All virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions._ 213

Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by

their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and

from it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew." 214

My leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a

moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation

itself lies beyond the pale of morality._ 214

The whole of morality of Europe is based upon the values _which are

useful to the herd._ 228

The herd regards the _exception,_ whether it be above or beneath its

general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to

itself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the

strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to

become guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact, to become their

_head-servants:_ thus they convert a danger into a thing which is

useful. 231

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one

type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,

against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and

against those who rise superior to its dead level. 236

My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic

morality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but not

beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different

valuation for their actions. 237

Conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned

for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it

does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of

certain actions, was _not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the

prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience,

the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of

emotions as the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing. 242

_By what means does a virtue attain to power?_--With precisely the same

means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of

opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of

their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of

acts of general "immorality."_ 252

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that

we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love

of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of

mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the

disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as

Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc. 253

The qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or

class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has:

for by means of them it may be harmful to us. 255

I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being

recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue

everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_

from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of

perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim

itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as

judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely

what is generally _forbidden:_ virtue as I understand it is the actual

_vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise

virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtu_--free from all

moralic acid. 258

Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these

things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely. 261

Vice is a somewhat arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting

from physiological degeneracy. A general proposition such as that

which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified

provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate

man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever

Christianity prospers and prevails, the proposition holds good: for

then the existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is

demonstrated. 269

It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how

he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning

circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; but

when he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most absurd of

all animals. 269

As to the whole socialistic ideal: it is nothing but a blockheaded

misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal. 275

An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to

further its purpose (a) by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin; (b) by

assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already

existing; (c) by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an

unquestionable power were manifesting itself; (d) by the slander of

its opponents' ideals; (e) by a lying teaching of the advantages which

follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general

peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God. 278

My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life

are lying beneath the _ban of morality:_ morality is the life-denying

instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated. 278

Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and

valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds.

Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the _weak_ and _mediocre_ of all

times, has been to _enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the

level of the weak: their chief weapon in this process_ was the _moral

principle._ The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as

evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords. 279

Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in

a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good

judgment, and virtue are ours." War urges people to this exaggerated

self-esteem. 281

Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a

"Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German

Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_

ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature.

One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it,

and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind. 281

Real heroism consists, _not_ in fighting under the banner of

self-sacrifice, submission and disinterestedness, but in _not fighting

at all_.... "I am thus: I will be thus--and you can go to the devil!"

282

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that

men were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as

slaves, the slaves of the future. 289

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many

_obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_

of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self. 290

I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with

what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it,

but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for other

_ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals. 291

If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's

neighbour that one is succouring. 294

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's _'ego'_ at the

cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of

others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step

towards truth to himself. 294

A morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the

self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience,

resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of

the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the

eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of

resentment, and of envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the

bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of

humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being-ruled, of poverty,

of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes

(or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of

unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross." 296

The _hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the

Socialists) appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of

revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative

instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings

of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, the discharge of resentment

which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing

egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative

measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult

of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly

appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice,"

"rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his

inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he

also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take

jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his

pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses,

condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself.

But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are

in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find

relief in slander. 298

I value a man according to the _quantum of power and fulness of his

will;_ not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I

consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial of will is both

defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of a _will_ according

to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and

torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I

do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of

reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more

evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been. 304

My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man represents a much higher

value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed

hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been

absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular

kind of man has sought to establish his measures of preservation

and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this

kind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his

strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre

intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he

reveals a _desire;_ that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been

developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to

the "desirable," _worth of man;_ that, up to the present, ideals have

really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the

poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced

men to yearn for nonentity_.... 311

One must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The

moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he

who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for

anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist. 314

The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to

"improve."... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a

lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a

rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even

the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his

species. 319

Up to the present, morality has developed at the _cost_ of: the

ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and

_beautiful_ natures, the independent and privileged classes in all

respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's

endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust

of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be

immoral),--hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values

are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts).--Degeneration and

self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them

that the conflict becomes _conscious._321

Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing:

let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness,

suffering, and sacrifice. Self-contempt on the part of the weak would

be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate

their kind. And would this be desirable?--should we really like a world

in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the

_plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?

... 323

Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is

a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and

other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in

one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say

nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers

that have appeared heretofore as _contemptible libertines_ hiding

behind the petticoats of the female "Truth." 384

What Nietzsche Taught · 第 67 / 77 题