
in the north and the Rumanians in the south-east. Bela Kun believed
that the surest way of converting his neighbours to his own views
was by force of arms. At the same time, by means of his soldiers
and especially of his “Terror-boys” under Szamueli, a ruffian with
an insatiable blood-lust, he contrived to suppress all attempts at
counter-revolution. Time after time the adherents of the old ruling
classes endeavoured to rise against the new tyranny, but on every
occasion they were prevented. The Hotel Hungaria in Budapest became the
scene of political murders, while Szamueli, scouring Hungary with his
executioners in a special train, made away with such individuals in
the provinces who threatened to become centres of resistance to the
Soviet rule. It was not until July that the military caste succeeded in
setting up a White Government in Szeged.
But even then this Government was powerless and isolated, mainly
through its own supineness.[21] The measures of the Soviet were
successful in preventing a rising of the masses in their favour,
although by this time the majority in Hungary were heartily sick of
the Bolshevik experiment and anxious to return to some form of sane
democracy. It might have been supposed that even the Magyar aristocracy
had learnt from the events of the past months that although Bolshevism
was unacceptable to the nation, the old regime would be almost equally
so. The mass of the people, at all events, believed that this lesson
had been learnt, and were prepared to allow their old leaders to accept
the task of cleansing the country from the stain of Bolshevism and of
establishing a new order on modern Western lines. If the people of the
country were prepared to agree to this, there was no reason for the
Entente to oppose their wishes. The Rumanians were eventually allowed
to enter Budapest to restore order, and with the advance of their
disciplined forces the Bolshevist regime disappeared like a shadow.
On the first of August the Soviet “resigned,” and the control of the
country was taken over by a military dictatorship, with Admiral Horthy
as Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Friedrich as Prime Minister.
The Military Dictatorship was the direct outcome of the White
Government of Szeged, and it immediately set about the work of
persecuting all those suspected of sympathy with the Bolsheviks. In
the words of a Liberal Magyar,[22] “_The victims of the Red Terror,
according to an official statement, amount to about 300; but those
of the White Terror are estimated at 6,000._ These atrocities must
not be placed to the account of the Hungarian people as a whole,
which is naturally kindly and humane; they are mainly the work of the
Hungarian ‘gentry’ class, which is both economically and politically
in decay, and which contains within it elements sufficiently corrupt
and demoralised to employ such methods to prop up their traditional
regime.” The doings of the Horthy Government will be examined later;
we are only concerned here with the factors which led up to its
establishment. It was natural that a reaction from Bolshevism should
sweep the country in the first moments of relief from its sway, and
it was confidently expected that as soon as the Military Dictatorship
had restored order it would give place to some form of Parliamentary
government elected on a truly democratic franchise. But the months
passed by, and it became apparent that the old ruling classes, having
regained the saddle with the assistance of the military clique, had
no intention of relinquishing it. The danger to Hungary involved in
this state of affairs was obvious to every onlooker. Oskar Jaszi,
writing in the _New Europe_ of November 20, 1919, said: “If the ancient
regime re-establishes itself in Hungary, if the magnates and prelates,
with their traditional allies, the autocratic country gentry and the
Jewish usurers of the cities, regain their ancient power, then all
the democratic gains of our October revolution are lost, and Hungary,
a prey to race hatred and Chauvinism, reverts to its old policy of
oppressing the peasantry, the working classes and such few non-Magyars
as remain.”
That the Horthy Government had every intention of restoring in
Hungary not only the conditions which obtained before the Bolshevik
experiment, but also those which obtained before the establishment
of the Karolyi Government, is proved by the fact that they refused
admission to the country to Karolyi himself and all his supporters. To
support democratic tendencies was in their eyes treason to the State
and destructive of the ultimate object which had they in view, the
restoration of the Hapsburgs. Not only must democracy be suppressed
with an iron hand, but any encroachment on the power of the ruling
classes must be strenuously avoided. Their attitude to the agrarian
question is a case in point. In Hungary, perhaps more than elsewhere,
the distribution of land has for many years been in grave need of
reform. For the most part agriculture has been in the hands of large
owners employing very little labour, and in consequence the land
hunger of the people has grown more and more acute. Under the Karolyi
Government, attempts were made to readjust the tenure of land, but very
little had been achieved before the fall of the Government at the hands
of the power of Bolshevism. As the author already quoted,[23] remarks:
“As a result of the territorial demands put forward at Budapest by
Colonel Vyx in the name of the Allies, the working classes suddenly
went over in large masses to the Communist camp. The Soviet Government
which followed annulled the Buza land reform (instituted under the
Karolyi regime), and one of the people’s commissaries afterwards
publicly boasted at a meeting that the Communists had succeeded in
preventing or reversing the subdivision of the large estates which
had already partially begun, and that in this they had been aided by
the large proprietors, who mobilised their influence for this common
aim.” This policy was, in fact, one of the fundamentals of Communism.
The land was the property of the State, and the large estates were,
therefore, State property which was not to be privately owned by any
section of the people. But, in order to manage these estates, they were
put in the hands of agricultural co-operative societies, and in many
cases the original owner was left as “manager” of his own estates for
the co-operatives. The net result was that the labourers were as far
from owning the land under Bolshevism as they had been under the former
oligarchy.
“As a natural result the Proletarian State roused the mistrust of the
great majority of the agricultural labourers, while the small and
medium peasant proprietors were no less alienated by so dishonest a
policy. Their suspicions were confirmed when the Communists came
out as open opponents of small peasant ownership.... The Hungarian
Soviet Dictatorship owes its really miserable failure only partially
to its corruption and excesses, which have often been exaggerated.
The foremost cause was that it aroused, by every possible means, the
hostility of the great majority of the agricultural population, and
this proved fatal to its food policy and also in other respects.
The Communist experiment would in any case have failed owing to its
internal weaknesses, especially in the matter of workmen’s discipline,
but it need not have left such a hateful memory behind it and injured
so gravely the whole cause of progress if the Soviet Government had
pursued a less doctrinaire and dishonourable agrarian policy.”[24]
The counter-revolution thus found the conditions of land tenure
practically untouched, and it took good care that no undesirable
democratic ideas should disturb it. Divide the land to some extent
it certainly did, but in such a way as to produce in Hungary a pure
and undiluted mediæval feudalism. “Nothing shows so well its (the
Horthy regime) feudal character as the provision that owners of
the new peasant or medium holdings enjoy certain privileges, and
are consequently liable to military service ‘if social order is
threatened.’ The Ministerial decree, published in August 1920 in the
official gazette, _Budapesti Kozlony_, says: ‘Recognised patriots
who have distinguished themselves in the War will receive from the
hands of the Chief of State, Governor Nicholas Horthy, of Nagybanya,
a grant of small holdings for the most part, but in some cases also
a lesser manorial estate. _The land received in fief is a reward for
valour in the War,’ but everyone who receives land ‘must always be
ready for such public services as aim at protecting social order and
social peace.’_ Those receiving such grants obtain all the privileges
of entail; their land cannot, therefore, be alienated, and will be
inherited undivided by the eldest male survivor. In addition to this
they also receive exemption from taxation, and the further privilege
that their land cannot be mortgaged. Such proprietors are allowed to
add to their name the hereditary predicate of _Vitez_ (which means ‘the
brave,’ or, in old parlance, the equivalent of knight). Thus the effect
of the Horthy land reform is to create a new armed nobility.”[25]
Lest it should seem absurd to apply the term “nobility” to landed
proprietors on so small a scale, it must be explained that Hungary is
accustomed to such a use of the word. Indeed, until 1848, the franchise
had been confined to the “nobility” so called, who were exceedingly
numerous, and indistinguishable from the remainder of the people either
by manners or wealth. They were known as _bocskoros nemesseg_, “sandal
nobility,” from their down-at-heel appearance. But they could be relied
upon to use their votes in the Magyar interest, and were therefore
invaluable to the Government.[26] It is obvious that the Horthy regime
is anxious to reintroduce this state of things, and to organise a band
of supporters upon whose votes and military training it can depend for
its continuance in power.[27]
The tendency of the present Government of Hungary is evident from this
example of its internal policy. It represents almost exclusively the
privileged classes, who are bitterly opposed to the introduction of any
form of democracy into the Magyar State. The Government believes that
for the time the people, alarmed at the ease with which the democracy
of Karolyi degenerated into the Communism of Bela Kun, will not resist
the reinstatement of an oligarchy. During this period of consent to
its administration, it is working hard to entrench itself throughout
Hungary, so that by the time the people grow restless under its rule
they will find themselves bound hand and foot and powerless.
It was not until the Entente intervened that the White Government of
1919 showed any signs of legalising its dictatorship by the summoning
of a National Assembly, which it finally did in November 1919. But
even then organisations like the “_M.O.V.E._” and the “_Awakened
Magyars_”[28] took good care that the assembly should contain as few
elements as possible likely to be dangerous to the cause they had at
heart. An extremely strict censorship guarded against unfavourable
reports of these elections reaching the ears of the outside world,
which was, indeed, for the most part, too vitally engaged upon the
problems of its own reconstruction to worry much about the details of
Hungarian conditions. On the surface things appeared to be going well.
Bolshevism had been defeated, a National Assembly was in process of
formation. Only the new States watched anxiously, knowing the dangers
which lurked behind the false appearance of a pacified Hungary. It is
only now, when the internal conditions of the countries of the world
are becoming more stabilised, that their inhabitants have eyes to
spare for the dramas being enacted in other lands than their own. In
the following chapters of this book, therefore, I shall endeavour to
inquire as to how far the new States, having achieved national unity,
are employing that unity for the furtherance of democratic ideals, and
are thereby demonstrating the justice of their existence in the modern
world; Hungary alone, the prey of an autocratic ruling class, we shall
find slipping back into reaction, and thereby becoming a danger to the
peace of Europe.[29]
FOOTNOTES:
[19] See _New Europe_, October 4, 1917.
[20] See page 7.
[21] An interesting picture is given of the inactivity and lack of
initiative of the White Government when a bold move on its part might
have saved Hungary from the ignominy of salvation at the hands of her
late enemies the Rumanians, is given by MM. Jerome and Jean Thiraud,
in their book, _Quand Israel est Roi_ (Paris, Plon-Nourrit et Cie).
“They were French officers who went to seek at Vienna, where they
have taken refuge, Count Teleki and his friends, in order to put them
at the head of the Government of Szeged. But few magnates, however,
elected to follow them, the majority of these gentlemen preferring
to remain in Vienna at the famous Hotel Sacher, where they lived on
the fat of the land and wasted their money in gambling. It was by
virtue of a French safe conduct, and escorted by French officers,
that Count Teleki and a few others were enabled to cross the Hungary
of Bela Kun without hindrance. It was under the protection of our
troops, under the friendly eyes of our Staff, that they were able to
organise their Ministry and their army. If they had shown at once
a greater promptitude of decision, if they had wasted less time in
futile discussion and in mutual recrimination, if the odd thousands
of officers who were collected at Szeged had resolutely marched upon
Budapest with the arms and munitions which we had lent them, they would
have secured on the way to support of many of the peasants of the
Plain, and would perhaps have overthrown the Bolshevik forces, already
almost dissolved. Instead of that, they schemed and made merry at
Szeged, and allowed the Supreme Council time to declare that it did not
recognise this reactionary Government.”
[22] Arnold Daniel, a supporter of Karolyi, in the _Slavonic Review_,
June 1922.
[23] Arnold Daniel, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.
[24] Arnold Daniel, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.
[25] Arnold Daniel, in the _Slavonic Review_, June 1922.
[26] For a description of the sandal nobility, see _Racial Problems in
Hungary_.
[27] “Fortunately this reversion to the Middle Ages can only take place
on a very small scale, because the depletion of the Treasury and the
interests of the big landlords do not permit of large purchases of
land, except in so far as the State lays its hands upon the communal
land” (Arnold Daniel, _loc. cit._).
[28] Societies for the propagation of Magyar sentiments by force. See
page 187.
[29] The point of view of an active member of the Magyar aristocratic
class towards the events from October 1918 to March 1919 may be
perceived in Miss Cécile Tormay’s _An Outlaw’s Diary_ (London, 1923).