JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC.
_England and Asia—The Persian war—The Chinese war—Russian diplomacy in
China—Singapore and Hong Kong—Labuan and Port Hamilton—Position of
Japan; its resources—Importance of Chinese alliance to
England—Strength of English position in the Pacific at
present—Possible danger from Russia through Mongolia and
Manchooria—Japan the key of the Pacific; her area and people; her
rapid development; her favourable position; effect of Panama Canal
on her commerce—England’s route to the East by the Canadian Pacific
Railway—Japanese manufactures—Rivalry of Germany and England in the
South Pacific—Imperial Federation for England and her
colonies—Importance of island of Formosa—Comparative progress of
Russia and England—The coming struggle._
Without doubt the Pacific will in the coming century be the platform of
commercial and political enterprise. This truth, however, escapes the
eyes of ninety-nine out of a hundred, just as did the importance of
Eastern Europe in 1790, and of Central Asia in 1857. In the former case
England did not appreciate the danger of a Russian aggression of Turkey,
and so Pitt’s intervention in the Turkish Question failed. It was
otherwise in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Crimean
War and the Berlin Congress proved great events in English history. In
1857 the national feeling in England was not aroused as to the
importance of defending Persia from foreign attack. Lord Palmerston had
written to Lord Clarendon, Feb. 17, 1857, “It is quite true, as you say,
that people in general are disposed to think lightly of our Persian War,
that is to say, not enough to see the importance of the question at
issue.” How strongly does the Afghan question attract the public
attention of England at the present day?
It is very evident that in 1857 very few in England were awake to the
vital importance of withstanding Russian inroads into the far East,
viz., the Pacific.
After defeating Russia miserably in the Crimean War and driving her back
at the Balkans by the Treaty of Paris, Lord Palmerston’s mind was now
revolving and discussing the following serious thought: “Where would
Russia stretch out her hands next?”
I think I am not wrong in stating the following as Lord Palmerston’s
solution of the problem:—
(_a_) That Russia was about to strike the English interests at
Afghanistan by an alliance with Persia.
(_b_) That she would attack the Afghan frontier single-handed.
(_c_) That an alliance would be formed with the Chinese, and a combined
hostility against Britain would be shown by both.
(_d_) She would extend her Siberian territory to the Pacific on the
north, thereby obtaining a seaport on that ocean’s coast, and make it an
outpost for undermining English influence in Southern China.
Therefore in 1856 Lord Palmerston declared war against Persia remarking
that “we are beginning to reveal the first openings of trenches against
India by Russia.”[1]
This policy proved a winning one. The Indian Mutiny of 1857, however,
scarcely gave Palmerston time to mature his Afghan Frontier scheme,
consequently his views with regard to that country were to a great
extent frustrated by Russia.
In the autumn of 1856, the _Arrow_ dispute gave Palmerston his
long-wished for opportunity of gaining a stronghold in the South China
Sea. He declared war on China. The causes of this dispute on the English
side were morally unjust and legally untenable. Cobden brought forward a
resolution to this effect—that “The paper laid on the table failed to
establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measure resorted to.”
Disraeli, Russell, and Graham all supported Cobden’s motion. Mr.
Gladstone, who was also in favour of the motion, said, at the conclusion
of his speech, “with every one of us it rests to show that this House,
which is the first, the most ancient, and the noblest temple of freedom
in the world, is also the temple of that everlasting justice without
which freedom itself would only be a name, or only a curse, to mankind.
And I cherish the trust that when you, sir, rise in your place to-night
to declare the numbers of the division from the chair which you adorn,
the words which you speak will go forth from the halls of the House of
Commons as a message of British justice and wisdom to the farthest
corner of the world.”
Mr. Gladstone, it certainly seems to me, only viewed the matter from a
moral point of view. If we look at it in this light, then the British
occupation of Port Hamilton was a still more striking example of English
“loose law and loose notion of morality in regard to Eastern nations.”
Palmerston was defeated in the House by sixteen votes, but was returned
at the general election by a large majority backed by the aggressive
feelings of the English nation.
He contended that “if the Chinese were right about the _Arrow_, they
were wrong about something else; if legality did not exactly justify
violence, it was at any rate required by _policy_.”[2] He described this
policy in the following way—“To maintain the rights, to defend the lives
and properties of British subjects, to _improve our relations with
China_, and in the selection and arrangement of those objects to perform
the duty which we owed to the country.”
This is easy to understand, and showed at any rate a disposition, in
fact a wish, for the Anglo-Chinese alliance.
The Treaty of Pekin was finally concluded in 1860, the terms of which
were—Toleration of Christianity, a revised tariff, payment of an
indemnity, and resident ambassadors at Pekin.
Whatever might have been the policy of Palmerston in the Chinese War,
Russia took it as indirectly pointed at herself.
General Ignatieff[3] was sent to China immediately as Russian
Plenipotentiary. It is said that he furnished maps to the allies, in
fact did his very best to bring the negotiations to a successful and
peaceful close, and immediately after the signing of the agreement, he
commenced overtures for his own country, and succeeded in obtaining from
China the cession of Eastern Siberia with Vladivostock and other
seaports on the Pacific (1858).
Lord Elgin asked Ignatieff why Russia was so anxious to obtain naval
ports on the Pacific. He replied: “We do not want them for our own sake,
but chiefly in order that we may be in a position to compel the English
to recognize that it is worth their while to be friends with us rather
than foes.”
Here began the struggle between England and Russia in the Pacific.
In 1859 Russia obtained the Saghalien[4] Island, in the North Pacific,
from Japan, in exchange for the Kurile Island, while England was
bombarding[5] Kagoshima, a port in South Japan (1862), but the English
were virtually repelled from there.
Previous to this period the English policy in Asia was to establish a
firm hold of Indian commerce with the South China Sea, for she could not
find so large and profitable a field of commerce elsewhere. Therefore
the English attention for the time being was entirely directed in that
quarter.
In 1819 the island of Singapore, as well as all the seas, straits, and
islands lying within ten miles of its coast, were ceded to the British
by the Sultan of Johor. It then contained only a few hundred piratical
fishermen, but now it is on the great road of commerce between the
eastern and western portions of Maritime Asia, and is a most important
military and naval station.
Hong Kong, an island off the southern coast of China, was occupied by
the English, and in 1842 was formally handed over by the Treaty of
Nankin. It has now become a great centre of trade, besides being a naval
and military station.
In 1846 Labuan, the northern part of Borneo, was ceded to Great Britain
by the Sultan of Borneo, and owing to the influence of Sir James Brooke
a settlement was at once formed. Now it also, like Singapore, forms an
important commercial station, and transmits to both China and Europe the
produce of Borneo and the Malay Archipelago.
Owing to the opening of seaports in Northern China for foreign trade in
1842, the growing Russian influence in the Northern Pacific and many
other circumstances caused England to perceive the necessity of having a
naval depôt and commercial harbour on the Tong Hai and on the Yellow
Sea. England was doubtless casting her eyes upon the Chusan Island or
some other island in the Chusan Archipelago, but did not dare to occupy
any one of them lest she should thereby offend the chief trading nation
of that quarter, viz., China.
However, in 1885 England annexed Port Hamilton, on the southern coast of
the Corea, during the threatened breach with Russia on the Murghab
question.
“Port Hamilton,” said the author of “The Present Condition of European
Politics,”[6] “was wisely occupied as a base from which, with or without
a Chinese alliance, Russia could be attacked on the Pacific. It is vital
to us that we should have a coaling station and a base of operations
within reach of Vladivostock and the Amoor at the beginning of a war, as
a guard-house for the protection of our China trade and for the
prevention of a sudden descent upon our colonies; ultimately as the head
station for our Canadian Pacific railroad trade; and at all times, and
especially in the later stages of the war, as an offensive station for
our main attack on Russia.”
Port Hamilton forms the gate of Tong Hai and the Yellow Sea; it cannot,
however, become a base of operations for an attack on the Russian force
at Vladivostock and the Amoor unless an English alliance is formed with
Japan. The above writer shows an ignorance of the importance of the
situation of Japan in the Pacific question. Japan holds the key of the
North China Sea and Japan Sea in Tsushima.[7] She has fortified that
island, and placed it in direct communication with the naval station of
Sasebo, also with the military forces of Kumamoto. She also can send
troops and fleets from the Kure naval station and the garrison of
Hiroshima. She would also, if required, have other naval stations on the
coast of the Japan Sea ready for any emergency. In this manner she would
be able to keep out the British fleet from attacking Vladivostock and
the Amoor through the Japan Sea. Even if she might not be able to do
this single-handed she certainly could by an alliance with Russia.
If also Japan occupied Fusan, on the south-eastern shore of the Corea,
the Japan Sea would be rendered almost impregnable from any southern
attack.
Again, Port Hamilton would be useless as a head station for the Canadian
Pacific Railway trade without an Anglo-Japanese alliance. If you look at
the map, you can easily appreciate the situation. Japan, with many
hundreds of small islands, lies between 24° and 52° in N. lat., its
eastern shores facing the Pacific and cutting off a direct line from
Vancouver’s Island to Port Hamilton. It must therefore depend mainly
upon Japan as a financial and political success.
Japan is now divided into six military districts, while the seas around
it are divided into five parts, each having its own chief station in
contemplation. The Government are now contemplating establishing a
strong naval station at Mororan in Hokkukaido, for the defence of the
district and also the shore of the northern part of the mainland,
especially of the Tsugaru Strait. The strait of Shimonoseki also has
been fortified and garrisoned on both sides, and has close communication
from the Kure naval station, and with Hiroshima, and Osaka. Railway
communication has also made great strides during the last few years, and
rapid transit has consequently greatly improved throughout the empire.
If the Kiushiu, the Loo Choo, and the Miyako Islands are well looked
after by the Japanese fleet from the Sasebo naval station, then Japan
would be able to sever the communication between Vancouver’s Islands and
Port Hamilton, and also between the former place and Hong Kong to a
certain extent. The San-Francisco-Hong Kong route would be injured, and
Shanghai-Port-Hamilton line would be threatened. Without doubt _Japan is
the Key of the Pacific_.
Reviewing the discussion, we find that Port Hamilton is rather useless
with regard to the Japan Sea and the Canadian Pacific railway road
without a Japanese alliance, but it would be of immense importance in
withstanding a Russian attack on the British interests from the Yellow
Sea through Mongolia or Manchooria. It is also an excellent position for
any offensive attack upon China in case of war breaking out.
The British occupation of Port Hamilton was very galling to the Chinese
nation, in fact, quite as disagreeable as the occupation of Malta and
Corsica was to Italy, and the annexing of the Channel Islands and
Heligoland to France and Germany. It has therefore somewhat shaken the
Anglo-Chinese alliance.
A Chinese alliance, however, is of far greater importance for English
interests than the occupation of Port Hamilton. If relations became
strained a severe blow would be dealt to English trade and commerce in
that part. The main portion of the commercial trade of China is with the
United Kingdom and her colonies; for instance, in 1887, the imports of
China from Great Britain, Hong Kong, and India amounted to about
89,000,000 tael, while the exports to the same countries were 48,000,000
tael. It is hardly possible to find two countries more closely connected
by trade than England and China.[8] The Hamilton scheme was wisely
abandoned in 1887, and the English Government obtained a written
guarantee from China against a Russian occupation in future years.
Viscount Cranbrook said in his reply to a question asked by Viscount
Sidmouth: “That the papers to which he referred did contain a written
statement, and a very long written statement on the part of the Chinese
Government giving the guarantee in question. It was not a mere verbal
statement by the Chinese Government, but a very deliberate note. It was
found that the Chinese had received from the Russian Government a
guarantee that Russia would not interfere with Corean territory in
future if the British did not, and the Chinese Government were naturally
in a position, on the faith of that guarantee by the Russian Government,
to give a guarantee to the British Government. The Marquess of
Salisbury, on the part of her Majesty’s Government, had accepted it as a
guarantee in writing from the Chinese Government.”
This policy was undoubtedly an exceedingly wise and good one. By this
England not only regained a firm and complete commercial alliance, but
also maintained and strengthened a political alliance against Russian
attacks from the Corea and indirectly from Manchooria and Mongolia.
England also saved money by the abandonment of the Port Hamilton scheme,
and saved her fleet from being, to a certain degree, scattered in such a
far-off quarter of the globe.
England now holds complete sway both commercially and navally in the
Pacific. Lord Salisbury’s policy is worthy of all praise, together with
Mr. Gladstone’s original scheme. If the scheme had never been originated
there would not have been so firm an Anglo-Chinese alliance as there now
is.
England’s power at the present time is three times as great as that of
Russia in the Pacific; in fact Russia has always been overweighted in
that respect. Therefore it is selfevident she could never be able to
withstand the combined Anglo-Chinese fleets.
It seems to me that the only feasible plan for a Russian attack on
Anglo-Chinese alliance would be from Mongolia and Manchooria by means of
an alliance with the Mongolian Tartars. This would be preferable to
coping with England face to face in the Pacific.
Chinese history plainly tells us that the Chinese could not withstand an
attack of the brave Mongol Tartars from the north, and that they have
proved a constant source of dread to them.
The Great Wall which stretches across the whole northern limit of the
Chinese Empire from the sea to the farthest western corner of the
Province of Kansal, was built only for the defence of China against the
northern “daring” Tartars.
Ghenghis Khan (1194), the rival of Attila, in the extent of his kingdom,
who overran the greater part of China and subdued nearly the whole of N.
Asia, who carried his arms into Persia and Delhi, drove the Indians on
to the Ganges, and also destroyed Astrakhan and the power of the
Ottoman, was a Mongolian Tartar.
In the thirteenth century Kokpitsuretsu invaded China from Mongolia and
formed the Gen dynasty which ruled over the whole eastern part of Asia
except Japan (1280 to 1368). The founder of the present Chinese dynasty
was a Manchoorian. Both, however, were of Mongolian extraction, and well
kept up the fame of the Tartars for boldness and general daring. Since
their times the Tartars have fully maintained their title of being the
most warlike tribe in Asia.
Therefore if Russia were allied with the Mongol Tartars she would be
able at least to reach the Yellow Sea, even if she were not able to do
China serious harm.
Her best policy would be to extend the Omsk-Tomsk Railway[9] to Kiakhta
_viâ_ Kansk and Irkutsk, and from there to Ust Strelka and
Blagovestchensk through Nertchinsk; a branch also might be thrown off
from Kiakhta to Oorga, in the direction of Pekin, the metropolis of
China; two branches might also be constructed from Nertchinsk—(_a_) to
Isitsikar, through the western boundary of Manchooria, with the ultimate
object of reaching some convenient harbour on the Gulf of Leaotong, or
the Yellow Sea, _viâ_ Kirin[10] and Moukden—(_b_) to L. Kulon through
the northern boundary of Mongolia in the direction of Pekin; and to
construct a branch line from Blagovestchensk to Isitsikar _viâ_ Merghen.
By these means Russia would not only open sources of untold wealth in
Siberia, but also secure a larger field of commerce in Manchooria and
Mongolia than she has done by the opening of the Trans-Caspian Railway.
It is clear that there would be more political and strategical
advantages in this quarter, than in Central Asia. Should Russia ever be
able to get possession of a seaport in the Gulf of Leaotong or in the
Yellow Sea, she would deal a heavy blow against the Anglo-Chinese
alliance, and ultimately frustrate, to a great extent, British
aspirations in the East.
Russia, however, has worked in quite a different way, and is
strengthening the defences at Vladivostock both in military and naval
forces, and is acting towards the Corea in a gradually-increasing
aggressive spirit, which had succeeded in Europe and Central Asia
previously for more than one hundred and fifty years.
Lord Derby well described the Russian tactics in the following
speech:—“It has never been preceded by storm, but by sap and mine. The
first process has been invariably that of fomenting discontent and
dissatisfaction amongst the subjects of subordinate states, then
proffering mediation, then offering assistance to the weaker party, then
declaring the independence of that party, then placing that independence
under the protection of Russia, and finally, from protection proceeding
to the incorporation, one by one, of those states into the gigantic body
of the Russian Empire.”
But Russia should remember that a Russian annexation of Corea—“the
Turkey” in Asia—would necessitate an alliance of England, China, and
Japan, who all possess common interests in the Pacific and Yellow Sea;
also that it might cause a second Crimean war in the Pacific instead of
on the Black Sea.
Japan was comparatively unknown until Commodore Perry, of the United
States, introduced her to European society in 1854. Since that date a
“wonderful metamorphosis” has taken place in every branch of
civilization.
The total area of Japan is about 148,742 square miles, or nearly a
quarter greater than that of the United Kingdom, while the population is
about 38,000,000. The climate is very healthy, while the natural
resources are many.
Japanese patriotism is very keen, and their love of country stands
before everything; they are brave, honest, and open-minded. The
following facts bear out the above statement: In 1281 the “Armada of
Mongol Tartars” reached the Japanese shores, only to be easily repulsed
in Kiushiu by the Japanese fleet. Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century
conquered the Corea, and General Saigo defeated and subjugated eighteen
of the resident chiefs with all their followers in Formosa (1873).
One of the great traits in the Japanese character is that they never
hesitate to adopt new systems and laws if they consider them beneficial
for their country. Feudalism was abolished in 1871 without bloodshed. In
1879 city and prefectural assemblies were created, based on the
principle of the election. The new Constitution was promulgated in 1889,
and new Houses of Peers and Commons will be opened this year (1890).
Railways are rapidly growing, over 1,000 miles already having been laid,
and soon the whole country will be opened out by the “iron horse.” All
the principal towns are connected by telegraph[11] with one another and
with Europe. The postal system[12] is carried out on English lines,
while the police force is strong and very efficient. The standing army
consists of about forty-three thousand men, which, however, could be
quickly increased to two hundred thousand in case of war, all trained
and equipped under the European system. The navy consists of thirty-two
ships, including several protected cruisers, and in this or next year it
will be reinforced by three more ironclads and five or six gunboats. The
Japanese navy is organized chiefly upon the pattern of the English navy.
[Illustration:
THE PACIFIC & ITS SEA ROUTES.]
The geographical situation and condition of Japan are very favourable to
her future prosperity, both commercially and from a manufacturing point
of view. Look at a map of the world—the country lies between two of the
largest commercial nations, viz., the United States and China, the
former[13] being England’s great commercial rival of the present day,
while the latter offers a large field for trade and commerce.
If M. de Lesseps’ scheme of the Panama Canal should happen to be
completed on his Suez Canal line, undoubtedly the Pacific Ocean would be
revolutionized in every way. Up to now the waterway from Europe to the
Pacific has been from the West, viz., _viâ_ the Suez Canal, or the Cape
of Good Hope.
But in case of the “gate of the Pacific” being open, then European goods
could be transported in another direction, and the nations in the
Pacific would have two sea routes. Japan would be placed practically in
the _centre_ of _three large markets_—Europe, Asia, and America—and its
commercial prosperity would be ensured.
If, however, the Panama scheme failed from one cause or another there
would be another sea route.[14]
In 1887 the American Senate sanctioned the creation of a company for the
construction of a maritime canal across Nicaragua,[15] and the actual
work was begun in October, 1889.
The President of the country, which has a surplus of 57,000,000 dollars,
alluding to the commencement of the Nicaragua Canal said in his message
to the Senate:—
“This Government is ready to promote every proper requirement for the
adjustment of all questions presenting obstacles to its completion.” It
is therefore pretty sure, sooner or later, to be completed, and would
take the place of the Panama Canal and give the same advantages with
regard to the Pacific and Japan.
“In the school of Carl Ritter,”[16] said Professor Seeley, “much has
been said of three stages of civilization determined by geographical
conditions—the potamic, which clings to rivers; the thalassic, which
grows up around inland seas; and lastly, the oceanic.” He also traced
the movements of the centre of commerce and intelligence in Europe, and
at last found out why England had attained her present greatness.
Without doubt, since the discovery of a new world the whole world has
become the oceanic.
But the discoveries of Watt and Stephenson, seem to me to have added
another stage to general civilization, viz., the railway; and it seems
also to me that we might call the present era “the railway-oceanic.”
The Canadian Pacific Railway scheme was completed in 1887. It has a
total length of at least 3,000 miles, starting from Quebec and finishing
at Vancouver’s Island on the Pacific. Its marvellous success will also
considerably change the general tenor of the Pacific even more than the
Panama or Nicaragua scheme will do. An express train can cross in five
days, while the voyage from Vancouver to Yokohama in Japan, would only
occupy twelve days steaming at the rate of fourteen or fifteen knots an
hour. From England the whole journey to Shanghai and Hong Kong by this
route would take only thirty-four or thirty-five days, and Australia now
has direct communication with the mother country through a sister
colony.
Last of all, Japan would have much better communication with the
European markets generally than is possible at the present time, if the
English proposed[17] mail steamers should run, and it is said that the
Canadian Pacific route would bring Japan within twenty-six or
twenty-seven days’ reach of England.
On the other hand, if the Russian Siberian Railway scheme should be
carried out to the Pacific at Vladivostock, it would open a very large
field of trade and commerce with inland Siberia to Japan. It would be
still more so if the Chinese railways were extended so as to open the
entire empire.[18]
Japan has not only a splendid future before her with regard to
commercial greatness, but has every chance of rising to the head of
manufacturing nations. In the latter respect she has advantages over
Vancouver’s Island and New South Wales, her rivals on the Pacific. She
is known to possess valuable mineral resources, having good coal mines
at Kiushiu and Hokkukaido. The climate of Japan varies in different
localities, but on the whole is exceedingly healthy. Consisting as the
country does of numerous islands she has many good harbours and trading
ports. Wages are low though they might rise if a corresponding increase
of labour is required. The credit system is fairly well carried out[19]
and is growing day by day. There are about four hundred banks, including
the Bank of Japan; and the medium of exchange has a regular standard.
The principal exports are silk, tea, coal, and rice. Japan is not the
producer of raw goods for manufacturing purposes, but simply works them
up. Her area is not in comparison with the commercial greatness which
she will attain in the future. She may import raw goods from America,
Australia, and the Asiatic countries, in the same way that England does.
Her position enables her also to obtain wool from Australia and
California, also cotton from China, Manchooria, India, and Queensland.
All these imports are worked up into different manufacturing goods. She
has an advantage here over England, for she has not so far to send her
manufactured goods, and does not need, like England, to send them all
round the world.
Thus we see Japan has ample scope from a commercial point of view, and
has plenty of friendly countries close at home for the production of her
raw material, and has great advantages in sea routes to America and
Australia.
The Japanese are born sailors, being islanders.
There are several large steamship companies[20] whose ships are
continually plying along her own shores[21] and also to the mainland of
China, and one company contemplates shortly opening communication with
North and South America. It has often puzzled me why Japan does not hold
closer relations with Australia, especially as Australia is becoming one
of her most important neighbours in commerce. I can certainly predict
that if this suggestion comes to pass, that together they will in the
future hold the key of the Pacific trade.
Australia and her near colonies have already begun to play an important
part in the affairs of the Pacific; and why should she not, considering
their natural wealth and general progress? European Powers have begun to
take great interest, both commercially and diplomatically, in these
colonies. England, France, Spain, and Holland long ago saw the advantage
of having secured coaling stations in the Pacific, and England and
France have always taken great care in selecting posts in the immediate
vicinity of the sea route between America and Australia; and since the
working of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Panama Canal, they have
begun to annex those islands which lie near the route from Panama to the
Australian colonies, and from the latter to Vancouver. The French
occupation of Tahiti and the Rapa (both containing good harbours) in
1880 was with the distinct object of controlling the sea route from
Panama to Sydney, Brisbane, and Auckland. England also began to fortify
Jamaica in 1887, and she is now casting her eyes on Raratonga. The
dispute regarding the New Hebrides and the Samoan Conference[22] were
simply for the protection of the Vancouvan-Australian-San-Franciscan
sea-ways. England has lately annexed the Ellice Islands and undoubtedly
will shortly occupy the Gilbert and Charlotte Islands.
Germany also has been considering the Asiatic-Australian routes,
foreseeing that the whole Pacific question rests on that basis. In 1884
she annexed New Guinea, and the Bismarckian policy proved a severe blow
to the British power in the North and West Pacific. There are three
great sea routes from New South Wales to Hong Kong and other parts of
the North Pacific; one travels eastward of the Solomon Islands and New
Caledonia (6,000 miles) and the other two westward of the
above-mentioned islands (5,500 and 5,000 miles).
The German occupation of New Guinea actually resulted in her having the
entire control of these three important sea routes. The English
possession of the Treasury Islands, the depôt made there, and of the
Louisiade Archipelago is certainly not strong enough to protect these
routes, though they are very important for the defence of the Australian
colonies. Even the trade route from Vancouver’s Island to Brisbane has
to a certain extent been endangered. It would be policy on England’s
part to annex the Solomon Islands if she means to regain the prestige
which she has lost owing to the Germanic policy of annexation in the
Pacific.
In order to firmly establish her power in this quarter, Germany, in
1885, raised a quarrel with Spain concerning the sovereignty of the
Caroline and Pelew Islands, but this quarrel was composed by the
mediation of the Pope.
Frederick the Great “preferred regiments, as a ship cost as much as a
regiment.” Bismarck preferred “the Greater Germany,” and his policy was
“the German trade with the German flag” (_i.e._, the German flag shall
go where German trade has already established a footing). This policy
proved very successful, not only in the West Pacific, but also in the
North Pacific and the eastern coast of Africa. Germany now is the chief
colonizing rival of England.
In 1883 Mr. Chester annexed all the parts of New Guinea with the
adjacent islands lying between 141 deg. and 155 deg. of E. long. Lord
Derby; however, annulled this annexation, regarding it as an unfriendly
act, and he also assured the Colonial Government that “Her Majesty’s
Government are confident that no foreign power contemplates interference
in New Guinea.” This occurred in May, 1884. But this prognostication did
not prove true, for in November of the same year Germany occupied New
Guinea.
This caused much public indignation in the English colonies against the
Home Government, and the public of England recognized that the reasons
and complaints of the Australian Colonies were right and just.
The movement of Imperial Federation sprang up in England, the chief
object of which was “a closer association between the Colonies and Great
Britain and Ireland for common national purposes such as colonial and
foreign policy, defence and trade.” The result of this was the Colonial
Conference in 1887; and Lord Salisbury, offering a hearty welcome to the
Colonial delegates, said: “I do not recommend you to indulge in schemes
of Constitution making;” but also said: “It will be the parent of a long
progeniture, and distant councils of the empire may, in some far-off
time, look back to the meeting in this room as the root from which their
greatness and beneficence sprang.”
The following subjects were submitted for discussion: (1) The local
defence of ports other than Imperial coaling stations; (2) the naval
defence of the Australian Colonies; (3) measures of precaution in
relation to the defences of colonial ports; (4) various questions in
connection with the military aspects of telegraph cables, their
necessity for purpose of war, and their protection; (5) questions
relating to the employment and training of local or native troops to
serve as garrisons of works of defence; and, lastly (6), the promotion
of commercial and social relations by the development of our postal and
telegraphic communication.
Thus, by means of this Conference, the military federation of the
British Empire was established. By its efforts the English squadron in
the China Sea and in the Australian seas are more closely connected
together than they have been before, and, if needed, the English forces
in the North Pacific would be reinforced by Australian troops. We saw an
instance of this in the late Egyptian campaign.
One more question remains to be ventilated, viz., whether England is
able to secure absolute power in the North Pacific with the naval and
military forces she has at her command there, using Hong Kong as the
centre of war preparations.
I answer in the negative. It could be maintained only by an occupier of
the Island of Formosa, the “Malta” of the North Pacific, which lies
between the North China Sea and the South China Sea. Its area is
estimated at 14,978 square miles. It has a healthy climate, tempered by
the influence of the sea and its mountains. Coal is to be found in
considerable quantities, although not of the best quality. Its natural
products are plentiful, such as sugar, tea, and rice. It possesses
several good harbours, one of which, Tam-sui, or Howei, is surrounded by
hills upwards of 2,000 feet high, and has a depth of 3½ fathoms with a
bar of 7½ feet.
From this island, with a good navy, any power almost might be exerted
over the North and South China Seas, and over the Pacific highways from
Hong Kong to Australia, Panama, Nicaragua, San Francisco, Vancouver,
Japan, Shanghai. All these are in fairly close proximity to Formosa, and
the Shanghai route to Hong Kong actually runs between the island and the
China mainland.
There remain still two or three more facts which must not be neglected
in order to obtain a fair view of this important question.
(_a_) It is a fine post for any offensive attack upon China, and also a
stronghold for an attack upon the British power in the Pacific. If
fortified and defended by a navy from any other power, Formosa would
prove a great rival to Hong Kong, which would lose at least half of its
importance, commercially and strategically, and which has already been
somewhat weakened by the French occupation of Cochin China, in 1882.[23]
(_b_) In case of Asiatic complications, England would naturally expect
reinforcements from Australia, and from the mother country by the
Canadian Pacific Railway, but after they arrive at Vancouver, and are on
transport, they will be at the mercy either of Japan or the occupier,
whoever it may be, of Formosa. Even the Bismarckian policy _re_ New
Guinea would be broken down, _i.e._, all commercial and strategical
communication between Hong Kong and Australia would be seriously
incommoded by the occupation of Formosa.
(_c_) If China herself occupied Formosa thoroughly,[24] and allied with
Japan who occupies the Loo Choo Islands, they would be impregnable in
the sea above 20° of N. lat.
Again, if the occupier of the Loo Choo Islands[25] also occupied Formosa
on a military basis, she again would have nearly absolute control of the
North Pacific. England would be supreme if she held both Hong Kong and
Formosa; Germany if the holder would not only complete the Bismarckian
policy in New Guinea, but would start a new Germanic policy in the North
Pacific.
Thus we see that Japan, China, England, and Germany, might become
important actors in the China Sea, while Russia and China would be
actors behind the scenes in Manchooria and Mongolia.
The whole result of a historical study of the foreign policy of England
and Russia tells us that Russia has increased her influence by annexing
and conquering in every[26] direction of the compass with Moscow as the
centre of the Empire. Peter the Great started in the direction of the
Baltic, _i.e._, north-west; Catherine II. towards the Crimea and Poland
in a south and westerly direction; Alexander I. confined his attention
to the Balkans and Caucasus, while Nicholas improved on the same
directions, and marched into Central Asia, and since 1858 the Russian
attention has been turned on the East, _i.e._, the Pacific.
England, on the other hand, has added to her fame by establishing the
following naval and coaling stations along the great highways of trade:—
Heligoland in the North Sea, the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Malta,
Cyprus, Perim, Aden, Ceylon, Singapore, Hong Kong and Labuan; the
Accession Islands, St. Helena, and the Cape of Good Hope, in Africa; the
Bermuda Islands, Halifax, the West Indies, especially Jamaica, and the
Falkland Islands in America, besides many important islands in the South
and West Pacific.
By means of these, in the present days of steam, she has been able to
maintain her place as the Queen of the Maritime World—a position
superior to Russia, although the latter country is lord of one-seventh
of the globe.
With such great rivals, we can surely predict that at some future time
Russia will work her way into Manchooria and Mongolia to the Yellow Sea
and attack the North Pacific. “Everything is obtained by pains,” said
Peter the Great, in 1722; “even India was not easily found after the
long journey round the Cape of Good Hope.”[27] To this Soimonf, who
afterwards devoted himself for seventeen years to the exploration of
Siberia, and was its governor, said that “Russia had a much nearer road
to India, and explained the water system of Siberia, how easily and with
how little land carriage goods could be sent from Russia to the Pacific
and then by ships to India.” Peter replied, “It is a long distance and
of no use yet awhile.” But in the present days of telegraphy and
railroads it is not a great distance at all.
England will without doubt occupy Formosa in order to uphold her power
in the same quarter. The result it would be almost impossible to
foretell. But this fact remains a certainty that will one day come to
pass, that England and Russia will at some future period fight for
supremacy in the North Pacific. Japan lies between the future
combatants!