Volumes I and II

"Human, All-Too-Human" (_"Menschliches Allzu Menschliches"_) was

first published in 1878. Previous to this time Nietzsche had devoted

himself to a sedulous study of the French philosophers--Pascal,

La Rochefoucauld, Vanergues, Montaigne and others--and these men

influenced him in his selection of the aphoristic style as a medium

for his thoughts. His serious illness at the time made it impossible

for him to attempt any large and co-ordinated philosophical task which

would have required sustained thinking and continual physical labour,

and the detached manner of writing employed by the French thinkers

fitted in with the intermittent manner in which he was necessitated to

work. "Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions," the second part of "Human,

All-Too-Human," appeared the following year; and "The Wanderer and his

Shadow," the third section, was made public in 1880. Six years later

these three parts were put together in two volumes under the caption of

the original book, and were subtitled "A Book of Free Spirits."

At that time Nietzsche already had numerous writings to his credit.

"The Birth of Tragedy" (_"Die Geburt der Tragödie"_) was composed

between 1869 and 1871, and issued in January, 1872. It was a treatise

on pessimism and Hellenism, and in it Nietzsche endeavoured to

ascertain the origin of Greek tragedy. In his research he passed over

many of the lesser philological discussions which were then occupying

the minds of his academic confrères, and, mild as was this first

published work of his, he suddenly found himself the centre of a

discussion which augured ill for his future at the University of Bâle.

In this book he undertook to explain the constant conflict between the

Apollonian and Dionysian ideals, and defined the differences underlying

these two great influences in Greek art. Later in his writings we find

him applying the theories stated in "The Birth of Tragedy" to all human

transactions.

"On the Future of our Educational Institutions" and "Homer and

Classical Philology," contained in one volume, were addresses

delivered during Nietzsche's professorship of classical philology

at Bâle University. In these lectures he pointed out the necessity

of protecting the man of genius, and denied the existence of actual

culture in the educational institutions of modern Germany, holding that

true culture is only for the higher type of man. He made a plea for an

institution where genuine culture, founded on the ideals of ancient

Greece, would be harboured for the few who would devote their lives

to it. Here unquestionably was the faint beginning of his conception

of the superman. While these lectures dealt only with the educational

institutions of Germany, the criticisms in them may nevertheless be

applied in a broader sense to the general principles underlying all

schools. This book is the first visible step in the development of his

thought.

More evidences of what was to come later are found in a series of

essays written during the early seventies, which are now published

under the general caption of "Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays."

The seven essays contained in this volume are: "The Greek State"

(1871), in which he attacked the modern conception of labour, and

advanced a brief for slavery based on the assumption that without it

true culture cannot exist; "The Greek Woman" (1871), an outline of

Nietzsche's ideal of woman; "On Music and Words" (1871), an analysis

of the origins of music and language and a statement of the functions

of each; "Homer's Contest" (1872), a comparison of the ancient and

modern individualistic strife, in which was pointed out the necessity

of competition in any successful commonwealth; "The Relation of

Schopenhauer's Philosophy to a German Culture" (1872), a gay attack

upon certain phases of German philistinism, with the suggestion that

Schopenhauer's philosophy would prove an excellent counter-irritant;

"Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks" (1873), a brilliant

account and exposition of those Greek thinkers who preceded Socrates;

and "On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense" (1873), a

rhapsodic refutation of the theory of absolute truth, in which we find

many denials of the values attached to current conventions. These

denials we are constantly meeting in the major part of Nietzsche's

later work.

In Volume I of "Thoughts Out of Season" we find two essays: "David

Strauss, the Confessor and Writer" (written in 1873), and "Richard

Wagner at Bayreuth" (written during the close of 1875 and at the

beginning of 1876). The first essay is an attack upon an ex-clerical

who set up a philosopher's shop in Nietzsche's day and succeeded in

sufficiently inflaming the popular mind to secure for himself a wide

and ardent following. Nietzsche, angered by the effect that Strauss's

sophistries had upon the German mind, undertook to answer them and

show up their spuriousness. In the essay on Richard Wagner, Nietzsche

praised the composer in no uncertain terms, hailing him as a saviour

of mankind through the medium of the drama. Nietzsche thought he saw

in Wagner a kindred spirit, a man free from the narrow dictates of his

time, one capable of establishing a new order of things in the realm of

art. Subsequently the philosopher turned against Wagner and denounced

him bitterly for his anti-Hellenic tendencies.

Volume II of "Thoughts out of Season" contains "The Use and Abuse of

History" and "Schopenhauer as Educator," both written in 1874. In the

first of these essays Nietzsche attacked the study of history which was

then the foremost educational fad in Germany. He denied it a place in

the curriculum of culture unless it had for its foundation a profound

knowledge of the causes of history. Also in this essay he made a plea

for the individualistic interpretation of history, arguing that the

events founded on the activities of majorities are useless to a true

understanding of the fundamentals of racial development. Here again

we encounter the foreshadowing of the philosophy of the superman.

Nietzsche paid high tribute to Schopenhauer in his essay "Schopenhauer

as Educator." Without subscribing unqualifiedly to all the doctrines

of the great pessimist, he nevertheless allied himself philosophically

with Schopenhauer's theory that all logic is an outgrowth of the law of

self-preservation.

In the autumn of 1874 Nietzsche wrote a series of brief comments

dealing with the subject of education. These paragraphs contain

about 20,000 words, and were to have constituted, when completed,

the fifth part of "Thoughts Out of Season." He never finished them,

however, and they were not published until after his death. These

fragments appear, under the caption of "We Philologists," at the end

of the volume entitled "The Case of Wagner." "We Philologists" is a

protest against the manner in which classical culture was promulgated

in the universities. It offers a stinging criticism of those German

professors, the philologists, to whom was entrusted the duty of

disseminating Greek cultural ideals, and in addition presents a concise

outline of what genuine Hellenic culture should consist. Nietzsche

protests against the filtering of pagan antiquity through Christian

doctrines--the method of teaching then in vogue--and insists that such

a form of education entirely misses its aim. Although "We Philologists"

is comparatively of small value to the student of Nietzsche's later

philosophy, it is interesting to note that as early as 1874, his

anti-Christian spirit was already well defined.

The four essays contained in the two volumes of "Thoughts out of

Season" and "We Philologists" were the first of an intended series

of pamphlets to be called _"Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen"_[1] but the

series was never finished. However, the Nietzschean philosophical

ideas had unquestionably begun to take definite form. Already there

had been attempts at idealistic and moralistic valuations. There had

also been a considerable amount of that preliminary analysis which was

to form a foundation for the destructive and constructive thoughts of

later years. In these essays Nietzsche had already begun to strike his

bearings, and while they cannot be taken as a part of his philosophical

scheme, they nevertheless form an excellent introduction for those

students who care to go behind the final expression of his ideas and

behold them in embryo.

"Human, All-Too-Human," following two years later, came as a distinct

surprise even to Nietzsche's most intimate friends: Wagner especially

was horrified at the heresies contained in it. There had not been

sufficient indications in his earlier writings for one to predict so

devastating an arraignment of modern life as was contained in this

work. It was a departure, not only in thought but also in manner, from

all else he had written. The conventional essay form had been set aside

for an aphoristic style. Here we find a series of paragraphs varying in

length from a few lines to a page or more, each dealing with a separate

and syllogistically detached idea. The epigram, which was to play

such an important part in all of Nietzsche's writings, is also found

in abundance. The form in which these two volumes are cast gives the

effect of a man felling a giant tree with a thousand blows of an axe,

as distinguished from the method of the man who saws it down gradually

and continuously.

Despite its muscular and incisive qualities, the manner of this work

is calm. As a whole it is an excellent example of those writings which

Nietzsche himself has called Apollonian. At times one even feels a

tentativeness in its utterances not unlike that which attaches to

the steps a man takes in a region he knows to be full of quicksands.

In this regard it is interesting to note how a certain insecurity at

the beginning of the work, which manifests itself in ultra-obscure

passages, later gives way to a clarity and humour indicative of almost

wanton temerity. In this book Nietzsche passes from the academician

to the iconoclast. He bridges the chasm from the doctor of philology

to the independent thinker. It is the record of the psychological

transition of his mind; and this record is evident in both his outlook

and his habits of expression.

Nietzsche, at his birth as a thinker, presents himself as an

arch-nihilist. He realised the necessity of destroying the universe

before an understanding of it was possible, and so the two volumes of

"Human, All-Too-Human" are almost entirely destructive. In this work

we have Nietzsche the trail-blazer, the incendiary, the idol-smasher,

the pessimist, the devastator. One by one the doctrines and tenets,

strengthened by the accumulative acceptance of centuries, go down

before his bludgeon. Piece by piece the universe of reality is

neutralised by his analyses. Every human transaction, every phase of

human hope and aspiration, is reduced to negation. Ancient and modern

cultures are dissected unsparingly. Political systems are stripped

of their integuments and their origins exposed. New valuations are

attached to the great artists and writers. Many of Nietzsche's most

famous definitions grow out of the ruthless inquests he makes in this

work.

This uncompassionate clearing away of accepted values prepared the

way for the books which were to come. Once having ascertained the

foundation on which human actions are built, the path was clear for

reconstruction and reorganisation. "Human, All-Too-Human," then, was

the first indirect voicing of Nietzsche's philosophy. All else had

been mere skirmishing with ideas. Only vaguely and desultorily had

his opinions been heretofore voiced. His analysis of history, his

criticisms of ancient and modern thought, had actually pried away the

superficial manifestations of existence and given him that insight

into the undercurrents of causation which was later to inspire him

in his work. For this reason we are more conscious of the man than of

the philosopher when reading the series of aphorisms which constitute

the main body of this document. "Human, All-Too-Human" is in the main

an inquiry into the fundamental reasons for human conduct. Nietzsche

devotes his efforts to showing that ideals, when pushed to their

final analysis, reveal a basis in human need. Especially does he

concern himself with the causes underlying current moral doctrines.

He points out that there is no static and absolute morality, but that

all moral codes are systems of deportment founded on human conditions

in accordance with the environmental needs of a people. From this

he states the corollary that all morality is subject to alteration,

amendment and abrogation. He asserts the relativity of the terms "good"

and "evil," and denies the justice of any final criticism of right and

wrong as applied to any human action.

From this Nietzsche deduces the formula which is at the bottom of all

individualistic philosophy, namely: that what is immoral for one man

is moral for another, and that the application of any moral code is

undesirable for the reason that no system of conduct can apply alike

to all men. Thus any attempt on the part of any one man to direct the

actions of any other man is in itself an immorality, because it is an

attempt to hinder and retard the development of the individual. It

must not be thought that Nietzsche's arrival at this conclusion is a

direct and simple affair based on superficial observation. Nor is it in

itself the end for which he strives. To the contrary, the conclusion

is stated mainly by inference. The work he lays out for himself is one

of analysis, and under his critical scalpel fall religions, political

institutions and nations, as well as individuals. Wherever he finds

a belief whose origin is considered divine, he tears away its surface

characteristics and inquires into it. In every instance he finds a

human ground for it. Going still further, he points out that all

institutions, in order to meet the constantly fluctuating conditions of

society, must subject themselves to change.

A multiplicity of themes comes under Nietzsche's observation in this

work. Not only is there a great deal of abstract reasoning but also

a vast amount of brilliant and penetrating criticism of men and

art. Ancient and modern philosophers, novelists, poets, musicians,

dramatists, as well as theories of art, literature and music, here come

under his careful and acute analysis. There are passages of startling

poetry interpolated between paragraphs of cynical and destructive

research. Nietzsche reveals himself as a scholar, the philologist, the

historian and the scientist, as well as the thinker. The amount of

general knowledge he displays in nearly every line of human endeavour

is astonishing. In his most elaborate processes of ratiocination he is

always capable of adhering to authenticated facts. He never side-steps

into the purely metaphysical or denies the existence of corporeality

once it has been assumed as a hypothesis. He breaks once and for all

with the metaphysicians and word-jugglers. Denying all reason in the

Kantian sense, he is always scrupulously reasonable.

Although no direct philosophical doctrines are propounded in "Human,

All-Too-Human," Nietzsche had undoubtedly outlined in his mind the

constructive works which were to come later. However, in reading

this work one finds but little indication--and that only obscurely

hinted at--of the transvaluation of values which was to follow the

devaluation. We have no hint, for instance, of the doctrine of the

superman other than an implied ideal of an intellectual aristocracy

which will permit of the highest development; of the individual.

Evolution beyond the present is mentioned but indirectly. The

future, to this destructive Nietzsche, is non-existent. His eyes are

continually turned toward the past and they shift no further than the

present. Only through implication is the Hellenic ideal voiced, and

then it is with a certain degree of speculation as to its efficacy in

meeting the demands of the modern man. Greek culture is used largely as

a means of comparison, or as an arbitrary premise of his dialectic. The

doctrine of eternal recurrence, which was to form one of the bases of

"Thus Spake Zarathustra," is not even suggested. The "will to power,"

the anti-Schopenhauerian doctrine, which is the framework on which all

of Nietzsche's constructive thinking is hung, was, at the time of his

writing "Human, All-Too-Human," a hypothesis, vague and undeveloped.

"Human, All-Too-Human" is the first work of Nietzsche one should read.

In reality it is an elaborate introduction to his later works. In his

following book, "The Dawn of Day," comes the birth of his philosophy;

it is the first real battle in his righteous warfare, the first great

blasphemous assault upon the accepted order of things. But it cannot be

readily understood or appreciated unless we have prepared ourselves for

it.

The selection of the passages from the present two volumes has been

extremely difficult, due to their multiplicity of themes and to

the heterogeneity of their treatment. It is impossible to create a

convincing effect of a razed forest by presenting a picture of an

occasional fallen tree. Herein has lain my chief difficulty. I have

been able to show only sections of the destruction of human values

which Nietzsche here accomplishes. Furthermore, it has been impossible

to give any very adequate idea of the vast amount of brilliant

criticism of men and art which is to be encountered in these two

volumes. All this must be got direct. It has been possible only to

suggest it here. Those portions of the books which I have been able to

comprehend in these excerpts are necessarily limited to Nietzsche's

more important destructive conclusions.

[Footnote 1: "Inopportune Speculations."]

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