three hours' speech upon it without other preparation than a perusal of
it in a newspaper; it had not yet been printed by the Senate. This
speech was a part of one of the most exciting debates in the annals of
Congress. He began with a calm but searching review of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, dwelling first on the failure of the measure to fix
any time when the people of a territory should exercise the right of
deciding whether they would have slavery or not. He illustrated his
point by citing some resolutions adopted by a handful of squatters in
Kansas as early as September, 1854, many months before any legislature
had been organized or elected, in which it was declared that the
squatters aforesaid "would exercise the right of expelling from the
territory, or otherwise punishing any individual, or individuals, who
may come among us and by act, conspiracy, or other illegal means, entice
away our slaves or clandestinely attempt in any way or form to affect
our rights of property in the same." These resolutions were passed
before any persons had arrived under the auspices, or by the aid, of the
New England Emigrant Aid Company; showing that, so far from being
aroused to violence by the threatening attitude of that organization,
the Missourians were giving notice beforehand that violence would be
used upon any intending settlers who might be opposed to the
introduction of slavery.
Douglas had wonderful skill in introducing sophisms into a discussion so
deftly that his opponent would not be likely to notice them, or would
think them not worth answering, and then enlarging upon them and leading
the debate away upon a false scent, thus convincing the hearers that, as
his opponent was weak in this particular, he was probably weak
everywhere. It was Trumbull's forte that he never failed to detect these
tricks and turns and never neglected them, but exposed them instantly,
before proceeding on the main line of his argument. It was this faculty
that made his coming into the Senate a welcome reinforcement to the
Republican side of the chamber.
The report under consideration abounded in these characteristic Douglas
pitfalls. It said, for example:
Although the act of incorporation [of the Emigrant Aid Company]
does not distinctly declare that it was formed for the purpose
of controlling the domestic institutions of Kansas and forcing
it into the Union with a prohibition of slavery in her
constitution, _regardless of the rights and wishes of the
people as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
and secured by their organic law_, yet the whole history of the
movement, the circumstances in which it had its origin, and the
professions and avowals of all engaged in it rendered it
certain and undeniable that such was its object.
Here was a double sophistry: First, the implication that, if the
Emigrant Aid Company had boldly avowed that its purpose was to control
the domestic institutions of Kansas and bring it into the Union as a
free state, its heinousness would have been plain to all; second, that
the Constitution of the United States, and the organic act of the
territory itself, guaranteed the people against such an outrage. But the
declared object of the Nebraska Bill was to allow the people to do this
very thing by a majority vote. Mr. Trumbull brought his flail down upon
this pair of sophisms with resounding force. In debate with Senator
Hale, a few days earlier, Toombs, of Georgia, had had the manliness to
say:
With reference to that portion of the Senator's argument
justifying the Emigrant Aid Societies,--whatever may be their
policy, whatever may be the tendency of that policy to produce
strife,--if they simply aid emigrants from Massachusetts to go
to Kansas and to become citizens of that territory, I am
prepared to say that they violate no law; and they had a right
to do it; and every attempt to prevent them from doing so
violated the law and ought not to be sustained.[22]
By way of justifying the Border Ruffians the report said that when the
emigrants from New England were going through Missouri, the violence of
their language and behavior excited apprehensions that their object was
to "abolitionize Kansas as a means of prosecuting a relentless warfare
on the institution of slavery within the limits of Missouri."
What! [said Trumbull,] abolitionize Kansas! It was said on all
sides of the Senate Chamber (when the Nebraska bill was
pending) that it was never meant to have slavery go into
Kansas. What is meant, then, by abolitionizing Kansas? Is it
abolitionizing a territory already free, and which was never
meant to be anything but free, for Free State men to settle in
it? I cannot understand the force of such language. But they
were to abolitionize Kansas, according to this report, and for
what purpose? As a means for prosecuting a relentless warfare
on the institution of slavery within the limits of Missouri.
Where is the evidence of such a design? I would like to see it.
It is not in this report, and if it exists I will go as far as
the gentleman to put it down. I will neither tolerate nor
countenance by my action here or elsewhere any society which
is resorting to means for prosecuting a relentless warfare upon
the institution of slavery within the limits of Missouri or any
other state. But there is not a particle of evidence of any
such intention in the document which professes to set forth the
acts of the Emigrant Aid Society, and which is incorporated in
this report.[23]
Trumbull next took up the contention of the report that since Governor
Reeder had recognized the usurping legislature, he and all other
governmental authorities were estopped from inquiring into its validity.
No great effort of a trained legal mind was required to overthrow that
pretension. Trumbull demolished it thoroughly. After giving a calm and
lucid sketch of the existing condition of affairs in the territory,
Trumbull brought his speech to a conclusion. It fills six pages of the
_Congressional Globe_.[24]
This was the prelude to a hot debate with Douglas, who immediately took
the floor. Trumbull had remarked in the course of his speech that the
only political party with which he had ever had any affiliations was the
Democratic. Douglas said that he should make a reply to his colleague's
speech as soon as it should be printed in the _Globe_, but that he
wished to take notice now of the statement that Trumbull claimed to be
a Democrat. This, he said, would be considered by every Democrat in
Illinois as a libel upon the party.
Senator Crittenden called Douglas to order for using the word "libel,"
which he said was unparliamentary, being equivalent to the word "lie."
Douglas insisted that he had not imputed untruth to his colleague, but
had only said that all the Democrats in Illinois would impute it to him
when they should read his speech. He then went into a general tirade
about "Black Republicans," "Know-Nothings," and "Abolitionists," who, he
said, had joined in making Trumbull a Senator, from which it was evident
that he was one of the same tribe, and not a Democrat. So far as the
people of Illinois were concerned, he said that his colleague did not
dare to go before them and take his chances in a general election, for
he (Douglas) had met him at Salem, Marion County, in the summer of 1855,
and had told him in the presence of thousands of people that, differing
as they did, they ought not both to represent the State at the same
time. Therefore, he proposed that they should both sign a paper
resigning their seats and appeal to the people, "and if I did not beat
him now with his Know-Nothingism, Abolitionism, and all other isms by a
majority of twenty thousand votes, he should take the seat without the
trouble of a contest."
Neither Trumbull nor Douglas was gifted with the sense of humor, but
Trumbull turned the laugh on his antagonist by his comments on the
coolness of the proposal that both Senators should resign their seats,
which Governor Matteson would have the right to fill immediately, and
which the people could in no event fill by a majority vote, since the
people did not elect Senators under our system of government. The reason
why he did not answer the challenge at Salem was that his colleague did
not stay to hear the answer. After he had finished his speech it was
very convenient for him to be absent. "He cut immediately for his tavern
without waiting to hear me." Trumbull denominated the challenge "a bald
clap-trap declamation and nothing else."
Douglas's charges about Know-Nothings and Abolitionists were well
calculated to make an impression in southern Illinois; hence Trumbull
did not choose to let them go unanswered. His reply was pitched upon a
higher plane, however, than his antagonist's tirade. He said:
In my part of the state there are no Know-Nothing organizations
of whose members I have any knowledge. If they exist, they
exist secretly. There are no open avowed ones among us. These
general charges, as to matters of opinion, amount to but very
little. It is altogether probable that the gentleman and myself
will differ in opinion not only upon this slavery question, but
also as to the sentiments of the people of Illinois. The views
which I entertain are honest ones; they are the sincere
sentiments of my heart. I will not say that the views which he
entertains in reference to those matters are not equally
honest. I impute no such thing as insincerity to any Senator.
Claiming for myself to be honest and sincere, I am willing to
award to others the same sincerity that I claim for myself. As
to what views other men in Illinois may entertain we may
honestly differ. The views of the members of the legislature
may be ascertained from their votes on resolutions before them.
I do not know how to ascertain them in any other way. As for
Abolitionists I do not know one in our state--one who wishes to
interfere with slavery in the states. I have not the
acquaintance of any of that class. There are thousands who
oppose the breaking-down of a compromise set up by our fathers
to prevent the extension of slavery, and I know that the
gentleman himself once uttered on this floor the sentiment that
he did not know a man who wished to extend slavery to a free
territory.
Douglas replied at length to Trumbull on the 20th of March, in his most
slippery and misleading style. If it were possible to admire the kind
of argument which makes the worse appear the better reason, this speech
would take high rank. It may be worth while to give a single sample.
Trumbull had said that in his opinion the words of the Missouri
Compromise, prohibiting slavery in certain territories "forever," meant
until the territory should be admitted into the Union as a state on
terms of equality with the other states. Douglas seized upon this as a
fatal admission, and asked why, if "forever" meant only a few years,
Trumbull and all his allies had been abusing him for repealing the
sacred compact.
If so [he continued], what is meant by all the leaders of that
great party, of which he (Trumbull) has become so prominent a
member, when they charge me with violating a solemn compact--a
compact which they say consecrated that territory to freedom
forever? _They_ say it was a compact binding forever. _He_ says
that it was an unfounded assumption, for it was only a law
which would become void without even being repealed; it was a
mere legislative enactment like any other territorial law, and
the word "forever" meant no more than the word
"hereafter"--that it would expire by its own limitation. If
this assumption be true, it necessarily follows that what he
calls the Missouri Compromise was no compact--was not a
contract--not even a compromise, the repeal of which would
involve a breach of faith.[25]
And he continued, ringing the changes on this alleged inconsistency
through two entire columns of the _Globe_, as though a compact could not
be made respecting a territory as well as for a state, and ignoring the
fact that if slaves were prevented from coming into the territory, the
material for forming a slave state would not exist when the people
should apply for admission to the Union. If the word "forever" had, as
Trumbull believed, applied only to the territory, it nevertheless
answered all practical purposes forever, by moulding the future state,
as the potter moulds the clay.[26]
The remainder of Douglas's speech was founded upon the doings of
Governor Reeder, whom he first used to buttress and sustain the bogus
legislature in its acts, and then turned upon and rent in pitiable
fragments, calling him "your Governor," as though the Republicans and
not their opponents had appointed him.
June 9, 1856, the two Senators drifted into debate on the Kansas
question again, and Trumbull put to Douglas the question which Lincoln
put to him with such momentous consequences in the Freeport debate two
years later: whether the people of a territory could lawfully exclude
slavery prior to the formation of a state constitution. Trumbull said
that the Democratic party was not harmonious on this point. He had heard
Brown, of Mississippi, argue on the floor of the Senate that slavery
could not be excluded from the territories, while in the formative
condition, by the territorial legislature, and he had heard Cass, of
Michigan, maintain exactly the opposite doctrine. He would like to know
what his colleague's views were upon that point:
My colleague [he said] has no sort of difficulty in deciding
the constitutional question as to the right of the people of a
territory, when they form their constitution, to establish or
prohibit slavery. Now will he tell me whether they have the
right _before_ they form a state constitution?[27]
Douglas did not answer this interrogatory. He insisted that it was
purely a judicial question, and that he and all good Democrats were in
harmony and would sustain the decision of the highest tribunal when it
should be rendered. The Dred Scott case was pending in the Supreme
Court, but that fact was not mentioned in the debate. The right of the
people of a territory to exclude slavery before arriving at statehood
was already the crux of the political situation, but its significance
was not generally perceived at that time. That Trumbull had grasped the
fact was shown by his concluding remarks in this debate, to wit:
My colleague says that the persons with whom he is acting are
perfectly agreed on the questions at issue. Why, sir, all of
them in the South say that they have a right to take their
slaves into a territory and to hold them there as such, while
all in the North deny it. If that is an agreement, then I do
not know what Bedlam would be.
Bedlam came at Charleston four years later. It is worthy of remark that
in this debate Douglas held that a negro could bring an action for
personal freedom in a territory and have it presented to the Supreme
Court of the United States for decision. In the Dred Scott case,
subsequently decided, the court held that a negro could not bring an
action in a court of the United States.
The Senate debate on Kansas affairs in the first session of the
Thirty-fourth Congress was participated in by nearly all the members of
the body. The best speech on the Republican side was made by Seward.
This was a carefully prepared, farseeing philosophical oration, in which
the South was warned that the stars in their courses were fighting
against slavery and that the institution took a step toward perdition
when it appealed to lawless violence. Sumner's speech, which in its
consequences became more celebrated, was sophomorical and vituperative
and was not calculated to help the cause that its author espoused; but
the assault made upon him by Preston S. Brooks maddened the North and
drew attention away from its defects of taste and judgment. Collamer, of
Vermont, made a notable speech in addition to his notable minority
report from the Committee on Territories. Wilson, of Massachusetts, and
Hale, of New Hampshire, received well-earned plaudits for the
thoroughness with which they exposed the frauds and violence of the
Border Ruffians, and commented on the vacillation and stammering of
President Pierce. That Trumbull had the advantage of his wily antagonist
must be the conclusion of impartial readers at the present day.
If a newcomer in the Senate to-day should plunge _in medias res_ and
deliver a three-hours' speech as soon as he could get the floor, he
would probably be made aware of the opinion of his elders that he had
been over-hasty. It was not so in the exciting times of the decade
before the Civil War. All help was eagerly welcomed. Moreover,
Trumbull's constituents would not have tolerated any delay on his part
in getting into the thickest of the fight. Any signs of hanging back
would have been construed as timidity. The anti-Nebraska Democrats of
Illinois required early proof that their Senator was not afraid of the
Little Giant, but was his match at cut-and-thrust debate as well as his
superior in dignity and moral power. The North rang with the praises of
Trumbull, and some persons, whose admiration of Lincoln was unbounded
and unchangeable, were heard to say that perhaps Providence had selected
the right man for Senator from Illinois. Although Lincoln's personality
was more magnetic, Trumbull's intellect was more alert, his diction the
more incisive, and his temper was the more combative of the two.
From a mass of letters and newspapers commending Mr. Trumbull on his
first appearance on the floor of the Senate, a few are selected for
notice.
The New York _Tribune_, March 15, 1856, Washington letter signed "H.
G.," p. 4, col. 5:
Mr. Trumbull's review of Senator Douglas's pro-slavery Kansas
report is hailed with enthusiasm, as calculated to do honor to
the palmiest days of the Senate. Though three hours long, it
commanded full galleries, and the most fixed attention to the
close. It was searching as well as able, and was at once
dignified and convincing.
When Mr. Trumbull closed, Mr. Douglas rose, in bad temper, to
complain that the attack had been commenced in his absence, and
to ask the Senate to fix a day for his reply. He said Mr.
Trumbull had claimed to be a Democrat; but that claim would be
considered a libel by the Democracy of Illinois. Here Mr.
Crittenden rose to a question of order, and a most exciting
passage ensued; the flash of the Kentuckian's eye and the
sternness of his bearing were such as are rarely seen in the
Senate.
The New York _Daily Times_, Washington letter, dated June 9:
Douglas was much disconcerted to-day by Senator Trumbull's keen
exposure of his Nebraska sophism. He was directly asked if he
believed that the people of the territories have the right to
exclude slavery before forming a state government, but he
refused to give his opinion, saying that it was a question to
be determined by the Supreme Court. Trumbull then exposed with
great force Douglas's equivocal platform of popular
sovereignty, which means one thing at the South and another at
the North. The "Little Giant" was fairly smoked out.
Charles Sumner writes to E. L. Pierce, March 21:
Trumbull is a hero, and more than a match for Douglas.
Illinois, in sending him, has done much to make me forget that
she sent Douglas. You will read the main speech which is able;
but you can hardly appreciate the ready courage and power with
which he grappled with his colleague and throttled him. We are
all proud of his work.
S. P. Chase, Executive Office, Columbus, Ohio, April 14, 1856, writes:
I have read your speech with great interest. It was
timely--exactly at the right moment and its logic and statement
are irresistible. How I rejoice that Illinois has sent you to
the Senate.
John Johnson, Mount Vernon, Illinois, writes:
I wish I could express the pleasure that I and many other of
your friends feel when we remember that we have such a man as
yourself in Congress, who loves liberty and truth and is not
ashamed or afraid to speak. Let me say that I thank the Ruler
of the Universe that we have got such a man into the Senate of
the United States.... Your influence will tell on the interests
of the nation in years to come.
John H. Bryant, Princeton, writes:
The expectations of those who elected Mr. Trumbull to the
Senate have been fully met by his course in that body, those of
Democratic antecedents being satisfied and the Whigs very
happily disappointed. For Mr. Lincoln the people have great
respect, and great confidence in his ability and integrity.
Still the feeling here is that you have filled the place at
this particular time better than he could have done.[28]
At this time Trumbull received a letter from one of the Ohio River
counties which, by reason of the singularity of its contents as well as
of the subsequent distinction of the writer, merits preservation:
Green B. Raum, Golconda, Pope Co., Feb. 9, '57, wishes Trumbull
to find out why he cannot get his pay for taking depositions at
the instance of the Secretary of the Interior in a lawsuit
involving the freedom of sixty negroes legally manumitted, but
still held in slavery in Crawford County, Arkansas. The
witnesses whose depositions were taken were living in Pope Co.,
Ill. Raum advanced $43.25 for witness fees and costs and was
engaged one month in the work, for which he charged $300. This
was done in May, 1855, but he had never been paid even the
amount that he advanced out of his own pocket.[29]
In April, 1857, Trumbull received an urgent appeal from Cyrus Aldrich,
George A. Nourse, and others in Minnesota asking him to come to that
territory and make speeches for one month to help the Republicans carry
the convention which had been called to frame a state constitution. He
responded to this call and took an active part in the campaign, which
resulted favorably to the Republican party.
FOOTNOTES:
[20] Edited by B. F. Stringfellow, author of _African Slavery no Evil_,
St. Louis, 1854.
[21] Cited in Villard's _John Brown_, p. 94.
[22] _Cong. Globe_, Appendix, 1856. p. 118.
[23] The writer of this book was intimately acquainted with the doings
of the Emigrant Aid Societies of the country, having been connected with
the National Kansas Committee at Chicago. The emigrants usually went up
the Missouri River by rail from St. Louis to Jefferson City and thence
by steamboat to Kansas City, Wyandotte, or Leavenworth. They were
cautioned to conceal as much as possible their identity and destination,
in order to avoid trouble. Such caution was not necessary, however,
since the emigrants knew that their own success depended largely upon
keeping that avenue of approach to Kansas open. Later, in the summer of
1856, it was closed, not in consequence of any threatening language or
action on the part of the emigrants, but because the Border Ruffians
were determined to cut off reinforcements to the Free State men in
Kansas. The tide of travel then took the road through Iowa and Nebraska,
a longer, more circuitous, and more expensive route.
[24] Appendix, p. 200.
[25] _Cong. Globe_, 34th Congress, Appendix, p. 281.
[26] In this debate Clayton, of Delaware, contended that the word
"forever" was meant to apply to any future political body, whether
territory or state, occupying the ground embraced in the defined limits.
Hence he considered the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, but he had
opposed the Nebraska Bill because he was not willing to reopen the
slavery agitation. _Cong. Globe_, 34th Congress, Appendix, p. 777.
[27] _Cong. Globe_, 1856, p. 1371.
[28] John H. Bryant, a man of large influence in central Illinois,
brother of William Cullen Bryant.
[29] Green B. Raum, Lawyer, Democrat, brigadier-general in the Union
army in the Civil War.
CHAPTER V
THE LECOMPTON FIGHT
In June, 1856, Lincoln wrote to Trumbull urging him to attend the
Republican National Convention which had been called to meet in
Philadelphia to nominate candidates for President and Vice-President and
suggesting that he labor for the nomination of a conservative man for
President. Trumbull went accordingly and cooeperated with N. B. Judd,
Leonard Swett, William B. Archer, and other delegates from Illinois in
the proceedings which led up to the futile nominations of Fremont and
Dayton. The only part of these proceedings which interests us now is the
fact that Abraham Lincoln, who was not a candidate for any place,
received one hundred and ten votes for Vice-President. This result was
brought about by Mr. William B. Archer, an Illinois Congressman, who
conceived the idea of proposing his name only a short time before the
voting began, and secured the cooeperation of Mr. Allison, of
Pennsylvania, to nominate him. Archer wrote to Lincoln that if this
bright idea had occurred to him a little earlier he could have obtained
a majority of the convention for him. When the news first reached
Lincoln at Urbana, Illinois, where he was attending court, he thought
that the one hundred and ten votes were cast for Mr. Lincoln, of
Massachusetts.
He wrote to Trumbull on the 27th saying, "It would have been easier for
us, I think, had we got McLean" (instead of Fremont), but he was not
without high hopes of carrying the state. He was confident of electing
Bissell for governor at all events. In August, Lincoln wrote again
saying that he had just returned from a speaking tour in Edgar, Coles,
and Shelby counties, and that he had found the chief embarrassment in
the way of Republican success was the Fillmore ticket. "The great
difficulty," he says, "with anti-slavery-extension Fillmore men is that
they suppose Fillmore as good as Fremont on that question; and it is a
delicate point to argue them out of it, they are so ready to think you
are abusing Mr. Fillmore." The Fillmore vote in Illinois was 37,444.
The Republican state ticket, headed by William H. Bissell for governor,
was elected, but Buchanan and Breckinridge, the Democratic nominees,
received the electoral vote of the state and were successful in the
country at large. The defeat of Fremont caused intense disappointment to
the Republicans at the time, but it was fortunate for the party and for
the country that he was beaten. He was not the man to deal with the
grave crisis impending. Disunion was a club already held in reserve to
greet any Republican President. Senator Mason, of Virginia, frankly said
so to Trumbull in a Senate debate (December 2, 1856), after the
election:
MR. MASON: What I said was this, that if that [Republican]
party came into power avowing the purpose that it did avow, it
would necessarily result in the dissolution of the Union,
whether they desired it or not. It was utterly immaterial who
was their President; he might have been a man of straw. I
allude to the purposes of the party.
MR. TRUMBULL: Why, sir, neither Colonel Fremont nor any other
person can be elected President of the United States except in
the constitutional mode, and if any individual is elected in
the mode prescribed in the Constitution, is that cause for
dissolution of the Union? Assuredly not. If it be, the
Constitution contains within itself the elements of its own
destruction.[30]
Four years passed ere Mr. Mason's prediction was put to the test, and
the intervening time was mainly occupied by a continuation of the Kansas
strife. The prevailing gloom in the Northern mind was reflected in a
letter written by Trumbull to Professor J. B. Turner, of Jacksonville,
Illinois, dated Alton, October 19, 1857, from which the following is an
extract:
Our free institutions are undergoing a fearful trial, nothing
less, as I can conceive, than a struggle with those now in
power, who are attempting to subvert the very basis upon which
they rest. Things are now being done in the name of the
Constitution which the framers of that instrument took special
pains to guard against, and which they did provide against as
plainly as human language could do it. The recent use of the
army in Kansas, to say nothing of the complicity of the
administration with the frauds and outrages which have been
committed in that territory, presents as clear a case of
usurpation as could well be imagined. Whether the people can be
waked up to the change which their government is undergoing in
time to prevent it, is the question. I believe they can. I will
not believe that the free people of this great country will
quietly suffer their government, established for the protection
of life and liberty, to be changed into a slaveholding
oligarchy whose chief object is the spread and perpetuation of
negro slavery and the degradation of free white labor.
Soon after the inauguration of Buchanan, Robert J. Walker, of
Mississippi, was appointed by him governor of Kansas Territory. Walker
was a native of Pennsylvania and a man of good repute. He had been
Secretary of the Treasury under President Polk, and was the author of
the Tariff of 1846. When he arrived in Kansas steps had already been
taken by the territorial legislature for electing members of a
constitutional convention with a view to admission to the Union as a
state. Governor Walker urged the Free State men to participate in this
election, promising them fair treatment and an honest count of votes;
but they still feared treachery and violence and fraud in the election
returns. Moreover, voters were required to take a test oath that they
would support the Constitution as framed. As Walker had assured them
that the Constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people, they
decided to take no part in framing it, but to vote it down when it
should be submitted.
The convention met in the territorial capital, Lecompton. While it was
in session a regular election of members of the territorial legislature
took place, and Governor Walker had so far won the confidence of the
Free State men that they took part in it and elected a majority of the
members of both branches. About one month later news came that the
constitutional convention had completed its labors and had decided not
to submit the constitution itself to a vote of the people, but only the
slavery clause. People could vote "For the constitution with slavery,"
or "For the constitution with no slavery," but in no case should the
right of property in slaves already in the territory be questioned, nor
should the constitution itself be amended until 1864, and no amendment
should be made affecting the rights of property in such slaves.
Senator Douglas was in Chicago when this news arrived. He at once
declared to his friends that this scheme had its origin in Buchanan's
Cabinet. Governor James W. Geary, Walker's predecessor in office, had
vetoed the bill calling the convention, because it contained no clause
requiring submission of the constitution to the people; but it had been
passed over his veto. He subsequently said, in a published letter, that
the committees of the legislature having the matter in charge informed
him that their friends in the South did not desire a submission clause.
It was proved later that a conspiracy with this aim existed in
Buchanan's Cabinet without his knowledge, and that the guiding spirit
was Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior. The chief
manager in Kansas was John Calhoun, the president of the convention, who
had been designated also as the canvassing officer of the election
returns under the submission clause.
Buchanan was not admitted to the secret of the conspiracy until the deed
was done. He had committed himself both verbally and in writing to the
submission of the whole constitution to the people for ratification or
rejection. He had pledged himself in this behalf to Governor Walker, who
had pledged himself to the people of Kansas. Walker kept his pledge, but
Buchanan broke his. He surrendered to the Cabinet cabal and made the
admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution the policy of his
administration. It proved to be his ruin, as an earlier breach of
promise had been the ruin of Pierce.
Walker exposed and denounced the whole conspiracy and resigned the
governorship, the duties of which devolved upon F. P. Stanton, the
secretary of the territory, a man of ability and integrity, who had been
a member of Congress from Tennessee. Stanton called the legislature in
special session. The legislature declared for a clause for or against
the constitution as a whole, to be voted on at an election to be held
January 4, 1858. Stanton was forthwith removed from office by Buchanan,
and John A. Denver was appointed governor to fill Walker's place.
The stand taken by Douglas in reference to the Lecompton Constitution
before the meeting of Congress, and the doubts and fears excited thereby
in the minds of the leading Republicans of Illinois, are indicated in
private letters received by Trumbull in that interval, a few of which
are here cited:
E. Peck, Chicago, November 23, 1857, says: Judge Douglas takes the
ground openly that the _whole_ of the Kansas constitution must be
submitted to the people for approval.
C. H. Ray, chief editor of the Chicago _Tribune_, writes that Douglas is
just starting for Washington; he says that he sent a man to the
_Tribune_ office to remonstrate against its course toward him "while he
is doing what we all want him to do." Dr. Ray had no faith in him.
N. B. Judd, Chicago, November 24, says that Douglas took pains to get
leading Republicans into his room to tell them that he intended to fight
the administration on the Kansas issue.
Judd, November 26, writes that Douglas tells his friends that "the whole
proceedings in Kansas were concocted by certain members of the Cabinet
to ruin him." He does not think that the President desires this, but he
cannot well help himself, and the conspirators intend to use Buchanan's
name again (for the Presidency).
Lincoln wrote under date, Chicago, Nov. 30, 1857: ... What think you of
the probable "rumpus" among the Democracy over the Kansas constitution?
I think the Republicans should stand clear of it. In their view both the
President and Douglas are wrong; and they should not espouse the cause
of either because they may consider the other a little farther wrong of
the two. From what I am told here, Douglas tried before leaving to draw
off some Republicans on the dodge, and even succeeded in making some
impression on one or two.
A. Jonas, Quincy, December 5, is unable to say whether Douglas is
sincere in the position he has lately taken. "Should he act right for
once on this question, it will be with some selfish motive."
William H. Bissell, governor, Springfield, December 12, thinks Douglas's
course is dictated solely by his fears connected with the next
senatorial election.
S. A. Hurlbut, Belvidere, December 14, thinks that as between Douglas
and the Southern politicians the latter have the advantage in point of
logic. "If the Lecompton Constitution prevails, no amount of party
discipline will hold more than one third of the Democratic voters in
Illinois." He predicts that the next Democratic National Convention will
endorse John C. Calhoun's doctrine that slavery exists in the
territories by virtue of the Constitution.
Sam Galloway, Columbus, Ohio, December 12, asks: "What means the
movement of Douglas? Is it a ruse or a bona-fide patriotic effort? We
don't know whether to commend or censure, and we are without any
knowledge of the workings of his heart except as indicated in his
speeches."
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, December 16, says: "Douglas is more of a man
than I took him to be. He has some nerve at least. I do not think he is
honest in any particular, yet in this difficulty he is right."
C. H. Ray, Chicago, December 18, asks for Trumbull's views of Douglas's
real purposes: "We are almost confounded here by his anomalous position
and do not know how to treat him and his overtures to the Republican
party. Personally, I am inclined to give him the lash, but I want to do
nothing that will damage our cause or hinder the emancipation of
Kansas."
John G. Nicolay, Springfield, December 20, has been canvassing the state
to procure subscribers for the St. Louis _Democrat_. He had very good
success until the "hard times" came. Then he found it necessary to
suspend operations. He says everybody is watching the political
developments in Washington, and he thinks that Douglas will be sustained
by nearly all his party in Illinois. "The Federal office-holders keep
mum and will not of course declare themselves until they are forced to
do so."
Samuel C. Parks, Lincoln, Logan County, December 26, says: Douglas is no
better now than when he was the undisputed leader of the pro-slavery
party. He has done more to undermine the principles upon which this
Government was founded than any other man that ever lived.
D. L. Phillips, Anna, Union County, March 2, 1858: "You need not pay any
attention to the silly statements of the _Missouri Republican_ and other
sheets respecting this part of the state being attached to Buchanan. It
is simply false. The Democracy here are led by the Allens, Marshall,
Logan, Parrish, Kuykendall, Simons, and others, and these are all for
Douglas. John Logan is bitter against Buchanan. I think we ought all to
be satisfied with the course of things. Let the worst come now. Better
far than defer it, for come it will and must."
The first session of the Thirty-fifth Congress began on the 7th of
December, 1857. President Buchanan's first message was largely concerned
with the affairs of Kansas. He spoke of the framers of the Topeka
Constitution as a "revolutionary organization," and said that the
Lecompton Constitution was the work of the lawfully constituted
authorities. He conceded that the submission clause of the Lecompton
instrument fell short of his own intentions and expectations, but
insisted that the slavery question was the only matter of dispute and
that that was actually submitted to the popular vote.
Trumbull was the first Senator to expose these unfounded assumptions,
and this he did in a brief argument as soon as the reading of the
message was finished. He showed, in the first place, that the Topeka
Constitution was no whit more "revolutionary" or irregular than the
Lecompton one, and one of the authorities whom he cited to sustain his
contention was Buchanan himself, who, in a parallel case, had contended
that the territorial legislature of Michigan had no authority to call a
convention to frame a state constitution, and that any such proceeding
was "an act of usurpation." This was not necessarily conclusive as to
anybody but Buchanan. Yet in another case cited, that of Arkansas, where
a territorial legislature was considering an act for the calling of a
convention to frame a state constitution and where the governor had
asked instructions from President Jackson as to his duty in the
premises, the Attorney-General had held that such an act of the
Legislature would be without authority and absolutely void. (This case
had been cited by Douglas the previous year, in an argument against the
Topeka Constitution.) The only regular proceeding was for Congress to
pass an enabling act, on such terms and conditions as it might
prescribe, under which the people might form a constitution preparatory
to admission to the Union. Any other mode of accomplishing the same
result, whether initiated by a popular assembly, as at Topeka, or by the
legislature, as at Lecompton, was in the nature of a petition which
Congress might respond to favorably, and thus legalize, or not. Neither
of these modes of beginning had any higher authority than the other.
Therefore, the underpinning of President Buchanan's first argument was
knocked out by two citations of authority which he could not controvert.
His second argument, that the slavery clause in the Lecompton
Constitution, the only thing in controversy, was submitted to the
popular vote, was easily demolished. The submission clause, said Mr.
Trumbull, "amounts simply to giving the free white people of Kansas a
right to determine the condition of a few negroes hereafter to be
brought into the state, and nothing more; the condition of those now
there cannot be touched."
On the following day, Senator Douglas made his speech against the
Lecompton Constitution. It had been eagerly expected, and the galleries
and floor were crowded. From his own standpoint it was a very strong
argument, and was received with vociferous applause, contrary to the
rules of the Senate. It left Buchanan with not a rag to cover him. It
was the first public speech Douglas had ever made which went counter to
the wishes of the Southern people. So when he said,--"I will go as far
as any of you to save the party. I have as much heart in the great cause
that binds us together as a party as any man living; I will sacrifice
anything short of principle and honor for the peace of the party; but if
the party will not stand by its principles, its faith, its pledges, I
will stand there and abide whatever consequences may result from the
position,"--we must believe that he was sincere and must respect him
for his courage. But his standpoint was that of one who "did not care
whether slavery was voted down or voted up." It represented no high
principle; the only right he contended for was the right of the people
to decide for themselves whether they would have a particular banking
system, or none at all; a Maine liquor law; or a railroad running this
way or that way; and finally whether they would have a slave code or
not. Great speeches are not kindled with such short stubble.
One thing hinted at in this speech was that Buchanan had been so
frightened by the revolt in the party against the Lecompton Constitution
that he had taken steps to have the pro-slavery clause rejected at the
coming election, by the very people who had framed it. "I think I have
seen enough in the last three days," he said, "to make it certain that
it will be _returned out_, no matter how the vote may stand." In a later
debate, February 4, Douglas said:
I made my objection [against the Lecompton Constitution] at a
time when the President of the United States told all his
friends that he was perfectly sure the pro-slavery clause would
be voted down. I did it at a time when all or nearly all the
Senators on this floor supposed the pro-slavery clause would be
stricken out. I assumed in my speech that it was to be returned
out, and that the constitution was to come here with that
article rejected.[31]
If Buchanan had that intention he was not able to carry it into effect.
Douglas at this time contemplated an alliance with the Republicans. His
state of mind is pictured in a letter written by Henry Wilson to Rev.
Theodore Parker, dated Washington, February 28, 1858, of which the
following is an extract:[32]
I say to you in confidence that you are mistaken in regard to
Douglas. He is as sure to be with us in the future as Chase,
Seward, or Sumner. I leave motives to God, but he is to be with
us, and he is to-day of more weight to our cause than any ten
men in the country. I know men and I know their power, and I
know that Douglas will go for crushing the Slave Power to
atoms. To use his own words to several of our friends _this
day_ in a three-hours' consultation: "We must grind this
administration to powder; we must punish every man who supports
this crime, and _we must prostrate forever the Slave Power_,
which uses Presidents and dishonors and disgraces them."
Similar testimony is found in the Trumbull correspondence, to wit:
Jesse K. Dubois, state Auditor, Springfield, March 22, 1858,
says he has a letter from Ray, of the Chicago _Tribune_, who
says that Sheahan, of the _Times_, who has just returned to
Washington, says that (1) Lecompton will be defeated; (2) that
the Republicans shall have all the majority they like in the
next Illinois legislature, to favor which he wants to unite
with us in all doubtful counties or rather help us by running
Douglas legislative tickets "(N. B. I do not see the point of
this)"; (3) he concedes us the Senator, and says Douglas is
willing to go into private life for a brief period, but
protests that we must not sacrifice their Congressmen who run
again on the Lecompton issue, if any one of them desires to go
back; (4) they will run candidates for Congress in every
district, but without hope of electing one in the four northern
districts "(N. B. I should think this is an easy matter)"; (5)
Douglas is willing to retire, and if he beats Lecompton, to
take his chances by and by; (6) Douglas and his friends have
had a caucus in Washington and they agree so to shape matters,
if possible, with Republican aid, as to return to the next
Congress an unbroken phalanx of anti-Lecompton men, and break
down the administration by making it harmless at home and
abroad; (7) the fight is to the death, _a l'outrance_, and
cannot be discontinued, no matter what comes up. Ray seems to
think Sheahan is honest in what he says, and has no doubt that
he speaks for Douglas.
A. Jonas, Quincy, April 11, says that letters have been
received from Chicago and Springfield implying that a
coalition is forming between a portion of the Republican party
on the one hand and Douglas and his followers on the other. He
protests strongly against any such coalition and declares it
can never be carried into effect. "To suppose that the
Republicans of this District can under any circumstances be
induced to support such a political demagogue and trickster as
Isaac N. Morris is to believe them capable of worshiping Satan
or submitting to the dictation of the slave oligarchy."
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, April 12, has just returned from
the East. He speaks of Greeley's "puffs" of Douglas, which he
regards as demoralizing to the Republicans of Illinois. "I
heard Greeley handled quite roughly by the candidate for
lieutenant-governor of Wisconsin, a very intelligent German. He
spoke to Greeley in my presence and said that Wisconsin stood
by Illinois and was not for sale."
E. Peck, Chicago, April 15: "Dr. Brainard has had a talk with
Dr. Ray, the substance of which was that we should consent to
run Douglas as our candidate for the House of Representatives
from this district. What does this mean? Can Brainard have any
authority to make such a proposition? Ray has been advising
with me, and we are both in the clouds. I requested permission
to write to you for your opinion before any opinions were
expressed here. Mr. Colfax may be able to tell you something of
the opinions of Douglas. I am shy in believing, and more shy in
confiding, ... yet Ray believes that Brainard was authorized by
Douglas to make the proposition."
N. B. Judd, Chicago, April 19, says that if the Lecompton Bill
is passed, Douglas is laid on the shelf. The Buchanan party in
Chicago is of no consequence, "great cry and little wool." We
shall have to fight the Democratic party as a unit. "How
Douglas is to be the Democratic party in Illinois and the ally
of the Republicans outside of the state is a problem which
those, who are arranging with him, ought to know how to work
out."
Overtures to the Republicans of Illinois did not come from Douglas only.
Here is one of a different hue:
George T. Brown, Alton, February 24, urges the appointment of
J. E. Starr (Buchanan Democrat) as postmaster at Alton.
"Slidell opened the way for you to talk to him and you can
easily do so. The Administration is very desirous that you
should not oppose their appointments, and will give you
anything."
The foregoing letter betokens a sudden change of mind in administration
circles at Washington, as is evidenced by the following communication
which Trumbull had received from one of his constituents a few weeks
earlier:
B. Werner, Caseyville, January 4, refers to a former letter
enclosing a petition for the establishment of a post-office at
Caseyville. Hearing nothing of the matter, he went to see Mr.
Armstrong, the postmaster at St. Louis, narrated the facts, and
asked whether any order had been received by him respecting it.
"He asked me to whom I had sent the petition. I told him to
you. He replied if I had sent the petition to Robert Smith
(Dem. M.C.) the matter would have been attended to, but as Mr.
Trumbull was a Black Republican, the department would not pay
any attention to it."
On the 2d of February, 1858, President Buchanan sent a special message
to Congress with a copy of the Lecompton Constitution, and recommended
that Kansas be admitted to the Union as a state under it. In this
message he made reference to the Dred Scott decision, which had been
pronounced by the Supreme Court in the previous March. On this point the
message said:
It has been solemnly adjudged by the highest tribunal known to
our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the
Constitution of the United States. Kansas is, therefore, at
this moment as much a slave state as Georgia, or South
Carolina.
Trumbull made a speech on the special message as soon as the reading of
it was finished by the secretary. He reviewed the action of Governor
Walker, which, in the beginning, had been avowedly taken with the view
of creating and promoting a Free State Democratic party in Kansas, to
which end he had made use of the soldiers placed at his disposal by the
President. That this was an act of usurpation was conclusively shown by
Trumbull, although Walker claimed that it had served the desirable
purpose of preventing an armed collision between the contending
factions. Trumbull then touched upon the Dred Scott case and maintained
that the Supreme Court had likewise usurped authority by pronouncing an
opinion on a case not before it. The court had virtually dismissed the
case for want of jurisdiction. It had decided that Dred Scott was not a
citizen and had no right to bring this action. There was no longer any
case before the judges who so held. "Their opinions," said Trumbull,
"are worth just as much as, and no more than, the opinions of any other
gentlemen equally respectable in the country." Consequently, President
Buchanan's assertion that Kansas was then as much a slave state as
Georgia or South Carolina was unfounded and preposterous. Seward,
Fessenden, and the Republican Senators generally held to this doctrine,
but Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana, replied with considerable force that
it was competent for the court to decide on what grounds it would give
its decision, and that it did, in so many words, elect to decide the
question of slavery in the territories, which was the principal question
raised by the counsel of Dred Scott. That the decision had an aim
different from the settlement of Dred Scott's claim, and that this aim
was political, is now sufficiently established. It is also established
that Dred Scott never took any steps consciously to secure freedom, but
that the action was brought in his name by some speculating lawyers in
St. Louis to secure damages or wages from the widow of Scott's master,
Dr. Emerson.[33] One additional fact is supplied by a letter in the
Trumbull correspondence, showing how the money was collected to pay the
plaintiff's court costs.
G. Bailey, Washington, May 12, 1857, writes, that when the case
of Dred Scott was first brought to the notice of Montgomery
Blair, he applied to him (Bailey) to know what to do. Blair
said he would freely give his services without charge if Bailey
would see to the necessary expenses of the case. Not having an
opportunity to confer with friends, Bailey replied that he
would become responsible. He had no doubt the necessary money
could be raised. On this assurance he proceeded, the case was
tried, and the result was before the country. Mr. Blair had
just rendered the bill of costs: $63.18 for writ of error and
$91.50 for printing briefs; total, $154.68. "May I be so bold,
my dear sir, as to ask you to contribute two dollars toward the
payment of this bill. I am now writing to seventy-five of the
Rep. Members of the late Congress, and if they will answer me
promptly, each enclosing the quota named, I can discharge the
bill by myself paying a double share."
_Mem._: $2 sent by Trumbull June 20th, '57.
The debate in the Senate on the Lecompton Bill continued till March 23.
The best speech on the Republican side was made by Fessenden, of Maine,
than whom a more consummate debater or more knightly character and
presence has not graced the Senate chamber in my time, if ever. On the
administration side the laboring oar was taken by Toombs, who spoke with
more truculence than he had shown in the Thirty-fourth Congress.
Jefferson Davis, who had been returned to the Senate after serving as
Secretary of War under Pierce, bore himself in this debate with decorum
and moderation.
The Lecompton Bill passed the Senate, but was disagreed to by the House,
and a conference committee was appointed which adopted a bill proposed
by Congressman English, of Indiana, which offered a large bonus of lands
to Kansas, for schools, for a university, and for public buildings, if
she would vote to come into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution
now. If she would not so vote, she should not have the lands and should
not come into the Union until she should have a population sufficient
to elect one member of Congress on the ratio prescribed by law. The form
of submission to a popular vote was to be: "Proposition accepted," or
"Proposition rejected." If there was a majority of acceptances, the
territory should be admitted as a state at once. Senator Seward and
Representative Howard, Republican members of the conference committee,
dissented from the report. This bill passed the House.
Douglas made a dignified speech against the English Bill, showing that
it was in the nature of a bribe to the people to vote in a particular
way. Although he did not think that the bribe would prevail, he could
not accept the principle. The bill nevertheless passed on the last day
of April, and on the 2d of August the English proposition was voted down
by the people of Kansas by an overwhelming majority. The Lecompton
Constitution thus disappeared from sublunary affairs, and John Calhoun
disappeared from Kansas as soon as steps were taken to look into the
returns of previous elections canvassed by him.
The opinion of a man of high position on the attitude of President
Buchanan toward Lecomptonism is found in another letter to Trumbull:
J. D. Caton, chief justice of the supreme court of Illinois,
Ottawa, March 6, 1858, does not think all the Presidents and
all the Cabinets and all the Congresses and all the supreme
courts and all the slaveholders on earth, with all the
constitutions that could be drawn, could ever make Kansas a
slave state. "No, there has been no such expectation, and I do
not believe desire on the part of the present administration to
make it a slave state, but as he [Buchanan] had already been
pestered to death with it, he resolved to make it a state as
soon as possible, and thus being rid of it, let them fight it
out as they liked. In this mood the Southern members of the
Cabinet found him when the news came of that Lecompton
Constitution being framed, and he committed himself, thinking,
no doubt, that Douglas would be hot for it and that there would
be no general opposition in his own party to it.... You say
that the slave trade will be established in every state in the
Union in five years if the Democratic party retains power! As
Butterfield told the Universalist preacher, who was proving
that all men would be saved, 'We hope for better things.'"
FOOTNOTES:
[30] _Cong. Globe_, vol. 42, p. 16.
[31] _Cong. Globe_, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 571.
[32] Lincoln and Herndon, by Joseph Fort Newton, p. 148.
[33] Frederick Trevor Hill in _Harper's Magazine_, July, 1907.
CHAPTER VI
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1858 AND THE JOHN BROWN RAID
The events described in the preceding chapter left Senator Douglas still
the towering figure in national politics. Although he had contributed
but a small part of the votes in the Senate and House by which the
Lecompton Bill had been defeated, he had furnished an indispensable
part. He had humbled the Buchanan administration. He had delivered
Kansas from the grasp of the Border Ruffians. What he might do for
freedom in the future, if properly encouraged, loomed large in the
imagination of the Eastern Republicans. Greeley, Seward, Banks, Bowles,
Burlingame, Henry Wilson, and scores of lesser lights were quoted as
desiring to see him returned to the Senate by Republican votes. Some
were even willing to support him for the Presidency.
The Republicans of Illinois did not share this enthusiasm. Not only had
they fixed upon Lincoln as their choice for Senator, but they felt that
they could not trust Douglas. He still said that he cared not whether
slavery was voted down or voted up. That was the very thing they did
care about. Could they assume that, after being reelected by their votes
and made their standard-bearer, he would be a new man, different from
the one he had been before? And if he remained of the same opinions as
before, what would become of the Republican party? Who could answer for
the demoralizing effects of taking him for a leader? The views of the
party leaders in Illinois are set forth at considerable length in
letters received by Senator Trumbull, the first one from Lincoln
himself:
BLOOMINGTON, December 28, 1857.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
DEAR SIR: What does the New York _Tribune_ mean by its constant
eulogizing and admiring and magnifying Douglas? Does it, in
this, speak the sentiments of the Republicans at Washington?
Have they concluded that the Republican cause generally can be
best promoted by sacrificing us here in Illinois? If so, we
would like to know it soon; it will save us a great deal of
labor to surrender at once.
As yet I have heard of no Republican here going over to
Douglas, but if the _Tribune_ continues to din his praises into
the ears of its five or ten thousand readers in Illinois, it is
more than can be hoped that all will stand firm. I am not
complaining, I only wish for a fair understanding. Please write
me at Springfield.
Your obt. servant,
A. LINCOLN.
C. H. Ray, Chicago, March 9, 1858, protests against any trading with
Douglas on the basis of reelecting him to the Senate by Republican
votes. The Republicans of Illinois are unanimous for Lincoln and will
not swerve from that purpose. Thinks that Douglas is coming to the
Republican camp and that the disposal of him will be a difficult problem
unless he will be content with a place in the Cabinet of the next
Republican President.
J. K. Dubois, Springfield, April 8, says that Hatch (secretary of state)
and himself were in Chicago a few days since. Found every man there firm
and true--Judd, Peck, Ray, Scripps, W. H. Brown, etc. Herndon has just
come home; says that Wilson, Banks, Greeley, etc., are for returning
Douglas to the Senate. "God forbid! Are our friends crazy?"
J. M. Palmer, Carlinville, May 25:
We feel here that we have fought a strenuous and
well-maintained battle with Douglas, backed up by the whole
strength of the Federal patronage, and have won some prospect
of overthrowing him and placing Illinois permanently in the
ranks of the party of progress, whether called Republican or by
some other name, and now, by a "Wall street operation,"
Lincoln, to whom we are all under great obligations, and all
our men who have borne the heat and burden of the day, are to
be kicked to one side and we are to throw up our caps for Judge
Douglas, and he very coolly tells us all the time that we are
Abolitionists and negro worshipers and that he accepts our
votes as a favor to us! Messrs. Greeley, Seward, Burlingame,
etc., are presumed to be able to estimate themselves properly,
and if they fix only that value on themselves, no one has a
right to complain, but if I vote for Douglas under such
circumstances, may I be ----. I don't swear, but you may fill
this blank as you please. Yet I have no personal feelings
against Douglas.... Lincoln and his friends were under no
obligation to us in that controversy [of 1855]. We had, though
but five, refused to vote for him under circumstances that we
thought, at the time, furnished good reason for our refusal. We
elected an anti-Nebraska Democrat to the Senate, by his aid
most magnanimously rendered, and that result placed us, through
you, on the highest possible ground in the new party. If you
had not been elected, we should have been a baffled faction at
the tail of an alien organization. We have, as a consequence,
an anti-Nebraska Democrat for governor, and our men are the
bone and sinew of the new organization, though we are in a
minority. In all these results Lincoln has contributed his
efforts and the Whig element have cooeperated. For myself,
therefore, I am unalterably determined to do all that I can to
elect Lincoln to the Senate. _I_ cannot elect him, but I can
give him and all his friends conclusive proof that I am
animated by honor and good faith, and will stand up for his
election until the Republican party, including himself and his
personal friends, say we have done enough. Hence no arrangement
that looks to the election of Douglas by Republican votes, that
does not meet the approval of Lincoln and his friends, can meet
my approval.
The chief difficulty was that Douglas had never established for himself
a character for stability. People did not know what they could depend
upon in dealing with him. Other questions than Lecompton would soon come
up, as to which his course would be uncertain. Who could say whether he
would look northward or southward for the Presidency two years hence?
Douglas knew that he need not look in either direction unless he could
first secure his reelection to the Senate. Bear-like, tied to a stake,
he must fight the course. His campaign against Lincoln for the
senatorship does not properly appertain to the Life of Trumbull,
although the latter took an active part in it. The author's
recollections and memoranda of that campaign were contributed to another
publication.[34] He recalls with pity the weary but undaunted look,
after nearly four months of incessant travel and speaking, of the Little
Giant, whose health was already much impaired. A letter from Fessenden
to Trumbull, dated November 16, 1856, spoke of him as "a dying man in
almost every sense, unless he mends speedily--of which, I take it, there
is little hope." In the Senate debates from 1855 on, he often spoke of
his bad health, and in one instance he got out of a sick-bed to vote on
the Lecompton Bill. The campaign of 1858 was a severe drain on his
remaining strength, but in manner and mien he gave no sign of the waste
and exhaustion within.
The Trumbull papers contain some contemporary notes on the campaign of
1858. The Buchanan Democrats in Illinois gave themselves the
high-sounding title of the National Democracy. By the Douglas men they
were called "Danites," a name borrowed from the literature of Mormondom.
Traces of this sect are found in the following letters:
D. L. Phillips, Anna, Union County, February 16, 1858, says
that Hon. John Dougherty will start in a few days for
Washington to console the President and look for an office for
himself. (He obtained the Marshalship of southern Illinois.)
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, July 8:
Mr. Lincoln was here a moment ago and told me that he had just
seen Col. Dougherty and had a conversation with him. He told
Lincoln that the National Democracy intended to run in every
county and district, a National Democrat for each and every
office. Lincoln replied, "If you do this the thing is settled."
... Lincoln is very certain as to Miller's and Bateman's
election (on the state ticket), but is gloomy and rather
uncertain about his own success.
Lincoln's own thoughts respecting the Danites are set forth incidentally
in the following letter:
SPRINGFIELD, June 23, 1858.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 16th reached me only yesterday.
We had already seen by telegraph a report of Douglas's
onslaught upon everybody but himself. I have this morning seen
the Washington _Union_, in which I think the Judge is rather
worsted in regard to the onslaught.
In relation to the charge of an alliance between the
Republicans and the Buchanan men in the state, if being rather
pleased to see a division in the ranks of Democracy, and not
doing anything to prevent it, be such an alliance, then there
is such an alliance. At least, that is true of me. But if it be
intended to charge that there is any alliance by which there is
to be any concession of principle on either side, or furnishing
of sinews, or partition of offices, or swapping of votes to any
extent, or the doing of anything, great or small, on the one
side for a consideration expressed or implied on the other, no
such thing is true so far as I know or believe.
Before this reaches you, you will have seen the proceedings of
our Republican State Convention. It was really a grand affair
and was in all respects all that our friends could desire.
The resolution in effect nominating me for Senator was passed
more for the object of closing down upon the everlasting
croaking about Wentworth than anything else. The signs look
reasonably well. Our state ticket, I think, will be elected
without much difficulty. But with the advantages they have of
us, we shall be hard run to carry the legislature. We shall
greet your return home with great pleasure.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
The only counties in the state in which the Danites showed any vitality
were Union County in the south and Bureau County in the north. They
polled only 5079 votes in the whole state.
The influence of the Eastern Republicans, who were inclined to support
Douglas at the beginning of the campaign, and especially that of the New
York _Tribune_, is noted by Judd and Herndon.
N. B. Judd, Chicago, July 16:
We have lost some Republicans in this region.... You may
attribute it to the course of the New York _Tribune_, which has
tended to loosen party ties and induce old Whigs to look upon
D.'s return to the Senate as rather desirable. You ought to
come to Illinois as soon as you can by way of New York and
straighten out the newspapers there. Even the _Evening Post_
compares Douglas to Silas Wright. Bah!
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, July 22:
There were some Republicans here--more than we had any idea
of--who had been silently influenced by Greeley, and who
intended to go for Douglas or not take sides against him. His
speech here aroused the old fires and now they are his enemies.
Has received a letter from Greeley in which he says: "Now,
Herndon, I am going to do all I reasonably can to elect
Lincoln."
N. B. Judd, Chicago, December 26 (after the election), says:
Horace Greeley has been here lecturing and doing what mischief
he could. He took Tom Dyer [Democrat, ex-mayor] into his
confidence and told him all the party secrets that he knew,
such as that we had been East and endeavored to get money for
the canvass and that we failed, etc.;--a beautiful chap he is,
to be entrusted with the interests of a party. Lecturing is a
mere pretense. He is running around to our small towns with
that pretense, but really to head off the defection from his
paper. It is being stopped by hundreds.
A. Jonas, Quincy, same date:
H. Greeley delivered a lecture before our lyceum last
evening--a large crowd to hear him. John Wood, Browning,
myself, and others talked to him very freely about the course
of the _Tribune_ in the late campaign. He acknowledged we were
right.
The Douglas men elected a majority of the legislature, but did not have
a majority, or even a plurality, of the popular vote. So it appears from
a letter to Trumbull, the existence of which the author himself had
forgotten.
Horace White, Chicago, January 10, 1859, sends a table of votes
cast for members of the legislature in the election of 1858,
showing a plurality of 4191 for Republican candidates for the
House of Representatives.
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, says that Lincoln was defeated in
the counties of Sangamon, Morgan, Madison, Logan, and Mason--a
group of counties within a radius of eighty miles from the
capital. They were men from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia
mainly, old-line Whigs, timid, but generally good men,
supporters of Fillmore in the election of 1856. "These men must
be reached in the coming election of 1860. Otherwise Trumbull
will be beaten also."
SPRINGFIELD, January 29,1859.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
DEAR SIR: I have just received your late speech in pamphlet
form, sent me by yourself. I had seen and read it before in a
newspaper and I really think it a capital one. When you can
find leisure, write me your present impression of Douglas's
movements.
Our friends here from different parts of the state, in and out
of the legislature, are united, resolute, and determined, and I
think it almost certain that we shall be far better organized
in 1860 than ever before.
We shall get no just apportionment (of legislative districts)
and the best we can do--if we can do that--is to prevent one
being made worse than the present.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
A letter from Lincoln following the campaign of 1858, is appended as
showing the cordial relations existing between himself and Trumbull. The
latter had written to him from Washington under date January 29, 1859,
saying that John Wentworth had written an article, intended for
publication in the Chicago _Journal_ (but which the editor of that paper
had refused to print), imputing bad faith toward Lincoln on the part of
N. B. Judd, B. C. Cook, and others, including Trumbull, in the last
senatorial campaign. Trumbull had received a copy of this article, and
as its object was to create enmity between friends, and as it would
probably be published somewhere, he wished to assure Lincoln that the
statements and insinuations contained in it were wholly false. To this
Lincoln replied as follows:
SPRINGFIELD, February 3, 1859.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 29th is received. The article
mentioned by you, prepared for the Chicago _Journal_, I have
not seen; nor do I wish to see it, though I heard of it a month
or more ago. Any effort to put enmity between you and me is as
idle as the wind. I do not for a moment doubt that you, Judd,
Cook, Palmer, and the Republicans generally coming from the old
Democratic ranks, were as sincerely anxious for my success in
the late contest as myself, and I beg to assure you beyond all
possible cavil that you can scarcely be more anxious to be
sustained two years hence than I am that you shall be
sustained. I cannot conceive it possible for me to be a rival
of yours or to take sides against you in favor of any rival.
Nor do I think there is much danger of the old Democratic and
Whig elements of our party breaking into opposing factions.
They certainly shall not if I can prevent it.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
Twenty days after this letter was penned, there was a debate in the
Senate which was an echo of the Illinois campaign, which must have been
extremely interesting to both Lincoln and Trumbull. In a debate with
Douglas in 1856, as already noted, Trumbull had asked him whether, under
his doctrine of popular sovereignty, the people could prohibit slavery
in a territory before they came to form a state constitution. He replied
that that was a judicial question to be settled by the courts, and that
all good Democrats would bow to the decision of the Supreme Court
whenever it should be made. At Freeport, in the campaign of 1858,
Lincoln put the same question to him in a slightly different form.
On the 23d of February, 1859, there was a Senate debate on this
question, in which Douglas contended that the Democratic party, by
supporting General Cass in 1848, had endorsed the same opinion that he
(Douglas) had maintained at Freeport, since Cass, in his so-called
"Nicholson Letter," had affirmed the doctrine of squatter sovereignty as
to slavery in the territories. Douglas now contended that every Southern
state that gave its electoral vote to Cass, including Mississippi, was
committed to the doctrine that the people of a territory could lawfully
exclude slavery while still in a territorial condition. Jefferson Davis
replied:
The State of Mississippi voted [in 1848] under the belief that
that letter meant no more than that when the territory became a
state, it had authority to decide that question.... If it had
been known that the venerable candidate then of the Democratic
party, and now Secretary of State, held the opinion which he so
frankly avowed at a subsequent period on the floor of the
Senate, I tell you, sir [addressing Douglas], he would have had
no more chance to get the vote of Mississippi than you with
your opinions would have to-day.[35]
On the 2d of February, 1860, Davis introduced a series of resolutions in
the Senate of a political character evidently intended to head off
Douglas at the coming Charleston Convention; or, failing that, to pave
the way for the withdrawal of the delegates of the cotton-growing
states. The fourth resolution was directed against the Douglas doctrine
of unfriendly legislation, thus:
_Resolved_, That neither Congress nor a territorial
legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of
indirect and unfriendly nature, possesses the power to annul or
impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United
States to take his slave property into the common territories;
but it is the duty of the Federal Government there to afford
for that, as for other species of property, the needful
protection; and if experience should at any time prove that the
judiciary does not possess power to insure adequate protection,
it will then become the duty of Congress to supply such
deficiency.
The Senate debate between Douglas and his Southern antagonists was
resumed in May, after the explosion of the Charleston Convention.
Douglas made a two days' speech (May 15 and 16) occupying four hours
each day, but did not mention the subject of unfriendly legislation, or
show how a territorial legislature could nullify or circumvent the Dred
Scott decision. He was answered by Benjamin, of Louisiana, in a speech
which made a sensation throughout the country, and in which the
doctrine of unfriendly legislation was mauled to tatters. Benjamin was
the first Southern statesman to make his bow to the rising fame of
Lincoln. After examining the Freeport debate, he said:
We accuse him [Douglas] for this, to-wit: that, having
bargained with us upon a point upon which we were at issue,
that it should be considered a judicial question; that he would
abide the decision; that he would act under the decision and
consider it a doctrine of the party; that, having said that to
us here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a
local election his knees gave way; his whole person trembled.
His adversary stood upon principle and was beaten, and lo, he
is the candidate of a mighty party for Presidency of the United
States. The Senator from Illinois faltered; he got the prize
for which he faltered, but lo, the prize of his ambition slips
from his grasp, because of the faltering which he paid as the
price of the ignoble prize--ignoble under the circumstances
under which he obtained it.[36]
There are scores of letters in Trumbull's correspondence calling for
copies of Benjamin's speech, yet it had no effect in Illinois, the
Danite vote being smaller in 1860 than it had been in 1858. Probably it
had influence in the National Democratic Convention at Charleston, from
which the delegates from ten Southern States seceded in whole or part
when the Douglas platform was adopted. This split was followed by an
adjournment to Baltimore, where a second split took place, Douglas being
nominated by one faction and Breckinridge, of Kentucky, by the other.
* * * * *
Fifty years have passed since John Brown, with twenty-one men, seized
the Government armory and arsenal at Harper's Ferry (October 16, 1859),
in an attempt to abolish slavery in the United States. As sinews of
war, he had about four thousand dollars, or dollars' worth of material
of one kind and another. With such resources he expected to do something
which the Government itself, with more than a million trained soldiers,
five hundred warships, and three billions of dollars, accomplished with
difficulty at the end of a four years' war, during which no negro
insurrection, large or small, took place. One might think that the
scheme itself was evidence of insanity. But to prove Brown insane on
this ground alone, we must convict also the persons who plotted and
cooeperated with him and who furnished him money and arms, knowing what
he intended to do with them. Some of these were men of high intelligence
who are still living without strait-jackets, and it is not conceivable
that they aided and abetted him without first estimating, as well as
they were able, the chances of success. Yet Brown refused to allow his
counsel to put in a plea of insanity on his trial, saying that he was no
more insane then than he had been all his life, which was probably true.
If he was not insane at the time of the Pottawatomie massacre, he was a
murderer who forfeited his own life five times in one night by taking
that number of lives of his fellow men in cold blood.
I saw and talked with Brown perhaps half a dozen times at Chicago during
his journeys to and from Kansas. He impressed me then as a religious
zealot of the Old Testament type, believing in the plenary inspiration
of the Scriptures and in himself as a competent interpreter thereof. But
the text "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord, I will repay," never
engaged his attention. He was oppressed with no doubts about anything,
least of all about his own mission in the world. His mission was to
bring slavery to an end, but that was a subject that he did not talk
about. He was a man of few words, and was extremely reticent about his
plans, even those of ordinary movements in daily life. He had a square
jaw, clean-shaven, and an air of calmness and self-confidence, which
attracted weaker intellects and gave him mastery over them. He had
steel-gray eyes, and steel-gray hair, close-cropped, that stood stiff on
his head like wool cards, giving him an aspect of invincibleness. When
he applied to the National Kansas Committee for the arms in their
possession after the Kansas war was ended, he was asked by Mr. H. B.
Hurd, the secretary, what use he intended to make of them. He refused to
answer, and his request was accordingly denied. The arms were voted back
to the Massachusetts men who had contributed them originally. Brown
obtained an order for them from the owners.
The Thirty-sixth Congress met on the 5th of December, 1859. The first
business introduced in the Senate was a resolution from Mason, of
Virginia, calling for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the
facts attending John Brown's invasion and seizure of the arsenal at
Harper's Ferry. Trumbull offered an amendment proposing that a similar
inquiry be made in regard to the seizure in December, 1855, of the
United States Arsenal at Liberty, Missouri, and the pillage thereof by a
band of Missourians, who were marching to capture and control the
ballot-boxes in Kansas. On the following day Trumbull made a brief
speech in support of his amendment, in the course of which he commented
on the Harper's Ferry affair in words which have never faded from the
memory of the present writer. Nobody during the intervening half-century
has summed up the moral and legal aspects of the John Brown raid more
truly or more forcibly. He said:
I hope this investigation will be thorough and complete. I
believe it will do good by disabusing the public mind, in that
portion of the Union which feels most sensitive upon this
subject, of the idea that the outbreak at Harper's Ferry
received any countenance or support from any considerable
number of persons in any portion of this Union. No man who is
not prepared to subvert the Constitution, destroy the
Government, and resolve society into its original elements, can
justify such an act. No matter what evils, either real or
imaginary, may exist in the body politic, if each individual,
or every set of twenty individuals, out of more than twenty
millions of people, is to be permitted, in his own way and in
defiance of the laws of the land, to undertake to correct those
evils, there is not a government on the face of the earth that
could last a day. And it seems to me, sir, that those persons
who reason only from abstract principles and believe themselves
justifiable on all occasions, and in every form, in combating
evil wherever it exists, forget that the right which they claim
for themselves exists equally in every other person. All
governments, the best which have been devised, encroach
necessarily more or less on the individual rights of man and to
that extent may be regarded as evils. Shall we, therefore,
destroy Government, dissolve society, destroy regulated and
constitutional liberty, and inaugurate in its stead anarchy--a
condition of things in which every man shall be permitted to
follow the instincts of his own passions, or prejudices, or
feelings, and where there will be no protection to the
physically weak against the encroachments of the strong? Till
we are prepared to inaugurate such a state as this, no man can
justify the deeds done at Harper's Ferry. In regard to the
misguided man who led the insurgents on that occasion, I have
no remarks to make. He has already expiated upon the gallows
the crime which he committed against the laws of his country;
and to answer for his errors, or his virtues, whatever they may
have been, he has gone fearlessly and willingly before that
Judge who cannot err; there let him rest.
The debate continued several days and took a pretty wide range, the
leading Senators on both sides taking part in it. Trumbull bore the
brunt of it on the Republican side, and was cross-examined in courteous
but searching terms by Yulee, of Florida, Chesnut, of South Carolina,
and Clay, of Alabama, who conceived that the teachings of the Republican
party tended to produce such characters as John Brown. Trumbull answered
all their queries promptly, fully, and satisfactorily to his political
friends, if not to his questioners. Nothing in his senatorial career
brought him more cordial letters of approval than this debate. One such
came from Lincoln:
SPRINGFIELD, December 25, 1859.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
DEAR SIR: I have carefully read your speech, and I judge that,
by the interruptions, it came out a much better speech than you
expected to make when you began. It really is an excellent one,
many of the points being most admirably made.
I was in the inside of the post-office last evening when a mail
came bringing a considerable number of your documents, and the
postmaster said to me: "These will be put in the boxes, and
half will never be called for. If Trumbull would send them to
me, I would distribute a hundred where he will get ten
distributed this way." I said: "Shall I write this to
Trumbull?" He replied: "If you choose you may." I believe he
was sincere, but you will judge of that for yourself.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
The next in chronological order of the letters of Lincoln to Trumbull is
the following:
SPRINGFIELD, March 16, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: When I first saw by the dispatches that Douglas
had run from the Senate while you were speaking, I did not
quite understand it; but seeing by the report that you were
cramming down his throat that infernal stereotyped lie of his
about "negro equality," the thing became plain.
Another matter; our friend Delahay wants to be one of the
Senators from Kansas. Certainly it is not for outsiders to
obtrude their interference. Delahay has suffered a great deal
in our cause and been very faithful to it, as I understand. He
writes me that some of the members of the Kansas legislature
have written you in a way that your simple answer might help
him. I wish you would consider whether you cannot assist that
far, without impropriety. I know it is a delicate matter; and I
do not wish to press you beyond your own judgment.
Yours as ever,
A. Lincoln.[37]
FOOTNOTES:
[34] Herndon-Weik. _Life of Lincoln_, 2d edition, vol. II, chap. IV.
[35] When Lincoln, at the Freeport debate, asked Douglas whether the
people of a territory could in any lawful way exclude slavery from their
limits prior to the formation of a state constitution, Douglas replied
that Lincoln had heard him answer that question "a hundred times from
every stump in Illinois." He certainly had answered it more than once,
and his answer had been published without attracting attention or
comment either North or South. On the 16th of July, 1858, six weeks
before the Freeport joint debate, he spoke at Bloomington, and there
announced and affirmed the doctrine of "unfriendly legislation" as a
means of excluding slavery from the territories. Lincoln was one of the
persons present when this speech was delivered. On the next day, Douglas
spoke at Springfield and repeated what he had said at Bloomington. Both
of these speeches were published in the Illinois _State Register_ of
July 19, yet the fact was not perceived, either by Lincoln himself, or
by any of the lynx-eyed editors and astute political friends who labored
to prevent him from asking Douglas the momentous question. Nor did the
Southern leaders seem to be aware of Douglas's views on this question
until they learned it from the Freeport debate.
[36] _Cong. Globe_, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2241.
[37] The manuscript of the foregoing letter is in the Lambert collection
of Lincolniana. The two following which relate also to Delahay's
senatorial aspirations, are in the collection of Jesse W. Weik, of
Greencastle, Ind.:
SPRINGFIELD, October 17, 1859.
DEAR DELAHAY: Your letter requesting me to drop a line in your
favor to Gen. Lane was duly received. I have thought it over,
and concluded it is not the best way. Any open attempt on my
part would injure you; and if the object merely be to assure
Gen. Lane of my friendship for you, show him the letter herewith
enclosed. I never saw him, or corresponded with him; so that a
letter directly from me to him, would run a great hazard of
doing harm to both you and me.
As to the pecuniary matter, about which you formerly wrote me, I
again appealed to our friend Turner by letter, but he never
answered. I can but repeat to you that I am so pressed myself,
as to be unable to assist you, unless I could get it from him.
Yours as ever,
(Enclosure) A. LINCOLN.
SPRINGFIELD, October 17, 1859.
M. W. DELAHAY, ESQ.,
My dear Sir: I hear your name mentioned for one of the seats in
the U.S. Senate from your new state. I certainly would be
gratified with your success; and if there was any proper way for
me to give you a lift, I would certainly do it. But, as it is, I
can only wish you well. It would be improper for me to
interfere; and if I were to attempt it, it would do you harm.
Your friend, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
P.S. Is not the election news glorious?
We shall hear of Delahay again.
CHAPTER VII
THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN--SECESSION
The nomination of Lincoln for President by the Republican National
Convention in 1860 was a rather impromptu affair. In the years preceding
1858 he had not been accounted a party leader of importance in national
politics. The Republican party was still inchoate. Seward and Chase were
its foremost men. Next to them in rank were Sumner, Fessenden, Hale,
Collamer, Wade, Banks, and Sherman. Lincoln was not counted even in the
second rank until after the joint debates with Douglas. Attention was
riveted upon him because his antagonist was the most noted man of the
time. After the contest of 1858 was ended, although ended in defeat,
Lincoln was certainly elevated in public estimation to a good place in
the second rank of party leadership. It was not until the beginning of
1860, however, that certain persons in Illinois began to think of him as
a possible nominee for the Presidency. Lincoln did not think of himself
in that light until the month of March, about ten weeks before the
convention met. His estimate of his own chances was sufficiently modest,
and even that was shared by few. After the event his nomination was seen
to have been a natural consequence of preexisting facts. Seward was the
logical candidate of the party if, upon a comparison of views, it were
believed that he could be elected. One third of the delegates of
Illinois desired his nomination and intended to vote for him after a few
complimentary votes for Lincoln.
There were some indispensable states, however, which, many people
believed, Seward could not carry. In Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island he was accounted too radical for the
temper of the electors. Illinois was reckoned by Trumbull and other
experienced politicians as doubtful if Seward should be the
standard-bearer. A conservative candidate of good repute, and
sufficiently well known to the public, seemed to be a desideratum.
Nobody had as yet thought of seeking a _radical_ candidate, who was
generally reputed to be a _conservative_. Bates, of Missouri, and
McLean, of Ohio, were the men most talked about by those who hesitated
to take Seward. McLean was a judge of the Supreme Court appointed by
President Jackson. He had been Postmaster-General under Monroe and John
Quincy Adams, and was now seventy-five years of age. Trumbull considered
him the safest candidate, for vote-getting purposes, as regarded
Illinois, if Lincoln were not nominated. In a letter dated April 7,
Lincoln had said that "if McLean were ten years younger he would be our
best candidate." Bates was regarded by both Lincoln and Trumbull as a
fairly good candidate, but Trumbull had been advised by Koerner, the
most influential German in Illinois, that Bates could not command the
German vote. Koerner had said also (in a letter dated March 15) that he
had made himself acquainted with the contents of more than fifty German
Republican newspapers in the United States and had found that they were
nearly unanimous for Seward, or Fremont, as first choice, but that they
would cordially support Lincoln or Chase.
On the 24th of April, Trumbull wrote to Lincoln in reference to the
Chicago nomination. He said that his own impression was that, as between
Lincoln and Seward, the latter would have the larger number of delegates
and would be likely to succeed; and that this was the prevailing belief
in Washington, even among those who did not want Seward nominated. He
was also of the opinion that Seward could not be elected if nominated.
The Congressmen from the doubtful states were generally of that opinion,
and his own correspondence from central and southern Illinois pointed
the same way. The next question was whether the nomination of Seward
could be prevented. It was Trumbull's opinion that McLean was the only
man who could succeed in the convention as against Seward, and he could
do so only as a compromise candidate, beginning with a few votes, but
being the second choice of a sufficient number to outvote Seward in the
end. As to Lincoln's chances he said:
Now I wish you to understand that I am for you first and
foremost, and want our state to send not only delegates
instructed in your favor, but your friends, who will stand by
you and nominate you if possible, never faltering unless you
yourself shall so advise.
In conclusion he asked Lincoln's opinion about McLean. Lincoln replied
in the following letter:
SPRINGFIELD, April 29, 1860.
Hon. L. Trumbull,
My dear Sir: Yours of the 24th was duly received, and I have
postponed answering it, hoping by the result at Charleston, to
know who is to lead our adversaries, before writing. But
Charleston hangs fire, and I wait no longer.
As you request, I will be entirely frank. The taste _is_ in my
mouth a little; and this, no doubt, disqualifies me, to some
extent, to form correct opinions. You may confidently rely,
however, that by no advice or consent of mine shall my
pretensions be pressed to the point of endangering our common
cause.
Now as to my opinion about the chances of others in Illinois, I
think neither Seward nor Bates can carry Illinois if Douglas
shall be on the track; and that either of them can, if he shall
not be. I rather think McLean could carry it, with Douglas on
or off. In other words, I think McLean is stronger in Illinois,
taking all sections of it, than either Seward or Bates, and I
think Seward the weakest of the three. I hear no objection to
McLean, except his age, but that objection seems to occur to
every one, and it is possible it might leave him no stronger
than the others. By the way, if we should nominate him, how
should we save ourselves the chance of filling his vacancy in
the court? Have him hold on up to the moment of his
inauguration? Would that course be no drawback upon us in the
canvass?
Recurring to Illinois, we want something quite as much as, and
which is harder to get than, the electoral vote,--the
legislature,--and it is exactly on this point that Seward's
nomination would be hard on us. Suppose he should gain us a
thousand votes in Winnebago, it would not compensate for the
loss of fifty in Edgar.
A word now for your own special benefit. You better write no
letter which can be distorted into opposition, or
_quasi_-opposition, to me. There are men on the constant watch
for such things, out of which to prejudice my peculiar friends
against you. While I have no more suspicion of you than I have
of my best friend living, I am kept in a constant struggle
against questions of this sort. I have hesitated some to write
this paragraph, lest you should suspect I do it for my own
benefit and not for yours, but on reflection I conclude you
will not suspect me. Let no eye but your own see this--not that
there is anything wrong or even ungenerous in it, but it would
be misconstrued.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
What happened in the Chicago Convention was widely different from the
conjectures of these writers, but the result seemed entirely reasonable
after it was reached. Lincoln was as radical as Seward--subsequent
events proved him to be more so--but his tone and temper had been more
conservative, more sedative, more sympathetic toward "our Southern
brethren," as he often called them. He had never endorsed the
"higher-law doctrine," with which Seward's name was associated; he
believed that the South was entitled, under the Constitution, to an
efficient Fugitive Slave Law; he had never incurred the enmity, as
Seward had, of the Fillmore men, or of the American party.
These facts, coupled with some personal contact and neighborliness,
early attracted the conservative delegates of Indiana. Seward, with his
"irrepressible conflict" speech, had been too strong a dose for them,
but they were quite willing to take Lincoln, whose phrase, "the house
divided against itself," had preceded the irrepressible conflict speech
by some months. The example of Indiana bore immediate fruit in other
quarters, and especially in Pennsylvania. Curtin, the nominee for
governor, was early convinced that Seward could not carry that state,
but that Lincoln could. Curtin and Henry S. Lane, the nominee for
governor of Indiana, became active torch-bearers for Lincoln.
When those states pronounced for Lincoln, the men of Vermont (the most
radical of the New England States), who had been waiting and watching in
the Babel of discord for some solid and assured fact, voting meantime
for Collamer, turned to Lincoln and gave him their entire vote.
Vermont's example was more important than her numerical strength, for it
disclosed the inmost thoughts of a group of intelligent, high-principled
men, who were moved by an unselfish purpose and a solemn responsibility.
Lincoln had now become the cynosure of the conservatives with a
first-class radical endorsement to boot, and he deserved both
distinctions. His nomination followed on the third ballot.
Dr. William Jayne, Springfield, May 20, wrote to Trumbull:
The National Convention is over and Lincoln is our
standard-bearer, much (I doubt not) to his own surprise; I know
to the surprise of his friends. They went to Chicago fearful
that Seward would be nominated, and ready to unite on any
other man, but anxious and zealous for Lincoln. Pennsylvania
could agree on no man of her own heartily. Ohio was for Chase
and Wade. Indiana was united on Lincoln. That fact made an
impression on the New England States. Seward's friends were
quite confident after the balloting commenced. Now, if Douglas
is not nominated, we will carry the state by thousands. If D.
is nominated, we will carry the state, but we will have a hard
fight to do it.
Out of a large mass of letters in the Trumbull correspondence touching
the nomination of Lincoln, a half-dozen are selected as examples.
Richard Yates, Jacksonville, May 24, 1860, says the Chicago
nominations were received with delight, and there is every
indication of success in Illinois.
John Tillson, Quincy, May 28, writes that the nominations are
highly acceptable here to every one except the Douglas men, who
have just found out that Mr. Seward is the purest, ablest, and
most consistent statesman of the age.
J. A. Mills, Atlanta, Logan County, June 4: "I have never seen
such enthusiasm, at least since 1840, as is now manifested for
Lincoln. Scores of Democrats are coming over to us."
B. Lewis, Jacksonville, June 6: "The Charleston Convention has
struck the Democratic party with paralysis wherever Douglas was
popular as their leader (and that was pretty much all over the
free states), and we have now such an opportunity to make an
impression as I never saw before.... We are actually making
conversions here every day. The fact tells the whole story. In
1858 I anxiously desired to hear of one occasionally, at least
as a sign, but I could never hear of a single one. Now it is
all gloriously changed."
W. H. Herndon, Springfield, June 14: "Lincoln is well and doing
well. Has hundreds of letters daily. Many visitors every hour
from all sections. He is bored, _bored badly_. Good gracious! I
would not have his place and be bored as he is. I could not
endure it."
H. G. McPike, Alton, June 29: "We have distributed a large
number of speeches as you are aware, the most effective, I
think, under all the circumstances, is that of Carl Schurz."
In reply to letters of Trumbull, of which no copies were kept by him,
Lincoln wrote the following:
SPRINGFIELD, May 26, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: I have received your letter since the nomination,
for which I sincerely thank you. As you say, if we cannot get
our state up now, I do not see when we can. The nominations
start well here, and everywhere else as far as I have heard. We
may have a back-set yet. Give my respects to the Republican
Senators, and especially to Mr. Hamlin, Mr. Seward, Gen.
Cameron, and Mr. Wade. Also to your good wife. Write again, and
do not write so short letters as I do.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., June 5, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of May 31, inclosing Judge R.'s[38] letter
is received. I see by the papers this morning, that Mr.
Fillmore refused to go with us. What do the New Yorkers at
Washington think of this? Governor Reeder was here last
evening, direct from Pennsylvania. He is entirely confident of
that state and of the general result. I do not remember to have
heard Gen. Cameron's opinion of Penn. Weed was here and saw us,
but he showed no signs whatever of the intriguer. He asked for
nothing and said N. Y. is safe without conditions.
Remembering that Peter denied his Lord with an oath, after most
solemnly protesting that he never would, I will not swear I
will make no committals, but I do not think I will.
Write me often. I look with great interest for your letters
now.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
Notwithstanding the brilliant opening of the campaign, the contest in
Illinois was a very stiff one. Dr. Jayne's forecast was confirmed by the
result. Lincoln's plurality over Douglas in the state was 11,946, and
his majority over all was 4629. Dr. Jayne was himself elected State
Senator in the district composed of Sangamon and Morgan counties. The
Republican State Committee made extraordinary efforts to carry this
district, as they believed that the reelection of Senator Trumbull would
depend upon it. They obtained five thousand dollars as a special fund
from New York for this purpose. Jayne was elected by a majority of seven
votes, but Douglas received a plurality of one hundred and three over
Lincoln in the same district. By the election of Jayne, the Republicans
secured a majority of one in the State Senate. This insured the holding
of a joint convention of the legislature, at which Trumbull was
reelected Senator.
At Springfield, Illinois, November 20, 1860, there was a grand
celebration of the election of Lincoln and Hamlin, at which speeches
were made by Trumbull, Palmer, and Yates. Lincoln had been urged to say
something at this meeting that would tend to quiet the rising surges of
disunion at the South, but he thought that the time for him to speak had
not yet come. He wished to let his record speak for him, and to see
whether the commotion in the slaveholding states would increase or
subside. Meanwhile he desired that the influence of this public meeting
at his home should be peaceful and not irritating. To this end he wrote
the following words, handed them to Trumbull and asked him to make them
a part of his speech:
I have labored in and for the Republican organization with
entire confidence that, whenever it shall be in power, each and
all of the states will be left in as complete control of their
own affairs respectively, and at as perfect liberty to choose
and employ their own means of protecting property and
preserving peace and order within their respective limits, as
they have ever been under any administration. Those who have
voted for Mr. Lincoln have expected and still expect this; and
they would not have voted for him had they expected otherwise.
I regard it as extremely fortunate for the peace of the whole
country that this point, upon which the Republicans have been
so long and so persistently misrepresented, is now brought to a
practical test and placed beyond the possibility of a doubt.
Disunionists _per se_ are now in hot haste to get out of the
Union, because they perceive they cannot much longer maintain
an apprehension among the Southern people that their homes and
firesides and their lives are to be endangered by the action of
the Federal Government. With such "Now or never" is the maxim.
I am rather glad of the military preparations in the South. It
will enable the people the more easily to suppress any
uprisings there, which those misrepresentations of purpose may
have encouraged.
These words were incorporated in Mr. Trumbull's speech and were printed
in the newspapers, and the manuscript in Lincoln's handwriting is still
preserved.[39]
But Mr. Lincoln's record neither hastened nor retarded the secession of
the Southern States. The words he had previously spoken or written were
as completely disregarded by the promoters of disunion as were those
uttered now by Trumbull.
Jefferson Davis was not one of the hot-heads of secession. His speech in
the Senate on January 10, 1861, reads like that of a man who sincerely
regretted the step that South Carolina had taken, and deprecated that
which Mississippi was about to take, although he justified it afterward,
but he believed that the coercion of South Carolina would be the
death-knell of the Union. His remedy for the existing menace was not to
reinforce the garrison at Fort Sumter, but to withdraw it altogether, as
a preliminary step to negotiations with the seceding state. Yet he did
not say what terms South Carolina would agree to, or that she would
agree to any. That Lincoln was in no mood to offer terms to South
Carolina or to any seceding states which did not say what would satisfy
them, was made emphatic in a letter from Dr. William Jayne to Trumbull,
dated Springfield, January 28, saying that Governor Yates had received
telegraph dispatches from the governors of Ohio and Indiana, asking
whether Illinois would appoint peace commissioners in response to a call
sent out by the governor of Virginia to meet at Washington on the 4th of
February. "Lincoln," he continued, "advised Yates not to take any action
at present. He said he would rather be hanged by the neck till he was
dead on the steps of the Capitol than buy or beg a peaceful
inauguration."
The following letters from Lincoln throw light on his attitude toward a
compromise at a somewhat earlier stage:
_Private and Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 10, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Let there be no compromise on the question of
_extending_ slavery. If there be, all our labor is lost, and
ere long must be done over again. The dangerous ground--that
into which some of our friends have a hankering to run--is Pop.
Sov. Have none of it. Stand firm. The tug has to come; and
better now than any time hereafter.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
_Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 17, 1860.
HON. L. TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours enclosing Mr. Wade's letter, which I
herewith return, is received. If any of our friends do prove
false and fix up a compromise on the territorial question, I am
for fighting again--that is all. It is but a repetition for me
to say I am for an honest enforcement of the Constitution--the
fugitive slave clause included.
Mr. Gilmore of N. C. wrote me, and I answered confidentially,
enclosing my letter to Gov. Corwin to be delivered or not as he
might deem prudent. I now enclose you a copy of it.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
_Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 21, 1860.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Thurlow Weed was with me nearly all day yesterday,
and left last night with three short resolutions which I drew
up, and which, or the substance of which, I think, would do
much good if introduced and unanimously supported by our
friends. They do not touch the territorial question. Mr. Weed
goes to Washington with them; and says that he will first of
all confer with you and Mr. Hamlin. I think it would be best
for Mr. Seward to introduce them, and Mr. Weed will let him
know that I think so. Show this to Mr. Hamlin, but beyond him
do not let my name be known in the matter.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
The first of the three resolutions named was to amend the Constitution
by providing that no future amendment should be made giving Congress the
power to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed by law.
The second was for a law of Congress providing that fugitive slaves
captured should have a jury trial. The third recommended that the
Northern States should "review" their personal liberty laws.
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., December 24, 1860.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: I expect to be able to offer Mr. Blair a place in
the Cabinet, but I cannot as yet be committed on the matter to
any extent whatever.
Dispatches have come here two days in succession that the forts
in South Carolina will be surrendered by order, or consent, at
least, of the President. I can scarcely believe this, but if it
prove true, I will, if our friends in Washington concur,
announce publicly at once that they are to be retaken after the
inauguration. This will give the Union men a rallying cry, and
preparations will proceed somewhat on this side as well as on
the other.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
Trumbull's own opinions about compromise were set forth in a
correspondence with E. C. Larned, an eminent lawyer of Chicago. Under
date January 7, Larned sent him a series of resolutions written by
himself which were passed at a great Union meeting composed of
Republicans and Democrats in Metropolitan Hall. One of these resolutions
suggested "great concessions" to the South without specifying what they
should be. Larned asked Trumbull to read them and advise him whether
they met his approval. Trumbull replied under date January 16, at
considerable length, saying:
In the present condition of things it is not advisable, in my
opinion, for Republicans to concede or talk of conceding
anything. The people of most of the Southern States are mad and
in no condition to listen to reasonable propositions. They
persist in misrepresenting the Republicans and many of them are
resolved on breaking up the Government before they will
consider what guarantees they want. To make or propose
concessions to such a people, only displays the weakness of the
Government. A Union which can be destroyed at the will of any
one state is hardly worth preserving. The first question to be
determined is whether we have a Government capable of
maintaining itself against a state rebellion. When that
question is effectually settled and the Republicans are
installed in power, I would willingly concede almost anything,
not involving principle, for the purpose of overcoming what I
regard the misapprehension and prejudice of the South, but to
propose concessions in advance of obtaining power looks to me
very much like a confession in advance that the principles on
which we carried the election are impracticable and wrong. Had
the Republican party from the start as one man refused to
entertain or talk compromises and concessions, and given it to
be understood that the Union was to be maintained and the laws
enforced at all hazards, I do not believe secession would ever
have obtained the strength it now has.
The pages of the _Congressional Globe_ of 1860-61 make the two most
intensely interesting volumes in our country's history. They embrace the
last words that the North and South had to say to each other before the
doors of the temple of Janus were thrown open to the Civil War. As the
moment of parting approached, the language became plainer, and its most
marked characteristic was not anger, not hatred between disputants, but
failure to understand each other. It was as though the men on either
side were looking at an object through glasses of different color, or
arguing in different languages, or worshiping different gods. Typical of
the disputants were Davis and Trumbull, men of equally strong
convictions and high breeding, and moved equally by love of country as
they understood that term. Davis made three speeches, two of which were
on the general subject of debate, and one his farewell to the Senate.
The first, singularly enough, was called out by a resolution offered by
a fellow Southerner and Democrat, Green, of Missouri (December 10,
1860), who proposed that there should be an armed police force provided
by Federal authority to guard, where necessary, the boundary line
between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding states, to preserve
the peace, prevent invasions, and execute the Fugitive Slave Law. This
scheme Davis considered a quack remedy, and he declared that he could
not give it his support because it looked to the employment of force to
bring about a condition of security which ought to exist without force.
The present want of security, he contended, could not be cured by an
armed patrol, but only by a change of sentiment in the majority section
of the Union toward the minority section. Upon this test he argued in a
dispassionate way for a considerable space, ending in these words:
This Union is dear to me as a Union of fraternal states. It
would lose its value to me if I had to regard it as a Union
held together by physical force. I would be happy to know that
every state now felt that fraternity which made this Union
possible; and if that evidence could go out, if evidence
satisfactory to the people of the South could be given, that
_that_ feeling existed in the hearts of the Northern people,
you might burn your statute books and we would cling to the
Union still. But it is because of their conviction that
hostility and not fraternity now exists in the hearts of the
Northern people, that they are looking to their reserved rights
and to their independent powers for their own protection. If
there be any good, then, which we can do, it is by sending
evidence to them of that which I fear does not exist--the
purpose in your constituents to fulfill in the spirit of
justice and fraternity all their constitutional obligations. If
you can submit to them that evidence, I feel confidence that
with the evidence that aggression is henceforth to cease, will
terminate all the measures for defense. Upon you of the
majority section it depends to restore peace and perpetuate the
Union of equal states; upon us of the minority section rests
the duty to maintain our equality and community rights; and the
means in one case or the other must be such as each can
control.[40]
This was the explicit confirmation of what Lincoln had said, in his
Cooper Institute speech a year earlier, was the chief difficulty of the
North: "We must not only let them (the South) alone, but we must somehow
convince them that we do let them alone."
The best speech made on the Republican side of the chamber during this
momentous session of Congress was made by Trumbull on the night of March
2. It was a speech adverse to the Crittenden Compromise, and was a reply
to Crittenden's final speech in support of it. This measure was a joint
resolution proposing certain amendments to the Constitution, the first
of which proposed to apply the old Missouri Compromise line, of 36 deg. 30'
north latitude, to all the remaining territory of the United States, so
that in all territory north of it, then owned or thereafter acquired,
slavery should be prohibited, and that in all south of it, then owned or
thereafter acquired, slavery should be recognized as existing, and that
the right of property in slaves there should be protected by Federal
law. It was offered on the 18th of December, 1860, and debated till the
2d of March following, when it was defeated by yeas 19, nays 20, all the
Republicans voting against it except Seward, who did not vote and was
not paired.[41]
Just before the vote was taken, Crittenden tried to amend his measure by
striking out the words "hereafter acquired" as to the territory south of
36 deg. 30', which he said was giving great offense in some parts of the
North. This was not in the measure as originally proposed by him, but he
had accepted it as an amendment offered by his colleague, Senator
Powell. It was then too late to amend except by unanimous consent, and
Hunter, of Virginia, objected. In this last debate, Mason drew attention
to the minimum demands of Virginia as expressed by her legislature.
These were the Crittenden Compromise, including territory "hereafter
acquired," and the right of slaveholders to pass with their slaves
through the free states with protection to their slave property in
transit. Mason intimated pretty plainly that even this would not satisfy
him, for which he received some castigation at the hands of Douglas. The
latter was a steady supporter of the Crittenden Compromise, but he
maintained throughout the debate that no cause for disunion would
exist, even if the measure were defeated, and that none would exist if
the Federal Government should attempt to compel a state or any number of
states to obey the Federal law.
Simultaneously with the rejection of the Crittenden Compromise, the
Senate, by a two-thirds majority, passed a joint resolution to amend the
Constitution by adding to it the following article:
Article XIII. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution
which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish
or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions
thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by
the laws of said state.
This was a resolution introduced by Corwin, of Ohio. It had already
passed the House by a two-thirds majority, but it fell into the limbo of
forgotten things before sunrise of the 4th of March.
During this crisis Trumbull was receiving hundreds of letters from his
constituents, nearly all exhorting him to stand firm. The only ones
counseling compromise were from the commercial classes in Chicago, and
of these there were fewer than might have been expected in view of the
threatened danger to trade and industry. The dwellers in the small towns
and on the farms were almost unanimously opposed to the Crittenden
Compromise. A few letters are here cited from representative men in
their respective localities:
A. B. Barrett (Mount Vernon, January 5) has taken pains to
gather the opinions of Republicans in his neighborhood in
reference to the secession movement and finds them, without a
single exception, in favor of enforcing the laws and opposed to
any concession on the part of Congress which would recognize
slavery as right in principle, or as a national institution.
J. H. Smith (Bushnell, January 7) contends that the Chicago
platform was a contract between the Republican voters and the
men elected to office by them, and the voters expect them to
live up to it, to the very letter. "If the South wants to fight
let them pitch in as soon as they please; we would rather fight
than allow slavery to go into any more territory." Encloses
resolutions to this purport passed by a public meeting of
citizens of his town.
A. C. Harding (Monmouth, January 12) is pained to hear a rumor
that some Republicans in Washington are considering a bill to
make a slave state south of 36 deg. 30', thus sanctioning a slave
code by Congress. Any concessions that shall violate the
pledges of the Republican party will instantly turn the guns of
our truest friends upon those who thus give strength to the
Southern rebels. Neither Adams nor Seward nor Lincoln can for a
moment escape the fatal consequences if they yield their
principles at the threat of disunion.
Wait Talcott (Rockford, January 17) has just finished reading
Seward's speech. It leads him to fear that yielding to the
South, and calling a national convention under their threat,
will embolden them, whenever the result of an election does not
suit them, to insist that the victors shall take the place of
the vanquished.
G. Koerner (Belleville, January 21): The Democratic Convention
at Springfield has done some mischief by inflaming the lower
order of the Democracy and confirming them in their seditious
views. On the other hand, it has disgusted the better class of
Democrats. It was a sort of indignation meeting of all the
disappointed candidates, office-seekers, and losers of bets. A
few Republicans are giving way under the pressure, but upon the
whole the party stands firm. "Has secession culminated or is
worse to come? I am prepared for the application of force. In
fact, a collision is inevitable. Why ought not we to test our
Government instead of leaving it to our children?"
H. G. McPike (Alton, January 24): "Our people believe the
Constitution to be good enough. Let it alone. A compromise of
any principle dissolves the Republican party, takes the great
moral heart out of it, and will in so far bring ruin on the
Government."
J. M. Sturtevant, president of Illinois College (Jacksonville,
January 30), protests against the tone of Mr. Seward's speech.
Says that the solid phalanx of thoughtful, conscientious,
earnest, religious men who form the backbone of the Republican
party will never follow Mr. Seward, or any other man, in the
direction in which he seems to be leading. "We want the
Constitution as it is, the Union as the Fathers framed it, and
the Chicago platform. And we will support no man and no party
that surrenders these or any portion of them."
Grant Goodrich (Chicago, January 31) is convinced by his
intercourse with the mass of Republicans, and with many
Democrats, that any concessions by which additional rights are
given to slavery will end the Republican party. There will be a
division of the Republicans; a new party will arise, which will
include the entire German element and which will be as hostile
to the "Union-saving" Republicans as to the Democrats, and much
more intolerant to their former allies.
E. Peck (Springfield, February 1) says that the proposition to
send commissioners to Washington was passed by the legislature
as a matter of necessity, because, if the Republicans had not
taken the lead, the Democrats would have done so, and would
have obtained the help of a sufficient number of weak-kneed
Republicans to make a majority. Mr. Lincoln would have
preferred that commissioners be not appointed.
W. H. Herndon (Springfield, February 9): "Are our Republican
friends going to concede away dignity, Constitution, Union,
laws, and justice? If they do, I am their enemy now and
forever. I may not have much influence, but I will help tear
down the Republican party and erect another in its stead.
Before I would buy the South, by compromises and concessions,
to get what is the people's due, I would die, rot, and be
forgotten, willingly."