ZUMALACARREGUI.

On a dull damp October morning of the year 1833--concerning the more

exact date of which it can only be ascertained that it was subsequently

to the twentieth day of the month--a man rather above the middle height,

wrapped in a military cloak of dark grey cloth, and wearing an oilskin

schako upon his head, was seen proceeding through the streets of

Pampeluna in the direction of the gate known as the Puerta del Carmen.

Although the cloak and schako, which were all that could at first be

distinguished of his dress, indicated their wearer to be an officer, it

was observed, that on passing the guard-house at the gate, he took some

pains to conceal his face, as though fearful of being recognised. Once

outside the walls, he crossed the river Arga by the Puente Nuevo, and

continued his progress along the Irurzun road. He had arrived at about

cannon-shot distance from the fortress of Pampeluna, when a man, leading

a small horse by the bridle, suddenly emerged from a place of

concealment by the roadside. The officer hastily fastened on a spur

which he had brought with him, put foot in stirrup, and mounted. For a

few moments he remained motionless, gazing at Pampeluna, as though

bidding a silent adieu to the friends he left behind him; then striking

his single spur into his horse's flank, he rapidly disappeared. Two

hours later he entered at full trot the village of Huarte Araquil, five

leagues from Pampeluna. The officer alighted at the house of a friend,

where there presently came to meet him a respectable inhabitant of

Pampeluna, by name Don Luis Mongelos, and the vicar or parish priest of

Huarte, Don Pedro Miguel Iraneta. The latter, as well by his sacred

character as by reason of the services that, at a former period, he had

rendered to the cause of the Spanish monarchy, enjoyed some influence in

his district.

The conference that Mongelos and Iraneta held with the unknown officer

lasted till a late hour of the night, when they separated to take a few

hours' repose. At early dawn they reassembled, and set out for the

valley of Berrueza, where they were told that they would find the chief

of the Navarrese Carlists, Don Francisco Iturralde, whom they were

desirous of seeing. They were fortunate enough to meet with him that

same day at the village of Piedramillera.

In those early days of the Royalist insurrection, and in the state of

anxiety and fermentation in which men's minds then were, the appearance

in the Carlist camp of an officer of rank could not do less than excite,

in the highest degree, the curiosity and interest of the inhabitants,

especially of those who had taken up arms for Don Carlos. Accordingly,

whilst the three strangers were with Iturralde, there was rapidly formed

at the door of the latter's quarters a large group, composed of

volunteers and peasants, and even of women and children. All were eager

to know who the person in the colonel's uniform might be; but

nevertheless, when he at last came out, and the crowd pressed forward to

examine him, not one of the numerous assemblage could tell his name.

The disappointed gazers were dispersing, when a party of officers

came up; and no sooner did these behold the stranger, than they

exclaimed simultaneously, and in a tone of mingled surprise and

enthusiasm--"ZUMALACARREGUI!"

Rarely has the axiom, that circumstances and opportunity make the man,

been more fully exemplified than in the person of the chief whose name

we have just written. For forty-five years he lived unknown and

unnoticed beyond a very limited circle, remarked only by his own

comrades, and by the generals under whom he served, as a good drill and

an efficient regimental officer. After twenty-five years' service, he

occupied the undistinguished post of colonel of a Spanish line regiment.

The probabilities were, that he would end his life with the embroidered

cuff of a brigadier-general, and be forgotten as soon as the earth had

closed over him. One man died, leaving a disputed crown; and spurred on,

as some say, by injustice done to him, as others maintain, by an

enthusiastic devotion to a principle, Zumalacarregui, in the twenty

months of life that were still accorded to him, raised and organized, by

his own unaided energies, a numerous and efficient army,

outmanoeuvred the practised leaders, and defeated the veteran troops

that were sent against him, and made himself a name that has been

repeated with respect and admiration by some of the highest military

authorities in Europe.

Don Tomas Zumalacarregui, a native of Guipuzcoa, was twenty years of age

when he first saw fire at Saragossa in 1808. When the French raised the

siege, he returned home, and remained there till Guipuzcoa, following

the example of the other Spanish provinces, declared against the

usurpation of Napoleon. He then immediately joined Jauregui, better

known as El Pastor or the Shepherd, on account of his having, like

another Viriatus--but without becoming a bandit--exchanged the crook for

the sabre. In spite of the youth of his new follower, El Pastor found

him of great assistance; and it is even said that Zumalacarregui,

ashamed of having for leader a man who could not write, undertook to

teach him, and succeeded in so doing. The war of independence at an

end, Areizaga, captain-general of the Basque provinces, appointed

Zumalacarregui his aide-de-camp; and finally, by his interest and

recommendation, procured him a captain's commission in the line. In this

new position the young officer made himself remarked for two things--an

inflexible firmness of character, and an enthusiastic love of his

profession. All his leisure was passed in the study of tactics, and he

rarely opened a book that treated of any other subject.

In 1822, under the constitutional _regime_, Zumalacarregui, being of

known Royalist opinions, was deprived of his company. He joined Quesada,

who was at the head of the _realistas_ in Navarre, and from him received

command of a battalion, which he kept till, at the end of the war, it

was disbanded in common with all the Navarrese corps. Whilst holding

this command, his skill and merit, and a certain air of superiority,

which was natural to him, excited the envy and dislike of some of his

brother officers; but to the intrigues and artifices employed to

injure him, he only opposed a redoubled zeal in the execution of

his duty. Subsequently he commanded a regiment with the rank of

lieutenant-colonel, and was at last made full colonel of the 3d light

infantry. The excellent state into which he brought this corps, caused

it to be sent from Valencia to Madrid, to form part of the military

pageant by which Queen Christina's first arrival at the capital of Spain

was celebrated. This piece of duty, it was expected, would have procured

Zumalacarregui his brigadier's rank; but the only thing he got by it was

a fall from his horse, from the effects of which he afterwards suffered.

Zumalacarregui's last command in the service of Ferdinand was that of

the 14th of the line. A curious narrative of the circumstances that

occurred whilst he had this regiment, is to be found in a letter from

the Carlist general, Don Carlos Vargas, who was at that time

aide-de-camp to Eguia, captain-general of Galicia, in which province the

14th was quartered.

"From time immemorial," says Vargas, "there had existed in the district

of the Ferrol a society of robbers, regularly sworn in and organized,

having branches all over the country, and so well directed in their

operations, that it was found impossible to make an end of them, or to

discover who they were. When any one of the associates was seen to

falter, or was suspected of an intention to betray his companions, he

was immediately assassinated, and almost always in some horrible

manner. Persons of every class and description belonged to this

association--even women, old men, and government functionaries of high

grade. From 1826 to 1832, a merchant of the name of C---- was at the

head of it--a very wealthy man, with respect to whom no one could

explain how it was that in so few years he had accumulated such great

riches. The public authorities, whose duty it was to discover and

suppress so infamous a society, had been drawn into it by bribery or

intimidation, or both; so that, instead of preventing the robberies,

they protected the robbers, and gave them all the opportunities in their

power. In spite of his known zeal, energy, and activity, General Eguia

had been unable to destroy, or even discover, this numerous band. He had

been deceived by the apparent zeal of the _alcalde mayor_ of the Ferrol,

Don V.G. D----, and of an _escribano_, named R----, a captain of

royalist volunteers. These two men denounced and prosecuted sundry small

offenders who formed no part of the grand association; and, by the good

understanding between them, baffled all the efforts of the

captain-general."

Eguia, finding that the robberies continued to as great an extent as

before, and that the temporary governor of the Ferrol did not aid him

efficaciously in detecting their perpetrators, removed him from his post

and conferred it on Zumalacarregui, with whose character he was well

acquainted. The latter in a very few days obtained a clue to the whole

confederacy, and arrested C---- and other rich accomplices. Various

anonymous offers of large sums of money were now made to Zumalacarregui,

and repeated threats of assassination held out to him; but he was

neither to be bribed nor frightened, and the wealthy and influential

confederates set every engine at work to bring about his dismissal and

ruin. Being known as a Royalist, the events that occurred at La Granja

in 1832 facilitated the designs of his enemies. At the same time

Brigadier-General Chacon, then commanding the royal corps of marines at

the Ferrol, and who has since been political chief of Madrid and one of

the cabinet, was also manoeuvring against Zumalacarregui, whose

character, it appears, awed him considerably. Under a pretext that a

Carlist _pronunciamento_ was contemplated, Chacon shut himself up in the

arsenal with his marines, and persisted in remaining there in spite of

the assurances of safety given to him by the governor. At last, having

had an interview at Santiago with the Captain-General Eguia, the latter

succeeded in tranquillizing his fears, and the marines came out of their

stronghold, looking very like a parcel of children whose nurse has

threatened them with a bugbear. Notwithstanding the absurdity of

Chacon's demonstration, it attracted the attention of the Christino

party, then in power; and as at that period all the officers of rank

known to entertain Royalist opinions were deprived, one after the other,

of their commands, there was nothing surprising in the same measure

being adopted with regard to Zumalacarregui, although nothing could be

alleged against him, whether as a man of honour or in a military or

political point of view. As soon as he left the Ferrol, the proceedings

against the robbers became paralysed; those of them who had been taken

were set at liberty, and resumed with impunity their course of crime.

In July 1833 Zumalacarregui took up his residence at Pampeluna, where,

three months later, he learned the death of Ferdinand VII. and the

declaration of General Santos Ladron in favour of Don Carlos. He would

probably have immediately departed to join the insurgents, had not the

authorities of Pampeluna had their eyes upon him. General Sola, then

governor of that fortress, hearing that he had been negotiating the

purchase of a horse, sent for him and enquired if such were really the

case. Zumalacarregui replied that even if it were so, it need not

surprise any body, for all his life he had been accustomed to keep a

horse. "Nevertheless," returned Sola, "for the present your Senoria must

be pleased to do without one." And this was the motive of the

clandestine manner in which Zumalacarregui left Pampeluna.

It has been already shown that although, from earliest manhood,

Zumalacarregui employed himself diligently in cultivating those

qualities, and acquiring that knowledge, by the judicious application of

which he afterwards gained such celebrity, his really public and

important life extended over a period of little more than a year and a

half. But within that short space how much was comprised! What hardship

and exertion--what efforts both mental and bodily--what an amount of

activity, excitement, peril, and success were accumulated in those few

months of existence! From the peculiar circumstances under which

Zumalacarregui's achievements occurred, an historian was very difficult

to be found for them. Those who surrounded him were generally speaking

men of action, less skilled in handling the pen than the sabre; and

moreover, during the six years' struggle, in which most of those who

survived its sanguinary contest took part to its close, the succession

of events was so rapid, the changes were so constant, that the incidents

of to-day might well cause those of yesterday to be imperfectly

remembered. Even the newspaper emissaries who hovered about the scene of

the contest, striving to collect intelligence, were foiled in so doing

by the constant movements of the Carlist general, by the wild country

and inclement season in which he carried on his operations. In the year

1836, a young Englishman, whom a love of adventure and zeal for the

cause had induced to draw his sword in behalf of Charles V., published a

narrative of twelve months' service with Zumalacarregui. There is much

in his book to amuse and interest, and Captain Henningsen, as we have

reason to know from other sources than the internal evidence of his

writings, is a gallant and accomplished officer. His descriptions are

graceful and agreeable, the sketches and anecdotes he gives are the very

romance of civil warfare--not that, as we believe, he either did or had

any occasion to embellish his account of a campaign which abounded in

the picturesque and the dramatic. He was only with Zumalacarregui,

however, during the latter half of his career, when the forces of the

Carlists had already assumed a certain numerical importance, and their

resources were on the increase. Of its earlier portion he could speak

but from hearsay; and it was during that earlier period that

Zumalacarregui had the greatest difficulties to contend

with--difficulties in overcoming which he displayed extraordinary talent

and perseverance. Besides this, we have always looked upon Captain

Henningsen's book rather as a slight, though interesting and truthful,

narrative of personal adventure, than as a record of Zumalacarregui's

career; nor does he claim for it a higher character than the one we are

disposed to concede to it. "I have merely," he says, "drawn a rough

sketch with charcoal on a guard-house wall--neither memoir, travels, nor

history--but which may have the merit of being a sketch from the life."

This is a correct definition. But the character and exploits of

Zumalacarregui were worthy of a chronicler who should treat the subject

more seriously--and such a one has lately been found. A personal friend,

who followed him from the first day that he took up arms for Don Carlos,

a native of the province in which the war was chiefly carried on, fully

acquainted with its state and the feelings of its inhabitants, as well

as with the incalculable disadvantages under which Zumalacarregui

laboured and the few advantages he enjoyed, has undertaken the task. Ten

years after Zumalacarregui's death, the Carlist general, Don Juan

Antonio Zaratiegui, has written, from the country of his exile, the

memoirs of his former leader.

Although the arrival of Zumalacarregui was hailed with the most lively

joy by the insurgents, and notwithstanding that he was senior in rank to

any officer then with the Navarrese Carlists, there were still

difficulties in the way of his taking the command. The whole force in

Navarre consisted but of nine hundred men--peasants for the most part,

many without arms, others with old and unserviceable ones; yet was the

colonelcy of this ragged and badly equipped regiment an object of

competition. Iturralde, who held it, refused to give it up,

although--with the exception of Juan Echevarria, the priest of Los

Arcos, who afterwards made his name infamous for his crimes and

excesses--all the officers and influential persons there assembled were

desirous he should resign it in favour of Zumalacarregui. Captain

Henningsen relates that Iturralde sent two companies of infantry to

arrest his rival, who, "reversing the game, sternly commanded them to

arrest Iturralde, and was obeyed." Of this we see no mention in the book

before us, where we are told, on the contrary, that Zumalacarregui,

finding Iturralde obstinate in retaining the command, was mounting his

horse with the intention of departing and offering his services to the

Alavese Carlists, when he was prevented on so doing by the mass of

officers and persons of distinction in the camp, who compelled him to

return to his quarters, promising that they would find means of

arranging matters satisfactorily. The captains formed up their

companies, and marched them to the parade-ground. When all were

assembled, Major Juan Sarasa, who was looked upon by the soldiers as

second in command, drew his sword, and exclaimed in a loud voice,

"Volunteers! In the name of King Charles the Fifth, Colonel Don Tomas

Zumalacarregui is recognised as Commandant-General of Navarre!" It is

certain that as Don Carlos was then far away from Navarre, and ignorant

even of what was going on there, he could not make this nomination; but

neither had he appointed Iturralde nor any of the other chiefs who

commanded in the various provinces. Under such circumstances this was

perhaps the most proper and solemn way of conferring the command,

especially when the choice fell upon the officer of the highest rank

there present. Before sheathing his sword, Sarasa ordered the guard of

honour at Iturralde's quarters to be relieved, and that Iturralde

himself should be kept under arrest until further orders from the new

chief. All this having taken place without opposition or disturbance,

Zumalacarregui made his appearance upon the parade, passed the troops in

review, and then causing them to form a circle round him, he addressed

them at some length.

From the first formation of a Carlist force in Navarre, the men had been

in the habit of receiving two reals, about fivepence sterling, a-day.

This rate of pay had been established by General Santos Ladron, and

continued by Iturralde, with the view of attracting volunteers. The

necessary funds had hitherto been supplied from certain moneys that had

been found at the beginning of the war in the hands of various

subordinate administrations. These funds, however, were now nearly

exhausted, and Zumalacarregui's first announcement to the soldiery was,

that he should reduce their pay one-half till times were better.

Considering the circumstances under which he had assumed the command,

this was a bold step. Most generals would have sought rather to

conciliate their men by an increase than to risk exciting discontent by

a reduction. Nevertheless, owing to Zumalacarregui's tone of mingled

firmness and conciliation, this alteration was made without exciting a

murmur.

Releasing Iturralde from his arrest Zumalacarregui appointed him second

in command, whilst Sarasa cheerfully descended to the third

place--thereby proving that in what he had done in favour of

Zumalacarregui, the good of the cause he had espoused was his only

motive. The command in chief, however, was merely _ad interim_. On the

arrival of Colonel Eraso, who was then detained in France, it was to be

given up to him. But when Eraso made his appearance, so convinced was he

of Zumalacarregui's superiority of talent, that he insisted, in spite of

the latter's urgent entreaties, in taking only the second post.

Upon assuming the command, Zumalacarregui at once determined on adopting

a defensive system of warfare--the only one, indeed, that was

practicable with his wretched resources and handful of men. Just at that

time General Sarsfield was marching with a strong column to the scene of

the insurrection; and at his approach the Castilian Carlists, under

Merino and Cuevillas, fled and dispersed to their homes. Sarsfield moved

on, and occupied Vittoria with little opposition. Soon afterwards

Zumalacarregui, who had betaken himself to the banks of the Ebro in

hopes of seizing some arms and horses, received an urgent summons to

repair to Bilboa, then held by the Royalists, and which Sarsfield was

advancing to attack. He hastened to obey the call, but only arrived at

that extremity of Navarre nearest to Biscay, in time to meet the remnant

of the Biscayan Carlists flying before the triumphant Christinos. The

troops in the Basque provinces, which, the evening before, had amounted

to five or six thousand men, were now reduced to as many hundreds. Their

arms, ammunition, and artillery, the latter consisting of four guns, had

been abandoned, and were in the power of the conquerors; and so complete

was the dissolution of the Carlist forces, that a vast number of persons

who were compromised by their conduct or opinions, seeing themselves

without defence, crossed the frontier into France. Zumalacarregui, with

three scanty, ill-armed battalions, which he had formed out of the

handful of Navarrese peasants before alluded to, was now the only hope

of the cause. The war was, to all appearance, at an end; and so it

undoubtedly would have been but for Zumalacarregui's extraordinary

qualities. When he left Pampeluna, the three Basque provinces and the

greater part of the Rioja, or plains of the Ebro, were held by the

Carlists. Merino had just issued a proclamation announcing himself to be

at the head of twenty thousand Castilian volunteers. In all, there were

nearly forty thousand men under arms for Don Carlos, and ready to

support the Navarrese rising. Suddenly this brilliant perspective had

disappeared like a scene in a play, and the twelve or fifteen hundred

men, half-naked, without uniform, and badly armed, who were assembled in

the valley of the Borunda, found themselves alone and unprotected in

front of a formidable and well-provided foe. All was confusion and

panic, when Zumalacarregui opposed his zeal and energy to the contagion

of alarm that was rapidly spreading amongst his men. His precautions,

his decided and inflexible character, gave life to a cause apparently at

the last gasp. Encouraging some, rousing others from the lethargy into

which they were sinking, he proceeded resolutely with the organization

of his three battalions, introduced strict discipline and subordination,

and procured five hundred muskets, and a supply of cartridges, from

Biscay and Guipuzcoa. General Villareal, who had saved one battalion

from the wreck of the Alavese troops, joined him; and the juntas and

deputations of the various provinces named Zumalacarregui

commander-in-chief of all the Carlist forces.

Meanwhile, Sarsfield's movements appearing too dilatory to the Christino

government, he was replaced by General Valdes, and appointed Viceroy of

Navarre. The arrival of winter, however, and a heavy fall of snow, in

some degree paralyzed the operations of the Christinos, whilst this

occasioned incredible sufferings to the Carlists. One battalion of the

latter, in passing from Navarre to Guipuzcoa, across the mountains of

Aralar, lost 460 men out of 620, of which it consisted. Numbed by cold,

and worn out by fatigue, they remained to die upon the road, or dragged

themselves for shelter to lonely hamlets and isolated farmhouses, where

many of them were discovered and taken by Christino detachments sent to

hunt them down. "Truly," says Zaratiegui, "it was a lamentable sight to

behold these unfortunate men, who were unable to move hand or foot, thus

persecuted. But even in this state of impotence and peril, not one of

them chose to avail himself of the pardon which the Christino generals

at that time freely offered to those who should renounce Don Carlos.

Doubtless a great proof of how noble and constant was their first

resolution."

In order not to inconvenience the inhabitants, Zumalacarregui was in the

habit of distributing his troops over large districts, himself

frequently remaining with only a handful of men about him. On one of

these occasions an incident occurred which is related at considerable

length by General Zaratiegui, who evidently attaches the greatest

importance to his late chief's most trifling actions, and, in the course

of his book, compares him to or sets him above various renowned heroes

of ancient and modern times. The anecdote, however, is curious, as

showing the constant state of vigilance and anxiety in which the

Carlists were kept during these early days of their uprising.

"Zumalacarregui had taken up his quarters in the hamlet of Zabal, which

consisted of only four houses; and, as the season was unfavourable for a

bivouac, he had scattered the troops through various small villages in

the neighbourhood. With himself there remained only a guard of fifteen

or twenty men, and a few aides-de-camp. It was in the middle of

December, when the nights are at the longest, and consequently the most

favourable time of the year for an enemy to accomplish a surprise. The

Carlist general lay awake in his bed, watching for the dawn, which

seemed to him longer than usual in appearing; till at last his own

restlessness and impatience made him fancy that the Christinos were

coming to surprise him. A distant noise which he heard, and which

resembled the trot of horses, confirmed the hallucination. He sprang

from his bed, and, nearly naked as he was, descended the stairs, opened

the door of the house, and tried to snatch away the musket of the

sentinel posted there, in order to defend himself against the

approaching enemy. The sentry, at once recognising him, kept him off

with his hand, and said firmly--'General, leave me my arms; when

needful, I shall know how to use them.' The man had only joined the

Carlists three days before, and, excepting his musket, bore no mark or

sign of his new profession, not even a cartouch-box; and, to complete

the singularity of the scene, he was mounting guard bareheaded. The

horses, of which Zumalacarregui, with extraordinary fineness of ear, had

detected the approach at a very great distance, soon afterwards made

their appearance. They were mounted by the men whose duty it was to go

from one village to another during the night, collecting rations. Things

returned to their previous state of tranquillity, and the sentinel was

rewarded for his steadiness and presence of mind.

"This incident," concludes Zaratiegui, "recalls to my recollection an

anecdote told by a Spanish author, of the great Captain Gonzalo de

Cordova. When that hero was laying siege to a fortress on the island of

Cephalonia, which was defended by the Turks, he was many times seen to

get up in his sleep, and to cry out to his soldiers to come and repel

the enemy; and it is also said, that owing to these alarms the Spaniards

more than once escaped a surprise."

Without reference to a map, it would be difficult for our readers to

appreciate a description of the extraordinary marches and countermarches

by which Zumalacarregui avoided his enemy until such time as he was able

to fight him. Sarsfield had no sooner established himself in his

vice-royalty at Pampeluna, that he collected all the troops he had at

his disposal, and began running after the Carlist chief. He displayed

great activity, made forced and rapid marches, and on arriving one

evening at the town of Puente la Reyna, found himself, by the result of

a well-planned movement, within an hour and a half's march of Artajona,

where Zumalacarregui had halted. Sarsfield made sure of coming to blows

the next morning; but he had forgotten to take into consideration the

insensibility to fatigue, and capacity of exertion, of the Navarrese

mountaineers. In the middle of the night, Zumalacarregui turned out his

men in dead silence, without sound of drum or trumpet, and began

retracing his steps along the road which he had that day followed. The

next morning, before Sarsfield arrived at Artajona, Zumalacarregui was

at Dicastillo, a long day's march off, and precisely at the same

distance from the Christino general at which he had been when the latter

commenced his pursuit. Sarsfield found matter for reflection in this,

and perceiving, doubtless, that a war in such a country as Navarre, and

against such a man as Zumalacarregui, was likely to prove a shoal upon

which more than one military reputation would be wrecked, he confided

the direction of operations to Generals Lorenzo and Oraa, and returned

to Pampeluna, whence he no more issued forth.

The first encounter between Zumalacarregui and the Christinos took place

on the 29th of December, near the village of Asarta. The Carlist force

consisted of seven small battalions or corps, together about 2500 men,

knowing, for the most part, little or nothing of a soldier's duty. Many

of the muskets were useless, and the ammunition so scarce, that ten

cartridges formed the allowance with which these troops went, for the

first time, under fire. In the combat that ensued, the Christinos

suffered considerable loss; and although the Carlists, who had most of

them expended their ammunition, finally retreated in haste and disorder,

the mere fact of having sustained for some time the assault of an enemy

so far superior to them in discipline and equipments, inspired these raw

recruits with fresh courage and confidence. The resistance that had been

made contrasted advantageously with the facility with which, at the

first commencement of the war, far larger bodies of the insurgents had

been put to flight. Several Christino officers came over to the Carlists

after this trifling action, of which the moral effect was altogether

highly favourable to the cause of Don Carlos.

Dividing his forces into three detachments, Zumalacarregui sent two of

these to draw off the attention of Lorenzo and Oraa, whilst he himself

suddenly appeared before the royal manufactory of shot and shell at

Orbaiceta, near the French frontier. The garrison, consisting of two

hundred men, capitulated, although it might very well have held out the

place against an enemy without artillery, until the arrival of

assistance, which would have been certain to come in two or three days.

Here were found two hundred excellent muskets, a brass four-pounder, and

more than 50,000 cartridges; besides an immense quantity of round-shot

and other projectiles, which at that time were useless to the Carlists,

as they had no artillery.

When, instead of the news which they had been expecting to receive, of

the extermination of the royalist faction, the Pampelonese learned that

Orbaiceta was captured; and that Lorenzo and Oraa had succeeded in

nothing except in knocking up their horses and fagging their men; they

sent to Valdes, the general-in-chief of the army of the North, who was

then in Biscay, imploring him to come and make an end of the Carlists.

Valdes hastened to Pampeluna, and on arriving there at once made a

sortie with five or six thousand men. Zumalacarregui posted himself in a

narrow pass, on the road along which the Christinos were advancing, and

awaited their arrival. Having done this, he sent out a number of

officers and soldiers, who were well acquainted with the country, to

observe the movements of the Queen's troops, and give notice of their

approach. The evening was drawing in, when a peasant came up in all

haste, laden with a large stone of a thin flat form, nearly a foot and a

half long. On reaching the presence of Zumalacarregui, he laid it down,

and requested the general to read what was written on it. One of the

scouts having no writing materials, and thinking the peasant incapable

of bearing a verbal message correctly, had taken this novel means of

conveying intelligence to his chief. In danger of being outflanked,

Zumalacarregui was compelled to abandon his advantageous position. The

following day a skirmish took place without result; and at last Valdes,

finding that he only fatigued his men uselessly, by pursuing an

adversary whom it was impossible to overtake, remained for some days

inactive.

A week had elapsed, which Zumalacarregui had passed at Navascues, busied

in organizing his troops, and making various important administrative

arrangements, when the approach of Oraa compelled him to a change of

place. On the evening of the 17th of February, the Christino general

having put up his infantry in the hamlets of Zubiri and Urdaniz, and the

detachments of cavalry that accompanied him, at a large _venta_ or inn

between those two places, Zumalacarregui resolved upon a nocturnal

attack.

It was at midnight that, by the light of a dozen trees, which had been

set on fire, and served for gigantic torches, the Carlist leader formed

up five companies in a thick wood, and after communicating to them his

project, directed them how to proceed. The post of honour was assigned

to a student of the name of Amezqueta, who, by his feats of courage,

subsequently rose from the rank of a simple volunteer to that of

colonel, and died in consequence of wounds received in action. One

company was sent to open a fire upon Zubiri, in which Oraa himself was

lodged; another was to attack the venta, where the cavalry were

quartered; and the remaining three were to penetrate into the streets

and houses of Urdaniz, which were occupied by five or six hundred

Christinos.

The night had at first been bright and moonlit, but was now cloudy and

dark; and Zumalacarregui, in order to avoid the terrible consequences

that might ensue if his soldiers mistook one another for the enemy,

ordered them to put on their shirts over their other garments. It

happened to be Carnival time, and the men, not at once understanding the

reason of this order, took it as a sort of masquerade proceeding, and

made themselves exceedingly merry about it. The result showed how

necessary a precaution it was. After various difficulties, occasioned by

the bad roads and extreme darkness, the three detachments reached their

respective destinations at about half-past two in the morning, and the

fire against Zubiri and Urdaniz commenced almost at the same moment. In

the first-named place, the Christinos kept themselves shut up in the

houses, from the windows of which they returned the fire, guided in

their aim by the flashes of their assailants' muskets. The sole object

of the Carlists was, to keep them employed, in order that they might not

interfere with what was going on at the two other points of attack. The

cavalry at the venta having neglected all precautions, and possessing no

effective means of defence, soon fell into the power of the Carlists;

but at Urdaniz, which was held by infantry, and against which the

expedition was more particularly directed, a hard-contested fight took

place. The first picket which the Carlists encountered was cut to pieces

to a man; the fire of a second outpost spread the alarm; but,

nevertheless, the attacking party penetrated into the ground-floor of

most of the houses, and a desperate contest ensued upon the stairs. The

horses in the stables were either carried off or killed; and nothing

would have been easier than to have set fire to the houses, and so

ensured the destruction of all the Christinos. From this latter

sanguinary measure, which a Cabrera or a Valmaseda would probably not

have hesitated to adopt, Zumalacarregui abstained. "It did not agree,"

says his biographer, "with the principles of equity and justice which he

observed relatively to the villages and their inhabitants;" from which

we are left to infer, that the burning alive of five hundred Christino

soldiers, could it have been done without injuring houses or peasants,

would have been rather an acceptable holocaust to the Carlist chief.

When all the advantages calculated upon from this expedition had been

obtained, the retreat was sounded, and, forming up his men with the

greatest celerity, Zumalacarregui marched rapidly away, carrying off the

arms, horses, and prisoners, that had been taken. With all his haste,

however, early upon the following day Lorenzo and Oraa were close upon

his heels; but the wary Carlist had omitted no precaution, and, in

anticipation of a hot pursuit, had ordered four battalions to meet him

at the neighbouring pass of Lizarraga, where he accordingly found them

waiting his arrival, and immediately prepared to give the Christinos a

warm reception. The latter, on arriving in front of the position,

probably considered it too formidable a one to attack; for they

forthwith retreated, leaving Zumalacarregui in the peaceable enjoyment

of a triumph which greatly increased his reputation and the confidence

of his followers.

Quesada, who succeeded Valdes in the command of the Queen's army, was

the first to introduce the horrible system of reprisals, or, it should

rather be said, to occasion it, by cruelty towards his prisoners.

Valdes, if he had done little towards terminating the war, had at least

not envenomed it, or rendered its character more ferocious than he had

found it. Although it was impossible to suspect him of any leaning

towards his opponents, he always showed great moderation and humanity,

and caused the wounded Carlists who fell into his hands to be treated

with as much care as if they had been his own men. Quesada, on the

contrary, irritated at the failure of certain attempts he had made to

seduce Zumalacarregui, and subsequently other Carlist leaders, from

their allegiance to him they called their King, and acting under the

influence of a disposition which many events in his life sufficiently

proved to be cruel and bloodthirsty, had scarcely assumed the command

when he gave the signal for reprisals, by shooting at Pampeluna the

Carlist officer, Don Juan Hugalde, although Zumalacarregui had offered

to give a Christino officer and two sergeants in exchange for him. This

was followed by numerous similar acts of cruelty, which at last were

cause that Villareal, by order of Zumalacarregui, shot more than a

hundred prisoners who had been taken a short time previously at a

village near Vittoria. Fortunately, at that particular period, the

prisoners on neither side were very numerous. In an action near Segura,

Leopold O'Donnell, cousin of the present governor of the Havannah, and

son of the well-known Count of Abisbal, fell into the hands of the

Carlists, with four other officers and a number of rank and file. The

five officers were shot, in retaliation for some recent execution of

Carlist prisoners; but Zumalacarregui, willing to make another effort

for the establishment of a more humane system, spared the lives of the

men, and ordered that seven amongst them who were wounded should be

taken care of, and, when cured, sent back to Pampeluna. In return for

this act of mercy, Quesada shot every prisoner he had, wounded or not.

Amongst others, a Captain Bayona, who had received two desperate wounds,

and was at the point of death, was dragged from his bed and shot on the

public square of the village of Lacunza. Zumalacarregui might have

repaid this atrocity by the slaughter of the Christino prisoners who

were still in his power, but having promised them their lives, he would

not recall his word.

A few days after this, four officers were made prisoners by Iturralde,

who entered the town of Los Arcos with a battalion, and captured them

before they had time to retreat to the fort. Quesada feeling very sure

of the fate reserved for them, hit upon a stratagem by which he hoped to

save their lives. He caused to be arrested at Pampeluna the parents of

several Carlist officers of rank, shut them up in the citadel, and sent

confessors to them. They were to be shot, he said, the very moment he

should learn the death of the officers whom Iturralde had taken. The

unfortunate captives begged permission to write to their sons and

relatives in the Carlist army, and this request, which was what Quesada

had reckoned upon, was granted. Those to whom the letters were sent

presented themselves before Zumalacarregui in the most profound

affliction, and implored him to show mercy to the four men on whose

lives depended the existence of persons so dear to them. But

Zumalacarregui, who saw at once that such a precedent would be in the

highest degree dangerous, inasmuch as most of the Carlists had friends

and near relatives in the Christino country, was firm in his refusal.

The officers were shot, but Quesada did not dare to incur the odium

which reprisals of the nature he had threatened would have heaped upon

his head. It was remarked also that he was greatly discouraged by the

proof he on this occasion obtained of his opponent's firmness and

energy, and of the unlimited authority and influence he enjoyed over

those under his command. The shooting of prisoners of war continued

without intermission till the Eliot convention took place.

The month of April had arrived without any one of the Carlist leaders

having received a communication, either verbal or written, from the

prince for whom they had now been six months under arms. At last, on the

11th of April, Zumalacarregui, who was then in the valley of the

Berrueza, received the much wished-for letter from the hands of a native

of Burgos, who, in the disguise of a muleteer, managed to reach his

camp. In this letter, which was dated the 18th of March 1834, Don Carlos

declared that his "royal heart and soul were sweetly affected by the

contemplation of the heroical efforts that were being made in the cause

of religion and his legitimate rights." He promised to maintain the

_fueros_ of the provinces, approved all that had been done, and gave

various and extensive powers to Zumalacarregui, whom he styled Mariscal

de Campo of the royal armies. The enthusiasm which this document

occasioned amongst the troops and the people of the provinces was so

great, that Zumalacarregui declared it to be worth a reinforcement of

twenty thousand men. It is probable also, although no express mention is

made of it, that about or rather before this time, some small supplies

of money had been received from the friends of Don Carlos in Spain, or

other countries; for we find the junta of Navarre busied in providing

new clothing for a part of the troops. The taxes levied in the districts

in which the Carlists operated, and those duties on goods passing the

frontier which they were able to collect, must at that period have been

of very trifling amount, and insufficient to meet the expenses even of

Zumalacarregui's small army.

During three months that Quesada had held the command, which he assumed

with a force that he himself admitted to consist of 23,000 infantry, and

1400 horse, he had accomplished literally nothing. On the other hand,

the Carlists had had several partial successes against himself and his

subordinates; he had lost a vast number of men; and finally, at the

action of Gulinas, near Pampeluna, Linares, one of his generals was so

ill-treated by Zumalacarregui, that all the carts and vehicles in

Pampeluna, including the bishop's carriage, were insufficient to carry

the wounded into the town. After this last disaster, the Spanish

government resolved to give Quesada a successor; and General Rodil, who

had just returned from his expedition into Portugal, upon which he had

gone in the vain hope of seizing the person of Don Carlos, was ordered

to repair to the northern provinces with the troops under his command.

After being detained some days at Madrid by Queen Christina, who had a

fancy to review the division, Rodil, whose activity was his best

quality, continued his march, and soon reached the Ebro with ten

thousand infantry, a proportionate number of cavalry, and a prodigious

train of baggage and artillery. It is said that more than a thousand

carts, and a still greater number of baggage animals, followed his army.

Generals Cordova, Figueras, Carandolet and others of note, formed part

of his brilliant staff, and at Logrono he was joined by Lorenzo and

Oraa with their divisions. The imposing force thus got together was

sufficient, it might well have been thought, to crush, ten times over,

the few companies of raw guerillas under Zumalacarregui's command.

The clash of arms and note of war-like preparation that now resounded

along the right bank of the Ebro, crossed the stream, and penetrated

into the valleys of Navarre. The eyes of the Carlists, both soldiers and

civilians, were fixed upon their chief, who, far from trying to conceal

the approaching danger, rather exaggerated its magnitude. There was

nothing he dreaded more than that his followers should think he was

trying to deceive them. That, he knew, would destroy their confidence in

him. He issued a proclamation to the troops, in which, after talking of

the formidable preparations of the enemy, he put a question to them.

"Volunteers!" he said, "shall you quail at the sight of this numerous

array?" When the officer who read the proclamation in front of the

assembled Navarrese battalions came to this question, a unanimous "No!"

unpremeditated and heartfelt, burst from the lips of every man present.

Upon learning this indication of the temper of the troops,

Zumalacarregui resolved upon a movement of unparalleled audacity. He had

information that on the following day Lorenzo and Oraa were to leave

Logrono for Pampeluna, followed twenty-four hours later by Rodil, with

the troops he had brought from Portugal. Zumalacarregui determined to

advance rapidly from the mountains amongst which he then found himself,

and to fall upon Rodil's left flank, trusting that troops unaccustomed

to that description of warfare would resist but feebly a sudden and

unexpected attack. However this daring plan might have succeeded, it

would certainly have been attempted, had not a totally unlooked-for,

and, to the Carlists, a most important event occurred to prevent it.

At midnight, on the 11th of July, the Carlist troops were about to

commence their march, when Legarra, the abbot of Lecumberri, suddenly

appeared before Zumalacarregui, and placed in his hands a sealed letter

of very small dimensions. The handwriting was unknown to the general,

and the sole address consisting of the two words, "_For

Zumalacarregui,_" he asked Legarra, previously to opening the letter,

whence and from whom it came. The sole information the abbot could give

was that he had received it from the junta of Navarre, and had been

desired to use all haste in its delivery. The general then opened and

read the missive; and as he did so, all those who were present were able

to note upon his countenance the great satisfaction with which the few

words it contained inspired him. He immediately countermanded the march,

ordered the horses to be unsaddled, and the troops to take up their

quarters for the night.

The contents of the note which caused all these changes, were as

follows:--

"Zumalacarregui: I am very near Spain, and to-morrow I trust by

God's help to reach Urdax. Take the necessary measures, and

communicate this to no one.

"CARLOS."

In spite of this last injunction, Zumalacarregui, calculating that Don

Carlos must by this time be on Spanish ground, could not refuse himself

the pleasure of telling such good news to his personal friends. They

repeated to others, and it soon became known throughout the camp, that

the King was coming. At daybreak the next morning, Zumalacarregui set

out, and at eleven at night reached the frontier town of Elizondo, where

he found Don Carlos, who, tired with his journey, had already gone to

bed, but, nevertheless, immediately received his faithful adherent. On

the following day he had several conferences with Zumalacarregui, on

whom he conferred the rank of Lieutenant-general and Chief of his Staff.

The same afternoon the bells were set ringing, and a _Te Deum_ was sung

for the happy arrival of the royal fugitive. It was attended by Don

Carlos, Zumalacarregui, the Baron de los Valles, and various other

notabilities.

His partizans as yet possessing no fortified town or stronghold in which

he could remain with security, Don Carlos was compelled, as soon as he

arrived in Spain, to seek safety in constant change of place.

Zumalacarregui, on the other hand, with Valdes and his formidable army

menacing him on all sides, could spare but little time to play the

courtier. After conducting Don Carlos through the valleys of Araquil,

the Borunda, and the two Amezcoas, in all of which that prince was

received, we are informed, with the most lively demonstrations of joy,

he confided him to the care of General Eraso, who marched him off to the

Basque provinces, to show him to the people, and keep him out of harm's

way. The Christino government and generals had at first affected to

disbelieve the arrival of Don Carlos, and had spread reports that a

person who resembled him had been chosen by the Carlist leaders to

personate the prince, and deceive the people. Soon, however, the fact

was placed beyond a doubt; and Rodil, sending several of his generals to

find Zumalacarregui, set out with twelve thousand men in pursuit of Don

Carlos, who was then in Biscay with a retinue of only twelve persons.

The small number of the Prince's attendants proved his best safeguard.

The Christinos advanced, displaying a vast front, and confident of

catching him; but favoured by the intricacies of the mountains, the

extensive forests and deep barrancas of Biscay, having, moreover, the

peasantry in his favour, and persons perfectly acquainted with the

country for guides, Don Carlos had little difficulty in eluding pursuit.

All Rodil's front and flank marches and countermarches served but to

send a vast number of his men into hospital, and to immortalize his name

in that province by the devastations and incendiarism that the soldiery

committed.

Whilst this was going on, Zumalacarregui was buzzing like an enraged

hornet round the divisions of Oraa, Carandolet, Lorenzo, and other

generals, cutting off outposts, surprising detachments, and doing them a

vast deal of mischief, with little or no loss to his own troops. General

Carandolet was particularly unfortunate; twice did Zumalacarregui

surprise him; first in the pass of San Fausto, where his column was

nearly destroyed; and a second time in the town of Viana, on the Ebro.

On this last occasion the affair was decided by the Carlist cavalry,

which for the first time had an opportunity of distinguishing itself. It

consisted of 250 ill-equipped and undrilled lancers, at the head of

which Zumalacarregui put himself, and charging the Christino horsemen,

who were nearly twice as numerous, broke them and put them to flight.

It is unnecessary, and would be monotonous, to follow Zumalacarregui,

step by step, through the summer campaign of 1834, which was a most

important one for the cause he defended. With the increase of numerical

force, which his successes, and the arrival of Don Carlos, brought to

his standard, the lack of arms, money, and ammunition began to make

themselves nearly as sensibly felt as at the commencement of the war.

When Don Carlos arrived in Spain and formed a ministry, Zumalacarregui

hoped and expected that the men composing the latter would possess some

influence abroad, and would be able to procure assistance of various

kinds. In this, however, he found himself mistaken; and to make matters

worse, he appears to have been already thwarted, in his plans and

arrangements, by the persons about Don Carlos. The division of counsels,

which subsequently ruined the Carlist cause, was already beginning to be

felt.

At the arrival of Don Carlos, the army was composed entirely of

volunteers, but a levy was now ordered of all the men capable of bearing

arms. Zumalacarregui opposed this strenuously, but was finally compelled

to give way, and four new battalions were formed, although there was

scarcely a musket in store to give to them. By this ill-advised measure,

the agricultural interests of the country were materially compromised,

and new and heavy charges imposed upon the military chest, for the

maintenance of troops which, being unarmed, were of course useless. This

was a source of great vexation to Zumalacarregui, who certainly had

enough to do to make head against the enemy opposed to him, without

being compelled at the same time to procure supplies, arms, and

ammunition for his troops, and to attend, in great measure, to the

administrative arrangements, which usually fall to the charge of the

civil authorities. At the commencement of the war, fifty thousand

cartridges were all he possessed, and those were soon consumed, as well

as some that were taken from the Christinos. It was very difficult and

costly to get powder from France, which could only be introduced in

quantities of three or four pounds, or little more. Unable to support

the delay and expense of this, Zumalacarregui established manufactories

in secluded corners of Navarre and the Basque provinces; and then, with

infinite risk, caused saltpetre to be brought from the very heart of

Arragon, and subsequently from France. The powder that was at first

produced was very weak and bad, and the manufacturers worked day and

night till they found means of improving it. The rules introduced into

the battalions, in order to economize this precious commodity, were

singular enough. The soldiers were forbidden to load their muskets till

the very moment of commencing an action; and then were only to fire when

the enemy was very near and fully exposed. Even the guards and pickets,

in view of the Christinos, had but a single musket loaded, which the

sentinels passed from one to another when relieved. Zumalacarregui

himself made frequent inspections of the men's ammunition, and would

often stop soldiers whom he met in the street or on the road, to

ascertain that they had not lost or wasted their cartridges.

The security of the Carlist army did not so much depend on the vigilance

of outposts and advanced guards, as on the system of transmitting

information that was established amongst the village alcaldes, and on

the zeal and fidelity of the _confidentes_ or spies. Without reckoning

those persons who acted in the latter capacity in the vicinity of their

own homes, Zumalacarregui always had about him eighteen or twenty

regularly paid spies; and to these, even in the moments of his greatest

poverty and difficulty, he showed himself liberal to prodigality.

Notwithstanding that it was out of his power to recompense sufficiently

the risks they ran, and the important services they rendered, these men

performed their arduous duties with admirable fidelity. Zaratiegui

relates an anecdote of one of them who, having been guilty of some

neglect, received, by order of Zumalacarregui, two hundred blows with a

stick, and was then turned out of the camp. The evening of the same day

on which this took place, when the general called as usual for his

_confidentes_, the man who had been beaten made his appearance with the

others. Although Zumalacarregui was acquainted with the characteristic

fidelity of these men, he could not help being struck with this instance

of it. His natural generosity of character prevented him from hesitating

a moment in restoring his confidence to the offender. "Rest yourself

to-night," he said to him; "to-morrow you will have to go upon a

service of the greatest importance, and which you alone are able to

perform." And the man left the room, perfectly consoled for the pain and

humiliation of his beating, by these few kind words, addressed to him in

presence of his comrades.

Another anecdote will illustrate the affection of the Carlist soldiers

for their leader, and their sympathy with his difficulties. The troops

all wore _alpargatas_--a species of sandal, of which the sole is of

plaited hemp. These are admirably adapted for long marches in dry

weather, but the wet destroys them, and they go to pieces directly. Of

these sandals, as of every other description of equipment, there was

sometimes great difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply. One day

that it rained heavily, Zumalacarregui was going to pass, with several

battalions, from the Ulzama to the valley of Ollo. The soil was clay,

and there was sure to be a great destruction of the hempen shoes.

Zumalacarregui, who at that time had no others wherewith to replace

them, rode along the line of march, and spoke to man here and there. "A

peseta," said he, (about tenpence sterling,) "for every man who presents

himself this evening with a sound pair of alpargatas." The word was

passed from mouth to mouth; the soldiers understood the difficulty in

which their general was, took off their shoes, and performed a long and

toilsome march barefoot. The next day, when Zumalacarregui ordered the

promised recompense to be distributed, the commandants of battalions

said that it was unnecessary, for that none of the men claimed it.

About this time, Zumalacarregui made an expedition beyond the Ebro, with

the view of carrying off a quantity of woollen cloth from the

manufactories at Escaray. He was unsuccessful in the immediate object of

the expedition; but, at a short distance from Logrono, he fell in with a

convoy, escorted by two companies of infantry and three strong squadrons

of dragoons. The latter charged the Carlist cavalry, which was of much

inferior force, and threw it into complete disorder. Zumalacarregui, who

was a short way behind, saw the disgraceful flight of his lancers, set

spurs to his horse, came up with the fugitives, and rallied them. As

soon as he had got together fifty men, he charged the Christinos,

regardless of the great disparity of force. The charge took place on the

high-road, where there was no room to form front by troops or squadrons.

Six or eight Christino dragoons of gigantic stature, _tiradores_ or

pioneers as they were called, occupied the whole width of the road,

whilst the convoy made all haste to gain the town. Zumalacarregui, with

six of his men, attacked them, and scarcely had their lances crossed the

Christino sabres, when the dragoons were all killed or wounded. The

Carlists charged onwards; the whole of the Christino cavalry was cut to

pieces or forced to run, and the convoy remained in the hands of the

conquerors. It consisted of two thousand muskets, and came very

opportunely to arm the four new battalions, which had been more than

three months in idleness, waiting for weapons.

On the 27th and 28th of October, just one year after Zumalacarregui had

taken command of the Carlist army, occurred the two famous actions in

the plains of Vittoria, when General O'Doyle and two thousand Christinos

fell into the hands of the victors, and nearly as many more were left

dead upon the field. O'Doyle and some of the officers taken were shot;

but the lives of the men were spared, and soon afterwards, at their own

request, their arms were restored to them, and they were incorporated in

the Carlist battalions. This, and other disasters, which about this time

befell Rodil's army, occasioned his recall by the Queen's government,

and the celebrated Mina was appointed in his stead.

The increase of Zumalacarregui's forces, and the advantages he had

gained, inspired him with the idea of capturing some of the Christino

forts in Navarre and the Basque provinces; the said forts being

exceedingly prejudicial to his operations. The great obstacle to his

wishes was, the weakness of his artillery. This consisted only of three

small field-pieces, such as are carried on the backs of mules, and could

be of little service in attacking fortifications. Of shot and shell he

had a large supply, which had been taken at the manufactory of

Orbaiceta. For seven or eight months these stores had been lying there

neglected, none of the Queen's generals having had the foresight to

remove them to a place of safety. Zumalacarregui now caused them to be

taken away, and concealed in the most intricate recesses of the

mountains. But these projectiles were of little use without guns; and to

procure the latter the ingenuity of the Carlists was taxed to the very

utmost. Zumalacarregui remembered that, upon a sandy spot on the

Biscayan coast, an old iron twelve-pounder was lying neglected and

forgotten. This he ordered to be brought to Navarre. A rude carriage was

constructed, on which it was mounted, and it was then dragged by six

pair of oxen over mountains, and through ravines, to the Sierra of

Urbasa, where it was buried. Soldiers are very ingenious in inventing

appropriate names; and as soon as the Carlist volunteers saw this

unwieldy old-fashioned piece of ordnance, full of moss and sand, and

covered with rust, they christened it the Abuelo, or the Grandfather, by

which appellation it was ever afterwards known. The only artillery

officer at that time with Zumalacarregui was Don Tomas Reina, who now,

in conjunction with one Balda, a professor of chemistry, began to devise

means for founding some guns. In the villages and hamlets within a

certain circumference, a requisition was made for all articles composed

of copper and brass, such as brasiers, stew-pans, chocolate pots,

warming-pans, &c.; but as it was found impossible to get sufficient of

these, the three field-pieces were added, and the whole melted together.

In the midst of a forest this strange foundery was established, and

after numerous failures, occasioned by want of experience and of the

proper tools, Reina succeeded in making a couple of howitzers, which,

although of uncouth appearance, it was thought might answer the purpose

for which they were intended.

Never were the Christinos more confident of a speedy termination to the

war than when Mina took the command. The well-earned reputation of that

chief, his peculiar aptitude for mountain warfare, and intimate

acquaintance with the country of Navarre, which had been the scene of

his triumphs during the war against Napoleon, certainly pointed him out

as the most fitting man to oppose to Zumalacarregui. Forgetting that

similar hopes had been founded on the skill of Quesada and Rodil, and on

the imposing forces they commanded, hopes which had been so signally

frustrated, the Queen's partizans now set up a premature song of

triumph, soon to be turned into notes of lamentation. The Mina of 1834,

old and bed-ridden, with his energies, mental perhaps as well as

physical, impaired by long inaction, was a very different man from the

Mina of 1810. When fighting against the French, the sympathies of the

Navarrese were with him; now they were against him, and in a war of this

description, that difference was of immense importance. In spite of the

wintry season and of the badness of his health, one of the first things

he did on assuming the command was to make an excursion to Puente la

Reyna, Maneru, and other places, where, in days gone by, he had had his

headquarters, and which he had then never entered without being greeted

as a hero and patriot, and welcomed with enthusiastic _vivas_. He

flattered himself that this enthusiasm would be again awakened by his

appearance; and was so much the more shocked when he found himself

received with the utmost coldness and indifference. His illness was

aggravated by disappointment, and he returned angry and disgusted to

Pampeluna. Thence, incapacitated by his infirmities from exerting

himself in the field, he directed from his cabinet the operations of his

lieutenants, and issued orders, the cruelty of some of which soon caused

his name to be as much execrated in Navarre as it had there once been

venerated. At no period of the war was less mercy shown to each other by

the contending parties than during Mina's command. Besides shooting all

prisoners taken with arms in their hands, he caused the wounded whom he

found in the Carlist hospitals to be slain upon their beds, and

_garroted_ or strangled a gentleman of Pampeluna, for no reason that

could be discovered except that he had two sons with the Carlists.

Several forts having about this time being taken or battered by

Zumalacarregui, Mina determined to get possession of the guns with which

this had been done. He was aware of the difficulty the Carlists had in

obtaining artillery; and knowing that it could not easily be transported

from one place to another in that rugged and mountainous country, he

conjectured that they were in the habit of burying it, which was

actually the case. In order to obtain information as to the whereabout

of the mortars with which the enemy had been shelling Elizondo, he

decimated the male inhabitants of Lecaros, and then burnt the village

itself to the ground. Such atrocities as these, far from advancing the

cause of Queen Isabel, materially injured it, offering as they did a

strong contrast with the conduct of Zumalacarregui, who, at the taking

of Los Arcos, Echarri-Eranaz, and other places, had shown mercy, and

even great kindness, to the wounded and prisoners he took. At last Mina

having ventured out in person with a division of the troops, carried in

a litter because he too ill to sit his horse, was signally beaten by

Zumalacarregui at a place called Siete Fuentes, or the Seven Fountains,

and himself narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. Soon after this

disaster he was deprived of the command, having done nothing whilst he

held it but lose men and forts, and exasperate the Navarrese peasantry

to an unparalleled extent.

An attempt that was made about this time to assassinate Espartero, who

then commanded a moveable column in Biscay, is thus narrated by General

Zaratiegui:--

"The constant passage of Espartero between Bilboa and Orduna, inspired a

peasant, who occupied a farmhouse near Luyando, with the idea of

attempting that general's life. It was said that the man had been robbed

or ill-treated by the soldiers of Espartero's division; but it is quite

as probable that the peasant fancied in his simplicity, that if he could

kill the Christino general, the war and the evils it inflicted on his

country would be at an end. Taking a large tree trunk, he fashioned it

into a sort of cannon, fixed it at a spot where it commanded the

high-road, and loaded it to the very mouth. The next time Espartero

passed that way, the peasant watched his moment, set fire to the fuse of

this singular piece of artillery, and then ran away. The Christino

soldiers hurried to the spot whence the explosion had proceeded, and

found the wooden cannon burst into fifty pieces. It was evidently the

act of an individual; but nevertheless the unlucky village of Luyando,

being the nearest to the scene of the event, was immediately set on

fire. Out of the sixty houses composing it, more than one half were

consumed; and if the others escaped, it was merely because the

Christinos happened to want them at the moment for their own

occupation."

Valdes was the last Christino general opposed to Zumalacarregui. Being

minister of war at the time of Mina's dismissal from the command, he

ordered all the troops that could possibly be spared to march to

Navarre, and himself followed to direct their operations. Upon his

appearance the war assumed a more humane character; and soon afterwards

the arrival of the British commissioner, and his successful

intervention, put an end to the system of reprisals, although after

Zumalacarregui's death it was again more than once resorted to by the

most ferocious of the leaders on either side. In honour of Lord Eliot,

Zumalacarregui set at liberty the prisoners he had made in the recent

action of the Amezcoas, in which Valdes had been roughly handled. Lord

Eliot having expressed a wish for an autograph of the Carlist leader,

Zumalacarregui took a pen and wrote, in Spanish, as follows:--

"At Asarta, a village of the valley of Berrueza, celebrated for the

various combats which have occurred there in the course of the present

century, the honour of receiving his Excellency Lord Eliot was enjoyed,

on the 25th April 1835, by Tomas Zumalacarregui."

Colonel Gurwood made the Carlist chief a present of an excellent field

glass, which had been used by the Duke of Wellington on some occasion

during the Peninsular war. "This telescope was so esteemed by

Zumalacarregui," says his biographer, "that as long as he lived he

always carried it with him; and at the present day, in spite of its

trifling intrinsic value, it is treasured by his family as the most

precious heir-loom they possess."

The non-success of Valdes's expedition to the valleys of the Amezcoas,

and the fatigues and losses sustained there by his troops, had greatly

discouraged the latter. On all sides the Carlists were obtaining

advantages, and their adversaries began to entertain a panic terror of

Zumalacarregui, who availed himself of this discouragement and temporary

inaction of the foe to attack several fortified places. Amongst others,

the town of Trevino, situated between Vittoria and the Ebro, and at only

three or four hours' march from the cantonments of Valdes's army, fell

into the hands of the Carlists. Assembling thirteen battalions at the

Venta of Armentia, Zumalacarregui brought up his artillery, consisting

of one cannon and one howitzer, with which in two days he forced the

place to capitulate. Although Valdes, from where he was, could hear the

sound of the guns, he did not venture to show himself till the Carlists

had destroyed the fortifications, and effected their retreat with

prisoners and artillery.

It was after this successful expedition, and at what may be considered

the most fortunate period of Zumalacarregui's career, that Don Carlos

conceived the idea of conferring a title on him. He caused this to be

intimated to the general, and also that he was only waiting to know what

title it would be the most agreeable to him to receive. "We will talk

about it," replied Zumalacarregui, "after entering Cadiz. As yet we are

not safe even in the Pyrenees, and a title of any kind would be but a

step towards the ridiculous." It was not till eleven months after his

death that Don Carlos issued a decree, making him grandee of Spain, by

the titles of Duke of Victory and Count of Zumalacarregui.

The garrisons of Estella and of various other fortified towns in the

interior of Navarre and the Basque provinces, were now withdrawn by

order of Valdes; other strong places were taken or capitulated, the

garrisons remaining for the most part prisoners of war. Within two

months after the Eliot convention, the Carlists had got 300 Christino

officers and 2000 rank and file, prisoners in their various depots,

without reckoning those who, on being captured, took up arms for Don

Carlos. To exchange against these, the Queen's generals had not a single

prisoner. About this time Espartero was beaten at Descarga by Eraso;

whilst Oraa met the same fate in the valley of the Baztan at the hands

of Sagastibelza. Jauregui abandoned Tolosa, leaving behind him a

quantity of ammunition and stores, and shut himself up in St Sebastian.

The intrigues and manoeuvres of certain individuals who surrounded Don

Carlos, pandered to his weaknesses, and worked upon his superstitious

bigotry, began to occasion Zumalacarregui serious annoyance, and to

interfere in some instances with his plans. During a short visit to

Segura, where the Carlist court then was, he experienced much disgust

and vexation. His health, moreover, began to fail him; and a week later,

from the town of Vergara, which he had just taken, with its garrison of

2000 men, he sent in his resignation. The following day Don Carlos

himself came to Vergara, and had a short conference with Zumalacarregui,

after which the latter marched upon Durango and Ochandiano, towns on the

Bilboa road, and took the latter, whilst the former was abandoned by its

garrison. It was now his wish to attack Vittoria, which was the nearest

large town, and the easiest to take; but just at this time, Don Carlos,

it appears, had been disappointed of a loan, and his flatterers and

advisers had been consoling him for it, by holding out a prospect of

taking Bilboa, which opulent commercial city contained, they said,

enough riches to get him out of all his difficulties. Zumalacarregui

opposed this plan, but his deference for Don Carlos finally caused him

to yield; and with a heavy heart, and a train of artillery totally

inadequate to the reduction of so strong a town, he sat down before

Bilboa. Two twelve-pounders and one six-pounder, two brass fours, two

howitzers and a mortar, were all that he had to oppose to the strong

defences and forty or fifty guns with which the capital of Biscay was

provided. There was also a great lack of certain descriptions of

ammunition. For the mortar there were only six-and-thirty shells; and to

add to the misfortunes of the attacking party, their two largest guns,

the twelve-pounders, burst on the very first day of the siege. During

the whole of that day and night, Zumalacarregui neither ate nor slept;

and on the morrow, which was the 15th of June, he wrote a letter to the

headquarters of Don Carlos, then at Durango, informing the ministers,

that owing to the immense disproportion between his means of attack and

the enemy's powers of defence, he expected it would be necessary to

raise tire siege.

After sending off this despatch, a great weight seemed removed from the

mind of Zumalacarregui, and he went down to the batteries. With the view

of observing whether the Bilbainos had made any repairs or thrown up

works in the course of the night, he ascended to the first floor of a

house situated near the sanctuary of Our Lady of Begona, and from the

balcony began to examine the enemy's line. Whilst standing there, a

bullet struck him on the right leg, about two inches from the knee. Nine

days afterwards he was dead--killed, there can be little doubt, less by

the wound or its effects than by the gross ignorance of his medical

attendants. Three Spanish doctors, a young English surgeon, and a

_curandero_, or quack, named Petriquillo, whom Zumalacarregui had known

from his youth, and in whose skill he had great confidence, were called

in. The Englishman, however, returned after two days to the squadron to

which he was attached, giving as his opinion, which agreed with that of

Don Carlos's own surgeon, one Gelos, that in a fortnight Zumalacarregui

would be on horseback again. Whilst Petriquillo was applying ointments

and frictions, and a doctor of medicine cramming the patient with drugs,

Gelos and another surgeon kept tormenting the wound with their probes.

The wounded man's general health, already affected by the various

annoyances he had recently experienced, began to give way; and at last,

within three or four hours after the extraction of the ball, an

operation that appears to have been performed in the most butcherlike

manner, Zumalacarregui breathed his last. He was forty-six years of age,

and left a wife and three daughters. All his worldly possessions

consisted of three horses and a mule, some arms, the telescope given him

by Colonel Gurwood, and fourteen ounces of gold.

If that weak and incapable prince, Don Carlos de Borbon, had allowed

Zumalacarregui to follow up his own plans of campaign, instead of

dictating to him unfeasible ones, there can be little doubt that in less

than another year he would have entered Madrid. The immense importance

of the _prestige_ attached to a general is well known. That of

Zumalacarregui was fully established, both with his own men and the

Queen's troops. The latter trembled at his very name; the former, at his

command, were ready to attack ten times their number.

"Are there only two battalions yonder?" enquired Captain Henningsen of a

Carlist soldier, pointing to a position which was menaced by a large

body of the enemy. "That is all, Senor," was the reply; "but the general

is there." The man was as confident of the safety of the position as

though there had been twenty battalions instead of two. And such was the

feeling throughout the Carlist army.

The only one of the Carlist or Christino leaders who united all the

qualities essential to success was Zumalacarregui. Some were honest, a

few were perhaps good tacticians, others were not deficient in energy,

but none were all three. The Christino generals were generally

conspicuous for their indecision, and for their want of zeal for the

cause they defended. Many of them would have been sorry to see an end

put to a war which gave them occupation, rapid promotion, decorations,

titles, and money. When Zumalacarregui began his campaign with a handful

of men, no one could catch him; when he got stronger and showed fight,

no one could stand against him. As soon as he died, his system of

warfare was abandoned, and victory ceased to be faithful to the Carlist

standard. The battle of Mendigorria, which occurred within a month after

his death, and in which the Carlists were signally defeated by Cordova,

taught the former that their previous successes had been owing at least

as much to their general's skill as to their own invincibility.

The most salient points in Zumalacarregui's character were his

generosity and energy. The former was carried almost to an excess. He

could not see persons in want without relieving them; and as his sole

income whilst commanding the Carlist army consisted of 2500 reals, or

twenty-five pounds sterling, a-month, which he took for his pay, he

frequently found himself without a maravedi in his pocket. It is related

of him, amongst many other anecdotes of the same kind, that once in

winter, the weather being very cold, he had ordered a coat, having only

one, and that much worn. The tailor had just brought it home and been

paid for it, when Zumalacarregui, happening to look out of the window,

saw one of his officers passing in a very ragged condition. He called

him up, made him try on his new coat, and finding that it fitted him,

sent him away with it, himself remaining in the same state as before.

For the charges of cruelty of disposition which have been brought

against Zumalacarregui, we are inclined to believe there was very

insufficient ground. He was a severe disciplinarian, shot his own men

when they deserved it, and his prisoners when the Christinos set him the

example; but if he had not done so he had better have sheathed his sword

at once, and left Don Carlos to fight his own battles, in which case

they would very soon have been over. His present biographer, who writes

coolly and dispassionately, and appears as sparing of indiscriminate

praise of his friends as of exaggerated blame of his foes, gives

numerous instances of Zumalacarregui's goodness of heart and humane

feeling. Of a bilious habit and a hasty temper, he could ill bear

contradiction, and at times would say or do things for which he was

afterwards sorry. In such cases he was not ashamed to acknowledge, and

if possible repair, his fault.

The death of Zumalacarregui was the subject of unbounded exultation to

the Christinos; and for long afterwards there might be seen upon the

walls of their towns and villages the remains of a proclamation

announcing it, and predicting a speedy annihilation of the faction.

Although this prophecy was not made good, and the war was protracted for

upwards of four years longer, it soon became evident that the loss

sustained was irreparable, and that the hopes of Carlism in the

Peninsula lay buried in the grave of Tomas Zumalacarregui.

REFERENCE: _Vida y Hechos de Don Tomas Zumalacarregui, Duque de la

Victoria, Conde de Zumalacarregui, y Capitan-General del Ejercito

de S.M. Don Carlos V., por el General del mismo Ejercito_,

DON J.A. ZARATIEGUI.