and Rules?_
I answer: That, for any thing Man can know to the contrary, all
Creatures may have some Natural Rules: but, every Creature may chuse
whether they will follow those Rules; I mean, such Rules as they
are capable to follow or practise: for, several kinds and sorts of
Creatures, cannot possibly follow one and the same Prescription and
Rule. Wherefore, Divine Prescriptions and Rules, must be, according to
the sorts and kinds of Creatures; and yet, all Creatures may have a
Notion, and so an Adoration of God, by reason all the Parts in Nature,
have Notions of God. But, concerning particular Worships, those must
be Prescriptions and Rules; or else, they are according to every
particular Creature's conception or choice.
CHAP. XI. Sins and Punishments, are Material.
As all Sins are Material, so are Punishments: for, Material Creatures,
cannot have Immaterial Sins; nor can Material Creatures be capable
of Immaterial Punishments; which may be proved out of the Sacred
Scripture: for, all the Punishments that are declared to be in Hell,
are Material Tortures: nay, Hell it self is described to be Material;
and not only Hell, but Heaven, is described to be Material. But,
whether Angels, and Devils, are Material, that is not declared: for,
though they are named Spirits, yet we know not whether those Spirits be
Immaterial. But, considering that Hell and Heaven is described to be
Material, it is probable, Spirits are also Material: nay, our blessed
Saviour Christ, who is in Heaven, with God the Father, hath a Material
Body; and in that Body will come attended by all the Hosts of Heaven,
to judg the quick and the dead; which quick and dead, are the Material
Parts of Nature: which could not be actually judged and punished, but
by a Material Body, as Christ hath. But, pray mistake me not; I say,
They could not be actually judged and punished; that is, not according
to Nature, as Material Actions: for, I do not mean here, Divine and
Immaterial Decrees. But Christ, being partly Divine, and partly
Natural; may be both a Divine and Natural Judg.
CHAP. XII. Of Human Conscience.
The Human Notions of GOD, Man calls _Conscience_: but, by reason
that Nature is full of Varieties, as having Self-moving Parts; Human
Creatures have different Notions, and so different Consciences,
which cause different Opinions and Devotions: but, Nature being as
much compoundable as dividable, it causes unity of some, as also,
divisions of other Opinions, which is the cause of several Religions:
which Religions, are several Communities and Divisions. But, as for
Conscience, and holy Notions, they being Natural, cannot be altered
by force, without a Free-will: so that the several Societies, or
Communicants, commit an Error, if not a Sin, to endeavour to compel
their Brethren to any particular Opinion: and, to prove it is an
Error, or Sin, the more earnest the _Compellers_ are, the more do the
_Compelled_ resist; which hath been the cause of many Martyrs. But
surely, all Christians should follow the Example of Christ, who was
like a meek Lamb, not a raging Lyon: neither did Christ command his
Apostles to Persecute; but, to suffer Persecution patiently. Wherefore,
_Liberty of Conscience_ may be allowed, conditionally, it be no ways a
prejudice to the Peaceable Government of the State or Kingdom.
The Second Part.
CHAP. I. Whether it is possible there could be Worlds consisting only
of the Rational Parts, and others only of the Sensitive Parts.
The Parts of my Mind did argue amongst themselves, _Whether there might
not be several kinds and sorts of Worlds in Infinite Nature?_
And they all agreed, That probably there might be several kinds and
sorts of Worlds.
But afterwards, the Opinion of the Major parts of my Mind, was, That it
is not possible: for, though the Rational parts of Nature move free,
without Burdens of the Inanimate Parts; yet, being Parts of the same
Body, (viz. of the Body of Nature) they could not be divided from the
Sensitive and Inanimate Parts; nor the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts,
from the Rational.
The Opinion of the Minor Parts of my Mind, was, That a Composed World,
of either degree, was not a division from the Infinite Body of Nature,
though they might divide so much, as to compose a World meerly of their
own Degree.
The Major's Opinion was, That it was impossible; because the three
Degrees, Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, were naturally joyned as
one Body, or Part.
The Minor's Opinion was, That a World might be naturally composed
only of Rational Parts, as a Human Mind is only composed of Rational
Parts; or, as the Rational Parts of a Human Creature, could compose
themselves into several Forms, _viz._ into several sorts and kinds of
Worlds, without the assistance of the Sensitive or the Inanimate Parts:
for, they fancy Worlds which are composed in Human Minds, without the
assistance of the Sensitive.
The Major Part agreed, That the Rational Corporeal Actions, were free;
and all their Architectors were of their own Degree: but yet, they were
so joyned in every Part and Particle, to the Sensitive and Inanimate,
as they could not separate from these two Degrees: for, though they
could divide and unite from, and to Particulars, as either of their own
Degrees, or the other Degrees; yet, the Three Degrees being but as one
united Body, they could not so divide, as not to be joyned to the other
Degrees: for, it was impossible for a Body to divide it self from it
self.
After this Argument, there followed another; _That, if it were possible
there could be a World composed only of the Rational Parts, without the
other two Degrees; Whether that World would be a Happy World?_
The Major Part's Opinion was, That, were it possible there could be
such unnatural Divisions, those divide Parts would be very unhappy:
for, the Rational Parts would be much unsatisfied without the
Sensitive; and the Sensitive very dull without the Rational: also, the
Sensitive Architectors would be very Irregular, wanting their Designing
Parts, which are the Rational Parts.
Upon which Argument, all the Parts of my Mind agreed in this Opinion,
That the Sensitive was so Sociable to the Rational, and the Rational so
Assisting to the Sensitive, and the Inanimate Parts so necessary to the
Sensitive Architectors, that they would not divide from each other, if
they could.
CHAP. II. Of Irregular and Regular Worlds.
Some Parts of my Mind were of opinion, _That there might be a World
composed only of Irregularities; and another, only of Regularities: and
some, that were partly composed of the one, and the other._
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That all Worlds were composed partly of
the one, and partly of the other; because all Nature's Actions were
poysed with Opposites, or Contraries: wherefore, there could not be a
World only of Irregularities, and another of Regularities.
The Major Part's Opinion, was, That Nature's Actions were as much
poysed by the contrary Actions of Two Worlds, as by the contrary
Actions of the Parts of One World, or one Creature: As for example, The
Peace and Trouble, Health and Sickness, Pain and Ease, and the like, of
one Human Creature; and so of the contrary Natures of several kinds and
sorts of Creatures of one and the same World.
After which Discourse, they generally agreed, There might be Regular
and Irregular Worlds; the one sort to be such happy Worlds, as that
they might be named Blessed Worlds; the other so miserable Worlds, as
might be named Cursed Worlds.
CHAP. III. Whether there be Egress and Regress between the Parts of
several Worlds.
There arose a Third Argument, _viz. Whether it was possible for some of
the Creatures of several Worlds, to remove, so as to remove out of one
World, into another?_
The Major Part's Opinion was, That it was possible for some Creatures:
for, if some particular Creatures could move all over the World, of
which they were a part, they might divide from the Parts of the World
they were of, and joyn with the Parts of another World.
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That they might travel all over the World
they were part of, but not to joyn with the Parts of another World, to
which they belong not.
The Major's Opinion was, That every Part and Particle, belonged to the
Infinite Body of Nature, and therefore not any Part could account it
self not of the Infinite Body; and being so, then every Part of Nature
may joyn, and divide from and to particular Parts, as they please, if
there were not Obstructions and Hindrances, and some Parts did not
obstruct other Parts: Wherefore, if there were not Obstructions, there
might be Egress and Regress amongst the particular Parts of several
Worlds.
The Minor's Opinion was, That if it could be according to the Major's
Opinion, it would cause an Infinite Confusion in Infinite Nature: for,
every Creature of every World, was composed according to the Nature and
Compositions of the World they were of: wherefore, the Products of one
kind or sort of Worlds, would not be sutable, agreeable, and Regular,
to the productions of another kind.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That it was impossible, since Nature is
one united Body, without _Vacuum_, but that the Parts of all Worlds
must have Egress and Regress.
CHAP. IV. Whether the Parts of one and the same Society, could, after
their Dissolution, meet and unite.
The Fifth Argument, was partly of the same Subject, _viz. Whether the
particular Parts of a Creature, (such as a Human Creature is) could
travel out of one World into another, after the dissolution of his
Human Life?_
The Major Part's Opinion was, That they could.
The Minor's Opinion was, They could not; because the particular Parts
so divided and joyned to and from other particular Parts and Societies,
as it was impossible, if they would, so to agree, as to divide from
those Parts and Societies they are joyned to, and from those they must
joyn with, to meet in another World, and joyn as they would, in the
same Society they were of, when the whole Society is dissolved. Neither
can Parts divide and joyn, as they would: for, though Self-moving Parts
have a Free-will to move; yet, being subject to Obstructions, they
must move as they can: for, no particular Part hath an absolute Power.
Wherefore, the Dispersed Parts of a Dissolved Society, cannot meet and
joyn as they would. Besides, every Part is as much affected to one
Sort, Kind, or Particular, they are Parts of, as to another. Besides,
the Knowledg of every Part alters, according as their Actions alter:
so that the Parts of one and the same Society, after division, have no
more knowledg of that Society.
CHAP. V. Whether, if a Creature being Dissolved, and could Unite again,
would be the same.
The Sixth Argument was, _That, put the case it were possible all the
several Parts belonging to one and the same Society; as for example, To
one Human Creature, after his Human Life was dissolved, and his Parts
dispersed, and afterwards, all those Parts meeting and uniting; Whether
that Human Creature would be the same?_
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That it could not be the same Society:
for, every Creature was according to the nature of their Kind or Sort;
and so according to the Form and Magnitude of one of their Kind or Sort.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Nature of every
particular Creature had such Forms, Shapes, and Properties, as was
natural to that sort of Creatures they were of; yet, the Magnitude of
particular Creatures of one and the same sort, might be very different.
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That if all the Parts of one Society, as
for example, a Man, from the first time of his Production, to the time
of his Dissolution, should, after division, come to meet and unite;
that Man, or any other Creature, would be a Monstrous Creature, as
having more Parts than was agreeable to the nature of his Kind.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Society, viz. The MAN,
would be a Society of greater Magnitude; yet, not any ways different
from the Nature of his Kind.
CHAP. VI. Of the Resurrection of Human Kind.
The Seventh Argument, was, _Whether all the particular Parts of every
Human Creature, at the time of the Resurrection, be, to meet and joyn,
as being of one and the same Society?_
The Minor Part's Opinion was, They shall not: for, if all those Parts
that had been of the same Body and Mind of one Man, from his first
Production, to the last of his Dissolution; or, from his Birth, to the
time of his Death, (supposing him to have liv'd long) should meet and
joyn, as one Society, that is, as one Man; that Man, at the time of
his Resurrection, would be a Gyant; and if so, then old Men would be
Gyants; and young Children, Dwarfs.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That, if it was not so, then every
particular Human Society would be imperfect at the time of their
Resurrection: for, if they should only rise with some of their Parts,
as (for example) when they were in the strength of their Age, then all
those Parts that had been either before, or after that time, would be
unjustly dealt with, especially if Man be the best Product in Nature.
Besides, if a dead Child did rise a Man, as at his most perfect Age,
it could not be said, He rises according to a Natural Man, having more
Parts than by Nature he ever had; and an old Man, fewer Parts than
naturally he hath had: so, what by Adding and Diminishing the Parts
of particular Men, it would not cause only Injustice; but, not any
particular Human Creature, would be the same he was.
CHAP. VII. Of the Dissolution of a World.
The Eighth Argument was, _That when all Human Creatures that were
dissolved, should rise, Whether the World they were of, should not be
dissolved?_
All the Parts of my Mind agreed, That when all the Human Creatures that
had been dissolved, should rise, the whole World, besides themselves,
must also dissolve, by reason they were Parts of the World: for, when
all those numerous dissolved and dispersed Parts, did meet and joyn,
the World wanting those Parts, could not subsist: for, the Frame, Form,
and Uniformity of the World, consisted of Parts; and those Parts that
have been of the Human Kind, are, at several times, of other kinds and
sorts of Creatures, as other sorts and kinds are of Human Kind; and all
the Sorts and Kinds, are Parts of the World: so that the World cannot
subsist, if any kind or sort of Creatures, that had been from the first
time of the Creation, should be united; I mean, into one and the same
sort or kind of Creatures; as it would be, if all those that are Quick,
and those that have been _Dissolved_, (that is, have been dead) should
be alive at one time.
CHAP. VIII. Of a New Heaven, and a New Earth.
The Ninth Argument was, _That if a World could be dissolved, and that
the Human Creatures should rise, and reunite; what World should they
reside in?_
All the Parts of my Thoughts generally agreed, That the Omnipotent
GOD would command the Parts of His Servant NATURE, to compose other
Worlds for them, into which Worlds they should be separated; the Good
should go into a Blessed World; the Bad, into a Cursed World: and the
Sacred Scripture declares, That there shall be a _New Heaven_, and a
_New Earth_; which, in their opinion, was a Heaven and a Hell, for the
Blessed and Cursed Human Kind of this World.
CHAP. IX. Whether there shall be a Material Heaven and Hell.
The Tenth Argument was, _Whether the Heaven and Hell that are to be
produced for the Blessed and Cursed, shall be Material?_
The Minor Part's Opinion was, That they shall not be Material.
The Major Parts were of opinion, They shall be Material, by reason all
those Creatures that did rise, were Material; and being Material, could
not be sensible either of Immaterial Blessings, or Punishments: neither
could an Immaterial World, be a fit or proper Residence for Material
Bodies, were those Bodies of the purest Substance. But, whether this
Material Heaven and Hell, shall be like other Material Worlds, the
Parts of my Mind could not agree, and so not give their Judgment. But,
in this they all agreed, That the Material Heaven and Hell, shall not
have any other Animal Creatures, than those that were of Human kind,
and those not produced, but raised from Death.
But when they came to argue, Whether there might be Elements, Minerals,
and Vegetables, they could not agree; but some did argue, and offer to
make proof, That there might be Mynes of Gold, and Rocks of Diamonds,
Rubies, and the like; all which, were Minerals. Also, some were of
opinion, there were Elements: for, Darkness and Light, are Elemental
Effects: and, if Hell was a World of Darkness; and Heaven, a World of
Light; it was probable there were Elements.
CHAP. X. Concerning the Ioys or Torments of the Blessed and Cursed,
after they are in Heaven, or Hell.
As for the _Ioys of Heaven_, and the _Torments of Hell_, all the Parts
of my Mind agreed, they could not conceive any more probably, than
those they had formerly conceived: which former Conceptions they had
occasioned the Sensitive Parts to declare; and having been formerly
divulged in the Book of my _Orations_, their Opinion was, _That it
would be a superfluous Work to cause them to be repeated in this
Book._ But, the Ground or Foundation of those Conceptions, is, That
God may decree, _That both the Sensitive and Rational Parts of those
that are restored to Life, should move in variety of Perceptions, or
Conceptions, without variety of Objects: and, that those Creatures_
(viz. _Human Creatures) that are raised from Death to Life, should
subsist without any Forrein Matter, but should be always the same in
Body and Mind, without any Traffick, Egress, or Regress of Forrein
Parts_. And the proof, that the Sensitive and Rational Parts of Human
Creatures, may make Perceptions, or rather Conceptions, without Forrein
Objects, is, _That many men in this world have had Conceptions, both
amongst the Rational and Sensitive, which Man names Visions, or
Imaginations; whereof some have been Pleasing and Delightful; others,
Displeasing, and Dreadful_.
The Third Part.
The PREAMBLE.
The Parts of my Mind, after some time of respite from _Philosophical
Arguments_, delighting in such harmless Pastimes; did begin to argue
about a _Regular_ and _Irregular World_; having formerly agreed, there
might be such Worlds in Nature; and that the Regular Worlds, were Happy
Worlds; the Irregular, Miserable Worlds. But, there was some division
amongst the Parts of my Mind, concerning the choice of their Arguments;
as, Whether to argue, first, of the particular Parts of the Regular, or
of the Irregular World. But, at last, they agreed to argue, first, of
the Regular World. But, pray mistake not these Arguments; for they are
not Arguments of such Worlds as are for the reception of the Blessed
and Cursed Humans, after their Resurrections: but, such as these Worlds
we are of, only freely Regular, or Irregular. Also, though I treat but
only of one Regular World, and one Irregular World; yet, my opinion is,
there may be a great many Irregular Worlds, and a great many Regular
Worlds, of several kinds and sorts: but, these I shall treat of, are
such as are somewhat like this World we are of.
CHAP. I. Of the Happy and Miserable Worlds.
The First Argument was, _Whether there might not be such Worlds in
Nature, as were in no kind or sort like this World we are of?_
They all agreed, That it was probable there was.
The Second Argument was, _Whether it was probable that the Happy and
Miserable Worlds were, in any kind, like this we are of._
They all agreed, It was probable that this World was somewhat like both
one, and the other; and so, both those were somewhat like this: for, as
the _Happy World_ was no ways Irregular; and the _Miserable World_ no
ways Regular: so this World we are of, was partly Irregular, and partly
Regular; and so it was a _Purgatory World_.
CHAP. II. Whether there be such kinds and sorts of Creatures in the
Happy and Blessed World, as in this World.
The Third Argument was, _Whether it was probable, the Happy and
Miserable Worlds, had Animal, Vegetable, Mineral, and Elemental Kinds?_
They agreed, It was probable there were such Kinds: but yet, those
Kinds, and particular sorts of those Kinds, might be different from
those of this World.
The Fourth Argument was, _Whether there was Human sorts of Creatures in
those Worlds._
They all agreed, There was.
CHAP. III. Of the Births and Deaths of the Heavenly World.
The Fifth Argument was, _Whether there could be Births and Deaths in
the Happy World?_
Some Parts of my Mind were of opinion, That if there was so Regular
a World, as that there were no Irregularities in it, there could not
be _Deaths_: for, Death was a Dissolution; and if there was no Death,
there could be no Birth, or Production: for, if any particular sort
of Creatures should Encrease, and never dissolve, they would become
Infinite; which every particular kind or sort of Creatures, may be, for
time, and be Eternal; as also, be Infinite for Number; because, as some
dissolve, others are produced. And so, if particular sorts or kinds of
Creatures, be Eternal; the particular Production and Dissolution, is
Infinite: but, if any Sort, or Kind, should encrease, without decrease,
not any particular World could contain them: As for example, If all the
Human Creatures that have been produced from our Father _Adam_, (which
hath not been above Six thousand years) should be alive, this World
could not contain them; much less, if this World, and the Human sorts
of Creatures, had been of a longer date. And besides, if there should
be a greater Encrease, by the Number of Human Creatures: in truth,
the numerous Encrease, would have caused Mankind, in the space of Six
thousand years, to be almost Infinite.
But, the Minor Parts of my Mind was of opinion, That then the _Happy
World_ could not be so perfectly Regular, if there was Death.
The Major Part's opinion was, That some sorts of Deaths were as
regular, as the most Regular Births: for, though Diseases were caused
by Irregular Actions, yet, Death was not: for, as it is not Irregular,
to be old; so it is not Irregular, to dye. But, this Argument broke off
for that time.
CHAP. IV. Whether those Creatures could be named Blessed, that are
subject to dye.
The Sixth Argument was, _Whether those Creatures could be called_
Blessed, _or_ _Happy, that are subject to dye?_
The Major Parts of my Mind was of opinion, That, if Death was as free
from Irregularities, as Birth; then it was as happy to Dye, as to be
Born.
The Minor Parts were of opinion, That though Dissolution might be as
Regular as Composition; yet, it was an Unhappiness for every particular
Society, to be dissolved.
The Major Part's Opinion, was, That though the particular Societies
were dissolved; yet, by reason the general Society of the Kind, did
continue, it was not so much Unhappiness; considering, particular
Parts, or Creatures, did make the General Society; and not, the
General, the Particular Societies: so that, the Parts of the
Particulars, remained in the General, as in the Kind of Sort.
The Minor Parts were of opinion, That the Particulars of the same Kind
or Sort, (as _Mankind_) did contribute but little to the General: for,
other sorts of Creatures did contribute more than they; only Mankind
was the Occasion, or Contributor of the First Foundation, but no more:
but, the other Parts or Creatures of the World, did contribute more
to their Kind, than the Creatures of the same Kind did: and, as other
Kinds, and Sorts, did contribute to Mankind; so Mankind, to other Kinds
or Sorts: for, all Kinds and Sorts, did contribute to the Subsistance
and Assistance of each other.
The Major Part's Opinion was, That if all the Parts of a World did
assist each other, then Death could be no Unhappiness, especially in
the Regular World; by reason all Creatures in that World, of what Kind
or Sort soever, was Perfect and Regular: so that, though the particular
Human Creatures did dissolve from being Humans; yet, their Parts could
not be Unhappy, when they did unite into other Kinds, and Sorts, or
particular Societies: for, those other sorts and kinds of Creatures,
might be as happy as Human Creatures.