VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence

does not involve existence.

PROPOSITIONS. I. Substance is by nature prior to its

modifications.

>>>>>Proof--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have

nothing in common.

>>>>>Proof--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in

itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the

conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause

of the other.

>>>>>Proof--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one

cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,

therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).

Q.E.D.

IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the

other, either by the difference of the attributes of the

substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

>>>>>Proof--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or

in something else (Ax. i.),-- that is (by Deff. iii. and v.),

nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except

substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given

besides the understanding, by which several things may be

distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in

other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.

Q.E.D.

V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances

having the same nature or attribute.

>>>>>Proof--If several distinct substances be granted, they must

be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of

their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications

(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it

will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an

identical attribute. If by the difference of their

modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its

modifications (Prop. i.)--it follows that setting the

modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is

truly, (Deff. iii and vi.), there cannot be conceived one

substance different from another--that is (by Prop. iv.), there

cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.

Q.E.D.

Ethics — Part 1 · 第 4 / 13 题