1813
Amount of the Allied forces against Napoleon--Their advance towards
the Rhine--Levy of 280,000 men--Dreadful situation of the French at
Mayence--Declaration of the Allies at Frankfort--Diplomatic
correspondents--The Due de Bassano succeeded by the Duke of Vicenza
--The conditions of the Allies vaguely accepted--Caulaincourt sent to
the headquarters of the Allies--Manifesto of the Allied powers to
the French people.--Gift of 30,000,000 from the Emperor's privy
purse--Wish to recall M. de Talleyrand--Singular advice relative to
Wellington--The French army recalled from Spain--The throne resigned
Joseph--Absurd accusation against M. Laine--Adjournment of the
Legislative Body--Napoleon's Speech to the Legislative Body--Remarks
of Napoleon reported by Cambaceres.
When the war resumed its course after the disaster of Leipsic I am
certain that the Allied sovereigns determined to treat with Napoleon only
in his own capital, as he, four years before, had refused to treat with
the Emperor of Austria except at Vienna. The latter sovereign now
completely raised the mask, and declared to the Emperor that he would
make common cause with Russia and Prussia against him. In his
declaration he made rise of the singular pretext, that the more enemies
there were against Napoleon there would be the greater chance of speedily
obliging him to accede to conditions which would at length restore the
tranquillity of which Europe stood so much in need. This declaration on
the part of Austria was an affair of no little importance, for she had
now raised an army of 260,000 men. An equal force was enrolled beneath
the Russian banners, which were advancing towards the Rhine. Prussia had
200,000 men; the Confederation of the Rhine 150,000: in short, including
the Swedes and the Dutch, the English troops in Spain and in the
Netherlands, the Danes, who had abandoned us, the Spaniards and
Portuguese, whose courage and hopes were revived by our reverses,
Napoleon had arrayed against him upwards of a million of armed men.
Among them, too, were the Neapolitans, with Murat at their head!
The month of November 1813 was fatal to the fortune of Napoleon. In all
parts the French armies were repulsed and driven back upon the Rhine,
while-in every direction, the Allied forces advanced towards that river.
For a considerable time I had confidently anticipated the fall of the
Empire; not because the foreign sovereigns had vowed its destruction, but
because I saw the impossibility of Napoleon defending himself against all
Europe, and because I knew that, however desperate might be his fortune,
nothing would induce him to consent to conditions which he considered
disgraceful. At this time every day was marked by a new defection. Even
the Bavarians, the natural Allies of France, they whom the Emperor had
led to victory at the commencement of the second campaign of Vienna, they
whom he had, as it were, adopted on the field of battle, were now against
us, and were the bitterest of our enemies.
Even before the battle of Leipsic, the consequences of which were so
ruinous to Napoleon, he had felt the necessity of applying to France for
a supply of troops; as if France had been inexhaustible. He directed the
Empress Regent to make this demand; and accordingly Maria Louisa
proceeded to the Senate, for the first time, in great state: but the
glories of the Empire were now on the decline. The Empress obtained a
levy of 280,000 troops, but they were no sooner enrolled than they were
sacrificed. The defection of the Bavarians considerably augmented the
difficulties which assailed the wreck of the army that had escaped from
Leipsic. The Bavarians had got before us to Hanau, a town four leagues
distant from Frankfort; there they established themselves, with the view
of cutting off our retreat; but French valour was roused, the little town
was speedily carried, and the Bavarians were repulsed with considerable
loss. The French army arrived at Mayence; if, indeed, one may give the
name of army to a few masses of men destitute, dispirited, and exhausted
by fatigue and privation. On the arrival of the troops at Mayence no
preparation had been made for receiving them: there were no provisions,
or supplies of any kind; and, as the climax of misfortune, infectious
epidemics broke out amongst the men. All the accounts I received
concurred in assuring me that their situation vas dreadful:
However; without counting the wreck which escaped from the disasters of
Leipsic, and the ravages of disease; without including the 280,000 men
which had been raised by a 'Senatus-consulte, on the application of Maria
Louisa, the Emperor still possessed 120,000 good troops; but they were in
the rear, scattered along the Elbe, shut up in fortresses such as
Dantzic, Hamburg, Torgau, and Spandau. Such was the horror of our
situation that if, on the one hand, we could not resolve to abandon them,
it was at the same time impossible to aid them. In France a universal
cry was raised for peace, at whatever price it could be purchased. In
this state of things it may be said that the year 1813 was more fatal to
Napoleon than the year 1812. The disasters of Moscow were repaired by
his activity and the sacrifices of France; but the disasters of Leipsic
were irreparable.
I shall shortly speak of some negotiations in which, if I had chosen, I
might have taken a part. After the battle of Leipsic, in which France
lost, for the second time, a formidable army, all the powers allied
against Napoleon declared at Frankfort, on the 9th of November, that they
would never break the bonds which united them; that henceforth it was not
merely a Continental peace, but a general peace, that would be demanded;
and that any negotiation not having a general peace for its object would
be rejected. The Allied powers declared that France was to be confined
within her natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. This
was all that was to remain of the vast Empire founded by Napoleon; but
still it must be allowed it was a great deal, after the many disasters
France had experienced, and when she was menaced with invasion by
numerous and victorious armies. But Napoleon could not accede to such
proposals, for he was always ready to yield to illusion when the truth
was not satisfactory to him.
According to the proposals of the Allies at Frankfort, Germany; Italy,
and Spain were to be entirely withdrawn from the dominion of France.
England recognised the freedom of trade and navigation, and there
appeared no reason to doubt the sincerity of her professed willingness to
make great sacrifices to promote the object proposed by the Allies. But
to these offers a fatal condition was added, namely, that the Congress
should meet in a town, to be declared neutral, on the right bank of the
Rhine, where the plenipotentiaries of all the belligerent powers were to
assemble; but the course of the war was not to be impeded by these
negotiations.
--[This, system of negotiating and advancing was a realization of
Metternich's idea copying Napoleon's own former procedure. "Let us
hold always the sword in one head, and the olive branch in the
other; always ready to negotiate, but only negotiating whilst
advancing. Here is Napoleon's system: may he find enemies who will
carry on war . . . as he would carry it on himself." (Metternich
vol. ii. p. 346).]--
The Due de Bassano (Maret), who was still Minister for Foreign Affairs,
replied, by order of Napoleon, to the overtures wade by the Allies for a
general Congress; and stated that the Emperor acceded to them, and wished
Mannheim to be chosen as the neutral town. M. Metternich replied in a
note, dated Frankfort, the 25th of November, stating that the Allies felt
no difficulty in acceding to Napoleon's choice of Mannheim for the
meeting of the Congress; but as M. de Bassano's letter contained no
mention of the general and summary bases I have just mentioned, and which
had been communicated to M. de St. Aignan at Frankfort, M. Metternich
stated that the Allies wished the Emperor Napoleon to declare his
determination respecting those bases, in order that insurmountable
difficulties might not arrest the negotiations at their very outset. The
Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt), who had just succeeded the Due de
Bassano, received this letter. Trusting to the declaration of Frankfort
he thought he would be justified in treating on those bases; he
confidently relied on the consent of Napoleon. But the Allies had now
determined not to grant the limits accorded by that declaration.
Caulaincourt was therefore obliged to apply for fresh powers, which being
granted, he replied, on the 2d of December, that Napoleon accepted the
fundamental and summary bases which had been communicated by M. de St.
Aignan. To this letter M. Metternich answered that the Emperors of
Russia and Austria were gratified to find that the Emperor of France
recognised the bases judged necessary by the Allies; that the two
sovereigns would communicate without delay the official document to their
Allies, and that they were convinced that immediately on receiving their
reply the negotiations might be opened without any interruption of the
war.
We shall now see the reason why these first negotiations came to no
result. In the month of October the Allies overthrew the colossal
edifice denominated the French Empire. When led by victory to the banks
of the Rhine they declared their wish to abstain from conquest, explained
their intentions, and manifested an unalterable resolution to abide by
them. This determination of the Allies induced the French Government to
evince pacific intentions. Napoleon wished, by an apparent desire for
peace, to justify, if I may so express myself, in the eyes of his
subjects, the necessity of new sacrifices; which, according to his
proclamations, he demanded only to enable him to obtain peace on as
honourable conditions as possible. But the truth is, he was resolved not
even to listen to the offers made at Frankfort. He always represented
the limits of the Rhine as merely a compensation for the dismemberment of
Poland and the immense aggrandisement of the English possessions in Asia.
But he wanted to gain time, and, if possible, to keep the Allied armies
on the right bank of the Rhine.
The immense levies made in France, one after the other, had converted the
conscription into a sort of pressgang. Men employed in agriculture and
manufactures were dragged from their labours; and the people began to
express their dissatisfaction at the measures of Government more loudly
than they had hitherto ventured to do; yet all were willing to make
another effort, if they could have persuaded themselves that the Emperor
would henceforth confine his thoughts to France alone. Napoleon sent
Caulaincourt to the headquarters of the Allies; but that was only for the
sake of gaining time, and inducing a belief that he was favourably
disposed to peace.
The Allies having learned the immense levies of troops which Napoleon was
making, and being well acquainted with the state of feeling in France,
published the famous manifesto, addressed to the French people, which was
profusely circulated, and may be referred to as a warning to subjects who
trust to the promises of Governments.
The good faith with which the promises in the manifesto were kept may be
judged of from the Treaty of Paris. In the meantime the manifesto did
not a little contribute to alienate from Napoleon those who were yet
faithful to his cause; for, by believing in the declarations of the
Allies, they saw in him the sole obstacle to that peace which France so
ardently desired. On this point, too, the Allies were not wrong, and I
confess that I did not see without great surprise that the Duc de Rovigo,
in that part of his Memoirs where he mentions this manifesto, reproaches
those who framed it for representing the Emperor as a madman, who replied
to overtures of peace only by conscription levies: After all, I do not
intend to maintain that the declaration was entirely sincere; with
respect to the future it certainly was not. Switzerland was already
tampered with, and attempts were made to induce her to permit the Allied
troops to enter France by the bridge of Bale. Things were going on no
better in the south of France, where the Anglo-Spanish army threatened
our frontiers by the Pyrenees, and already occupied Pampeluna; and at the
same time the internal affairs of the country were no less critical than
its external position. It was in vain to levy troops; everything
essential to an army was wanting. To meet the most pressing demands the
Emperor drew out 30,000,000 from the immense treasure which he had
accumulated in the cellars and galleries of the Pavillion Marsan, at the
Tuileries. These 30,000,000 were speedily swallowed up. Nevertheless it
was an act of generosity on the part of Napoleon, and I never could
understand on what ground the Legislative Body complained of the outlay,
because, as the funds did not proceed from the Budget, there needed no
financial law to authorise their application. Besides, why did these
rigid legislators, who, while fortune smiled on Bonaparte, dared not
utter a word on the subject, demand, previously to the gratuitous gift
just mentioned, that the 350,000,000 in the Emperor's privy puree should
be transferred to the Imperial treasury and carried to the public
accounts? Why did they wink at the accumulation in the Tuileries of the
contributions and exactions levied in, conquered countries? The answer
is plain: because there would have been danger in opposing it.
Amidst the difficulties which assailed the Emperor he cast his eyes on
M. de Talleyrand. But it being required, as a condition of his receiving
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, that he should resign his office of
Vice-Grand-Elector, M. de Talleyrand preferred a permanent post to a
portfolio, which the caprice of a moment might withdraw. I have been
informed that, in a conversation with the Emperor, M. de Talleyrand gave
him the extraordinary advice of working upon the ambition of the English
family of Wellesley, and to excite in the mind of Wellington, the lustre
of whose reputation was now dawning, ambitious projects which would have
embarrassed the coalition. Napoleon, however, did not adopt this
proposition, the issue of which he thought too uncertain, and above all,
too remote, in the urgent circumstances in which it stood. Caulaincourt
was then made Minister for Foreign Affairs, in lieu of M. Maret, who was
appointed Secretary of State, an office much better suited to him.
Meanwhile the Emperor was wholly intent on the means of repelling the
attack which was preparing against him. The critical circumstances in
which he was placed seemed to restore the energy which time had in some
measure robbed him of. He turned his eyes towards Spain, and resolved to
bring the army from that country to oppose the Allies, whose movements
indicated their intention of entering France by Switzerland. An event
occurred connected with this subject calculated to have a decided
influence on the affairs of the moment, namely, the renunciation by
Joseph, King of Spain, of all right to the crown, to be followed by the
return; as had been agreed on; of Ferdinand to his dominions. Joseph
made this sacrifice at the instigation of his brother. The treaty was
signed, but an inconceivable delay occurred in its execution, while the
torrent, which was advancing upon France, rushed forward so rapidly that
the treaty could not be carried into execution. Ferdinand, it is true,
re-ascended his throne, but from other causes.
The Emperor was deeply interested in the march of the Allies. It was
important to destroy the bridge of Bale, because the Rhine once crossed
masses of the enemy would be thrown into France. At this time I had
close relations with a foreign diplomat whom I am forbidden by discretion
to name. He told me that the enemy was advancing towards the frontier,
and that the bridge of Bale would not be destroyed, as it had been so
agreed at Berne, where the Allies had gained the day. This astonished
me, because I knew, on the other hand, from a person who ought, to have
been equally well informed,--that it was hoped the bridge would be blown
up. Being much interested in knowing the truth, I sent on my own
account, an agent to Bale who on his return told me that the bridge would
remain.
On the 19th of December the Legislative Body was convoked. It was on a
Wednesday. M. Laine was Vice-President under M. Regnier. A committee
was appointed to examine and report on the communications of the Emperor.
The report and conclusions of the committee were not satisfactory; it was
alleged that they betrayed a revolutionary tendency, of which M. Laine
was absurdly accused of having been one of the promoters; but all who
knew him must have been convinced of the falsehood of the charge. The
Emperor ordered the report to be seized, and then adjourned the
Legislative Body. Those who attentively observed the events of the time
will recollect the stupor which prevailed in Paris on the intelligence of
this seizure and of the adjournment of the Legislative Body. A thousand
conjectures were started as to what new occurrences had taken place
abroad, but nothing satisfactory was learned.
I considered this a great mistake. Who can doubt that if the Legislative
Body had taken the frank and noble step of declaring that France accepted
the conditions of Frankfort they would not have been listened to by the
Allies? But the words, "You are dishonoured if you cede a single village
acquired by a 'Senatus-consulte'," always, resounded in Napoleon's ears:
they flattered his secret thoughts, and every pacific proposal was
rejected.
The members of the adjourned Legislative Body went as usual to take leave
of the Emperor, who received them on a Sunday, and after delivering to
them the speech, which is very well known, dismissed the rebels with
great ill-humour, refusing to hear any explanation. "I have suppressed
your address," he began abruptly: "it was incendiary. I called you round
me to do good--you have done ill. Eleven-twelfths of you are well-
intentioned, the others, and above all M. Laine, are factious intriguers,
devoted to England, to all my enemies, and corresponding through the
channel of the advocate Deseze with the Bourbons. Return to your
Departments, and feel that my eye will follow you; you have endeavoured
to humble me, you may kill me, but you shall not dishonour me. You make
remonstrances; is this a time, when the stranger invades our provinces,
and 200,000 Cossacks are ready to overflow our country? There may have
been petty abuses; I never connived at them. You, M. Raynouard, you said
that. Prince Massena robbed a man at Marseilles of his house. You lie!
The General took possession of a vacant house, and my Minister shall
indemnify the proprietor. Is it thus that you dare affront a Marshal of
France who has bled for his country, and grown gray in victory? Why did
you not make your complaints in private to me? I would have done you
justice. We should wash our dirty linen at home, and not drag it out
before the world. You, call yourselves Representatives of the Nation.
It is not true; you are only Deputies of the Departments; a small portion
of the State, inferior to the Senate, inferior even to the Council of
State. The Representatives of the People! I am alone the Representative
of the People. Twice have 24,000,000 of French called me to the throne:
which of you durst undertake such a burden? It had already overwhelmed
(ecrase), your Assemblies, and your Conventions, your Vergniauds and your
Guadets, your Jacobins and your Girondins. They are all dead! What, who
are you? nothing--all authority is in the Throne; and what is the
Throne? this wooden frame covered with velvet?--no, I am the Throne!
You have added wrong to reproaches. You have talked of concessions--
concessions that even my enemies dared not ask! I suppose if they asked
Champaigne you would have had me give them La Brie besides; but in four
months I will conquer peace, or I shall be dead! You advise! how dare
you debate of such high matters (de si graves interets)! You have put me
in the front of the battle as the cause of war--it is infamous (c'est une
atrocite). In all your committees you have excluded the friends of
Government--extraordinary commission--committee of finance--committee of
the address, all, all my enemies. M. Laine, I repeat it, is a traitor;
he is a wicked man, the others are mere intriguers. I do justice to the
eleven-twelfths; but the factions I know, and will pursue. Is it, I ask
again, is it while the enemy is in France that you should have done this?
But nature has gifted me with a determined courage--nothing can overcome
me. It cost my pride much too--I made that sacrifice; I--but I am above
your miserable declamations--I was in need of consolation, and you would
mortify me--but, no, my victories shall crush your clamours! In three
months we shall have peace, and you shall repent your folly. I am one of
those who triumph or die.
"Go back to your Departments if any one of you dare to print your address
I shall publish it in the Moniteur with notes of my own. Go; France
stands in more need of me than I do of France. I bear the eleven-
twelfths of you in my heart--I shall nominate the Deputies to the two
series which are vacant, and I shall reduce the Legislative Body to the
discharge of its proper duties. The inhabitants of Alsace and Franche
Comte have more spirit than you; they ask me for arms, I send them, and
one of my aides de camp will lead them against the enemy."
In after conversations he said of the Legislative Body that "its members
never came to Paris but to obtain some favours. They importuned the
Ministers from morning till night, and complained if they were not
immediately satisfied. When invited to dinner they burn with envy at the
splendour they see before them." I heard this from Cambaceres, who was
present when the Emperor made these remarks.