There is no doubt that if any one[87] of the Great Powers had proposed

the cession of Crete to Greece it would have met with the general

approbation of the Congress. This would not have met with Turkish

opposition, particularly as England had before the Berlin Congress

mentioned it in the Anglo-Turkish agreement; and to show that Turkey did

not attach much importance to Crete, it is related in Turkish history

that it was offered to Mehemet Ali as a reward for his help in the Greek

insurrection; besides, the national force of Turkey was not large enough

to utilize the strong natural position of the island.

Austria,[88] unless she had been influenced by her national vanity,

would have agreed to such a proposal owing to the great value as a

national defence that she received from the Balkan States. Again,

Germany, France, and Italy could find no reasonable argument for

opposing this plan.

The policy of England with regard to a neutral state has always been to

strengthen its national power, and that to such a degree as to properly

maintain its fixed neutrality.

In 1815 England ceded the Java Islands to the Dutch on the formation of

the Netherlands at the Congress of Vienna. Why did she do this? For this

reason: because by doing this the new States would be rendered neutral

in case of a French or German invasion, and by this cession of Java the

Dutch national power was increased in every way, and their power of

maintaining a strict neutrality rendered stronger.

Another instance may strengthen my statement. Corfu, an important

military and naval post, was put under English protection at the Vienna

Congress, 1815. Lord Palmerston at one time saw that it would be

impolitic to hand over Corfu to Austria, and declared that the islands

ought never to be abandoned by England.

However, when the new kingdom of Greece was formed England cordially

agreed to hand over Corfu and several other islands to Greece, on the

condition that the Greeks should choose a king subject to the approval

of England. The fortifications of Corfu were demolished, and the

neutrality of the islands was declared by the Great Powers.

These circumstances, then, tend to show us that England was distinctly

favourable[89] to the cession of Crete to Greece, and they were

considerably strengthened by the fact that Greece was an ally of

England, and the commercial relations between the two were very free.

There is no doubt that the marriage of the Crown Prince of Greece with a

German Princess (1889) has morally strengthened the position and power

of Greece. However, Greece still needs material strength for the

maintenance of a strict neutrality.

Turning to another country, we find that it is a matter of considerable

doubt whether Belgium can maintain a firm neutrality in case of a

Franco-German war. At the time of Lord Palmerston she might perhaps have

been able to do so, but the recent discoveries in the world of science,

and their application to military purposes, and the immense increase of

the French and German armies, have changed the military world, and the

neutrality of Belgium is a doubtful point. In 1887 an important

discussion on this question took place, which resulted in the

fortification of Namur and Liege. This was followed by the fortification

of the Meuse, but it is said that the Belgians have not enough troops to

garrison these newly-made defences. It has been publicly admitted in

Belgium that their national force is not sufficient to defend a

violation of neutrality against France and Germany, therefore Belgium

must regard the first violator of her neutrality as her national enemy,

and will be obliged to ally herself with a nation which is an enemy of

the state which has violated neutrality. This is not the Belgium which

Lord Palmerston meant it to be.

Another important fact is that since the Franco-German war German

attention has been turned to the North Sea, and a new naval harbour and

arsenal have been built at Wihelmshafen. Two other large harbours in the

North Sea have also been improved lately, viz., Hamburg and Bremen.

Kiel, the finest port on the Baltic, has been confiscated, and is now

connected with the North Sea by a canal, through which ships of large

tonnage may one day pass. Numerous ironclads and fleets of large

merchant and emigrant steam vessels have been constructed which, in case

of war, can be armed and turned into transports. Her land forces have

been well organized and augmented, and military tactics scientifically

developed. From these threatening facts it is certain that in the event

of a Franco-German war both Holland and Belgium would occupy most

dangerous positions. Having these events staring them in the face, only

one expedient could present itself to the two states, viz., union. This

would enable them to show a powerful front to the rival Powers, and

would enable them both to maintain a united fixed neutrality, thus

showing Lord Palmerston’s mistaken policy of the separation of the two

states to be a weak one with regard to the present state of affairs,

though perhaps it may have served its purpose at that time.

All these arguments go to prove that a cession of Crete to Greece would

be beneficial to both European and Grecian interests.

Constantinople was hardly mentioned in the Berlin Treaty, although it is

said that Lord Beaconsfield had suggested to General Ignatieff a Russian

occupation of the Bosphorus with an English one of Mitylene. Ignatieff

said, however, that “Mitylene was too near, as it was only two hours’

steam from the north of the Dardanelles.” Lord Beaconsfield did not,

therefore, press the discussion. The importance of Constantinople can be

explained in a few words.

By possession of the Straits Russia would be able to make the Black Sea

a second Caspian, whose coasts are left undefended, and it would become

a great Russian arsenal, for ten or fifteen thousand troops would be

sufficient to shut out an English fleet from the Straits, and by this

means quite two hundred thousand Russian troops could be withdrawn from

the Black Sea and turned to the Balkans, Asia Minor, or Central Asia.

_The Anglo-Turkish Convention._

Notwithstanding the fact that Austria has fulfilled her contract in

preventing Russian aggression through the Balkans, yet Russia could find

a way through Asia Minor, although her progress through Asia was stopped

by England at the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

By this treaty, however, England committed a still more grave and

serious breach of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 than by this Berlin

Treaty. Yet although England and Russia had made a secret agreement

beforehand, still the Berlin Treaty was discussed and drawn up by the

Congress. Therefore England was only morally to blame. But the

Anglo-Turkish Convention was concluded between the two countries

themselves, and was never submitted for the consideration of the Great

Powers. Lord Beaconsfield sought to screen England by declaring that

Russia had concluded the San Stefano Treaty with Turkey without the

knowledge and consent of the Powers, and Russia herself, therefore, had

broken the principles of the 1856 and 1871 Treaties. Yet this did not

conceal the fact that England herself had not acted up to her tenets in

the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

The Porte ceded Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, together with its port, to

Russia. England occupied Cyprus, and engaged to defend Asiatic Turkey,

Syria, Palestine, Assyria, Arabia, and Armenia, against Russian

invasion.

Has England performed her contract in Asiatic Turkey as Austria has done

in the Balkans? We will see. Cyprus is left almost in the same condition

as it was before our English occupation, and nothing has been done by

England for the defence of Asiatic Turkey, while only a few hundred

soldiers guard against a Russian invasion in Asia Minor. Surely this

cannot be a sufficient number of men to withstand a Russian army. What,

then, has become of the Anglo-Turkish Convention? Russia has taken

advantage of this, and is doing her utmost to bring about war in that

quarter.

By the Berlin Treaty the Russian Emperor declared that it was his

_intention_ to constitute Batoum a free port essentially commercial.

Lord Salisbury interpreted this remark that the port of Batoum was to be

_only_ a commercial port. The Russian Emperor has, however, _changed his

intention_, and Batoum is essentially a fortress, and is connected with

Poti by a railway through Kutais.

Why cannot, therefore, Russia have an idea of breaking the Berlin Treaty

with equal freedom as England did with regard to the Treaties of 1856

and 1871 by concluding the Anglo-Turkish Convention single-handed? It

seems to me that Russia has a great opportunity of advancing to

Erzeroum, and from there proceeding to Alexandretta; and from there to

Constantinople. At any rate she has ample opportunities of reaching the

Persian Gulf by piercing the northern frontiers and western part of

Persia, and thus completing the far-seeing policies of Peter the Great,

Nicholas, and Alexander.

How can England withstand this? When Cyprus was placed under English

administration both France and Italy were opposed to this, France

especially so, because she had a special interest with regard to Syria.

However, she concluded a secret agreement with England, that the latter

would consent to a French Protectorate over Tunis, which was done in

1881, a protectorate which is now extending to Tripoli. Many regard this

action of France as an indirect third offer of Egypt to England, the

first having been made by Nicholas I., and the second by Louis Philippe.

Whatever the French occupation of Tunis might be, England occupied Egypt

in 1885, thus fulfilling Lord Palmerston’s prophecy of a quarter of a

century before, when he said that “if a practicable waterway were

created between the Gulf of Pelusium and the Red Sea England would be

compelled sooner or later to annex Egypt, and that he opposed M. de

Lessep’s scheme because he considered it undesirable that England should

annex territory in that part of the world.”[90]

The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, and Lord Palmerston’s prophecy was

fulfilled. In 1875 the English Government purchased the Khedive’s shares

(£4,000,000) in the Suez Canal, and this was followed by the bombardment

of Alexandria by the British fleet in 1885. The chief aim of the English

occupation of Egypt was “to possess the inns on the north road.”[91]

It will be impossible to avoid the conflict of English and French

interests as long as there is only one route through the Suez Canal to

India, and an Anglo-French alliance on the subject seems to be far

distant, particularly as England has three-fourths of the traffic

through the canal.

It is also a matter of great importance that England should keep Egypt

orderly and peaceful. Lord Salisbury, in an excellent speech on Lord

Mayor’s Day, 1889, said:

“We (English) have undertaken to sustain Egypt until she is competent to

sustain herself against every enemy, foreign or domestic. We cannot see

that that time has yet arrived. It may arrive quicker or later. Other

Powers may help us by concurring in measures which will improve the

position and increase the prosperity of Egypt, or they may defer that

day by taking an opposite course. But whether the day comes sooner or

later, our policy remains unaltered, and we will pursue our task to the

end.”

We can easily get at the pith of Lord Salisbury’s speech. If France

again became a co-partner of England in establishing peace and order in

Egypt, then England would be quite willing to restore the dual control

with regard to Egypt, and Lord Salisbury in 1878 had declared that

England did not desire to annex Egypt.

The dual control of France and England with regard to Egypt might

possibly settle affairs there temporarily, or neutralize that country on

the same lines as Belgium; but still this is not a sufficient guarantee

against an Anglo-French dispute on the Egyptian question.

The French Government of the present day is not noted for stability,

always changing, never agreeing, and ready for foreign quarrels, and

although now they are supporting the English Government in Egypt, it is

not safe to depend upon them, for the feeling of rivalry is sure to

arise, and great caution has to be exercised in order to prevent

complications arising. No matter what happens, England must have free

communication with India, and as long as there is only one road,

ruptures will be inevitable, and there can be no firm alliance as in the

case of the Crimean War.

It seems to me to be a favourable time to suggest to Turkey the

construction of a railway from Constantinople or some other port on the

Mediterranean to Bussorah on the Persian Gulf: why should not England

undertake the construction herself? This route would certainly possess

four great advantages:

(1) It would be a shorter route to India.

(2) It would be a valuable means of quick transportation of either

Turkish or English troops for the defence of Asia Minor.

(3) It would avoid a clashing of English and French interests in Egypt

to a certain extent, and a dual control would thereby be strengthened,

and would produce two more results, viz:—

(_a_) A firmer alliance between England and France.

(_b_) England would be able to reduce her troops in Egypt, and devote

them to the defence of Asia Minor, and by this means be more able to

withstand Russian attacks in that quarter and in Persia.

(4) Lastly, Turkey would be strengthened financially owing to the

prosperity of her commerce, and productions in Asia Minor, which is the

usual effect of such a communication.

By this means England can fulfil her public duty to Turkey, which she

had undertaken to do by the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and can maintain

her national honour pledged when Lord Beaconsfield and Count Andrassy

discussed the defence of Turkey from Russian invasion in Asia and

Europe.

It is difficult to see why this railway scheme was not brought forward

at the Anglo-Turkish Convention, because it appears to me to be of

primary importance for the defence of both Asia Minor and India; and

also how it escaped the mind of so clever a statesman as Lord

Beaconsfield.

It has, however, been informally discussed both at political meetings

and by pamphlet only recently: the financial difficulties seemed quite

surmountable, but political opinions are decidedly at variance on the

subject. But it is my opinion that England would be perfectly right in

compelling Turkey to carry out this scheme, and if she was not able to

execute it, then England could perform it herself, and she would be only

fulfilling one of the duties which she has undertaken to perform with

the Sultan at the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

The following articles strangely enough appeared in one of the English

daily papers[92]:—

“The tradition, adhered to even by Lord Beaconsfield, of remaining

allied with Turkey at all hazards, is no longer advocated even by

Conservative occupants of the Foreign Office. Since the occupation by

England of Cyprus, and still more of Egypt, Constantinople has lost much

of its importance to England. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea would,

in the event of war, pass through the Dardanelles, with or without the

Sultan’s consent, and advance into the Mediterranean. The rule of the

Sultan at Constantinople, therefore, no longer affords a guarantee

against a Russian attack of the English possessions in the

Mediterranean. Russia already possesses a road to India _viâ_ Merv, and

the possession of Constantinople could afford her no resistance in this

direction.”

“England, on the other hand, in the event of Russia’s impeding the

conveyance of English troops through the Suez Canal, has at her disposal

another way to India, one which leads exclusively through British

dominions—the new Canadian railway. One no longer thinks of defending

India at Constantinople, but in Afghanistan and on the Anglo-Afghan

frontier. England has as much interest as the other Powers in preventing

Russia from advancing towards Constantinople, but this is no longer held

to be a vital interest that would have to be protected even by force of

arms.”

This is certainly a serious mistake in policy if backed up by the

English Government, even more so than that of the Duke of Wellington,

1827–1830.

If Constantinople were once occupied by Russia, it is certain that

Turkey would be a thing of the past, the Russian fleet on the Black Sea

would at once sail into the Mediterranean and attack the English

supremacy there. The Russian occupation would enable them to withdraw

quite 200,000 troops from the Black Sea coasts which could be used for

an attack on the Balkans, Armenia, or Central Asia; Cyprus would be lost

to England, and Asia Minor to Turkey; Russia would have a largely

increased power in the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf would be no

longer open to English ships.

If the Franco-Russian alliance of to-day remained firm, and war was to

be declared, then England would only have two long routes to India:

(_a_) round the Cape of Good Hope, (_b_) the new Canadian railway. Lord

Charles Beresford said, “With the Cape well fortified and held by a

military force, England might laugh at the world.” But the Cape would be

unsafe, owing to France having now firm hold of the Indian Ocean

“Malta,” viz., Madagascar.

Notwithstanding that the new Canadian route passes exclusively through

British dominions, yet it cannot be called a direct route, for it is

certainly a seven days longer journey than the Gibraltar route to

Calcutta. Russia, on the other hand, could send an immense number of

troops in seven or ten days from Moscow to the Afghan frontiers, and in

about another extra day from St. Petersburg, or the Caucasian Peninsula.

This would be all in favour of Russia gaining the first military move—a

matter of extreme importance in the present advanced stage of military

tactics.

This question may also be viewed from two other points:—

First, Cobden[93] and Bright were once under the idea that if Russia

occupied Constantinople, she would change into a peaceful and civilized

nation, and that England would be materially benefited commercially.

This was merely an imaginary dream, for there is no doubt in my mind

that a Russian occupation of the Turkish capital is a preliminary to

shutting out English trade from the Black Sea by heavy protective

duties. Second, England has engaged herself, together with the other

European Powers, to respect the integrity and independence of the

Ottoman Empire by the Treaties of Paris, London, and Berlin, and still

more emphatically by the Anglo-Turkish Convention. If, therefore, she

followed the policy of leaving Constantinople to its fate, and simply

defended her interests on the Afghan frontiers, she would at once be

branded with disgrace, and stigmatized as a breaker of the 1856, 1871,

and 1878 Treaties, and a backslider from the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

At the present time, however, an indirect change of policy may be

observed. Early in March, 1889, the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord

George Hamilton) introduced and passed the Naval Defences Bill,

authorizing an expenditure of £21,500,000 on the Navy by constructing

eight first and two second-class battle-ships, nine first-class and

thirty-three smaller cruisers, and eighteen torpedo gunboats. This

surely implies that England is determined to prevent Russian

encroachments both at Constantinople and in the Mediterranean.

Reviewing the above, the following things seem plainly revealed, viz.,

that Russia has in the majority of cases assumed an offensive policy

while England has maintained a defensive one with regard to Eastern

Europe.

Pitt started a splendid scheme of resistance against Russia; Canning

worked upon it, and developed the European Concert scheme with regard to

Turkey; Palmerston improved, expanded, and eventually completed a

perfectly harmonious unison; while Beaconsfield composed and worked

variations upon the original strain of the Concert. Surely the example

of such noble and great statesmen is worthy of veneration both in the

present and the future.

IX.

CENTRAL ASIA.

_Rise of British power in India—Rivalry of France—Aims of

Napoleon—Russian influence in Central Asia—Its great extension after

the Crimean War—And after the Berlin Congress—Possible points of

attack on India—Constantinople the real aim of Russia’s Asiatic

policy—Recent Russian annexations and railways in Central

Asia—Reaction of Asiatic movements on the Balkan question—Dangerous

condition of Austria—Possible future Russian advances in

Asia—England’s true policy the construction of a speedy route to

India by railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf—Alliance

of England, France, Turkey, Austria, and Italy would effectively

thwart Russian schemes._

I do not mean to detain my readers for any length of time upon this

tedious subject which has been so often discussed. I shall sketch the

policy of England and Russia in the region in question. However, it must

not be forgotten that the subject is important, as it leads up to the

great Pacific Question which will occupy European attention for many

years to come.

The foundation of the British Empire in India dates from the Battle of

Plassey, June 23, 1757, and Clive’s Second Governorship of the East

India Company established the India administration on a firm basis.

Warren Hastings improved and properly organized the foundation laid by

Clive, and Lord Cornwallis consolidated Bengal and the other chief

states, and rendered them fairly secure.

Lord Wellesley was the first who felt fully convinced that England

should be the permanent predominant Power in India, and he carried out

this policy by extensive subsidiary alliances with native princes by

which the states were placed under British protection.

It is said that this policy was suggested by “the great events that were

taking place in Europe, where French ideas and French arms under the

genius of Bonaparte were reducing kingdoms and states to provinces of an

Empire.”[94]

Lord Minto first opened relations with the Punjaub, Afghanistan, and

Persia. He was succeeded by Lord Moira, who saw that the British

frontiers in India could never be secured till the natural barrier of

the Himalayas and the sea were reached; while Lord Dalhousie proved a

faithful follower and improver of this policy, and at last made India a

completely organized state.

_England’s Opponents in British India._

The Portuguese ascendency in India was of short duration. It was

followed by a keen rivalry between the English and French, the former

eventually obtaining the precedence. This was owing to the naval

superiority of the English in Indian seas, under the wise guidance of

Chatham, supported by the skilful military and civil administration of

Clive and Hastings.

In 1797–1798 Napoleon threatened to invade India from the north; first

he threatened an attack from the Deccan, then in the latter part of the

year he concluded an alliance with several Asiatic princes preparatory

to another attack from the same quarter.

The Marquis Wellesley was at once sent out and landed in Madras, April

26, 1798. Affairs seemed critical. Napoleon was preparing for a great

invasion of Egypt prior to a descent on India. Tippoo Sultan, in India,

was raising troops, disciplined under French management, and

strengthened by French help, commanded by Raymond. Rao Sindia (the

Mahratta ruler), the Peshawar (Governor of Poonah), the Ameer of

Afghanistan, and Holkar were all hostile to English interests in India,

and threatened to plunge everything into war with the assistance of the

French.

Wellesley plainly saw that a defensive policy was the best. Accordingly

he made an alliance with some of the Mahratta powers to frustrate a

French invasion from the north. He also strongly urged the English Home

Government to take possession of the Cape of Good Hope, and the Isles of

France and Bourbon, in order to cut off the sea route to India from

France. This advice was followed by the English Government, who retained

Malta, Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Ionian Islands by the

provisions of the Congress of Vienna, 1815.

He then began to crush Tippoo Sultan and his allies, and by the

brilliant victories of Assaye and Argaum brought them to his feet.

Having conquered these Native states he now began to take measures to

consolidate them. He allowed the princes to retain their titles, but

subjected them to the English Power, which secured them from foreign

aggression, and also let them have full liberty with regard to internal

administration.

On his recall in 1805 a policy of non-interference was carried on by his

successor, Lord Cornwallis.

During the Napoleonic European War, Lord Minto was Governor-General.

Under his able administration the French Isles of Bourbon and Mauritius

and the Dutch East Indian Islands were captured. He also sent political

missions into Persia, Sindia, and Poonah to crush down the French

influence and intrigue there.

Napoleon fell in 1815, and the most formidable opponent to British

Indian interests disappeared.

Yet the Marquis of Hastings and his successors still carried out the

same policy of annexation as had been in existence during the alarms of

Napoleon, and the Indian frontiers have ever since been keenly watched

and guarded from foreign attack. The second Mahratta War (1817–1819) and

the first Burmese War (1824–1826) are instances of British watchfulness

over the frontiers.

As was to be expected, Russia appeared on the scene in the place of

France, and the drama of the Anglo-Russian struggle in Afghanistan was

enacted in 1837.

[Illustration:

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA.]

For some time previously Russia had been gradually advancing into

Central Asia. This movement started with Peter the Great, while

Alexander I. arranged with Napoleon by the Treaty of Tilsit (1807) to

annex whatever he pleased in Central Asia. Hence the Russian boast of

Nicholas that “Russia has no boundary in Central Asia.” For some time,

however, Turkish affairs occupied the Russian minds, and Asia was left

untouched, while for twenty or thirty years after the fall of Napoleon,

all the great countries were endeavouring to restore the balance of

power in Europe. Then in 1830 Russia began to show her hand, and seized

Jaxartes, and in 1837 the siege of Herat by the Persians (no doubt

incited by the Russians), which is sometimes called the north-western

gate of India, and the failure of negotiations with Dost Mohammed, who

was backed by Russian influence, urged the English to take strong

measures in order to protect India from Russian invasion, especially

through the two Afghan Passes, the Bolon and Khyber.

The first English move was the sending of an expedition to Cabul, and

its occupation in 1839. Its intention was to place a ruler over

Afghanistan who should be under English influence. This was considered

defensive policy.

In 1847 Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell the following:—

“The roads through Persia are good, and the Caspian gives additional

facilities. From Astrabad through Afghanistan are very practicable

military roads. A Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might

convert Afghanistan into the advanced post of Russia.”

The annexation of Sind (1843), Punjaub (1849), Oudh (1856), and the

second Burmese War (1852), are all policies on the same lines.

Just at this period Russia was warmly engaged with Turkish affairs, and

in 1853–1856 was employed in the Crimean War against England, France,

and Turkey. She was beaten, and by the Treaty of Paris was driven back

from the Danube, and forbidden to put a Russian fleet of any description

in the Black Sea, and the fortifications of Sebastopol were dismantled.

Thus a Russian advance on the Balkans and Armenia seemed then almost

hopeless. Therefore she turned her attention to Central Asia, and

vigorously carried out her plans for several years.

In 1864 the Russian forces captured Tchenken, in Turkestan, and she had

advanced as far as the river Syr Daria. In 1865 she declared war with

Bokhara, and captured Taskend, which was followed by the surrender of

Khojind (1866).

In 1867 the province of Syr Adria was annexed, and in the same year

Nicholas installed a Russian Government in Turkestan. In 1868 Samarcand

was subjugated, and the Ameer of Bokhara was practically made a vassal

of the Czar. In 1869 Krasnovodok, on the east coast of the Caspian, next

fell a prey to Russian greed, and a fort was built there, and at present

forms one of the Russian military outposts.

During and after the Franco-German War she was busily engaged in Central

Asia, and still increased and extended her boundaries, until at length

the Oxus was reached, and the Clarendon boundary in 1872 for a time

stopped her roving footsteps. In 1873, however, the whole territory of

the Khan of Khiva was drawn in, and the river Atrak was now the boundary

with Persia. Zerafshan next fell before her, and now the Tian Shan

mountains and the eastern part of Semipolatinsk formed the eastern

boundary with China. Lastly, 1876 saw the annexation of Ferghana.

Let us now direct our attention to the English frontiers and territory,

which she was trying to consolidate more firmly.

The Indian Mutiny of 1857 had led to the transferring of the Government

of India from the East India Company to the Crown, and the reins of

government from a Governor-General to a Viceroy (1858). The tour of the

Prince of Wales through India, 1875–1876, had done a good deal of good

in creating a friendly feeling with the natives, and he had met with a

brilliant reception. This was the preliminary to Queen Victoria being

proclaimed Empress of India in 1877.

The Russo-Turkish War (1878), the San Stefano Treaty, and the Congress

of Berlin, produced a new phase in the Afghan question. The opposition

of Austria to Russia at the Balkans, the defence of England in Asia

Minor, both by the provisions of the Berlin Treaty, and the

Anglo-Turkish Convention had frustrated the schemes of Russia in Europe;

she therefore turned her undivided energies to her advance in Central

Asia, with the object of dividing the attention and forces of the

English between Asia Minor and the Afghan frontiers.

In 1880 the final conquest of the Turcomans along the northern frontier

of Persia and the east coast of the Caspian facilitated her designs, and

Askhabad was occupied. The dispute of the Kulja frontier with China was

a winning move also in the eastern direction, also a part of

Semipolatinsk was added, and fresh boundaries were made in the

south-west of Ferghana towards the Chinese Empire, which measure caused

England to adopt a defensive policy by the third Burmese War (1885).

In 1882 the Russo-Merv Convention was concluded, finally deciding the

submission of the latter, while in 1884 “His Imperial Highness (of

Russia) had determined to accept the allegiance of the Merv-Turcomans,

and to send an officer to administer the government of that region.”[95]

The annexation of Merv gave Russia possession of the river Murghab,

giving her an opportunity of having a waterway to Herat if needed.

This action compelled England to appoint a Commission to define the

North-West frontier of Afghanistan (1885). England at this time was

worried also with Egyptian affairs. Russia, notwithstanding, advanced

and occupied Sarakhs and various other posts on the North-West frontier,

all being strategically important. This aroused the English Government,

who at once asked for a vote of credit of £11,000,000, and began to show

such a determined front that Russia was compelled to make certain

concessions.

However, at the conclusion of the negotiations it was found that Russia

had pushed herself a considerable distance towards Herat, and had

reached Ak Robat, while the railway to Samarcand was nearly finished.

Thus Russia certainly scored a winning point, and, if desirous, could

attack the Anglo-Indian frontier by three ways:

(1) By advancing towards Cabul from Bokhara across the Oxus.

(2) By marching towards Candahar _viâ_ Herat by the Meshed line.

(3) By attacking the same place through the Attric Valley and Merv

route.

The unsettled condition of the boundary between the Oxus and the Heri

Rud, and particularly the Upper Oxus, will undoubtedly prove a source of

discord between Russia and England for many years to come.

In spite of the strenuous efforts of Russia in advancing, and extending

her power and boundaries in Central Asia, yet her great and absorbing

thought was not revealed openly to the watchful eyes of European Powers,

viz., to have full control of Constantinople, the key to the Black Sea,

and by obtaining this to command the Mediterranean and be paramount in

Western Europe.

A favourite manœuvre in military operations is to try and divert an

opponent’s eyes from the true point of attack, and by so doing to weaken

the opposition at that point.

As we have casually mentioned before, the elder Pitt “conquered America

in Germany,” and afterwards when Charles III. of Spain concluded a

secret Treaty known as the (third) “Family compact” with France,

intending really to make war upon England, Chatham “determined to attack

without delay the Havannah and Philippine Islands.”

Again, as another illustration of the above statement, we saw that

Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition and his invasion of Russia were really

underhand blows at England.

But why did he not attack America or Ireland? Surely if he had sailed

directly from Brest, 1798, to either of the above places, instead of

going to Egypt as he did, with the combined fleets of France, Spain, and

Holland, he would have dealt a much deadlier blow at British power.

Let us examine the policy of Russia which has caused me to make the

above statement.

Catherine II. had resolved to reach Constantinople through the Balkan

Peninsula. Pitt withstood this resolution by supporting the Ottoman

Empire, together with Austria, as conducive to the interests of both

nations. Austria, therefore, became an enemy of Russia.

Alexander I., therefore, seeing the united interests of England, France,

Austria, and Turkey allied against him, changed his front and determined

to reach Constantinople along the Caucasian route. He plainly saw that

by this manœuvre he would compel England and France to defend the

Caucasus.

At the beginning of his career the Czar Nicholas followed the same plans

as his predecessor, but carried them out much more firmly; he increased

his field of operations by invading Persia, 1826–1828, and occupied

Armenia.

By this measure, no doubt, he expected to attract either England or

France, perhaps both of them, to the Caucasian Question, thereby

weakening the power of their alliance in the Balkans. France certainly

would feel considerable uneasiness for the Holy Places which had a

special charm for her Catholic followers. England would also have felt

qualms, seeing that if Russia occupied Persia, and made it an outpost

for attacking India through Afghanistan she would have considerable

trouble in defending her possession. However, this scheme did not prove

so effective as Nicholas wished, for it did not divide the attention of

England and France in the Balkans.

Russia, therefore, perceiving this, followed the Napoleonic scheme of a

direct attack on India with the help of several Asiatic states. In 1830

she first appeared in Central Asia and soon subjugated Persia and

induced the Shah to occupy Herat, 1837. Alarmed at this, the whole

energy of England was directed towards Afghanistan, and special

preparations, which lasted for a quarter of a century, were made to

defend an attack from that quarter. The home affairs of England,

together with these alarming schemes of Russia with regard to India,

determined the Wellington Ministry to advocate non-interference in

Balkan affairs.

Russia also removed French opposition from the Balkans to Syria by

stirring up quarrels between the Greek and Latin Churches in Jerusalem.

In addition to this, as I have shown, Nicholas separated England and

France by his diplomatic tact.

Thus Turkey was left alone with Austria in the Balkans. Nicholas then,

feeling confident of success, at once threatened Constantinople by

taking the steps which led to the Crimean War. He, however, overreached

himself, and was beaten, as we have seen, by the allied armies of

England, France, and Turkey.

Immediately after the Crimean War Russia again stretched out her hands

on Persia as she had done in 1837. Lord Palmerston, however, closed them

by declaring war with the same country. “We are beginning,” wrote Lord

Palmerston, “to repel the first openings of trenches against India by

Russia, and whatever difficulties Ferokh may make about Afghanistan we

may be sure that Russia is his prompt and secret backer.”[96]

In 1857 the peace of Paris was concluded by which the Shah renounced all

claim over Herat and Afghanistan. This was a clever political stroke

against a Russian attack on India.

In 1849 Lord Palmerston wrote:—

“Persia must, I (Lord Palmerston) fear, now be looked on as an advanced

post for Russia whenever she chooses to make use of it. She will command

it either by overpowering force or by bribing the state by prospect of

acquisition in Afghanistan.”

However, ultimately the same policy was again resorted to by the Czar to

worry England in Central Asia. Again the Russians advanced into Central

Asia towards the Indian frontier and extended their borders both south

and east with great celerity.

But a fresh complication arose extremely favourable for Russian plots.

The Franco-German War (1870) seemed to be an introduction to the

accomplishment of her wishes. France was miserably defeated, while the

hands of Germany were fully tied up with Alsace and Lorraine. Two

formidable opponents to Russian arms were therefore placed _hors de

combat_. England and Austria were thus the only powers left for the

defence of Constantinople. Austria had previously been weakened by a war

with Prussia. It therefore seemed that England was the only strong

supporter of the Ottoman Empire, and Russia determined to _conquer

Turkey in Central Asia_, so she conquered and annexed Central Asia as

far as possible until her boundaries reached Afghanistan and the Chinese

Empire in 1874. Being naturally alarmed at these encroachments, England

again was obliged to devote all her energies to the Indian and Afghan

frontiers, and engaged in the Afghan War.

Russia now saw that she was in a better position with regard to Turkey

than she had been before the Crimean War, for although Turkey was still

assisted by Austria, yet the latter had not fully recovered from the

Prusso-Austrian War. Again France was in a convulsed state, while

England was harassed with Afghan affairs. A general alliance of the

Mediterranean Powers seemed therefore impossible.

Russia, therefore, boldly declared war in 1878, and marched to the gates

of Constantinople, and eventually concluded the San Stefano Treaty. This

aroused both England and Austria, and, owing to their warlike attitude,

the Berlin Congress was convened, and Russia again found her hands

withheld from the Turkish metropolis, although she succeeded in

definitely dividing the attention of England and Austria in the Balkans

by turning English eyes towards Asia Minor. Her success was still

greater in obtaining the outlet of the Danube and the arsenal of Batoum

in the Black Sea.

Glancing, then, at the situation generally, one can perceive that Russia

saw that the English opposition in Asia Minor would prove formidable,

but she did not think that the Austrian defence of the Balkans would

turn out so dangerous to her hopes. Her reasons for thinking this were

plain. England at this crisis was a nation of the first magnitude, both

in strength and wealth, and if only she (England) had fortified and

occupied Cyprus as she ought to have done, she would have proved a

valuable ally to Turkey, and would also have commanded the Ægean Sea.

Russia saw that the most advantageous policy would be to distract

England’s attention both from Cyprus and Asia Minor. To accomplish this

she for the _third time started to conquer Turkey through Central Asia_.

In 1878 she concluded a secret agreement with Persia by which the

territory down to Sarakhs from the Russian frontier was ceded, to her.

Her influence in Khorasan was increasing day by day, and especially so

in Meshed, owing to the skill and tact of M. Vlassoff, the Russian

Consul-General in that district. India was again threatened by her, and

Herat approached. Her boundaries were extended into the Chinese

dominions, and great uneasiness was caused in England concerning the

boundary question of the Oxus.

The most effective and important step, however, taken by Russia for the

accomplishment of her schemes, was the construction of the

Caspian-Samarcand Railway. It was started in 1881 with the primary

object of facilitating the war operations of General Skobeloff for the

reduction of the Tekkes. Lord Hartington called General Annenkoff, the

promoter of the railway, “a foolish fellow.” However, Samarcand was

reached in 1885, during the time that an Anglo-Russian war was

threatening about the Murghab question. Thus a general military[97]

communication of Russia with Asia was established. She had three ways of

sending troops and materials in the direction of the eastern shores of

the Caspian:—

(1) From St. Petersburg to Saratoff on the Volga, _viâ_ Moscow, by

railway, from there to Astrakhan by steamboat on the river, and from the

latter place to Krasnovodsk or Uzan Ada.

(2) From St. Petersburg to Voladis Caucase per railway, from thence to

Tiflis by post road (an eighteen hours’ journey), from Tiflis to Baku by

railway, and from there to Uzan Ada.

(3) From Odessa or the Crimea to Poti on the eastern Black Sea coast by

steam, from Poti to Baku, and from there to Uzan Ada.

The water traffic across the Caspian, from its different ports is

carried on by fifteen ships of the Caucasus and Mercury Company. They

are in receipt of a large annual subsidy from the state for the

conveyance of mails and troops, and also for the use of their boats for

transport in case of war. One of these fifteen steamers sails from Baku

to Uzan Ada twice a week.[98]

The Trans-Caucasian Railway starts from the latter place, running east

and afterwards north-east to Merv. From there it proceeds in the same

direction, crossing the Oxus, passing Bokhara, and eventually terminates

at Samarcand—a distance altogether of about nine hundred miles.

The work of laying the rails was done by two battalions of Russian

soldiers (five hundred each) and also by five thousand native labourers,

whose wage was threepence a day. Wages have since been increased to

sixpence a day. From the amount expended in labour we can see that the

railway expense did not prove inordinately dear, viz., 30,000,000

roubles, including also the cost of the Siberian Railway, especially as

the Russian estimate at first was 60,000,000 roubles. The average rate

of laying the rails was exceedingly rapid, viz., four or five miles a

day.

There are now one hundred and four locomotives and one thousand two

hundred wagons, fifteen new locomotives have lately been ordered, six

new passenger wagons, and eighty cistern cars. A commission has recently

reported in favour of a further grant to General Annenkoff of 8,000,000

roubles.[99]

This line has opened a wide field for trade with Central Asia. The

traffic in 1888 alone was about £3,000,000, and General Annenkoff

announced that the net profit of the railway in 1888 amounted to about

£80,000, that 2,000,000 pods of cotton had been conveyed by it during

the same year, and that in 1889 a total of 4,000,000 pods was

anticipated.[100]

Viewing from a political and strategical point of view this railway has

been an even more important factor. The northern frontier of Persia by

its means has been placed completely at the mercy of Russia, and by it

she was enabled to consolidate her new Asiatic territories which she had

annexed and conquered, Russian troops were able to be transported to the

Afghan frontier at a very short notice from all parts of Russia.

Without doubt the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway and its

threatening results have proved of immense value for the success of

Russia. By its means England was induced to turn her attention from Asia

Minor to Indian affairs. This resulted in embroiling England with the

second Afghan War, compelled her to appoint a boundary commission, and

plunged her into the third Burmese War. All these catastrophes compelled

her to neglect her Anglo-Turkish Convention promises—a result aimed at

by her Russian friends(?)

Even in Persia English influence is at a discount, and proportionately

Russian influence is rising. The appointment of Sir H. D. Wolff, a

clever diplomatist, to the Teheran Court, and the brilliant reception

accorded to the Shah during his recent visit by the English, were too

late to do any good. It may do good, and it may not.

Let us now see what effect upon Austria the Russo-Asiatic policy had.

Firstly, Austria had been left alone to cope with Russia in the Balkans,

and she was practicably left to defend the Ottoman Empire. France and

Germany were practicably disarmed, and were unable materially, to assist

Turkey against Russia. England, as we have seen before, was occupied

elsewhere, and had practically deserted Asia Minor, although this might

be altered if only she would station troops at Cyprus or somewhere near

at hand. Austria did not wish for a naval alliance only, which she

considered practically useless in event of war, but she wanted a

complete alliance. An alliance between the two Powers failed at the

Berlin Congress, and also in October, 1886.

Thus Russia obtained her desires in dividing the two Powers in Europe

and Asia, and prevented a general alliance by threatening Central Asia.

Certainly Austria had performed her Balkan duty well, although she was

clearly overweighted, and the result was internal exhaustion, financial

difficulties, social discontent, the result of pecuniary troubles.[101]

Of all the great European cities, the socialists are at the present

moment strongest in Vienna. An able political writer of the present day

has said: “The Dualism of the Monarchy (Austria-Hungary) is very nearly

dead, and if Austria is to exist at all she must rapidly become

tripartite, and ultimately resolve herself into a somewhat loose

confederation.”[102]

These domestic difficulties have caused her to gradually lose her

influence in the Balkans, and the abdication of King Milan of Servia has

proved a still more serious blow to her power in that quarter.

It seems to me impolitic for Russia to go to war with the five million

Magyars. It would be better to influence Austria so as to increase her

internal discords and foster them by skilful diplomacy if she wished to

attain her objects. For instance, to demonstrate against the accession

of Prince Ferdinand to the Bulgarian throne, to oppose the Bulgarian

loans, and give pecuniary help herself to immigrants from Montenegro to

Servia.

The consequence would be that Austria could not possibly remain peaceful

when inhabited by bitter anti-Russian Magyars. She would have to make

war preparations and spend money, and would thus increase her financial

difficulties, and the result would be the breaking down of the Dual

Monarchy, “the personal union of fifty-six states,” a mixture of races,

religions, and tongues.

A strong and compact confederation can only be obtained by sound

financial dealings. Austria once broken down by internal discord, then

Constantinople and the Balkans would be Russian possessions.

If Russia is desirous of accomplishing her ends, her great aim must be

to prevent any of the great Powers from making an alliance with Austria.

Owing to the Franco-Russian alliance, Russia is quite powerful enough to

hinder any effective alliance with Germany.

With regard to an alliance with England, there is one strong barrier

which, if kept up, will always prevent such a coalition, viz., the

Trans-Caspian Railway.

The following ideas would still further separate the two Powers:—

(1) The extension of the railway from Samarcand to Kokan, because from

Kokan Russia can threaten to push on her border to Eastern Turkestan,

and move southward to Tibet, and from there will be able to threaten the

territory of Cashmere, which are the boundaries at present unsettled.

(2) An extension of railway from Samarcand to Tashkend, which is

contemplated, and when completed will connect Siberia from a military

point of view. It can be also taken north-west, along the north-eastern

shore of the Aral Sea, and may be connected with the parent line at

Orenburg, and connected with Russia and Central Asia for military

purposes.

(3) To construct a line from Mertvi, or Dead Bay, on the Caspian, to the

western shore of the Sea of Aral. This would prove another quick mode of

transit, particularly from St. Petersburg and Moscow to Kilif, on the

Oxus, and also to Samarcand. At present steamers ply on the Amu Daria

from the Aral Sea southwards as far as Kilif on the northern boundary of

Afghanistan.

These steamers are 20 feet broad, 150 feet long, and are of 500–horse

power, travelling 16 miles an hour, and are capable of conveying 300

soldiers and 20 officers.

(4) To throw off a branch line from Bokhara to Kilif, and from there to

Balkh.

(5) Two branch lines (_a_) from Merv to Herat, _viâ_ Penjdeh; (_b_) from

Merv to Sarakhs, _viâ_ Chacha, and still further to Kuhsan, in the

direction of Herat.

(6) By entering the Persian dominion from the present northern boundary

to occupy Meshed, proceeding thence to Kuhsan to meet the line from

Sarakhs.

In consequence of the approaching departure for Persia of M. de

Buelzoff, the newly-appointed minister at Teheran, most of the Russian

newspapers warmly advocated the immediate construction of a line from

the northern part of Persia.

(7) An extension of railway from Meshed through Khorasan and Serstan

southwards as far as Nasirabad, and eventually to get a port on the

Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean.

Once let Russia get the long-wished-for outlet in the southern seas, and

then she will be still more able to strike another blow against English

influence. There is not the least doubt that Persian affairs will occupy

the attention of England for some years to come.

All these extensions will, if carried out, mean a Russian invasion all

along the Hindostan frontier, and thus would further indirectly her

European aspiration.

On the other hand, looking from an English point of view, we can suggest

a scheme of frustration by means of sound and politic administration.

For instance, at present large railways start from Calcutta, Madras, and

Bombay, traversing Delhi and Lahore, terminating at Peshawar; from

Lahore the line runs to Kurrachee, on the Arabian Sea, and a branch line

goes north-west from Sakkar to Pishin, _viâ_ Quetta. Thus we see the

English defence of her Indian frontier is fairly well looked after,

although a “_forward_” policy of railway construction in India may, and

no doubt will, be advantageous to English defence and commerce.

England is certainly heavily handicapped owing to the want of a short

and safe communication with India. The Suez Canal is not safe enough,

both the Canadian Railway and the Cape of Good Hope routes are long,

therefore it is a matter of great moment that she should have a safe and

quick route by which she might despatch troops and materials with

celerity.

The following route, if carried out, would prove of the very greatest

advantage to England. First, the occupation of the Karrack Island in the

Persian Gulf, which is in every respect suitable for a military station,

having good water and being healthy. It is with truth often termed the

key of the Persian Gulf.

Secondly, a railway should be constructed from Scandarum, on the

Mediterranean, to Bussorah, on the Persian Gulf, through the Euphrates

Valley—a saving of from seven hundred to one thousand miles, and of

nearly four days.

If an Afghan war arose, troops could be landed at Kurrachee instead of

Bombay, and time would be gained and the monsoon also avoided. Troops

could be forwarded at very short notice from Malta to Pishin and

Peshawar, with almost equal speed to that with which Russia can collect

troops in Central Asia.

If once opened, the trade of Central Asia, India, and China would find

its way by this route, and open out Persian and Indian relations with

Europe as much as the Suez Canal[103] did after its opening; Persia

would be considerably strengthened. It would also, together with the

military occupation of Karrack and Cyprus (if done properly), give a

guarantee to both India and Persia against Russian attacks.

The distance from Scandarum to Bussorah is only seven hundred miles, and

would be safe against attacks, being protected by the double rivers, the

Euphrates and Tigris, for most of its course. Its cost would be

estimated at £9,000,000, which might easily be raised in the London

market. Also if the Mudinia Aksu line be extended to Scandarum, _viâ_

Kiniah or the Scutari-Ismid line to Aleppo, through Angora, Kaisariyeh,

and Abbiston, other beneficial effects may be produced. In the latter

case it amounts, and is practically similar, to an extension of the

Eastern Railway to the Persian Gulf, which starts from Paris, and passes

Vienna, Belgrade, Sophia, Adrianople, terminating at Constantinople. So

a direct land route could be obtained from Bussorah to Calais or

Rotterdam if a bridge was constructed over the Bosphorus.

As I have already shown in chapter VIII., the construction of the

Euphrates Railway would avoid a Franco-English conflict of interests in

Egypt to a certain extent, and a dual control would be established; thus

a strong and effective alliance would ensue, caused by mutual interests,

and England would be able thereby to withdraw her troops from Egypt, and

devote them to the defence of Asia Minor. Thus a firm alliance between

England and Turkey would follow, and would prevent a Mahommedhan

rebellion in India against England, the Sultan being looked upon as the

Mahommedhan Pope.

England will also be able to call Indian troops to her assistance in

Asia Minor. It will follow that as a larger number of troops and a

better communication is obtained in Asia Minor, Austria would be quite

willing to ally herself with England, instead of refusing, as she had

done twice before, the English power at sea being only of little use.

England and Austria therefore can not only jointly support Turkey, but

also England can “come to the assistance of Austria in Europe, and

Austria make common cause with England in the event of Turkey being

attacked in Asia Minor.”

Having a French, Austrian, and Turkish alliance, England can send her

home troops both to India and Asia Minor by the Eastern Railway in a

very short space of time, and can strengthen both countries and also

help in the Balkans if required, and a firm and lasting alliance would

be made.

Why cannot Italy join this alliance? It is a matter of necessity and

advantage, both geographically and strategically, to do so, and if an

alliance in Southern Europe could thus be made, the safety of the

Balkans, Asia Minor, Persia, and Afghanistan might be assured, even if

Germany joined Russia, and the lofty hopes of Russia would be dashed to

the ground.

THE END.

-----

Footnote 1:

Lord Palmerston’s letter to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1857.

Footnote 2:

John Morley’s “The Life of Richard Cobden,” vol. ii. p. 189.

Footnote 3:

“In the year 1855 or 1856 his father’s influence succeeded in

procuring him a position in the suite of General Muravieff, who as

Governor-general of Eastern Siberia, had undertaken a more accurate

investigation of the Amoor territory, and was preparing for its

colonization. During this work, the French and English war with China

broke out; the allies occupied Pekin, and seemed to threaten the

existence of the Celestial Empire. This moment was taken advantage of

by Russia, who had already been negotiating for some time with China,

respecting the cession of a large territory south of the Amoor.

Ignatieff was sent to China as ambassador extraordinary” (F. E.

Bunnett’s “Russian Society,” p. 170).

Footnote 4:

“The preciousness of Saghalien in the eye of the Russians, however,

does not lie so much in its coal beds, its promise of future harvests,

its use as a penal colony, or its six hundred miles of length, but in

its situation commanding the northern entrance to the sea of Japan,

and guarding, like a huge breakwater, the mouth of the great river

Amoor” (John Geddie, F.R.G.S., “The Russian Empire,” p. 484).

Footnote 5:

“If war is made to enforce a commercial treaty, we run the risk of

engaging in protracted hostilities, and of earning a reputation for

quarrelling with every nation in the East.... The Japanese may well be

jealous of Europeans, who insult their usages and carry away their

gold” (Lord J. Russell to Mr. Alcock, Feb. 28, 1860).

Footnote 6:

“The Present Condition of European Politics,” p. 175.

Footnote 7:

Earl Russell, Nov. 22, 1861, echoed these conditions (four conditions)

and equivalent, and added a somewhat cunning addition: “_The opening

of the ports of Tsushima_ (in place of Osaka, the centre and trading

city of the Empire) _and the neighbouring coast of Corea as far as

Japanese authority extends_, to the trade of the treaty powers.” It

could only be the expectation of some secret advantages that do not at

first sight meet the eye that could have induced any one to propose

the port of Tsushima for that of Osaka (“Diplomacy in Japan,” p. 61).

The Japanese wisely declined the British offer.

Footnote 8:

IN 1887. IMPORTS IN VALUE FROM EXPORTS IN VALUE TO

Great Britain 25,666,477 tael 16,482,809 tael.

Hong Kong 57,761,039 tael 31,393,189 tael.

India 5,537,375 tael 797,579 tael.

Continent of Europe (without Russia) 2,587,548 tael 11,545,406 tael.

The average value of the Haikwan tael during 1887 was 4s. 10¼d. (“The

Statesman’s Year-book,” 1889.)

Footnote 9:

The Czar approved of the plan for completing the Siberian Railway, and

for its connection with the Trans-Caucasian line, Jan., 1890; the

works are to be commenced by the 1st of May at the latest.

Footnote 10:

The Chinese Government gave its assent to the construction of a

railway from Pekin to Kirin _viâ_ Moukden Jan., 1890.

Footnote 11:

There are now more than sixteen million miles of wire, and in 1887 the

number of telegrams carried were about five millions (“The Statesman’s

Year-book,” 1889).

Footnote 12:

The post office carried, in 1887, 54,313,385 letters, 55,332,873 post

cards, 20,713,422 newspapers and books, 163,630 packets, 7,014,859

letters and newspapers free of postage (“The Statesman’s Year-book,”

1889).

Footnote 13:

“The English world-empire has two gigantic neighbours in the west and

in the east. In the West she has the United States, and in the East

Russia for a neighbour” (Prof. Seeley’s “Expansion of England,” p.

288).

Footnote 14:

Extracts from a pamphlet written in 1847 by His Imperial Majesty,

Napoleon III.:—

“There are certain countries which, from their geographical situation,

are destined to a highly prosperous future. Wealth, power, every

national advantage, flows into them, provided that where Nature has

done her utmost, man does not neglect to avail himself of her

beneficent assistance.

“Those countries are in the most favourable conditions which are

situated on the high road of commerce, and which offer to commerce the

safest ports and harbours, as well as the most profitable interchange

of commodities. Such countries, finding in the intercourse of foreign

trade illimitable resources, are enabled to take advantage of the

fertility of their soil; and in this way a home trade springs up

commensurate with the increase of mercantile traffic. It is by such

means that Tyre and Carthage, Constantinople, Venice, Genoa,

Amsterdam, Liverpool, and London attained to such great prosperity,

rising from the condition of poor hamlets to extensive and affluent

commercial cities, and exhibiting to surrounding nations the

astonishing spectacle of powerful states springing suddenly from

unwholesome swamps and marshes. Venice in particular was indebted for

her overwhelming grandeur to the geographical position which

constituted her for centuries the _entrepôt_ between Europe and the

East; and it was only when the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope

opened a ship passage to the latter that her prosperity gradually

declined. Notwithstanding, so great was her accumulation of wealth,

and consequent commercial influence, that she withstood for three

centuries the formidable competition thus created.

“There exists another city famous in history, although now fallen from

its pristine grandeur, so admirably situated as to excite the jealousy

of all the great European Powers, who combine to maintain in it a

government so far barbarous as to be incapable of taking advantage of

the great resources bestowed upon it by nature. The geographical

position of Constantinople is such as rendered her the queen of the

ancient world. Occupying, as she does, the central point between

Europe, Asia, and Africa, she could become the _entrepôt_ of the

commerce of all these countries, and obtain over them an immense

preponderance; for in politics, as in strategy, a central position

always commands the circumference. Situated between two seas, of

which, like two great lakes, she commands the entrance, she could shut

up in them, sheltered from the assaults of all other nations, the most

formidable fleets, by which she could exercise dominion in the

Mediterranean as well as in the Black Sea, thereby commanding the

entrance of the Danube, which opens the way to Germany, as well as the

sources of the Euphrates, which open the road to the Indies, dictating

her own terms to the commerce of Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and

Egypt. This is what the proud city of Constantine could be, and this

is what she is not, ‘because’ as Montesquieu says, ‘God permitted that

Turks should exist on earth, a people the most fit to possess

uselessly a great empire.’

“There exists in the New World a state as admirably situated as

Constantinople, and we must say, up to the present time, as uselessly

occupied; we allude to the state of Nicaragua. As Constantinople is

the centre of the ancient world, so is the town of Leon, or rather

Massaya, the centre of the new; and if the tongue of land which

separates its two lakes from the Pacific Ocean were cut through, she

would command by her central position the entire coast of North and

South America. Like Constantinople, Massaya is situated between two

extensive natural harbours, capable of giving shelter to the largest

fleets, safe from attack. The state of Nicaragua can become, better

than Constantinople, the necessary route for the great commerce of the

world, for it is for the United States the shortest road to China and

the East Indies, and for England and the rest of Europe to New

Holland, Polynesia, and the whole of the western coast of America. The

state of Nicaragua is, then, destined to attain to an extraordinary

degree of prosperity and grandeur; for that which renders its

political position more advantageous than that of Constantinople is,

that the great maritime powers of Europe would witness with pleasure,

and not with jealousy, its attainment of a station no less favourable

to its individual interests than to the commerce of the world.

“France, England, Holland, Russia, and the United States, have a great

commercial interest in the establishment of a communication between

the two oceans; but England has more than the other powers a political

interest in the execution of this project. England will see with

pleasure Central America become a flourishing and powerful state,

which will establish a balance of power by creating in Spanish America

a new centre of active enterprise, powerful enough to give rise to a

great feeling of nationality and to prevent, by backing Mexico, any

further encroachment from the north. England will witness with

satisfaction the opening of a route which will enable her to

communicate more speedily with Oregon, China, and her possessions in

New Holland. She will find, in a word, that the advancement of Central

America will renovate the declining commerce of Jamaica and the other

English island in the Antilles, the progressive decay of which will be

thereby stopped. It is a happy coincidence that the political and

commercial prosperity of the state of Nicaragua is closely connected

with the policy of that nation which has the greatest preponderance on

the sea.”

Footnote 15:

“The total length of the canal from sea to sea would be little short

of 200 miles, viz., 15½ miles from the Pacific to the lake, 56½ across

the lake, and 119 to the Atlantic; total, 191 miles; and the Lake of

Nicaragua is navigable for ships of the largest class down to the

mouth of the river San Juan” (C. B. Pin’s “The Gate of the Pacific,”

p. 133).

Footnote 16:

Prof. Seeley’s “Expansion of England,” p. 87.

Footnote 17:

“The negotiations with the Imperial Government for the establishment

of a permanent line of first-class steamships, suitable for service as

armed cruisers in case of need, resulted in an official notification

that Her Majesty’s Government had decided to grant a subsidy of

£60,000 per annum for a monthly service between Vancouver and Hong

Kong, _viâ_ Yokohama” (“Canada, Statistical Abstract and Record for

the Year 1887,” p. 306).

Footnote 18:

“China is a storehouse of men and means; its outer door has scarcely

yet been opened” (R. E. Webster’s “The Trade of the World,” p. 317).

Footnote 19:

Sir H. Parkes, late Minister of England in Japan, said: “The statement

of the national liabilities this year (1878), shows that Japan has

kept faith with her foreign creditors, the interest on her foreign

debt and the sum requisite for the payment of the amount of capital

redeemed during the year having been duly provided. There is no reason

to doubt that care will be taken to ensure punctual payment in future

on this account until the entire extinction of this debt in 1895.”

Japan has never failed to pay her foreign debts.

Footnote 20:

There is also a Maritime Insurance Company.

Footnote 21:

Light-houses—fifty-seven in number and some of them are very powerful.

Footnote 22:

The Samoan Convention declared the Samoan Islands to be neutral

territory. The citizens and subjects of the signatory powers will

enjoy equal rights and the independence of the islands is recognized

with Malietou as king: Jan., 1890.

Footnote 23:

The whole history of the French in the East is indissolubly bound up

with the history of their efforts to destroy our Eastern supremacy.

Mauritius was occupied to enable French cruisers to prey on our East

Indiamen. Louis XIV. volunteered armed aid to Annam in order to cut

off Calcutta from Canton. A French occupation of Tonkin is a serious

matter. French cruisers supplied with coal from the mines of Tonkin

would lie in the fairway of our China trade, Burmah and Calcutta would

be effectually blockaded, and our outlying Oriental possessions

grievously threatened (C. B. Norman’s “Tonkin and France in the Far

East”).

Footnote 24:

The inhabitants of the eastern region refuse to recognize the Chinese

authority. China cannot control the people of Formosa at all. There is

a proverb, “Every three years an outbreak, every five a rebellion.”

Footnote 25:

In 1873 a Japanese vessel was wrecked on the eastern coast of Formosa

and the crew massacred by the savages. The Japanese Government sent an

expedition which was perfectly successful. Eighteen of the tribes in

Formosa were defeated and subjugated.

Footnote 26:

The Russian frontier has been advanced toward Berlin,

Dresden, Munich, Vienna, and Paris— about 700 miles

Towards Constantinople about 500 miles

Towards Stockholm about 630 miles

Towards Teheran about 1000 miles

Towards Peshawar about 1300 miles

Footnote 27:

E. Schuyler’s “Peter the Great,” vol. ii. p. 592.

Footnote 28:

“The separation of the Church of England from that of Rome, formally

accomplished under Henry VIII., was a political and legal rather than

a religious reformation. The doctrinal changes followed under Edward

VI. and Elizabeth” (Taswell-Langmead’s “English Constitutional

History,” p. 399).

Footnote 29:

“In the sixteenth century all Europe was aghast at the designs of

Philip II. of Spain. He had the great mines of the New World, or at

least levied a heavy tax on their produce. He seemed to be possessed

of inexhaustible riches. He was baffled, beaten, made bankrupt by the

Dutch, in whose country there was not an ounce of natural gold or

silver, who got all their money by trade, were rapidly becoming the

richest nation of Europe when Philip had ruined Spain and brought down

the Genoese traders, on his declaring himself bankrupt” (J. E. Thorold

Rogers’s, “The Economic Interpretation of History,” p. 95).

Footnote 30:

“Till this time our merchants were struggling to gain a footing and

open up trade between England and different quarters of the globe, and

endeavouring to prove that the encouragement of trade was for the

royal honour and benefit ... and their interests coincided with the

national ambition of out-doing the Dutch, who would not acknowledge

our sovereignty on the sea, and of thus attaining a mercantile

supremacy throughout the world” (Dr. Cunningham’s “Growth of English

Industry and Commerce,” p. 325).

Footnote 31:

(1) 1651. That the importation of goods into England, except in

English ships, or in the ships of the nation producing the goods, was

forbidden.

(2) 1663. That the colonies should receive no goods whatsoever by

foreign vessels.

(3) 1672. That all the principal articles of commerce should be

prohibited from being imported into England unless by English ships

manned by a crew of whom at least three-quarters were English

subjects.

Footnote 32:

England, Holland, and Sweden.

Footnote 33:

Prof. Seeley’s “Expansion of England,” p. 95.

Footnote 34:

“There was between England and France during the Seven Years’ War the

most disastrous struggle in which France was ever engaged. For all the

wars in Europe, from the Peace of Utrecht to the outbreak of the great

Continental War, were waged on behalf of monopolies of commerce, or,

to be more accurate, monopolies of market, for success meant the

exclusion of the beaten nation from the markets now secured by the

victorious rival. At the end of the Seven Years’ War France was

stripped of nearly every colony she possessed. At the beginning of it

she was the rival of England in North America and in India. At the end

of it she had scarce a foothold in either” (J. E. Thorold Rogers, “The

Economic Interpretation of History,” p. 110).

Footnote 35:

Macaulay’s famous Essay on the Earl of Chatham.

Footnote 36:

“His (the elder Pitt) greatness is throughout identified with the

Expansion of England; he is a statesman of Greater Britain. It is in

the buccaneering war with Spain that he sows his political wild oats;

his glory is won in the great colonial duel with France; his old age

is spent in striving to avert schism in Greater Britain” (Prof.

Seeley’s “Expansion of England,” p. 144).

Footnote 37:

The epitaph on Chatham’s monument in Westminster Abbey.

Footnote 38:

The declaration of American Independence.

Footnote 39:

“As in the American War, France avenges on England her expulsion from

the New World, so under Napoleon she makes Titanic efforts to recover

her lost place there. This, indeed, is Napoleon’s fixed view with

regard to England. He sees in England never the island, the European

state, but always the world Empire, the network of dependencies and

colonies and islands covering every sea, among which he was himself

destined to find his prison and his grave” (Seeley’s “Expansion of

England,” p. 33).

Footnote 40:

The first coalition of England, Prussia, Holland, and Sweden, was for

the purpose of keeping the European Peace.

The second coalition (1799–1801), composed of Russia, England,

Austria, Portugal, Naples, and the Ottoman Empire.

The third coalition (1805), composed of England, Russia, Austria, and

Sweden.

Footnote 41:

“Though he was still but forty-seven, the hollow voice and wasted

frame of the great Minister had long told that death was near, and the

blow to his hopes proved fatal. ‘Roll up that map,’ he said, pointing

to the map of Europe, ‘it will not be wanted these ten years.’ Once

only he rallied from stupor; and those who bent over him caught a

faint murmur of ‘My country! How I leave my country!’” (Green’s “Short

History of English People,” p. 799).

Footnote 42:

Prof. Seeley’s “Expansion of England,” p. 105.

Footnote 43:

Napoleon, at St. Helena, prophesied that before a century was over

Europe would be Cossack or Republican.

Footnote 44:

“The English victory at La Hogue, and the revival of the trade with

Holland, had much to do with Peter’s visit to Archangel” (E.

Schuyler’s “Peter the Great,” vol. i. p. 276).

Footnote 45:

E. Schuyler’s “Peter the Great,” vol. i. p. 323.

Footnote 46:

E. Schuyler’s “Peter the Great,” vol. i. p. 368.

Footnote 47:

“Upon the Continental System he (Napoleon) had staked everything. He

had united all Europe in the crusade against England; no state, least

of all such a state as Russia, could withdraw from the system without

practically joining England. Nevertheless, we may wonder that, if he

felt obliged to make war upon Russia, he should have chosen to wage it

in the manner he did, by an overwhelming invasion” (Seeley’s “A Short

History of Napoleon the Great,” p. 169). Prof. Seeley also told the

author that “if the Continental System had existed a little longer

England would have been ruined, because it seems to me that a

revolution would have taken place in England.”

Footnote 48:

“Napoleon’s great mistake was that he had laid his plan for an

invasion of England and a war in Europe at the same time” (Seeley’s “A

Short History of Napoleon the Great,” p. 115).

Footnote 49:

The Prince Regent declared his personal adherence to its principles.

Footnote 50:

Lord Castlereagh’s Speech, 1812.

Footnote 51:

He was “engaged in the glorious attempt to restore that country to her

ancient freedom and renown” (The Epitaph in the Church near Newstead).

Footnote 52:

“In the present state of European politics there seems to be in the

East a sort of vacuum, which it is advisable to supply, in order to

counterbalance the preponderance of the North.... If anything like an

equilibrium is to be upheld, Greece must be supported. Mr. Canning, I

think, understands this, and intends to behave towards Greece” (R. C.

Jebb’s “Modern Greece,” pp. 178–179).

Footnote 53:

This disadvantageous treaty for Russia was made owing to the

disappearance of immense numbers of soldiers.

Footnote 54:

“The pressure of the heavy taxation and of the debts, which now

reached eight hundred millions, was embittered by the general distress

of the country” (J. R. Green’s “A Short History of the English

People,” p. 812).

Footnote 55:

“Our ultimate object is the peace of the world; but let it not be said

that we cultivate peace either because we fear or because we are not

prepared for war. The resources created by peace are the means of war.

In cherishing these resources we but accumulate those means. Our

present repose is no more a proof of our inability to act than the

state of inertness and inactivity in which I have seen those mighty

masses that float in the waters above your town is a proof they are

devoid of strength and incapable of being fitted for action. You well

know how one of those stupendous masses now reposing on their shadow

in perfect stillness, how soon, upon any call of patriotism or

necessity, it would assume the likeness of an animated thing, instinct

with life and motion; how soon it would ruffle, as it were, its

swelling plumage; how quickly it would put forth all its beauty and

its bravery, collect its scattered elements of strength, and awake its

dormant thunders. Such as is one of these magnificent machines when

springing from inaction into a display of its strength, such is

England herself, while apparently passive and motionless she silently

causes power to be put forth on an adequate occasion” (Canning’s

speech at Plymouth, August, 1823).

Footnote 56:

Holland’s “European Concert on the Eastern Question,” p. 206.

Footnote 57:

“The growth of intimate relations between England and that country

France ... was manifestly viewed by him with jealous distrust,

calculated as it was to affect most seriously any designs which might

be entertained at St. Petersburg for enlarging Russian territory at

the expense of Turkey. To detach England from this alliance would

naturally be regarded by the Czar as a master-stroke of policy, and

the recent conduct of France in the Eastern Question may have seemed

to furnish an opening for making the attempt. If, however, as

currently believed at the time, one main object of his visit was to

ascertain for himself whether this was possible, he must soon have

been satisfied to the contrary by the very decided language with which

Sir Robert Peel received his suggestions as to the probably selfish

action of France, in the event of the affairs of Turkey coming to a

crisis” (Sir T. Martyn’s “Life of the Prince Consort,” vol. i. p.

216).

Footnote 58:

Thornton’s “Foreign Secretaries of the Nineteenth Century,” vol. iii.

p. 100.

Footnote 59:

In 1840 France succeeded in obtaining from the Porte a grant of

distinguished privileges in regard to the Holy Land.

Footnote 60:

Ashley’s “Life of Lord Palmerston,” vol. i. p. 279.

Footnote 61:

Kinglake’s “History of Crimean War,” vol. i. p. 82.

Footnote 62:

Baron Brunnon, the Russian Minister, said, to Count Vitzthum, “he knew

that his Emperor (Nicholas), relying on Lord Aberdeen’s well-known

love of peace, and on the protocol which had been signed by Aberdeen

in 1844 under entirely different circumstances, regarded two things

impossible: first, that England should declare war against Russia; and

secondly, that she should conclude an alliance against Russia with

France” (Count Vitzthum’s “St. Petersburg and London,” vol. i. p. 66).

Footnote 63:

“Men dwelling amidst the snows of Russia are driven by very nature to

grow covetous when they hear of the happier lands where all the year

round there are roses and long sunny days. And since this people have

a seaboard and ports on the Euxine, they are forced by an everlasting

policy to desire the command of the straits which lead through the

heart of an empire into the midst of that world of which men kindle

thoughts when they speak of the Ægean and of Greece, and the Ionian

shores, and of Palestine and Egypt, and of Italy, and of France, and

of Spain, and the land of the Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond, and

the path of ships on the ocean” (Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,”

vol. i. p. 54).

Footnote 64:

Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. i. p. 90.

Footnote 65:

The Grand Vizier said the mission was meant “to win some important

right from Turkey, which would destroy her independence, and that the

Czar’s object was to trample under foot the rights of the Porte and

the independence of the Sovereign” (Kinglake’s “Invasion of the

Crimea,” vol. i. p. 99).

Footnote 66:

“That the Sultan’s promise to protect his Christian subjects in the

free exercise of their religion differed extremely from a right

conferred on any foreign Power to enforce that protection, and also

the same degree of interference might be dangerous to the Porte when

exercised by so powerful an empire as Russia, on behalf of ten

millions of Greeks” (Lord Stratford’s view).

Footnote 67:

“When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting the modifications we

found that he interpreted the Note in a manner quite different from

ourselves, and in a great degree justified the objections of Turks. We

could not therefore honestly continue to give an interpretation to the

Note, and ask the Turks again to sign it, when we knew that the

interpretation of the Emperor is entirely different” (Lord Sheridan’s

letter to Earl Russel, Sept. 22, 1853).

Footnote 68:

“I thought the Emperor Alexander had shown considerable moral courage

in making peace after the Crimean War, contrary to the general feeling

in Russia, and Prince D—— gave me the following curious details of

what occurred on that occasion, which he said had been related to him

by one of the Ministers present:—The Emperor called a Council of War

at St. Petersburg, which was composed of the following members: Prince

Dolgorouky, Minister of War; the Grand Duke Constantine, Minister of

Marine; M. de Broek, Minister of Finance; Count Blondoff, Prince

Moronzow, and, I think, M. Lapouchine, Minister of the Interior. The

Emperor first called on the Minister of War to report on the state of

the army, and he said the resources were exhausted, that more

recruiting was almost impossible, and that he did not see how the war

could be continued. The Emperor next addressed himself to his brother,

who, together with Count Blondoff, was in favour of continuing

hostilities at all risks. The Emperor asked what was the state of the

navy? The Grand Duke answered, ‘Sire, we have a fleet in the Baltic,

and another in the Black Sea.’ The Emperor acquiesced, but added,

‘True; but those fleets have never left our harbours. Are they fit to

oppose the English and French fleets?’ The Grand Duke was obliged to

reply in the negative. ‘Then,’ said the Emperor, ‘it appears we have

no army and no fleet?’ The Grand Duke sighed, looked down, but made no

answer. The Emperor next addressed the Minister of Finance, and asked

what report he could give. He said, ‘Sire, we have just made one

disadvantageous loan, upon conditions imposed upon us at Hamburg, and

I believe another to be impossible.’ The Emperor then addressed the

Council, and said, ‘Gentlemen, it appears from what we have just heard

that we have neither army, navy, nor money; how, then, is it possible

for me to continue the war?’ Count Blondoff then stepped forward and

said, with deep emotion, ‘Sire, after the report we have just heard,

it is clear that your Majesty is forced to make peace, but at the same

time you must dismiss your incompetent Ministers, who have not known

how to serve either your father or yourself—dismiss us all.’ The

consternation of the other members of the Council at this outburst was

great, but peace was signed forthwith” (Lady Bloomfield’s “Court and

Diplomatic Life”).

Footnote 69:

A letter to Lord Clarendon, May 22, 1853.

Footnote 70:

The strength of Lord Palmerston’s character and his determination in

matters of ready action is well illustrated through an incident

recorded by Baron Bunsen (“Memoirs of Bunsen”): “Bunsen and Palmerston

had elected to be rowed over to Portsmouth from Osborne, when guests

of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and, the weather being rough, the

Foreign Minister took the helm, demonstrating the connection between

steering the vessel of State, as Bunsen phrased it, and steering a

boat at sea—‘Oh, _one learns boating at Cambridge, even though one may

have learnt nothing better_,’ remarked Lord Palmerston; and guide the

craft safely to shore he certainly did. But when they landed, alas!

the train was gone.”

Footnote 71:

Gladstone’s speech, May 8, 1854.

Footnote 72:

“Napoleon’s object was clear: in the first place, to wrest from the

Emperor Nicholas the moral hegemony which he wielded on the Continent,

and then, after conquering Russia, to get his hands free to tear up

the treaties of 1815, restore to France her so-called natural

frontiers, and reconstruct the map of Europe in accordance with

Napoleonic ideas” (Count Vitzthum’s “St. Petersburg and London,” vol.

i. p. 73).

Footnote 73:

Earl Russell’s “Recollections and Suggestions, 1813–1873,” p. 476.

Footnote 74:

“No sooner had Napoleon learned that an English Cabinet Minister was

to go to Vienna than he sent thither also his own Minister of Foreign

Affairs, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, while Prince Gortschakoff, who had

already been designated as Nesselrode’s successor, represented Russia

at the Conference. The first two points—the cessation of the Russian

protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia, and the regulation of the

navigation of the Danube in conformity with the resolutions of the

Congress of Vienna—presented little difficulty. On the other hand, a

lively word combat, and a not less lively interchange of despatches,

arose over the third point, which demanded the revision of the

Dardanelles Treaty of July 13, 1841, and the abrogation of Russian

supremacy in the Black Sea. The words, ‘mettre fin à la prépondérance

russe dans la Mer Noire,’ were of a very elastic nature, and capable

of various interpretations. The Western Powers, mindful of Europe,

demanded the neutralization of the Black Sea and a limitation of the

number of Russian and Turkish war ships. Gortschakoff declared that

Sebastopol was not yet taken, and probably never would be taken, and

that Russia must reject any attempt to limit her naval forces as a

humiliation unworthy of a Great Power. Austria then proposed a

compromise that Russia should pledge herself to maintain the _status

quo_ of 1853; and that each of the Western Powers should be entitled

to station two frigates in the Black Sea, in order to see that Russia

did not increase her fleet. At the same time Austria promised to

consider it as a _casus belli_ if Russia kept there a single ship of

war more than in 1853. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who, in the interest of

exhausted France, was anxious to bring the war to an end, accepted

this proposed compromise, and induced Lord John Russell to do

likewise. Both were disavowed. Drouyn de Lhuys sent in his

resignation, and was succeeded at the Ministry on the Quai d’Orsay by

Walewski; but Lord John Russell, scorned alike by his friends and

foes, returned to London, and, in spite of all, remained Minister for

the present” (Count Vitzthum’s, “St. Petersburg and London.”)

Footnote 75:

In 1876 (September) Mr. Gladstone published his pamphlet entitled

“Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East.” It passed through

almost countless editions and created a great sensation.

Footnote 76:

“First, religious liberty, in the sense of religious equality, full

and entire; second, the abolition of tax-farming; third, the exclusive

application to Bosnia and Herzegovina of their own direct taxation;

fourth, the appointment of an executory Commission to carry these

reforms into effect, to be composed equally of Mahommedans and

Christians; fifth, the amelioration of the condition of the rural

population by some more satisfactory arrangement between the Christian

Rajahs and the Mahommedan Agas, or landowners” (The Duke of Argyll’s

“The Eastern Question,” vol. i. p. 161).

Footnote 77:

“Sir H. Elliot was directed to give a ‘general support’ to the

Andrassy Note. It will be seen that in the mode of giving this

‘general support’ to the action of the European Powers, Her Majesty’s

Government here contrived to reduce the value of it to the lowest

possible amount, and expressly to negative the significance of it....

But more than this—it is distinctly implied that any such meaning, if

it were entertained, would be a violation of the Ninth Article of the

Treaty of Paris. The Turks were thus encouraged to claim under that

treaty a licence and immunity which it never was intended to afford.

It is evident, therefore, that the British Cabinet only joined the

other Powers, first, because it was impossible to deny the justice of

the demand made on Turkey; secondly, because it would be inconvenient

to stand alone against the united opinion of all the other Cabinets of

Europe; thirdly, because Turkey herself saw some advantage in

accepting the communication” (Ibid. vol. i. p. 166).

Footnote 78:

Lord Derby said that “the Note now proposed was sure to lead to

farther diplomatic interference in the internal affairs of Turkey.”

Footnote 79:

“First, the provision of means sufficient to settle the refugees in

their homes; second, the distribution of these means by a mixed

Commission, with a Herzegovinian Christian as President; third, the

concentration of Turkish troops into certain places; fourth, the

retention of arms by the Christians; fifth, the Consuls or Delegates

of the Powers to have a watch over the application of the promised

reforms and repatriation of the people. The Memorandum farther

proceeded thus in its closing paragraph: If, however, the armistice

were to expire without the effort of the Powers being successful in

attaining the ends they have in view, the three Imperial Courts are of

opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their diplomatic

action by the sanction of an agreement, with a view to such

efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest of

general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development” (The

Duke of Argyll’s “The Eastern Question,” vol. i. p. 193).

Footnote 80:

“The objections of detail taken by the English Cabinet to the Berlin

Memorandum were at once met by Prince Bismarck by the declaration that

these points were entirely ‘open to discussion, that they might be

modified according to circumstances, and that he, for one, would

willingly entertain any improvement which Her Majesty’s Government

might have to propose.’... France implored Her Majesty’s Government to

reconsider its decision, and declared that persistence in it would, at

such a momentous crisis, be nothing short of a ‘public calamity.’ She

‘could not conceal the apprehensions for the future to which this

refusal have given rise.’ Italy did the same. The position was, that

England objected to everything proposed by others, and had nothing to

propose herself. Continued trust in the Turks was her only suggestion”

(The Duke of Argyll’s “The Eastern Question,” vol. i. pp. 202, 203).

Footnote 81:

“At the first meeting of the Congress (June 13, 1878) Lord

Beaconsfield made his concerted objection to the advanced position of

the Russian troops at the gates of Constantinople. Count Schouvaloff

replied that this advanced position had been taken up by the Russian

army in consequence of the entry of the English fleet into the

Bosphorus. Prince Bismarck, the President of the Congress, expressed

himself satisfied with the Russian reply” (The Duke of Argyll’s “The

Eastern Question,” vol. ii. p. 144).

Footnote 82:

“Truth about Russia,” p. 282.

Footnote 83:

Lord Beaconsfield’s speech, April 8, 1878.

Footnote 84:

“The topics regulated by the three Treaties of Paris, London, and

Berlin are:—

“(i.) The admission of the Porte to the concert of Europe (P. Art. 7).

“(ii.) The agreement as to resort to mediation (P. 8).

“(iii.) Religious equality in Turkey (P. 9; B. 62).

“(iv.) The navigation of the Straits (P. 10; L. 2).

“(v.) The navigation of the Black Sea (P. 12; L. 3).

“(vi.) The navigation of the Danube (P. 13–19; L. 4–7; B. 52–57; L.

1883).

“(vii.) Roumania (B. 43–51).

“(viii.) Servia (B. 34, 40–42).

“(ix.) Montenegro (B. 26–31, 33).

“(x.) Bulgaria (B. 1–12).

“(xi.) Eastern Roumelia (B. 13–21).

“(xii.) Bosnia and Herzegovina (B. 25).

“(xiii.) Other European provinces (B. 23).

“(xiv.) The Armenian provinces (B. 61).

“(xv.) Cessions to Greece (B. 24; Cons. of 1881).

“(xvi.) The Russian boundaries (B. 45, 58–60).

“(xvii.) The Persian boundary (B. 60).”

(Holland’s “European Concert in the Eastern Question”).

Footnote 85:

In the House of Lords, July 18, 1878.

Footnote 86:

See Holland’s “European Concert in the Eastern Question.”

Footnote 87:

At the ninth meeting of the Congress “the Greek delegates asked the

Congress to sanction the annexation to the Hellenic Kingdom of the

island of Crete, and the province of Thessaly and Epirus” (The Duke of

Argyll’s “The Eastern Question,” vol. ii. p. 167).

Footnote 88:

“Russia had pointedly and emphatically declared that she would not

oppose any larger measure of liberty which the Congress might desire

to secure to the provinces bordering on Greece. There was no symptom

of any serious opposition from any other Powers. But England had

deserted the cause of Greece, because they sold it to the Turks as

part of the price to be paid for the island of Cyprus” (The Duke of

Argyll’s, “The Eastern Question,” vol. ii. p. 170).

Footnote 89:

“Returning to Greece,” said Beaconsfield, “no one could doubt as to

the future of this country. States, like individuals, which have a

future, are in a position to be able to wait” (The Duke of Argyll’s

“The Eastern Question,” vol. ii. p. 169).

Footnote 90:

The explanation of Lord Palmerston’s opposition to M. de Lessep’s

scheme, which was given confidentially by him to one of his

subordinates in the Foreign Office.

Footnote 91:

“We do not want Egypt, or wish it for ourselves any more than any

rational man, with an estate in the north of England and a residence

in the south, would have wished to possess the inns on the north road.

All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept,

always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops

and post horses. We want to trade with Egypt, and to travel through

Egypt” (Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Cowley, November 25, 1859).

Footnote 92:

_Pall Mall_, September 15, 1886.

Footnote 93:

“If Russia obtained Constantinople, she must cease to be barbarous

before she could become formidable; and if she made a great navy, it

must be by doing as the Venetians, the Dutch, the English, and the

Americans did, by the accumulation of wealth, the exercise of

industry, the superior skill and intelligence of her artizans”

(Cobden’s Manchester Speech).

Footnote 94:

Carlo’s “British India,” p. 59.

Footnote 95:

Sir E. Thornton’s telegram from St. Petersburg.

Footnote 96:

Lord Palmerston’s Letter to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1857.

Footnote 97:

“Russia is divided into fifteen military districts, which comprise

also Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, the Trans-Caspian region, and

Turkestan. The entire Russian effective force, including officers,

artillery, engineers, train, &c., consists of—

Regular army 1,766,278

Cossack troops 145,325

Irregular troops 6,331

—————————

Total 1,917,934

—————————

By adding to these figures, the effective troops not levied in time of

peace, say 100,000 men, we reach an effective of 2,000,000 for the war

footing. The Russian militia, which may be called out in times of war,

amounts to 3,000,000 men” (_Harper’s Magazine_, January, 1890), “The

Russian Army” by a Russian General.

Footnote 98:

_The Times._

Footnote 99:

_The Times._

Footnote 100:

_The Times._

Footnote 101:

“A disastrous bankruptcy was the result of the wars which marked the

beginning of the century, and the crash of 1873 caused most serious

loss both to state and individuals. The stock exchange of Vienna is

one of those where speculation is not rife. The Budget of 1888 for

Austria gave £41,335,000 as the amount of revenue, and £48,030,000 as

that of expenditure, and the public debt as £83,091,060. For Hungary,

the revenue was in 1887 £28,937,630, and the expenditure £29,547,853.

The public debt for the whole of the Empire is twenty-seven millions

of florins” Leger’s “History of Austro-Hungary” (translated by Mrs. B.

Hill), p. 633.

Footnote 102:

“The Present Condition of European Politics,” p. 203.

Footnote 103:

“A few years ago a swift voyage from England to Calcutta, _viâ_ the

Cape of Good Hope, was from a hundred and ten to a hundred and twenty

days. Now steamers by way of the Canal make the same voyage in about

thirty days. Here, then, is a diminution of 75 per cent. on the

enormous stocks of goods continually required to be held unused,

involving continued risk of depreciation, loss of interest, cost of

insurance, to meet the requirements of mere transit” (S. A. Wells’

“Practical Economics,” p. 236).

The Gresham Press,

UNWIN BROTHERS,

CHILWORTH AND LONDON.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

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