UNITED ITALY AND THE DIS-UNITED STATES
1861-1865
Lord John at the Foreign Office--Austria and Italy--Victor Emmanuel
and Mazzini--Cavour and Napoleon III.--Lord John's energetic
protest--His sympathy with Garibaldi and the struggle for
freedom--The gratitude of the Italians--Death of the Prince
Consort--The 'Trent' affair--Lord John's remonstrance--The
'Alabama' difficulty--Lord Selborne's statement--The Cotton Famine.
FOREIGN politics claimed Lord John's undivided attention throughout the
four remaining years of the Palmerston Administration. It was well for
the nation that a statesman of so much courage and self-reliance, cool
sagacity, and wide experience, controlled the Foreign Office in years
when wars and rumours of war prevailed alike in Europe and in America.
He once declared that it had always been his aim to promote the cause of
civil and religious liberty, not merely in England, but in other parts
of the world, and events were now looming which were destined to justify
such an assertion. It is not possible to enter at length into the
complicated problems with which he had to deal during his tenure of the
Foreign Office, but the broad principles which animated his policy can,
in rough outline at least, be stated. It is well in this connection to
fall back upon his own words: 'In my time very difficult questions
arose. During the period I held the seals of the Foreign Office I had to
discuss the question of the independence of Italy, of a treaty
regarding Poland made by Lord Castlereagh, the treaty regarding Denmark
made by Lord Malmesbury, the injuries done to England by the republic of
Mexico, and, not to mention minor questions, the whole of the
transactions arising out of the civil war in America, embittered as they
were by the desire of a party in the United States to lay upon England
the whole blame of the insurrection, the "irrepressible conflict" of
their own fellow-citizens.' Both of these questions were far-reaching
and crucial, and in his attitude towards Italy and America, when they
were in the throes of revolution, Lord Russell's generous love of
liberty and vigour of judgment alike stand revealed.
Prince Metternich declared soon after the peace of 1815 that Italy was
'only a geographical expression.' The taunt was true at the time, but
even then there was a young dreamer living who was destined to render it
false. 'Great ideas,' declared Mazzini, 'create great nations,' and his
whole career was devoted to the attempt to bring about a united Italy.
The statesmanship of Cavour and the sword of Garibaldi were enlisted in
the same sacred cause. The petty governments of the Peninsula grew
suddenly impossible, and Italy was freed from native tyranny and foreign
domination. Austria, not content with the possession of Lombardy, which
was ceded to her by the treaty of 1815, had made her power felt in
almost every direction, and even at Naples her authority prevailed. The
Austrians were not merely an alien but a hated race, for they stood
between the Italian people and their dream of national independence and
unity, and native despotism could always count on their aid in quelling
any outbreak of the revolutionary spirit. The governments of the
country, Austria and the Vatican apart, were rendered contemptible by
the character of its tyrannical, incapable, and superstitious rulers,
but with the sway of such powers of darkness Sardinia presented a bright
contrast. The hopes of patriotic Italians gathered around Victor
Emmanuel II., who had fought gallantly at Novara in 1849, and who
possessed more public spirit and common-sense than the majority of
crowned heads. Victor Emmanuel ascended the throne of Sardinia at the
age of twenty-eight, immediately after the crushing disaster which
seemed hopelessly to have wrecked the cause of Italian independence.
Although he believed, with Mazzini, that there was only room for two
kinds of Italians in Italy, the friends and the enemies of Austria, he
showed remarkable self-restraint, and adopted a policy of conciliation
towards foreign Powers, whilst widening the liberties of his own
subjects until all over the land Italians came to regard Sardinia with
admiration, and to covet 'liberty as it was in Piedmont.'
[Sidenote: COUNT CAVOUR]
He gathered around him men who were in sympathy with modern ideas of
liberty and progress. Amongst them was Count Cavour, a statesman
destined to impress not Italy alone, but Europe, by his honesty of
purpose, force of character, and practical sagacity. From 1852 to 1859,
when he retired, rather than agree to the humiliating terms of the
Treaty of Villafranca, Cavour was supreme in Sardinia. He found Sardinia
crippled by defeat, and crushed with debt, the bitter bequest of the
Austrian War; but his courage never faltered, and his capacity was equal
to the strain. Victor Emmanuel gave him a free hand, and he used it for
the consolidation of the kingdom. He repealed the duties on corn,
reformed the tariff, and introduced measures of free trade. He
encouraged public works, brought about the construction of railways and
telegraphs, and advanced perceptibly popular education. He saw that if
the nation was to gain her independence, and his sovereign become ruler
of a united Italy, it was necessary to propitiate the Western Powers. In
pursuance of such a policy, Cavour induced Piedmont to join the Allies
in the Crimean War, and the Italian soldiers behaved with conspicuous
bravery at the battle of Tchernaya. When the war closed Sardinia was
becoming a power in Europe, and Cavour established his right to a seat
at the Congress of Paris, where he made known the growing discontent in
Italy with the temporal power of the Papacy.
In the summer of 1858 Napoleon III. was taking the waters at Plombieres,
where also Count Cavour was on a visit. The Emperor's mood was leisured
and cordial, and Cavour took the opportunity of bringing the Court of
Turin into intimate but secret relations with that of the Tuileries.
France was to come to the aid of Sardinia under certain conditions in
the event of a war with Austria. Napoleon was not, of course, inclined
to serve Victor Emmanuel for naught, and he therefore stipulated for
Savoy and Nice. Cavour also strengthened the position of Sardinia by
arranging a marriage between the Princess Clotilde, daughter of Victor
Emmanuel, and the Emperor's cousin, Prince Napoleon. Alarmed at the
military preparations in Sardinia, and the growth of the kingdom as a
political power in Europe, Austria at the beginning of 1859 addressed an
imperious demand for disarmament, which was met by Cavour by a curt
refusal. The match had been put to the gunpowder and a fight for liberty
took place. The campaign was short but decisive. The Austrian army
crossed in force the Ticino, then hesitated and was lost. If they had
acted promptly they might have crushed the troops of Piedmont, whom they
greatly outnumbered, before the soldiers of France could cross the Alps.
The battle of Magenta, and the still more deadly struggle at Solferino
between Austria and the Allies, decided the issue, and by the beginning
of July Napoleon, for the moment, was master of the situation.
[Sidenote: VILLAFRANCA]
The French Emperor, with characteristic duplicity, had only half
revealed his hand in those confidential talks at Plombieres. Italy was
the cradle of his race, and he too wished to create, if not a King of
Rome, a federation of small States ruled by princes of his own blood.
The public rejoicings at Florence, Parma, Modena, and Bologna, and the
ardent expression of the populace at such centres for union with
Sardinia, made the Emperor wince, and showed him that it was impossible,
even with French bayonets, to crush the aspirations of a nation.
Napoleon met Francis Joseph at Villafranca, and the preliminaries of
peace were arranged on July 11 in a high-handed fashion, and without
even the presence of Victor Emmanuel. Lombardy was ceded to Sardinia,
though Austria was allowed to keep Venetia and the fortress of Mantua.
France afterwards took Nice and Savoy; and the Grand Duke of Tuscany and
the Duke of Modena were restored to power. The Treaty of Zurich ratified
these terms in the month of November. Meanwhile it was officially
announced that the Emperor of Austria and the Emperor of the French
would 'favour the creation of an Italian Confederation under the
honorary presidency of the Holy Father.'
The Countess Martinengo Cesaresco, in a brilliant book published within
the last few months on 'The Liberation of Italy,' in describing Lord
John Russell's opposition to the terms of peace at Villafranca, and the
vigorous protest which, as Foreign Minister, he made on behalf of
England, says: 'It was a happy circumstance for Italy that her unity had
no better friends than in the English Government during those difficult
years. Cavour's words, soon after Villafranca, "It is England's turn
now," were not belied.'[39] With Lord John at the Foreign Office,
England rose to the occasion. Napoleon III. wished to make a cat's-paw
of this country, and was sanguine enough to believe that Her Majesty's
Government would take the proposed Italian Confederation under its wing.
Lord Palmerston, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord John Russell, were not,
however, the men to bow to his behests, and the latter in particular
could scarcely conceal his contempt for the scheme of the two emperors.
'We are asked to propose a partition of the peoples of Italy,' he
exclaimed, 'as if we had the right to dispose of them.'
[Sidenote: FRANCE AND AUSTRIA]
Lord John contended that if Austria, by virtue of her presence on
Italian soil, was a member of the suggested confederation, she, because
of the Vatican, the King of Naples, and the two dukes, would virtually
rule the roost. He wrote to the British Minister at Florence in favour
of a frank expression on the part of the people of Tuscany of their own
wishes in the matter, and declared in the House of Commons that he could
have neither part nor lot with any attempt to deprive the people of
Italy of their right to choose their own ruler. He protested against the
presence in Italy of foreign troops, whether French or Austrian, and in
despatches to Paris and Vienna he made the French and Austrian
Governments aware that England was altogether opposed to any return to
that 'system of foreign interference which for upwards of forty years
has been the misfortune of Italy and the danger of Europe.' Lord John
urged that France and Austria should agree not to employ armed
intervention for the future in the affairs of Italy, unless called upon
to do so by the unanimous voice of the five Great Powers of Europe. He
further contended that Napoleon III. should arrange with Pius IX. for
the evacuation of Rome by the troops of France. He protested in vain
against the annexation of Savoy and Nice by France, which he regarded as
altogether a retrograde movement. In March 1860, in a speech in the
House of Commons, he declared that the course which the Emperor Napoleon
had taken was of a kind to produce great distrust all over Europe. He
regarded the annexation of Savoy, not merely as in itself an act of
aggression, but as one which was likely to 'lead a nation so warlike as
the French to call upon its Government from time to time to commit other
acts of aggression.' England wished to live on the most friendly terms
with France. It was necessary, however, for the nations of Europe to
maintain peace, to respect not merely each others' rights, but each
others' boundaries, and, above all, to restore, and not to disturb that
'commercial confidence which is the result of peace, which tends to
peace, and which ultimately forms the happiness of nations.' When
Napoleon patched up a peace with Francis Joseph, which practically
ignored the aspirations of the Italian people, their indignation knew no
bounds, and they determined to work out their own redemption.
Garibaldi had already distinguished himself in the campaign which had
culminated at Solferino, and he now took the field against the Bourbons
in Naples and Sicily, whilst insurrections broke out in other parts of
Italy. France suggested that England should help her in arresting
Garibaldi's victorious march, but Lord John was too old a friend of
freedom to respond to such a proposal. He held that the Neapolitan
Government--the iniquities of which Mr. Gladstone had exposed in an
outburst of righteous indignation in 1851--must be left to reap the
consequences of 'misgovernment which had no parallel in all Europe.'
Garibaldi, carried thither by the enthusiasm of humanity and the justice
of his cause, entered Naples in triumph on September 7, 1860, the day
after the ignominious flight of Francis II. Victor Emmanuel was
proclaimed King of Italy two days later, and when he met the new
Parliament of his widened realm at Turin he was able to declare: 'Our
country is no more the Italy of the Romans, nor the Italy of the Middle
Ages: it is no longer the field for every foreign ambition, it becomes
henceforth the Italy of the Italians.'
Lord John's part in the struggle did him infinite credit. He held
resolutely to the view all through the crisis, and in the face of the
censure of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, that the Italians were
the best judges of their own interests, and that the Italian revolution
was as justifiable as the English revolution of 1688. He declared that,
far from censuring Victor Emmanuel and Count Cavour, her Majesty's
Government preferred to turn its eyes to the 'gratifying prospect of a
people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the
work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of
Europe.' Foreign Courts might bluster, protest, or sneer, but England
was with her Foreign Minister; and 'Punch' summed up the verdict of the
nation in generous words of doggerel verse:
'Well said, Johnny Russell! That latest despatch
You have sent to Turin is exactly the thing;
And again, my dear John, you come up to the scratch
With a pluck that does credit to you and the Ring.'
[Sidenote: ITALY'S GRATITUDE]
The utmost enthusiasm prevailed in Italy when the terms of Lord John's
despatch became known. Count Cavour and General Garibaldi vied with each
other in emphatic acknowledgments, and Lord John was assured that he was
'blessed night and morning by twenty millions of Italians.' In the
summer of 1864 Garibaldi visited England, and received a greater popular
ovation in the streets of the metropolis than that which has been
accorded to any crowned head in the Queen's reign. He went down to
Pembroke Lodge to thank Lord John in person for the help which he had
given to Italy in the hour of her greatest need. Lord John received a
beautiful expression of the gratitude of the nation, in the shape of an
exquisite marble statue by Carlo Romano, representing Young Italy
holding in her outstretched arms a diadem, inscribed with the arms of
its united States. During subsequent visits to Florence and San Remo he
was received with demonstrations of popular respect, and at the latter
place, shortly after his final retirement from office in 1866, he said,
in reply to an address: 'I thank you with all my heart for the honour
you have done me. I rejoice with you in seeing Italy free and
independent, with a monarchical government and under a patriotic king.
The Italian nation has all the elements of a prosperous political life,
which had been wanting for many centuries. The union of religion,
liberty, and civil order will increase the prosperity of this beautiful
country.'
[Sidenote: THE PRINCE CONSORT]
A still more delicate problem of international policy, and one which
naturally came much nearer home to English susceptibilities, arose in
the autumn of 1861--a year which was rendered memorable on one side of
the Atlantic by the outbreak of the Civil War, and on the other by the
national sorrow over the unexpected death, at the early age of
forty-two, of the Prince Consort. The latter event was not merely an
overwhelming and irrevocable loss to the Queen, but in an emphatic sense
a misfortune--it might almost be said a disaster--to the nation. It was
not until the closing years of his life that the personal nobility and
political sagacity of Prince Albert were fully recognised by the English
people. Brought up in a small and narrow German Court, the Prince
Consort in the early years of her Majesty's reign was somewhat formal in
his manners and punctilious in his demands. The published records of the
reign show that he was inclined to lean too much to the wisdom, which
was not always 'profitable to direct,' of Baron Stockmar, a trusted
adviser of the Court, of autocratic instincts and strong prejudices, who
failed to understand either the genius of the English constitution or
the temper of the English race. It is an open secret that the Prince
Consort during the first decade of the reign was by no means popular,
either with the classes or the masses. His position was a difficult one,
for he was, in the words of one of the chief statesmen of the reign, at
once the 'permanent Secretary and the permanent Prime Minister' of the
Crown; and there were undoubtedly occasions when in both capacities he
magnified his office. Even if the Great Exhibition of 1851 had been
memorable for nothing else, it would have been noteworthy as the period
which marked a new departure in the Prince's relations with all grades
of her Majesty's subjects. It not only brought him into touch with the
people, but it brought into view, as well as into play, his practical
mastery of affairs, and also his enlightened sympathy with the progress
in art and science, no less than in the commercial activities, of the
nation. It was not, however, until the closing years of his life, when
the dreary escapades of the Coalition Ministry were beginning to be
forgotten, that the great qualities of the Prince Consort were
appreciated to any adequate degree. From the close of the Crimean War to
his untimely death, at the beginning of the Civil War in America, was
unquestionably the happiest as well as the most influential period in a
life which was at once sensitive and upright.
It ought in common fairness to be added that the character of the Prince
mellowed visibly during his later years, and that the formality of his
earlier manner was exchanged for a more genial attitude towards those
with whom he came in contact in the duties and society of the Court. Mr.
Disraeli told Count Vitzthum that if the Prince Consort had outlived the
'old stagers' of political life with whom he was surrounded, he would
have given to England--though with constitutional guarantees--the
'blessing of absolute government.' Although such a verdict palpably
overshot the mark, it is significant in itself and worthy of record,
since it points both to the strength and the limitations of an
illustrious life. There are passages in Lady Russell's diary, of too
personal and too sacred a character to quote, which reveal not only the
poignant grief of the Queen, but the manner in which she turned
instinctively in her burst of need to an old and trusted adviser of the
Crown. High but artless tribute is paid in the same pages to the Queen's
devotion to duty under the heart-breaking strain of a loss which
overshadowed with sorrow every home in England, as well as the Palace at
Windsor, at Christmas, 1861.
[Sidenote: THE 'TRENT' AFFAIR]
The last act of the Prince Consort of an official kind was to soften
certain expressions in the interests of international peace and goodwill
in the famous despatch which was sent by the English Government, at the
beginning of December, to the British Ambassador at Washington, when a
deadlock suddenly arose between England and the United States over the
'Trent' affair, and war seemed imminent. Hostilities had broken out
between the North and the South in the previous July, and the opinion of
England was sharply divided on the merits of the struggle. The bone of
contention, to put the matter concisely, was the refusal of South
Carolina and ten other States to submit to the authority of the Central
Government of the Union. It was an old quarrel which had existed from
the foundation of the American Commonwealth, for the individual States
of the Union had always been jealous of any infringement of the right of
self-government; but slavery was now the ostensible root of bitterness,
and matters were complicated by radical divergences on the subject of
tariffs. The Southern States took a high hand against the Federal
Government. They seceded from the Union, and announced their
independence to the world at large, under the style and title of the
Confederate States of America. Flushed by the opening victory which
followed the first appeal to the sword, the Confederate Government
determined to send envoys to Europe. Messrs. Mason and Slidell embarked
at Havana, at the beginning of November, on board the British
mail-steamer 'Trent,' as representatives to the English and French
Governments respectively. The 'Trent' was stopped on her voyage by the
American man-of-war 'San Jacinto,' and Captain Wilkes, her commander,
demanded that the Confederate envoys and their secretaries should be
handed over to his charge. The captain of the 'Trent' made a vigorous
protest against this sort of armed intervention, but he had no
alternative except to yield, and Messrs. Mason and Slidell were carried
back to America and lodged in a military fortress.
The 'Trent' arrived at Southampton on November 27, and when her captain
told his story indignation knew no bounds. The law of nations had been
set at defiance, and the right of asylum under the British flag had been
violated. The clamour of the Press and of the streets grew suddenly
fierce and strong, and the universal feeling of the moment found
expression in the phrase, 'Bear this, bear all.' Lord John Russell at
once addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the American Government on an
'act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a
violation of international law.' He made it plain that her Majesty's
Ministers were not prepared to allow such an insult to pass without
'full reparation;' but, at the same time, he refused to believe that it
could be the 'deliberate intention' of the Government of the United
States to force upon them so grave a question. He therefore expressed
the hope that the United States of its own accord would at once 'offer
to the British Government such redress as alone could satisfy the
British nation.' He added that this must take the form of the liberation
of the envoys and their secretaries, in order that they might again be
placed under British protection, and that such an act must be
accompanied by a suitable apology. President Lincoln and Mr. Seward
reluctantly gave way; but their decision was hastened by the war
preparations in England, and the protests which France, Austria,
Prussia, Russia, and Italy made against so wanton an outrage.
The war took its course, and it seemed on more than one occasion as if
England must take sides in a struggle which, it soon became apparent,
was to be fought out to the bitter end. Thoughts of mediation had
occurred, both to Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, and in 1862 they
contemplated the thankless task of mediation, but the project was
abandoned as at least premature. Feeling ran high in England over the
discussion as to whether the 'great domestic institution' of Negro
slavery really lay at the basis of the struggle or not, and public
opinion was split into hostile camps. Sympathy with the North was
alienated by the marked honours which were paid to the commander of the
'San Jacinto;' and the bravery with which the South fought, for what
many people persisted in declaring was merely the right of
self-government, kindled enthusiasm for those who struggled against
overwhelming odds. In the summer of 1862 a new difficulty arose, and the
maintenance of international peace was once more imperilled. The
blockade of the Southern ports crippled the Confederate Government, and
an armed cruiser was built on the Mersey to wage a war of retaliation on
the high seas against the merchant ships of the North. When the
'Alabama' was almost ready the Federal Government got wind of the
matter, and formally protested against the ship being allowed to put to
sea.
[Sidenote: THE 'ALABAMA' DIFFICULTY]
The Cabinet submitted the question to the law officers of the Crown;
delay followed, and whilst the matter was still under deliberation the
'Alabama,' on the pretext of a trial trip, escaped, and began at once
her remarkable career of destruction. The late Lord Selborne, who at
that time was Solicitor-General, wrote for these pages the following
detailed and, of course, authoritative statement of what transpired, and
the facts which he recounts show that Lord Russell, in spite of the
generous admission which he himself made in his 'Recollections,' was in
reality not responsible for a blunder which almost led to war, and which
when submitted to arbitration at Geneva cost England--besides much
irritation--the sum of 3,000,000_l._
'It was when Lord Russell was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
during the American Civil War, and when I was one of the Law Officers of
the Crown, that I first became personally well acquainted with him; and
from that time he honoured me with his friendship. In this way I had
good opportunities of knowledge on some subjects as to which he has been
at times misrepresented or misunderstood; and perhaps I may best do
honour to his memory by referring to those subjects.
'There can be no idea more unfounded than that which would call in
question his friendliness towards the United States during their contest
with the Confederates. But he had a strong sense, both of the duty of
strictly observing all obligations incumbent on this country as a
neutral Power by the law of nations, and of the danger of innovating
upon them by the admission of claims on either side, not warranted by
that law as generally understood, and with which, in the then state both
of our own and of the American Neutrality Laws, it would have been
practically impossible for the Government of a free country to comply.
As a general principle, the freedom of commercial dealings between the
citizens of a neutral State and belligerents, subject to the right of
belligerents to protect themselves against breach of blockade or
carriage of contraband, had been universally allowed, and by no nation
more insisted on than by the United States. Lord Russell did not think
it safe or expedient to endeavour to restrict that liberty. When asked
to put in force Acts of Parliament made for the better protection of our
neutrality, he took, with promptitude and with absolute good faith, such
measures as it would have been proper to take in any case in which our
own public interests were concerned; but he thought (and in my judgment
he was entirely right in thinking) that it was not the duty of a British
Minister, seeking to enforce British statute law, to add to other risks
of failure that of unconstitutional disregard of the securities for the
liberty of the subject, provided by the system on which British laws
generally are administered and enforced.
'It was not through any fault or negligence of Lord Russell that the
ship "Alabama," or any other vessel equipped for the war service of the
Confederate States, left the ports of this country. The course taken by
him in all those cases was the same. He considered that some _prima
facie_ evidence of an actual or intended violation either of our own law
or of the law of nations (such as might be produced in a court of
justice) was necessary, and that in judging whether there was such
evidence he ought to be guided by the advice of the Law Officers of the
Crown. To obtain such evidence, he did not neglect any means which the
law placed in his power. If in any case the Board of Customs may have
been ill-advised, and omitted (as Sir Alexander Cockburn thought) to
take precautions which they ought otherwise to have taken, this was no
fault of Lord Russell; still less was he chargeable with the delay of
three or four days which took place in the case of the "Alabama," in
consequence of the illness of the Queen's Advocate, Sir John Harding;
without which that vessel might never have gone to sea.
[Sidenote: LORD SELBORNE'S EXPLANATION]
'Lord Russell stated to Mr. Adams, immediately afterwards, that Sir
John Harding's illness was the cause of that delay. No one then called
that statement in question, which could not have been made without good
foundation. But after a lapse of many years, when almost everybody who
had known the exact circumstances was dead, stories inconsistent with it
obtained currency. Of these, the most remarkable was published in 1881,
in a book widely read, the "Reminiscences" of the late Thomas Mozley.
The writer appears to have persuaded himself (certainly without any
foundation in fact) that "there was not one of her Majesty's Ministers
who was not ready to jump out of his skin for joy when he heard of the
escape of the 'Alabama.'"[40] He said that he met Sir John Harding
"shortly after the 'Alabama' had got away," and was told by him that he
(Sir John) had been expecting a communication from Government anxiously
the whole week before, that the expectation had unsettled and unnerved
him for other business, and that he had stayed in chambers rather later
than usual on Saturday for the chance of hearing at last from them. He
had then gone to his house in the country. Returning on Monday, when he
was engaged to appear in court, he found a large bundle of documents in
a big envelope, without even an accompanying note, that had been dropped
into the letter-box on Saturday evening. To all appearance, every letter
and every remonstrance and every affidavit, as fast as it arrived from
Liverpool, had been piled in a pigeon-hole till four or five o'clock on
Saturday, when the Minister, on taking his own departure for the
country, had directed a clerk to tie up the whole heap and carry it to
Doctors' Commons.
'The facts are, that in the earlier stage of that business, before July
23, the Attorney- and Solicitor-General only were consulted, and Sir
John Harding knew nothing at all about it. No part of the statement said
by Mr. Mozley to have been made to him could possibly be true; because
during the whole time in question Sir John Harding was under care for
unsoundness of mind, from which he never even partially recovered, and
which prevented him from attending to any kind of business, or going
into court, or to his chambers, or to his country house. He was in that
condition on July 23, 1862 (Wednesday, not Saturday) when the
depositions on which the question of the detention of the "Alabama"
turned were received at the Foreign Office. Lord Russell, not knowing
that he was ill, and thinking it desirable, from the importance of the
matter, to have the opinion of all the three Law Officers (of whom the
Queen's Advocate was then senior in rank), sent them on the same day,
with the usual covering letter, for that opinion; and they must have
been delivered by the messenger, in the ordinary course, at Sir John
Harding's house or chambers. There they remained till, the delay causing
inquiry, they were recovered and sent to the Attorney-General, who
received them on Monday, the 28th, and lost no time in holding a
consultation with the Solicitor-General. Their opinion, advising that
the ship should be stopped, was in Lord Russell's hands early the next
morning; and he sent an order by telegraph to Liverpool to stop her; but
before it could be executed she had gone to sea.
'Some of the facts relating to Sir John Harding's illness remained,
until lately, in more or less obscurity, and Mr. Mozley's was not the
only erroneous version of them which got abroad. One such version having
been mentioned, as if authentic, in a debate in the House of Commons on
March 17, 1893, I wrote to the "Times" to correct it; and in
confirmation of my statement the gentleman who had been Sir John
Harding's medical attendant in July 1862 came forward, and by reference
to his diary, kept at the time, placed the facts and dates beyond future
controversy.
[Sidenote: THE QUESTION OF ARBITRATION]
'In the diplomatic correspondence, as to the "Alabama" and other
subjects of complaint by the United States, Lord Russell stood firmly
upon the ground that Great Britain had not failed in any duty of
neutrality; and Lord Lyons, the sagacious Minister who then represented
this country at Washington, thought there would be much more danger to
our future relations with the United States in any departure from that
position than in strict and steady adherence to it. But no sooner was
the war ended than new currents of opinion set in. In a debate on the
subject in the House of Commons on March 6, 1868, Lord Stanley (then
Foreign Secretary), who had never been of the same mind about it with
his less cautious friends, said that a "tendency might be detected to be
almost too ready to accuse ourselves of faults we had not committed, and
to assume that on every doubtful point the decision ought to be against
us." The sequel is well known. The Conservative Government consented to
refer to arbitration, not all the questions raised by the Government of
the United States, but those arising out of the ships alleged to have
been equipped or to have received augmentation of force within the
British dominions for the war service of the Confederate States; and
from that concession no other Government could recede. For a long time
the Government or the Senate of the United States objected to any
reference so limited, and to the last they refused to go into an open
arbitration. They made it a condition, that new Rules should be
formulated, not only for future observance, but for retrospective
application to their own claims. This condition, unprecedented and open
in principle to the gravest objections, was accepted for the sake of
peace with a nation so nearly allied to us; not, however, without an
express declaration, on the face of the Treaty of Washington, that the
British Government could not assent to those new Rules as a statement of
principles of international law which were in force when the claims
arose.
'While the Commissioners at Washington were engaged in their
deliberations, I was in frequent communication both with Lord Granville
and other members of the Cabinet, and also with Lord Russell, who could
not be brought to approve of that way of settling the controversy. He
had an invincible repugnance to the reference of any questions affecting
the honour and good faith of this country, or its internal
administration, to foreign arbitrators; and he thought those questions
would not be excluded by the proposed arrangement. He felt no confidence
that any reciprocal advantages to this country would be obtained from
the new Rules. Their only effect, in his view, would be to send us
handicapped into the arbitration. He did not believe that the United
States would follow the example which we had set, by strengthening their
Neutrality Laws; or that they would be able, unless they did so, to
prevent violations of the Rules by their citizens in any future war in
which we might be belligerent and they neutral, any more than they had
been able in former times to prevent the equipment of ships within their
territory against Spain and Portugal. It was not without difficulty that
he restrained himself from giving public expression to those views; but,
from generous and patriotic motives, he did so. The sequel is not likely
to have convinced him that his apprehensions were groundless. The
character of the "Case" presented on the part of the United States, with
the "indirect claims," and the arguments used to support them, would
have prevented the arbitration from proceeding at all, but for action of
an unusual kind taken by the arbitrators. In such of their decisions as
were adverse to this country, the arbitrators founded themselves
entirely upon the new Rules, without any reference to general
international law or historical precedents; and the United States have
done nothing, down to this day, to strengthen their Neutrality Laws,
though certainly requiring it, at least as much as ours did before
1870.'
[Sidenote: THE COTTON FAMINE]
Lord Russell then held resolutely to the view that her Majesty's
Government had steadily endeavoured to maintain a policy of strict
neutrality, and so long as he was in power at the Foreign Office, or at
the Treasury, the demands of the United States for compensation were
ignored. Meanwhile, there arose a mighty famine in Lancashire through
the failure of the cotton supply, and 800,000 operatives were thrown,
through no fault of their own, on the charity of the nation, which rose
splendidly to meet the occasion. All classes of the community were bound
more closely together in the gentle task of philanthropy, as well as in
admiration of the uncomplaining heroism with which privation was met by
the suffering workpeople.
FOOTNOTES:
[39] _The Liberation of Italy_, 1815-1870, by the Countess Evelyn
Martinengo Cesaresco (Seeley and Co. 1895), p. 252.
[40] Second edition, 1892, chap. xcii.