effect on the public of such statements attributed to him. There is no
record in any of the riot testimony in the coroner's office or in the
state's attorney's office of any bombs exploded during the riot, nor
of police captains warning white people to arm, nor of any fear on the
part of whites of a Negro invasion. In the Berger Odman case before the
coroner's jury there is a statement that a police sergeant warned the
Negroes of Ogden Park to arm and to shoot at the feet of rioters if they
attempted to invade the few blocks marked off for Negroes by the police.
_Herald-Examiner_, July 28. Subheadline: "Negroes Have Arms":
A man whose name is withheld reported to the _Herald-Examiner_
that Negroes had more than 2,000 Springfield rifles and an
adequate supply of soft-nosed bullets. R. R. Jackson, alderman
from the second ward, brands the story as untrue.
This statement is not substantiated.
_Herald-Examiner_, July 29:
Several thousand men stoned the old Eighth Regiment Armory in
the heart of the riot zone, doors were burst in, and hundreds
of guns with ammunition taken by the mob. Police rushed to
the scene firing into the mob and finally drove it from the
armory. According to reports more than 50 persons were shot
or otherwise injured.
Refutation of this statement is found in the testimony of Police Captain
Mullen before the coroner's jury in the Eugene Williams case:
I received a rumor that the soldiers [referring to Negro
soldiers of the Eighth Regiment] had gone over to the armory
for the sole purpose of breaking in and getting rifles. I
dispatched two patrol wagons full of men; after arriving there,
we found out they had been there and broke some windows, but
they found out there were no weapons in there.
Another type of fear-provoking rumor current in street crowds reported
the force and the aggressive plans of the opposing race. Some of these
rumors, current among Negro crowds, were to the effect that a white mob
was gathering on Wentworth Avenue ready to break into the "Black Belt";
that a white mob was waiting to break through at Sixtieth and Ada streets;
that a white mob was ready to advance upon Twenty-seventh and Dearborn
streets. The first of these rumors had its effect upon the inception of
the Angelus riot, and the second so aroused the fears of Negroes that
when a white mob led by young white boys did step over the "dead-line"
boundaries established by the police, guns were immediately turned upon
them, and one of the invaders was killed. Of the third rumor, Police
Lieutenant Burns said:
... an old colored man came to me ... and said that the colored
people on Dearborn Street in the 2800 block were moving out in
fear of a white mob coming from across the tracks from across
Wentworth Avenue.... On the southwest corner of Twenty-eighth
and Dearborn I found a number of colored men standing in
front of a building there. They had pieces of brick and stone
in their pockets and were peering around the corner west on
Twenty-eighth Street apparently in great fear.
Among the whites fear was not so prevalent. A fear-producing rumor was
revealed, however, in the examination of two deputy sheriffs who fired
on a Negro. The deputies had heard that Negroes were going to burn up
or blow up factories in the district which they were patrolling. When
a dark form was seen in an alley, panic seized both deputies, and they
emptied their revolvers at an innocent Negro who lived in the adjoining
house.
Chief among the anger-provoking rumors were tales of injury done to
women of the race circulating the rumor. The similarity of the stories
and their persistence shows extraordinary credulity on the part of the
public. For the most horrible of these rumors, telling of the brutal
killing of a woman and baby (sometimes the story is told of a Negro
woman, sometimes of a white) there was no foundation in fact. The story
was circulated not only by the newspapers of both races, but was current
always in the crowds on the streets. Here is the story as told in the
white press:
_Chicago Tribune_, July 29:
There is an account of "two desperate revolver battles fought
by the police with colored men alleged to have killed two
white women and a white child."
It is reported that policemen saw two Negroes knock down a
woman and child and kick them. The Negroes ran before the
police could reach them.
_Herald-Examiner_, July 29:
Two white women, one of them with a baby in her arms, were
attacked and wounded by Negro mobs firing on street cars....
A colored woman with a baby in her arms was reported at the
Deering Police Station, according to this item, to have been
attacked by a mob of more than 100 white men. When the mob
finally fled before the approach of a squad of police both the
woman and child were lying in the street beaten to death, "it
is said."
_Daily News_, July 29:
Another man is held at the Stock Yards station charged with the
murder of a white woman in West 47th Street and Wentworth....
The Negroes, four in number, were arrested at East 39th and
Cottage Grove Avenue, this afternoon by the detective. They are
believed to be the ones who seriously wounded Mrs. Margaret
Kelley, white woman, at W. 47th and Wentworth. She was shot
in the back and may die. The names of those under arrest were
not given out.
[NOTE.--"Murder" changed to "seriously injured" in the main
story. Mrs. Mary Kelly was shot in the arm according to the
police report and not in the back.]
The men arrested for the shooting were Henry Harris and Scott Brown,
deputy sheriffs, and four others according to the records of the state's
attorney. Sheriff Peters says of the case, that Harris was charged with
shooting someone, but when the case came up the charge was dropped.
Sheriff Peters was convinced that Harris was innocent.
_Daily News_, July 29. Headline, given place of first importance in the
pink section: "Women Shot as Riots Grow." Columns 7 and 8 of first-page
white section are headed, "Attack White Women as Race Riots Grow. Death
Roster Is 30."
The item reads: "Race rioters began to attack white women this afternoon
according to report received at the Detective Bureau and the Stock
Yards Police Station." The article continues, that Swift & Company had
not received any such reports of attacks on their women employees. But
farther on the item gives an account of a Swift & Company truck filled
with girl employees fired upon by Negroes at Forty-seventh Street and
the Panhandle railroad. The driver was reported killed and several of
the girls injured.
The juxtaposition of "Death roster is 30" and "Attack white women"
gives a wrong impression. The "several girls injured" at Forty-seventh
Street evidently refers to the case of Mrs. Mary Kelly. The records of
the state's attorney's office also show that Josephine Mansfield was
supposed to have been wounded by Harris, _et al._, but the charge was
dropped. She was wounded in the shoulder, according to the police report.
_Daily News_, July 30:
Alderman McDonough described a raid into the white district the
night before by a carload of colored men who passed Thirty-fifth
Street and Wallace "shouting and shooting." The gunmen shot
down a woman and a little boy who stood close by.
[NOTE.--No record of such a case.]
Here is the "injury done to women" story as it appeared in the Negro press:
_Chicago Defender_, August 2:
An unidentified young woman and three-months-old baby were
found dead on the street at the intersection of Forty-seventh
and Wentworth. She had attempted to board a car there when
the mob seized her, beat her, slashed her body to ribbons,
and beat the baby's brains out against a telegraph pole. Not
satisfied with this one rioter severed her breasts and a white
youngster bore it aloft on a pole triumphantly while the crowd
hooted gleefully. The whole time this was happening several
policemen were in the crowd but did not make any attempt to
make a rescue until too late.
Concerning all of these stories it may be stated that the coroner had
no cases of deaths of women and children brought before him. There was
nothing in the police reports or the files of the state's attorney or
hospital reports or the reports of Olivet Baptist Church, which would
give any foundation for reports of the killing of a woman and child,
white or Negro.
There were other rumors which had the same anger-producing effect as
reports of attacks on women. A notable case of this kind was the fatal
clash at the Angelus, an apartment house for white people at Thirty-fifth
Street and Wabash Avenue, on Monday, July 28 (see p. 6). The trouble
here grew from four o'clock in the afternoon until it culminated in
the shooting at 8:00 P.M. The excitement was stimulated by the rapid
spread of various rumors. It was said that a white mob was gathering
at Thirty-fifth Street and Wentworth Avenue, only a few blocks from the
colored mob which was massed on Thirty-fifth Street from State Street to
Wabash Avenue. The rumor was that the white men are armed and prepared
to "clean up the 'Black Belt.'" Another rumor had it that a Negro's
sister had been killed while coming home from the Stock Yards where she
worked. Finally came the rumor that a white person had fired a shot
from the Angelus building, wounding a colored boy. The rumor quickly
went through the crowd swarming around the building, but no one heard
or saw the shooting. A search of the building disclosed no firearms.
Police Sergeant Middleton, Negro, described the situation as "everybody
trying to tell you something and you couldn't get anything." Another
Negro policeman said it was "just a rumor that went around through the
crowd and everybody was saying, 'He shot from that window'; I would go
to that window and the crowd would say, 'That is the window over there.'"
The anger-provoking power of rumor was seen in the ensuing clash. About
1,500 Negroes massed on one corner of Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash
Avenue, and about 100 policemen grouped themselves at the intersection
of the two streets. At the sight of a brick flying from the Negro mob the
police fired a volley into the midst of the mob. More shots came quickly
from both sides. Four Negroes were killed, and many were injured, among
both the Negroes and the police.
The Angelus rumor appeared as follows in a Negro newspaper, the _Chicago
Defender_, August 2: "White occupants of the Angelus apartments began
firing shots and throwing missiles from their windows. One man was shot
through the head but before his name could be secured he was spirited
away."
In the case of Joseph Lovings, a Negro killed by an Italian mob, press
reports that were entirely false tended strongly to provoke the anger
of Negro mobs. For example:
_Herald-Examiner_, July 30: "He had been shot, stabbed and gasoline had
been thrown on his body which had been set afire. The police extinguished
the fire and took the body to the County Morgue."
_Tribune_, July 30: "This report says that he was stabbed and shot
sixteen times, then his body saturated with gasoline and set afire."
The coroner's jury in commenting on this rumor said: "It gives us
satisfaction to say that this rumor, from our investigation, is false
and unsubstantiated."
Among the horror rumors one finds such examples as the story of the white
man who stood at the entrance to Exchange Avenue and knocked down half a
dozen Negroes as they came by. This was current in the Stock Yards and
was told by one of the workers at the inquest on the body of William
Dozier, Negro, killed in the Yards. Another rumor had it that a Negro
woman nicknamed "Heavy" had partly slashed off the head of a white man.
This was picked up by a detective circulating among white people living
in the "Black Belt."
But chief among horror rumors was the Bubbly Creek rumor, which took
this form in the press:
_Daily News_, July 29. Subheadline: "Four Bodies in Bubbly Creek." The
article does not give details but says, "Bodies of four colored men
were taken today from Bubbly Creek in the Stock Yards district, it is
reported."
This was one of the most persistent rumors of the riot, and intelligent
men were found repeating it in half-credulous tones. A meat curer,
talking in the superintendent's office of Swift & Company, said: "Well,
I hear they did drag two or three out of Bubbly Creek.... Dead bodies,
that is the report that came to the Yards, but personally I never got
any positive evidence that there was any people who was found there."
A juror on the coroner's panel said: "A man told a friend of mine--I
can furnish the name of that man--a man told him that he saw fifty-six
bodies taken out of Bubbly Creek. They made a statement they used a net
and seine to drag them out."
Mr. Williams, Negro attorney, said he was told that the bodies of 100
Negroes had been found in Bubbly Creek.
In its final report, the coroner's jury made this conclusive statement
regarding the Bubbly Creek rumor:
Bubbly Creek has been the favorite cemetery for the undiscovered
dead, and our inquiry has been partly directed to that
stream. In our inquiry we have been assisted by the Stock
Yards officials and workers, by adjacent property owners and
residents, by private detective bureaus, the Police Department,
Department of Health, State's Attorney's office, by observing
and intelligent colored citizens, and by other agencies, and
we are firmly of the opinion that these reports, so widely
circulated, are erroneous, misleading, and without foundation
in fact, the race riot victims numbering thirty-eight, and
no more, nor are there any colored citizens reported to us as
missing.
Rumor, fermenting in mobs, prepares the mob mind for the direct suggestion
impelling otherwise law-abiding citizens to atrocities. Another more
insidious and potentially more dangerous result is the slow accumulation
of feeling which builds between the white and Negro the strongest barrier
of race prejudice.
_Police._--There has been much criticism of the manner in which the
riot was handled by the authorities, but it may be pointed out that the
riot was not quelled until at least four groups of peace guardians had
taken part in handling it. The two most important groups were the police
and the militia; the others were composed of deputy sheriffs and Negro
ex-soldiers.
Testimony before the coroner's jury and in hearings before this Commission
throws considerable light on the actions of the Police Department as
a whole during the riot, its methods in meeting the unusual situation,
and on the conduct of individual policemen. First-hand information and
opinion was obtained from Chief of Police Garrity and State's Attorney
Hoyne.
The police had two severe handicaps at the outset of the rioting. The
first, as declared by Chief Garrity, was lack of sufficient numbers
adequately to cope with the situation. The coroner's jury found that "the
police force should be enlarged. It is too small to cope with the needs
of Chicago." The grand jury added: "The police force is also inadequate
in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000) officers should be added
to the existing force." This number approximates the need urged by Chief
Garrity, who, when asked before the Commission as to the sufficiency of
his force, answered: "No. I haven't sufficient force. I haven't got a
sufficient force now to properly police the city of Chicago by one-third."
Militia officers and other police officials held the same general opinion.
The second handicap, distrust of white policemen by all Negroes, while
implied and not admitted by Chief Garrity, was frankly explained by
State's Attorney Hoyne. He said before the Commission: "There is no
doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair in making
arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while
they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could get."
Leaders among the Negroes clearly indicate that discrimination in arrest
was a principal cause of widespread and long-standing distrust. Whether
justified or not, this feeling was actual and bitter. This distrust
had grown seriously during the six months preceding the riot because no
arrests were made in bombing cases. State's Attorney Hoyne said before
the commission: "I don't know of a single case where the police have
apprehended any man who has blown up a house."
Charles S. Duke, a well-educated and fair-minded Negro, gave his reaction
to the bombings when he said that he did not "believe a Negro would have
been allowed to go unpunished five minutes." Mrs. Clarke, Negro, said
her house was bombed three times, once while a plain-clothes policeman
was inside waiting for bombers, but no arrests were made. One suspect
was put under surveillance but was not held.
The trial of the three Negro policemen before the Merit Committee
of the Police Department because they refused to use the "Jim Crow"
sleeping-quarters in a police station doubtless added to race feeling,
particularly in view of the publicity it received in the "Black Belt."
Negro distrust of the police increased among the Negroes during the
period of the riot. With each clash a new cause for suspicion seemed to
spring up. The most striking instance occurred on the first afternoon
when Policeman Callahan refused to arrest the white man whom the Negro
crowd accused of causing the drowning of Williams, the Negro boy. This
refusal has been called the beginning of the riot because it led to mob
violence of grave consequences. However that may have been, the fact
remains that this refusal was heralded broadcast by the Negroes as the
kind of action they might expect from the police.
Typical of the minor tales which laid the foundation for the Negroes'
bitterness toward this white policeman are the following:
1. Kin Lumpkin, Negro, was beaten by a mob on the "L" platform at
Forty-seventh Street, as he was going home from work. The policeman
arrested Lumpkin and had him booked for rioting. No other arrests were
made. Lumpkin was held from July 28 to August 1.
2. Two policemen, one of them Officer McCarty of the Twenty-sixth
Precinct, witnessed the beating of Wellington Dunmore, Negro, of 4120
South Campbell Avenue, but, according to the victim, refused to assist
him.
3. John Slovall and brother, Negroes, were beaten and robbed by whites
in sight of a white policeman. No arrests were made. The officer did
not even call for aid.
4. While looking for his mother at Thirty-first and State streets
on Tuesday, July 29, Wm. F. Thornton, Negro, 3207 South Park Avenue,
asked a policeman to take him home. The officer took him to the police
station and locked him up. Another Negro applied for protection, but the
police searched him, clubbed him, and when he ran, the sergeant told
another policeman to shoot him. The policeman obeyed and the man fell
under the "L" station. He was picked up by the same patrol wagon that
took Thornton to the Cottage Grove Police Station. The officer, Bundy,
arrested Thornton.
[Illustration: NEGROES BEING ESCORTED BY POLICE TO SAFETY ZONE FROM THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF FORTY-EIGHTH STREET AND WENTWORTH AVENUE]
[Illustration: SEARCHING NEGROES FOR ARMS IN POLICE STATION]
A report on 229 Negroes and whites accused of various criminal activities
disclosed the fact that 154 were Negroes and seventy-five were whites.
The state's attorney reported eighty-one indictments against Negroes and
forty-seven against whites after all riot cases were cleared up. These
figures show that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice
as many were indicted as whites.
At first glance these figures indicate greater riot activity on the
part of Negroes, and therefore one would expect to find twice as many
whites injured as Negroes. But out of a total of 520 injured persons
whose race was definitely reported, 342 were Negroes and 178 whites.
The fact that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice
as many were injured as whites suggests the conclusion that whites were
not apprehended as readily as Negroes.
Herman M. Adler, state criminologist of Illinois, testifying before
the Commission, expressed the belief that the police showed much more
readiness to arrest Negroes than whites because the officers thought
they were "taking fewer chances if they 'soaked' a colored man."
Negro distrust of police and courts seems to have been confirmed by the
action of the state's attorney's office in bringing only Negro riot cases
before the grand jury. This body, however, took a stand for fair play
and justice for both sides, and though its action may have been novel,
it was effective. In its final report, the grand jury said:
This jury has no apology to offer for its attitude with
reference to requesting the state's attorney to supply it with
information of crimes perpetrated by whites against blacks
before considering further evidence against blacks. This
attitude gave rise to the reports in the press that this grand
jury "had gone on a strike." As a matter of fact, its position
was merely a suspension of hearing further cases of crimes
committed by blacks against whites until the state's attorney
submitted evidence concerning the various crimes committed by
whites against blacks. The reason for this attitude arose from
a sense of justice on the part of this jury. It is the opinion
of this jury that the colored people suffered more at the hands
of the white hoodlums than the white people suffered at the
hands of the black hoodlums. Notwithstanding this fact, the
cases presented to this jury against the blacks far outnumber
those against the whites.
State's Attorney Hoyne justified this action by saying that the Police
Department brought in Negroes only, and until they arrested whites, he
was limited to proceedings against Negroes.
The coroner's jury on November 3, 1919, reported as follows:
Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the time
of race rioting, the arrests made for rioting by the police
of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of
white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially,
at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or
otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite
and aggravate the colored population.
This seeming discrimination in arrests naturally deepened Negro distrust
and lack of confidence in the police. Testimony was taken by the
Commission on the plans and action of the Police Department during the
riot period, since the Commission felt that the distribution of forces
and the methods used by the department to meet such an emergency were
matters of first importance.
Chief of Police Garrity testified that there were 3,500 policemen in the
department at the time of the riot, and that he had "practically every
policeman in the city of Chicago down there," indicating Thirty-fifth
Street and Rhodes Avenue as "practically in the heart of the district
where the most trouble was." The widest distribution from that center,
he said, was over an area bounded by Lake Michigan, Ashland Avenue, Van
Buren Street, and Sixty-ninth Street.
The heaviest concentration of police, however, was in the "Black Belt."
The Stanton Avenue Police Station at Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes
Avenue is at about the center of the most congested Negro residential
area. Asked how many policemen were assigned to that vicinity (the area
from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets), Chief Garrity said, "We had
in the neighborhood of 2,800 men in that territory." Later the chief
said only "the necessary sergeants and one or two men at each station
were held back for emergency calls" in all other parts of the city. This
means that four-fifths of the total police force was concentrated there.
Although there is no direct testimony as to the existence of flying
squadrons of police, yet such bodies appear to have been operating.
Probably the most important of these was the patrol under Police Captain
Mullen, who said that his territory extended from Twenty-second to
Thirty-ninth streets and from the lake to the Rock Island tracks, or
roughly the "Black Belt." Chief Deputy Alcock[9] sent eighty-eight
policemen into this district on Sunday afternoon, twenty-five more at
midnight, and fifty more on Monday morning.
In describing the disposition of police details, Chief Garrity said:
"They were routed by him [Alcock] according to conditions existing in
different districts. Some districts might have a hundred men in the
block and in the next block there might be only ten, according to what
conditions were." Forces were moved from one point of disturbance to
another by means of patrol wagons on request of local commanders.
The 2,800 policemen in the "Black Belt" were under the command of Chief
Deputy Alcock with headquarters in the Stanton Avenue Station. He "used
his discretion in the number of men assigned to the different points
and the handling of them in the different territories."
Riot orders were given by Chief Garrity as follows: "Wherever possible
suppress the riot and restore peace"; "the second day I ordered a
dead line on Wentworth Avenue and Twenty-second Street to, I think,
Sixty-third Street"; "instructions were that 'you will allow no colored
people to go across to the west and no white people to go across to the
east.'" Cabarets, saloons, and public places were ordered closed, and
all large gatherings of either whites or Negroes were prohibited from
Van Buren to Sixty-ninth streets and from Ashland Avenue to the lake.
The chief added, "Closing clubrooms and everything in the district west
of Wentworth Avenue as well as east of it." A general policy was adopted
of search and seizure of persons suspected of carrying weapons on the
street, and of houses from which firing came. Captain Mullen testified
before the coroner's jury at the Eugene Williams inquest that on July
29 Chief Deputy Alcock lined up the policemen in front of the Stanton
Avenue Station and gave them their orders. They were told to "preserve
the peace; that was all."
Police records of clashes were incomplete and often inaccurate. This
was in part due, and naturally so, to the stress of the moment. In many
cases the station lists of injured were far from complete and in few
instances were the names of witnesses given. Even the dates and hours
of clashes were loosely recorded. Persons arrested were frequently
not booked at all, while on the other hand it was not uncommon to find
innocent persons charged with serious offenses. Henry Scholz, policeman
of the Twenty-sixth Precinct, threw much light on police records while
being examined in connection with certain automobile arrests:
They were all discharged, booked for "disorderly," because
we couldn't find the guns in the mix-up. It was the first or
second day down there and they were bringing them in right
and left, and I suppose in the mix-up they mislaid the guns,
or put them away somewhere, or booked them to someone else.
We held them about a week trying to find the guns and trying
to find the officers that got the guns.
It is important to know how the distribution and routing of police
affected the general riot situation. As already shown four-fifths of the
police forces were concentrated in the "Black Belt." This undoubtedly
both weakened police forces elsewhere and also prevented or delayed
reinforcements in outside districts. Only 34 per cent of the total number
of reported injuries occurred in the area of concentration. Negro hatred
of the police is worth mentioning again here, especially since many of
the deaths and injuries occurred during clashes between white policemen
and Negro mobs.
That other districts where danger existed were poorly protected is shown
by the fact that fatal clashes occurred there without interruption by the
police. The most conspicuous case is noted in the "Loop" atrocities on
July 29, where two Negroes, Hardwick and Williams, were killed, several
were injured and robbed, and business property of whites was damaged. A
police sergeant said that only three officers and one sergeant were in
the district on the night of July 28-29. In the Stock Yards district,
where 41 per cent of the injuries and several deaths occurred, there
is no record of an attempt by the police to increase the riot forces.
In this district gang raids by whites were practically beyond control.
On July 28 B. F. Hardy, a Negro, was killed at Forty-sixth Street and
Cottage Grove Avenue. Sergeant Clancy later testified that there were
no policemen in this district until after the trouble. The foreman of
the grand jury investigated the activities of the Deering Street Station
under Police Captain Gallery. He says: "They didn't have a sufficient
number of policemen to handle the situation. If I remember correctly,
he had eight patrolmen covering a district of any number of square miles."
In spite of the concentration of police in the "Black Belt" some parts
of that area seem at times not to have been properly guarded. Several
serious clashes occurred there after the police arrived in force. Theodore
Copling, Negro, was shot to death at Thirtieth and State streets in the
heart of the "Black Belt" on July 30. This had been a riotous corner for
three days, yet no policemen were at hand. The nearest was a detective
sergeant on Twenty-ninth Street between Federal and State streets. Samuel
Banks, Negro, was shot and killed near the corner of Twenty-seventh
and Dearborn streets on July 30 at 11:00 P.M., yet Lieutenant Burns, in
charge of this district, testified at the inquest that twelve to fourteen
officers were at Twenty-seventh and Dearborn streets immediately before
the shooting.
It was undoubtedly the relatively large number of clashes which the
police were unable to prevent that led the coroner's jury to recommend
that "(6) there should be organization of the force for riot work for
the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages."
The conduct of individual policemen received much adverse criticism
from the Negroes. This was to be expected in the circumstances, but
disregarding the general prejudice of which white officers were accused,
certain cases of discrimination, abuse, brutality, indifference, and
neglect on the part of individuals are deserving of examination.
Abusive and brutal treatment was complained of by Horace Jennings, 3422
South Aberdeen Street. He reported to the state's attorney's office
that Policeman G----, of the Grand Crossing Station, approached him,
as he lay wounded by a mob attack, with the words, "Where's your gun,
you black ---- of a ----? You damn niggers are raising hell"; that the
officer hit him on the head, and he did not regain consciousness until
some time later in the Burnside Hospital; and he further charged that
Gallagher took a purse containing $13 when he searched him.
Three Negroes were rescued by the police from a white mob of twenty-five
or thirty men. Scott, one of the Negroes, was taken from the street car
on which all three were riding, by the command of a policeman to "come
out of there, you big rusty brute, you. I ought to shoot you," and was
given a blow on the head. According to a witness he was again struck by
the policeman as he was pushed into the patrol wagon. He was subjected
to rough treatment at the jail and was kept incommunicado from July 28
to August 4, not being permitted to notify his wife or an attorney. None
of the twenty-five or thirty white rioters was arrested. There was some
evidence of fear on the part of the police to arrest rioting whites.
Fear by policemen of Negroes is also disclosed. George Crumm, white, 124
East Forty-sixth Street, informed the state's attorney's office that he
was beaten by a Negro mob, got police assistance, and pointed out the
rioters, but the police "didn't seem to want to interfere any."
On several occasions policemen left the scene of riots on questionable
excuses while the rioting was in progress. Of the three mounted policemen
at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue who rushed to the spot where a
mob was attacking Otterson, two accompanied the automobile of Otterson
to the hospital. The mob was not quelled or dispersed. When the house
of William O'Deneal, Negro, 4742 Wells Street, was attacked, the police
took O'Deneal to the station and left the mob to sack and burn his house.
At the killing of William Dozier, Negro, all three police officers who
responded to notice of an attack by a white mob of 300 or more, left
in the same patrol wagon. The names of witnesses were not taken. It was
the custom for all to accompany the wagon, according to Officer McDonough.
Political "pull" exercised with the police on behalf of rioters has been
indicated. It was noted that one of "Ragen's Colts" said an officer of
the Stock Yards Station "tipped them off" to stay away from their club
because Attorney General Brundage's office was out investigating them.
Indifference both to extreme lawlessness during the riot and to the
procedure of the inquest marked the examination of Captain of Police
Mullen before the coroner's jury. He was in command of twelve mounted men
and between sixty-three and 100 men on foot at Thirty-fifth Street and
Wabash Avenue when a clash between the police and a Negro mob occurred.
While it appears to be the fact that he left just before the heavy firing
to telephone from a saloon one block away, yet the building he was in
was struck by bullets. The following excerpt from the inquest speaks
for itself:
_Q._: What time did the shooting take place at the building
known as the Angelus Building? What time did that occur? Was
there any shooting at that building?
_Mullen_: Not that I heard.
_Q._: Had there been any shooting done there that evening
around ... before you left?
_Mullen_: Not to my knowledge.
_Q._: When was the shooting done, and where were you?
_Mullen_: What do you mean shooting?
Three men were killed and many injured at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash
Avenue at this time. Firing broke out near-by almost immediately.
_Q._: There were some shots fired at Thirty-fifth and State,
Captain, at eight that night, right after the volley was fired,
we have absolute evidence.
_Mullen_: Well, you may have, but I have not.
Yet Captain Mullen was in command of the police who killed two more men
and inflicted other wounds when the Negroes ran before the police advance.
_Militia._--The rapid growth of the riot both in violence and
territorially created such alarm among the authorities and the public
that the question of its control became a matter of paramount concern
to the community. Before twenty-four hours had elapsed requests were
made to the local authorities for the militia. The representations were
based on insufficiency of police forces and were strongly urged before
the chief of police.
Chief Garrity steadily refused to ask for troops, in spite of his
repeated statement that the police force was insufficient. He gave as
his reason the belief that inexperienced militiamen would add to the
deaths and disorders. Mayor Thompson supported the chief's refusal until
outside pressure compelled him to ask the governor for aid. On the other
hand the chief deputy of police was quoted by State's Attorney Hoyne
as having said at the outbreak of the riot that the police would not
be able to handle the situation, and that troops were needed. In this
he was supported by Mr. Hoyne. From observation of conditions on the
first three days of the riot, the chief of staff of the troops, Colonel
Ronayne, concluded that the police were insufficient in numbers, that no
improvement was apparent in the general situation, and that therefore
the troops were necessary. He saw no reason, however, for putting the
city under martial law. Other military men were of the same opinion.
During all of this time Governor Lowden kept in close touch with the
situation from his quarters at the Blackstone Hotel. When the riot
appeared to be subsiding he started to keep an appointment out of town
but, on hearing that there was a renewal of violence, returned to the city
on a special train. When the request was made for the active co-operation
of the troops he acted with promptness.
The troops themselves were clearly of high caliber. For the most part
they were in home service during the war and were older men than are
ordinarily found in militia organizations. They "usually came from
the higher type of business men, men of affairs, men that knew how to
think," as one of their commanding officers described them. They were
all American-born.
[Illustration: NEGROES UNDER PROTECTION OF POLICE AND MILITIA BUYING
PROVISIONS BROUGHT INTO THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD IN WAGONS]
[Illustration: THE MILITIA AND NEGROES ON FRIENDLY TERMS]
The militia discipline was of the best. Not a single case of breach of
discipline was reported to the regimental commanders. No guardhouse was
necessary during the riot, a remarkable commentary on troop conduct.
The militia had been given special drills in the suppression of riots
and insurrections for a year and a half previous to this occasion, and
were, in the estimation of their commanding officer, "probably better
prepared for riot drill than any troops ever put on duty in the state."
The activities of the militia did not begin as early as many citizens
wished. Though troops began to mobilize in the armories on Monday night,
July 28, they were not called to actual duty on the streets until
10:30 P.M., Wednesday, July 30. When called to active duty they were
distributed in the areas of conflict. Between 5,000 and 6,000 troops
were called out. This number was made up entirely of white troops from
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and
from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Reserve Militia regiments of
the militia. Colored troops who had composed the Eighth Regiment were
not reorganized at that time, and therefore none participated.
Distribution of troops was determined not by the militia command but
by the police, because the city was not under martial law, the civil
authority being merely insufficient, not broken. The Third Infantry
covered the territory from Thirty-first to Thirty-eighth streets and
from State to Halsted streets; Eleventh Infantry from Thirty-ninth to
Forty-seventh streets, and from State to Halsted streets; Tenth Infantry
from Forty-eighth to Fifty-fifth streets (later extended to Sixty-third
Street by details from the First Infantry), and from Cottage Grove to
Stewart avenues. The First, Fourth, and Ninth Infantry were held in
reserve. Detachments responded to calls from the chief of police in
districts outside these areas. Headquarters for the commanding general
and his chief of staff were in the Congress Hotel at the northern boundary
of the riot zone.
The orders under which the militia operated did not have the authority
of martial law. The purpose of the orders was to effect a thorough
co-operation with the police only, and not to take over any duties
other than the preservation of law and order. Except in this respect,
civilian routine remained undisturbed. The method of co-operation
put the commanding officer of a regiment in absolute control, within
the limits above described, in his district. The police reduced their
number to normal requirements by removing their reserves as soon as the
militia moved in. The patrolmen then went about on ordinary duties in
the districts. Persons arrested by the militia were turned over to the
police.
Responsibility for the preservation of law and order rested on the
regimental commanders. Careful instructions were given troops for
preventing violence: they were to act as soldiers in a gentlemanly
manner; they were furnished with arms to enable them to perform their
duties; they were to use the arms only when necessary; they were to use
bayonet and butt in preference to firing, but if the situation demanded
shooting, they were not to hesitate to deliver an effective fire. Above
all, the formation of mobs was to be prevented.
The manner in which the militia was received by various elements in the
communities where stationed is illuminating. Police officers were glad
that the troops came to relieve them. Two policemen on duty with a patrol
exclaimed, when they heard the militia had come in force, "Thank God!
We can't stand up under this much longer!" The police at Cottage Grove
Avenue said, "We are tickled to death to see you fellows come in; you
have never looked so good to us before!" A regimental commander said his
organization was "welcomed into the zone, of course, by everybody, and
I'd say especially by the colored people." A similar report came from
another regimental commander.
But there was some show of hostility to the troops. Hoodlums fired on
some detachments when they first came in, and Colonel Bolte reported a
hatred for the troops by "the Hamburg Athletic Club, the Ragen's, and
the Emeralds, and a whole bunch of them over there who didn't like to
be controlled!" Volunteer ex-service men with no legal status, but who
aided the police at the time, and deputy sheriffs with overseas training
ridiculed the militia with such taunts as, "Tin soldiers!" The effect of
this attitude on the populace necessitated the arrest of some disturbers
and the removal of unauthorized persons from the streets.
It is a singular fact that militia activities were principally against
gangs of hoodlums, and the majority of these gangs were composed of
white youths. Said one commander, "Rowdies of the white population tried
to get through the lines and had to be arrested." "At one time a heavy
truck or two loaded with white gangsters attempted to break through the
militia but was checked." Plenty of trouble "with the Ragen's and other
similar organizations" was reported by yet another commander.
The militia unquestionably prevented mob formations, raids, and "sniping."
They checked marauders still in search of prey. In many cases they
prevented the initial moves of lawlessness by taking stations at critical
points long before raiders arrived.
There was a marked contrast between the militia and the police. The
troops were under definite orders; commanders had absolute control of
their forces and knew at all times where and how many effectives were
available. Precision and promptness of movement was the rule. Reserves
were always at hand. Discipline was always good. Only one person, a
white man, was killed by the troops. Whatever other restraining causes
contributed, it is certain that the riot was not revived after the troops
were posted.
Most of the troops were withdrawn on August 8.
_Volunteers._--Many Negro ex-service men, formerly members of the old
Eighth Regiment (Negro) of the Illinois National Guard, donned their
uniforms, armed, and offered their services to the police and militia.
The militia on duty found that these Negro volunteers had no authority
or military status and consequently ordered them to disband, which they
did.
Before the troops were called out, however, a determined effort was
made by one Britton, white police reserve, to organize ex-soldiers for
volunteer service. He said as many as thirty-five joined him. They were
denied permits to carry weapons but are reported to have done so. It
was these men who used an automobile, driven with the mufflers open, to
clear the streets.
Evidence of the use of liquor was noticed among these men during their
active period. Some were involved in the killing of Samuel Banks, Negro;
some in the robbery of a restaurant and in misdeeds of a minor character.
Following the implication of individuals among them in these crimes,
numbers of the ex-soldiers were arrested by the police, but were released
by order of Chief Garrity on account of the assistance many of them had
rendered the department and because of representations of business men
who felt that the arrests were unjust.
_Deputy sheriffs._--In addition to police, militiamen, and volunteers,
another group composed of specially recruited deputy sheriffs, appeared
in the riot zone as preservers of the peace. They were sworn in by
Sheriff Peters, of Cook County, after citizens had appealed to him, he
said, to quell the riot. In regard to their formation, numbers, orders,
and duties, the sheriff had this to say:
I advertised for ex-service men to serve as deputy sheriffs. A
thousand or more applied. They were all men who had returned
from the war and were out of work. I hired 500 of them, kept
them in the army uniforms, and instructed them to shoot to
kill any disturbers or rioters. The presence of these men and
the show of authority thereby made was effective, and the riot
was quelled.
Fifteen thousand dollars was spent on this force.
It appears that these deputies came on the scene toward the end of the
riot week and at once fell into disfavor with the militia, whom they
ridiculed as "tin soldiers" in much the same manner as did the volunteers.
Two regimental commanders of militia said the special deputies "did
not behave in a very pleasant manner" and "in the majority of instances
were no good." The sheriff was notified to call them in and they soon
disappeared. There is no record of organized methods of procedure or of
their activities.
_Restoration of order._--Long before actual hostilities ceased, and even
before the arrival of the militia, various agencies, in addition to the
police, were at work trying to hold lawlessness in check and restore
order. Efforts of citizens of both races helped greatly in bringing
about peace. As long as the rioting was in progress thousands of Negroes
were cut off from their employment. The Stock Yards workers especially
were affected, since Negroes living east of Wentworth Avenue would have
been forced to go to work on foot through the district in which the
worst rioting occurred. The hostilities also cut off the food supply
in the main riot areas. The dealers in the "Black Belt," principally
Jewish merchants, became alarmed lest temporary lack of funds due to the
separation from work and wages should lead Negroes to loot their stores.
On August 1, the various packing companies made the unpaid wages of
Negro employees available for them by establishing pay stations at the
Chicago Urban League at 3032 Wabash Avenue, the Wabash Avenue Young Men's
Christian Association at 3763 Wabash Avenue, the South Side Community
Service House at 3201 South Wabash Avenue, and the Binga State Bank,
Thirty-eighth and State streets. Approximately 6,000 employees were paid
in this way. Banks within the district made small temporary loans to
stranded persons, sometimes without security. The cashier of the Franklin
State Bank at Thirty-fifth Street and Michigan Avenue said that he had
made loans of more than $200 to Negroes in sums of $2 and $3 on their
simple promise to pay, and that every dollar had been repaid.
All the local newspapers in their editorial columns took a vigorous
stand against disorder, urged the people to be calm and avoid crowds,
and were insistent that those responsible for rioting should be brought
to justice. The _Tribune_, for example, published editorials under the
following captions: "Regain Order and Keep It," "Sane Men and Rioters,"
"This Is No Holiday," "The Facts of the Riot," and "Penalties for
Rioters." All of these articles were calm appeals for tolerance, sanity,
and dispassionate inquiry for the facts. The _Evening American_, in an
editorial entitled "This Is Chicago's Crisis; Keep a Cool Head," said:
Chicago is facing its crisis today.
In one great section of the city law and order for the time
being seem to have been flung to the four winds. White men and
colored men are shooting one another down in the streets for
no earthly cause except that the color of their faces differs.
These mobs are not representative of whites or blacks. They
are the hoodlums of both races. But the law abiding whites
and blacks are innocent victims.
Hotheads and smoking gun barrels have almost wrested the rule
from the keepers of the peace.
It is worse than a calamity, this race rioting. It is a deadly,
ghastly scourge, a dire contagion that is sweeping through a
community for no reason except that mob violence is contagious.
It is up to the cool-headed men of Chicago to settle the great
difficulty. It is up to the serious-minded business men of the
city to get together and find a solution to a problem which
has become so serious.
To meet violence with violence is but making matters worse.
Gun toting at a time like this only adds fuel to the fire
already raging.
Reason is the solution. It is mightier than the six-gun. How it
is to be exerted is for the level-headed citizenry to decide,
and decide at once.
Hardly an hour passes that more names are not added to the
already long list of slain in the South Side rioting.
There is no time to be lost. Other matters must be put aside
for the moment and a solution reached for Chicago's greatest
problem.
[Illustration: NEGRO STOCK YARDS WORKERS CUT OFF FROM WORK RECEIVING
WAGES
Photograph taken at temporary pay station established at the Y.M.C.A.
by packing companies.]
[Illustration: BUYING ICE FROM FREIGHT CAR SWITCHED INTO NEGRO RESIDENCE
AREA]
Labor unions also took a hand in the efforts toward peace. Unionists
of both races were exhorted to co-operate in bringing about harmonious
relations, and meetings for this purpose were planned by trade-union
leaders, as described in the section of this report dealing with the
Negro in industry. Probably the most effective effort of union labor was
the following article in the _New Majority_, the organ of the Chicago
Federation of Labor, prominently displayed:
FOR WHITE UNION MEN TO READ
Let any white union worker who has ever been on strike where
gunmen or machine gun have been brought in and turned on him
and his fellows search his memory and recall how he felt. In
this critical moment let every union man remember the tactics
of the boss in a strike when he tries by shooting to terrorize
striking workers into violence to protect themselves.
Well, that is how the Negroes feel. They are panic-stricken
over the prospect of being killed.
A heavy responsibility rests on the white portion of the
community to stop assault on Negroes by white men. Violence
against them is not the way to solve the vexed race problem.
This responsibility rests particularly heavy upon the white
men and women of organized labor, not because they had anything
to do with starting the present trouble, but because of their
advantageous position to help end it. Right now it is going
to be decided whether the colored workers are to continue to
come into the labor movement or whether they are going to feel
that they have been abandoned by it and lose confidence in it.
It is a critical time for Chicago.
It is a critical time for organized labor.
All the influence of the unions should be exerted on the
community to protect colored fellow-workers from the unreasoning
frenzy of race prejudice. Indications of the past have been
that organized labor has gone further in eliminating race
hatred than any other class. It is up against the acid test
now to show whether this is so.
Various social agencies took steps to help in the emergency and restore
order. The American Red Cross has a branch at Thirty-fifth Street and
Michigan Avenue. As soon as the rioting became serious a special relief
headquarters was established here, and food was distributed to needy
families cut off from work. The Urban League was used as a headquarters
for the distribution of food.
The Urban League had for several years, through its employment bureau,
handled a large proportion of the city's Negro labor supply and was
conversant with difficulties likely to result from the rioting. It made
food surveys of the entire Negro area, printed and distributed thousands
of circulars and dodgers urging Negroes to stay off the streets, refrain
from dangerous discussions of the riot, and co-operate with the police in
every way to maintain order. The League sent telegrams to the governor
and mayor suggesting plans for curbing disorder, organized committees
of citizens to aid the authorities in restoring order, and served as a
bureau of information and medium of communication between the white and
Negro groups during the worst hostilities.
The Young Men's Christian Association was similarly active within the
area of its efforts. Religious bodies, ministers' associations, and
individual ministers exerted their influence over their respective
groups by advising the citizens to "keep cool," "hold their heads," and
generally to let the authorities settle the riot. Negro business men and
one Negro alderman sent wagons through the streets bearing large signs
which advised Negroes not to congregate on streets, engage in arguments,
or participate in any way in the disorders. The signs further stated
that people would be advised when it would be safe to return to work.
Other persons went about speaking on street corners urging co-operation
with the police and militia. Appeals by officials and leading citizens
were published in the white and Negro papers, carrying similar advice.
During the riot a committee of citizens representing forty-eight social,
civic, commercial, and professional organizations met at the Union League
Club and petitioned the governor to take steps to quiet the existing
disorder and appoint a commission to study the situation with a view to
preventing a repetition of it. As a result of this appeal followed by
similar urgings by many committees, the present Chicago Commission on
Race Relations was appointed and began its work.
_Aftermath of the riot._--After the restoration of order community
activities were superficially the same as before the riot, but under
the surface there remained a deepened bitterness of race feeling which
spread far beyond the time and territorial limits of the riot itself.
All the deep-seated causes of friction which had developed so largely
from the failure to work out an adjustment of the increased Negro
population due to the migration were and are still present, undiminished
in influence. Consciousness of racial difference and more or less
unconscious fear and distrust were increased and spread by the riot.
Among the whites this was evidenced by the general belief that Negroes
were gathering stores of arms and ammunition. Among the Negroes a growing
race solidarity has been marked. There is a greater lack of confidence
in the white man's law and machinery of protection. Continued bombings
of Negro houses in mixed areas and failure to apprehend the culprits no
doubt strengthen this attitude.
Reports of various Negro gatherings held soon after the riot show this
to be the case. Many Negroes frankly urged their brothers that they must
arm themselves and fight if attacked. At one meeting a Negro is reported
to have said:
The recent race riots have done at least one thing for the
colored race. In the past we Negroes have failed to appreciate
what solidarity means. We have, on the contrary, been much
divided. Since the riot we are getting together and devising
ways and means of protecting our interests. The recent race
riots have convinced us that we must take steps to protect
ourselves. Never again will we be found unprepared. It is
the duty of every man here to provide himself with guns and
ammunition. I, myself, have at least one gun and at least
enough ammunition to make it useful.
The riot furnished the gang and hoodlum element a chance to indulge
in lawlessness. Fear of death and injury may help to hold that element
in check. But it cannot be argued that fear of punishment is much of a
factor, for very few convictions of rioters were secured.
Quick justice would have been a salutary means of curbing tendencies
to riot, according to both the coroner's jury and the grand jury. The
coroner's jury said: "One remedy for race rioting is a speedy conviction
and punishment of those guilty, regardless of race or color, giving
all concerned a fair and impartial hearing." Its eighth recommendation
reads: "Above all, a strict enforcement of the law by public officials,
fair and impartial, will do more than any other agency in restoring
the good name of Chicago, and prevent rioting from any cause from again
disturbing the peace of our city."
The August, 1919, grand jury said: "This jury feels that in order to
allay further race prejudice and to prevent the re-enactment of shameful
crimes committed during the recent riots, efficient, prompt, and fearless
justice on the part of the judiciary be meted out to the guilty ones,
whether they be white or black."
In a fair consideration of whether swift and impartial justice was meted
out, it must be noted that it was extremely hard to secure evidence
sufficient for successful prosecution. Police attention upon arriving
at the scene of a clash was directed more to removing the injured than
apprehending the guilty. Where attempts were made to search out the
offenders, it was next to impossible to get results on account of the
keen race consciousness which made Negroes disclaim knowledge of Negro
culprits and white people deny seeing specific white men act aggressively.
Many of the crowds were neighborhood gatherings and leaders were often
the sons of neighbors.
In most of the riot cases brought before the state's attorney's office
the same difficulty was experienced. Whole blocks of residents were
subpoenaed and accurately described the assaults, but failed entirely to
recognize any of the assailants. The grand jury found the same obstacle.
The foreman, referring to the kind of testimony brought before that body
by Negroes on complaints against whites, said: "... they [the grand
jury] usually found it to be hearsay testimony. Some other individual
told them about So-and-So. That a crime had been committed there was no
question, but to get at the root of it was absolutely impossible."
In spite of these difficulties, those familiar with the riot situation
believe that more arrests of active rioters might have been made
and more convictions obtained. A study of the riot deaths shows that
justice failed to be as swift and sure as the coroner's and grand juries
recommended. The blame for this failure is variously placed on the police,
state's attorney, judge, or jury, according to the prejudice of the one
attempting to fix blame, or his connection with any of these agencies.
The fact remains that the punitive results of the legal processes were
too negligible to furnish a proper deterrent to future rioters.
Of the thirty-eight persons whose death constituted the riot's principal
toll--
Fifteen met death at the hands of mobs. The coroners' jury recommended
that the members of the unknown mobs be apprehended. None were ever found.
Six were killed under circumstances establishing no criminal
responsibility: three white men were killed by Negroes in self-defense,
and three Negroes were shot by policemen in the discharge of their duty.
Four Negroes lost their lives in the Angelus riot. The coroner made no
recommendations, and the cases were not carried farther.
Four cases--two Negro and two white--led to recommendations from
the coroner's jury for further investigation of certain persons, but
sufficient evidence was lacking for indictments.
Nine cases resulted in indictments, four of which led to convictions.
Thus in only four cases was criminal responsibility for death fixed and
punishment meted out to the guilty.
Indictments and convictions are divided according to the race of the
persons criminally involved as follows:
====================================================
| Negro | White
----------------+-------+---------+-------+---------
| Cases | Persons | Cases | Persons
+-------+---------+-------+---------
Indictments[10] | 6 | 17 | 3 | 4
Convictions | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2
----------------+-------+---------+-------+---------
There is evidence that the riot of 1919 aroused many citizens of both
races to a quickened sense of the suffering and disgrace which had come
and might come again to the community, and developed a determination to
prevent a recurrence of so disastrous an outbreak of race hatred. This
was manifest, as another section of this report shows, in the courage and
control which people of both races displayed on at least two occasions
in 1920 when confronted suddenly with events out of which serious riots
might easily have grown.
[Illustration: MILK WAS DISTRIBUTED FOR THE BABIES]
[Illustration: PROVISIONS WERE SUPPLIED BY THE RED CROSS TO HUNDREDS OF
NEGRO FAMILIES]
This examination of the facts of the riot reveals certain outstanding
features, as follows:
1. The riot violence was not continuous, hour by hour, but was
intermittent.
2. The greatest number of injuries occurred in the district west of
Wentworth Avenue, inclusive of Wentworth, and south of the Chicago
River to Fifty-fifth Street, or, broadly speaking, in the Stock Yards
district. The next greatest number occurred in the so-called "Black
Belt," Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets, inclusive, Wentworth to
the lake, exclusive of Wentworth; Thirty-ninth to Fifty-fifth streets,
inclusive, Clark Street to Michigan Avenue, exclusive of Michigan.
3. Organized raids occurred only after a period of sporadic clashes and
spontaneous mob outbreaks.
4. Main thoroughfares witnessed 76 per cent of the injuries on the South
Side. The streets which suffered most severely were State, Halsted,
Thirty-first, Thirty-fifth, and Forty-seventh. Transfer corners were
always centers of trouble.
5. Most of the rioting occurred after working hours. This was particularly
true after the street-car strike started.
6. Gangs, particularly among the young whites, formed definite nuclei
for crowd and mob leadership. "Athletic clubs" supplied the leaders of
many gangs.
7. Whites usually employed fists and clubs in their attacks upon Negroes;
Negroes used firearms and knives in their attacks.
8. Crowds and mobs engaged in rioting were usually composed of a small
nucleus of leaders and an acquiescing mass of spectators. The leaders
were young men, usually between sixteen and twenty-one. Dispersal was
most effectively accomplished by sudden, unexpected gun fire.
9. Rumor kept the crowds in an excited, potential mob state. The press
was responsible for wide dissemination of much of the inflammatory matter
in spoken rumors, though editorials calculated to allay race hatred and
help the forces of order were factors in the restoration of peace.
10. The police lacked sufficient forces for handling the riot; they were
hampered by the Negroes' distrust of them; routing orders and records
were not handled with proper care; certain officers were undoubtedly
unsuited to police or riot duty.
11. The personnel of the militia employed in this riot was of an unusually
high type. This unquestionably accounts for the confidence placed in
them by both races. Riot training, definite orders, and good staff work
contributed to their efficiency.
12. The machinery of justice was affected by prejudices and political
rivalries.
From their reviews of the evidence brought before them, the coroner's
jury and the grand jury presented analyses of the riot, and each made
recommendations of a remedial sort. These recommendations follow:
CORONER'S JURY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. We believe that a representative committee of white and
colored people, working together, could suggest and bring
about the necessary and advisable changes.
2. In specifically attacking the housing situation: The
correction of the evil by enlarging the living quarters and
placing them in a better sanitary state would in part solve
the difficulty. We believe voluntary segregation would follow
and to a considerable extent remove one cause of unrest.
This is a matter that might well be considered by the Real
Estate Board and by improvement clubs and organizations of
property owners in the South Division, and by the Health
Department.
3. In regard to the "athletic clubs": Properly governed and
controlled they should be encouraged and fostered and, when
necessary, disciplined.
4. Hoodlumism evokes this comment: Citizens of Chicago, make
your hoodlum element amenable to law, break up and destroy
hoodlumism as you would a pestilence. It is our belief that
this element can be brought under control of the law, and it
must be done if we are to remove the danger of rioting from any
cause. Vicious hoodlumism, entirely aside from race hatred,
was present in practically all of the thirty-eight killings,
known as race riots.
5. We earnestly urge that fathers and mothers teach their
children the lesson of remaining at home when rioting occurs,
and furthermore, they should be kept occupied, as idleness
and bad association often cause young people to become bad
men and women.
6. One remedy for race rioting is a speedy conviction and
punishment of those guilty, regardless of race or color, giving
all concerned a fair and impartial hearing.
7. Tolerance must be practiced between both white and colored in
the discussion of the race problem, practiced in our everyday
intercourse, in public conveyances, and in meetings of all
kinds.
8. Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the
time of race rioting the arrests made for rioting by the police
of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of
white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially
at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or
otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite
and aggravate the colored population.
9. In cases of murder it is of the utmost importance that
expert criminologists should arrive on the scene at the
earliest possible moment, and that a complete examination may
be made of the scene of the murder before the body is removed
or handled, and while the necessary evidence for conviction
may be obtained, which otherwise may be lost or destroyed. We
have found in the riot cases many instances where the removal
of bodies by inexperienced men, in some cases police officers,
destroyed valuable evidence.
We heartily concur with Coroner Hoffman as to the fact that
Chicago badly needs a permanent murder-investigation squad,
which the coroner planned and has so persistently advocated
in the past. We believe that this squad should be equipped
with motor vehicles and subject to call at any hour of the
day or night. This squad should consist of six or more trained
policemen, working in relays of eight hours, a photographer,
a finger-print expert, a coroner's physician and chemist, the
coroner or deputy coroner, and a state's attorney. In addition
thereto, two trained policemen from the police department
precinct wherein the murder occurred, and a representative
of the City News Bureau. This squad should be available for
immediate service, and it should be the duty of the police at
the scene of the murder to allow no one to handle the body or
enter premises where murder occurred until the arrival of the
squad.
10. The police force should be enlarged. It is too small to
cope with the needs of Chicago, and under the present living
conditions the policeman's pay is entirely inadequate and
should be substantially increased.
Superannuated and incapacitated members of the police force
should be retired under a proper and satisfactory pension
system.
There should be organization of the force for riot work, for
the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages.
GRAND JURY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. It is reasonable to believe that the colored people, if
provided with proper housing facilities and an area sufficient
in extent, would voluntarily segregate themselves. The present
neighborhood known as the "Black Belt" could, by reasonable
public improvement, assisted by our leading public citizens,
be made a decent place to live in for a much larger population
than it now accommodates.... This movement should enlist the
financial and moral support of the industries employing large
numbers of the black race.
2. Facilities for bathing, playgrounds, police protection,
better housing and neighborhood conditions, are matters
deserving the earnest attention of the proper authorities.
3. The employment of the colored people is imperative to the
welfare of this community. Discriminating against the Negro,
or, in other words, failure to give him an opportunity to make
an honest livelihood after having induced him to migrate to
this section of the country, simply adds to the already far
too great number of hoodlums that infest our city.
4. This jury feels that in order to allay further race prejudice
and to prevent the re-enactment of shameful crimes committed
during the recent riots, efficient, prompt, and fearless
justice on the part of the law-enforcing officers, as well
as on the part of the judiciary, be meted out to the guilty
ones, whether they be white or black.
5. ... There is a lack of co-operation and harmony among the
agencies of law enforcement, which impairs their efficiency,
leads to miscarriages of justice, and wastes the public funds.
6. The parole law should be amended so that a criminal once
paroled and subsequently arrested may not a second time be
paroled.
7. The efficiency of the police force would be further greatly
increased by the co-operation of the judiciary in refusing to
grant wholesale continuances without carefully scrutinizing the
results thereof when members of the police force are required
to act as witnesses.
8. The police department is in need of a thorough
house-cleaning. Every officer, no matter what his position
is, who fails in his full duty should be dismissed. Grafters
and those who allow themselves to be dominated by political
influences, who are paid to protect the lives and property of
our citizens, should be dismissed and punished to the fullest
extent of the law.
9. It is the opinion of this jury that the police force is
also inadequate in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000)
officers should be added to the existing force.
10. Policemen who have arrived at the age where their usefulness
is a matter of the past should be pensioned, notwithstanding
their present number, and notwithstanding the fact that the
pension fund is already taxed to its utmost. The needed funds
for this purpose should be provided.
11. ... payment of salaries to public officers commensurate
with the increased cost of living.
12. The authorities employed to enforce the law should
thoroughly investigate clubs and other organizations posing
as athletic and social clubs which really are organizations
of hoodlums and criminals formed for the purpose of furthering
the interest of local politics.
13. The jury also finds that vice of all kinds is rampant in
the "Black Belt," and a thorough cleaning up of that district is
absolutely essential to the peace and welfare of the community.
14. Political influence to a large extent is responsible for
the brazenness with which the Chicago bum, pickpocket, and gun
and hold-up man operates. It is also the opinion of the jury
that the indeterminate-sentence law frequently operates in a
miscarriage of justice, and it is our opinion that the court
should fix the sentence of offenders at the time of their
conviction.
15. Because of the large number of young boys involved in the
rioting, the jury recommends the resumption of the activities
of the Y.M.C.A., the Knights of Columbus, and Salvation Army,
as well as other similar organizations....
CHAPTER II
OTHER OUTBREAKS IN ILLINOIS
I. MINOR CLASHES IN AND NEAR CHICAGO
1. CLASHES IN CHICAGO PRECEDING THE RIOT OF 1919
The race riot of 1919 in Chicago was preceded by a long series of
more or less serious clashes between whites and Negroes. Some of these
are discussed in the section of this report dealing with contacts in
recreation. Others are here described to show the development of friction
and conflict leading up to the 1919 riot. Two brutal and unprovoked
murders of Negroes by gangs of white hoodlums preceded the riot by only
a few weeks.
In many of the antecedent clashes a conspicuous part was played by gangs
or clubs of white boys and young men. These operations frequently showed
organization, and the gangsters were often armed with brass knuckles,
clubs, and revolvers.
Some of the earlier clashes, however, did not have their origin in gang
activities. For instance, it may be that the resentment by whites of
the coming of Negroes into their neighborhood inspired the crowd of boys
between twelve and sixteen years of age who, in February, 1917, stoned
a four-flat building at 456 West Forty-sixth Street. Two Negro families
moved into the two second-floor flats of this building. The next afternoon
about 100 boys from nearby schools stoned the building. The two Negroes
attempted to remonstrate but were driven back. One of them reached the
office of the agent of the building, who notified the police. A patrol
wagon responded, but the boys had disappeared. After it had gone the
boys reappeared and renewed the stoning. Every window in the upper part
of the building was broken. On a second riot call Captain Caughlin and
Lieutenant James McGann and a squad of police rescued the Negroes, who
shortly afterward sought other quarters.
Detectives learned the identity of thirty of the boys, some of whom
confessed. With their parents they were compelled to appear at the Stock
Yards police station and pay for the damage inflicted.
The death of a white man, wrongly thought to have been murdered by
Negroes, led to rioting on the night of July 3, 1917, in which a party of
white men in an automobile fired upon a group of Negroes at Fifty-third
and Federal streets. Apparently no one was hit. Earlier in the evening
Charles A. Maronde, a saloon-keeper at 5161 South State Street, had been
found dead following an altercation with Negroes whose passage through
his premises had irritated him. Two shots were fired, but it was not
proved whether by Maronde or by the Negroes. A coroner's jury found that
he had died of heart disease.
In July and August, 1917, there were minor outbreaks of trouble between
Negroes and naval recruits from the Great Lakes Naval Training Station.
In some instances recruits and in others Negroes were reported to be
the aggressors.
When organized gangs took part in clashes the results were more serious.
A typical case started in the Kohler saloon at South State and Fifty-first
streets on May 27, 1919, two months before the riot.
A group of about ten white men entered the saloon together. When a Negro
came in and called for a drink, one of the whites knocked him down and
kicked him out of the front door. Arming himself with brickbats, the
Negro called on the whites to come out. The gang crossed to another
saloon on the opposite corner, and when they left it shortly afterward,
they carried revolvers. They then beat the Negro, cutting his head. Dr.
Homer Cooper, whose office is above the Kohler saloon, and one of his
patients, Michael Pantaliono, witnessed the affray.
Roscoe C. Johnston, a Negro plain-clothes man who had been on the police
force only four days, was told of the trouble by a citizen and found
the gang in the second saloon. As he approached, Mart. Flannigan drew
a revolver. Johnston called two plain-clothes men, who chanced to be
outside, to summon a patrol wagon, then followed the gang back to the
Kohler saloon and disarmed and arrested Flannigan. Johnston found three
automatic revolvers behind the bar in the saloon and arrested three more
of the men for carrying concealed weapons. Later six more of the men
were taken when the patrol wagon returned to Kohler's, including Patten,
the bartender.
The cases of these ten men were dismissed when they came to trial a
week later before Judge Grant; lack of evidence was the reason given.
Flannigan explained that he carried the gun to protect himself while
taking money to the bank. These young men were said by onlookers to be
members of "Ragen's Colts."
"Ragen's Colts" were frequently identified with lawlessness and specific
clashes before and during the riot. They are typical of the gangs and
"athletic clubs" which were responsible for much disorder, including
attacks upon Negroes. This organization was sponsored by Frank Ragen,
a politician whose record and methods have long offended the decent
citizenship of Chicago. As a member of the Board of Cook County
Commissioners, he allied himself with a spoils-seeking majority against
which two or three public-spirited members waged a courageous struggle.
His participation in the Board's deliberations was marked by such conduct
as the hurling of a large record book and inkwells at members who opposed
the "ring."
As part of his political following he gathered about him the young
hoodlums who make up an important element of the club on which he bestowed
his name. Ragen's influence has often been able to protect the "Colts"
from punishment for criminal acts, including the persecution of Negroes.
Other "athletic" and "social" clubs, though not so notorious, have been
of a like nature. Miss Mary McDowell, head resident of the University
of Chicago Social Settlement, told the Commission that she knew of five
such clubs composed of young men between seventeen and twenty-two:
Especially before the war they were always under obligation
to some politician for renting a store and paying the initial
expenses of their clubs. That's what started them, and it has
come to be quite the fashion to get an empty store with big
panes of glass on which they like to put their names. I am
speaking now of "back of the Yards" conditions.
The Ragen Club is mostly Irish-American. The others are from
the second generation of many nationalities. I don't think
they have deliberate criminal desires. I think they get into
these ways, and then they are used and exploited often by
politicians.... It is about the most dangerous thing that
we have in the city. Whether the police could not stop them
at the time of the riot on the Monday when they went down
Forty-seventh Street with firearms showing in their hands in
autos (a young man living with us can give you his affidavit
on it) and shouting as they went, "We'll get those niggers!" I
don't suppose anybody would want to say, but the fact remains
that nobody did stop them. They went across Halsted Street
towards State Street. Four policemen were there and they never
stopped them at all.
Miss Jane Addams, of Hull-House, also described to the Commission the
way in which the ward politicians are responsible for these clubs. She
said:
The politicians have had a new trick the last few years all
over the city. They pay rent, as Miss McDowell said, for clubs
of boys below the voting age. The politician used to take
care of the young voter and the boy nearly a voter, but now
he comes down to boys of thirteen and fourteen and fifteen and
begins to pay their rent and give them special privileges and
keeps the police off when they are gambling. The whole boy
problem is very much more mixed up with these--I won't call
them gangs, but they are clubs with more or less political
affiliations. They are not always loyal to their political
boss, but he expects them to be and they are, more or less.
The gangs and "athletic clubs" became more boldly active in the spring
of 1919. On the night of June 21, five weeks before the riot, there
were two wanton murders of Negroes by gangs of white hoodlums. One of
the Negroes was Sanford Harris, the other Joseph Robinson. There is
no evidence that either had been offensive in any way, yet they were
deliberately killed by gangs. There is evidence that the gangs in the
neighborhoods of these crimes had spread such fear among Negro residents
that murders of this kind were not unexpected.
Harris lived on Dearborn Street between Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh
streets. About 11:30 P.M. on June 21 he escorted from his home to a
street car at State and Fifty-seventh streets a woman friend who had
been calling on his wife. A Negro man, woman, and child alighted from
this car, and Harris walked behind them west on Fifty-seventh Street on
his way home. A number of white youths approached the man, woman, and
child, one of the gang saying, "Let's get that nigger," referring to the
man. Because of the child's presence they were allowed to pass unmolested.
Then the gang caught sight of Harris, who started to run across a vacant
lot toward his home. A shot was fired and Harris fell after going a short
distance. He died at the Cook County Hospital from peritonitis due to
the bullet wound.
A woman living near Fifty-seventh and Dearborn streets caught hold of
one of the gang who had a pistol in his hand. A plain-clothes policeman
appeared, and she called upon him to arrest the gangster who, she said,
had shot Harris. The detective merely asked how she was able to pick out
the man who had fired the shot. Apparently he ignored the fact that the
man held a revolver in his hand, nor does it appear that he even looked
to see whether it had been recently discharged.
A Mrs. T----, who lived above the saloon at the northwest corner of State
and Fifty-seventh streets, had witnessed the assault on Harris from her
back porch. When other plain-clothes men came upon the scene, she told
them that the gang had hidden under the viaduct on Fifty-seventh Street
west of Dearborn, but there were no arrests and apparently no attempts
to make any.
Earlier the same evening, an altercation had taken place between a number
of white boys from sixteen to twenty years of age and Thomas Johnson,
a Negro who, with a Mrs. Moss, conducted a store next to a saloon at
State and Fifty-seventh streets. The boys had been loafing outside the
door and using foul language. Johnson remonstrated with them and finally
got a stick and started after them. A number of other Negroes aided in
driving off the boys, who, as they left, threatened to "get a gang and
come back and get you." It is thought that this was the gang that killed
Harris.
Joseph Robinson, the other Negro killed that same night, had lived at
514 West Fifty-fourth Place. He was forty-seven years of age, a laborer
for the Union Coal Company, and had a wife and six children, the oldest
seventeen years of age. He was attacked by a gang at Fifty-fifth Street
and Princeton Avenue, apparently without provocation, and received knife
wounds in the back and left leg. He died from shock and hemorrhages on
June 23.
A man named Morden, who lived at 5713 Drexel Avenue, testified at the
Robinson inquest that he had met a gang of from fifteen to thirty men
at Fifty-fifth Street and Shields Avenue about a block from Princeton
Avenue. He said the gang was walking rapidly east and divided to pass
him. He was not far away when Robinson was attacked. The Negro had
evidently been coming in the opposite direction, west on Fifty-fifth
Street (Garfield Boulevard) and the assault began the instant he met
the gang. Morden heard a shot fired and saw Robinson stagger across
the street to a candy store. He saw several men rush forward and help
Robinson in the door as the gang scattered. Morden declared that several
of the gang carried clubs, and that he saw several of these during the
assault.
Nicholas Gianakas, who conducted the candy store at 5458 Princeton
Avenue, into which the wounded man had run, testified that he heard the
shot and saw people outside running in all directions. He saw Robinson
coming in the door with blood running off him. Presently Robinson got
up and went outside to sit on the curb. Gianakas called up the police
station for an ambulance. He saw no weapons in the hands of any of the
crowd outside and recognized none of them. He heard people saying that
a mob had come from "the Yards."
Peter Paul Byrne, a patrolman, testified that he had been called from
his beat at Fifty-fifth and State streets by a man in an automobile, who
drove him to the candy store. There he also telephoned for an ambulance,
then went out and rounded up "some kids" on suspicion. There was a big
crowd around, he said, men, women, and children.
One man testified at the inquest that an acquaintance spoke of having
seen a Greek run out of the candy store and hit Robinson on the head
with a hammer or hatchet. But this acquaintance, when called to testify,
denied the story.
Captain Caughlin, in charge of the police of that precinct, testified
that a number of men had been arrested on suspicion, but all of them
had been discharged because none of them knew anything about the matter.
People had been running in every direction, he said, there had been a good
deal of commotion, and he seemed to think it would have been virtually
impossible for the police to find any of the guilty persons.
C. L. McCutcheon, a Negro railway postal clerk, living at 517 West
Fifty-fourth Place, testified at the inquest that he had been threatened
by mobs, that a gang over on the boulevard had so terrorized the fifteen
or twenty "colored boys" in the neighborhood for a long time that none
of them dared to go about alone; that he himself had two boys who would
not go on Halsted Street for $10 a trip.
Following the killing of Harris and Robinson notices were posted along
Garfield Boulevard and some neighboring streets saying that the authors
of the notices would "get" all the "niggers" on July 4, 1919. These
notices also called for help from sympathizers. They predicted that
there would be a street-car strike on the appointed day, and that then
they expected to run all Negroes out of the district. Some witnesses
at the inquest stated that the Negroes of the district, who up to that
time had done nothing to protect themselves, were advised by friendly
whites to "prepare for the worst," as trouble could scarcely be avoided.
2. RACIAL OUTBREAK IN WAUKEGAN
May 31 and June 2, 1920
Waukegan, Illinois, thirty-six miles north of Chicago and near the Great
Lakes Naval Training Station of the United States Navy, was the scene
of two riotous attacks during the nights of May 31 and June 2, 1920,
on a lodging-house for Negroes, by bands of recruits on leave from the
Naval Training Station. No lives were lost, and only two persons were
hurt, neither of them seriously.
These outbursts scarcely classify as race riots. The chief motive seems
to have been a desire for excitement on the part of young and active
naval recruits.
The Sherman House was a dilapidated place on Genesee Street, the main
street of the town. It had been abandoned by whites and was run as a
lodging-house for thirty or thirty-five unmarried Negroes, chiefly factory
workers. On the first floor was a poolroom and soft-drink "parlor,"
which some of the naval recruits had patronized.
A mischievous Negro boy of ten years, George Taylor, was primarily
responsible for the outbreaks. On the afternoon of May 31 he and his
little sister had been throwing stones at passing automobiles in Sheridan
Road. One of these missiles broke the wind shield of an automobile driven
by Lieutenant A. F. Blazier, an officer at the Great Lakes Station,
who allowed this fact to become known to some of the recruits at the
station. Late that evening an unorganized mob of recruits assembled at
the Sherman House and threw stones, breaking nearly all the windows.
The mob was rushed by all the available police in Waukegan, who took
six prisoners. One reported incident was the chasing of a Negro by half
a dozen bluejackets and marines and his rescue by the police.
Provost guards from the Naval Station rounded up the rioters and took
them back to Great Lakes, thus ending the outbreak.
Two nights later, or June 2, 150 boys on leave from the Naval Training
Station renewed the attack. They gathered in a ravine near the hotel and
at ten o'clock they poured forth, led by a sailor carrying an American
flag. The police had been warned and were ready with reinforcements.
About seventy-five feet from the lodging-house the police ordered the
attackers to halt; no attention was paid to the command, and they fired
their riot guns in the air, wounding two marines who were some distance
away. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued, during which the police seized the
flag and arrested two marines. The Great Lakes boys gathered about the
police station and demanded their comrades.
Commander M. M. Frucht, executive officer of the Naval Station, who
had already been sent to Waukegan by Commandant Bassett, appeared at
the door and quieted the crowd with a promise that all concerned would
have a square deal. He also advised them to return at once to the Naval
Station.
The police released the two prisoners and gave back the flag. Two hundred
provost guards from the Naval Station arrived in motor trucks while the
crowd was at the police station.
Waukegan youths, evidently banded together for the purpose, searched the
house of Edward Dorsey, Negro, at 905 Market Street, on the night of
June 5. Ten of them, ranging from seventeen to twenty-two years, were
arrested. They said they had heard that five white persons were held
prisoners in Dorsey's home and that it was their intention to effect a
rescue. It was asserted that a number of provost guards accompanied the
crowd to the Dorsey house.
The general spirit of the people of Waukegan regarding Negroes may be
judged from a proclamation by Mayor J. F. Bidinger, in which he disclaimed
for the people of the city any intention to harass the Negro. Referring
to reports that some of the white people of the town had participated
in the disturbances, the mayor said: "In the first they did not, and
in the second in no great numbers. Hoodlums generally run true to form
and seldom overlook ready-made opportunity to manifest their peculiar
taste in deviltry. Hence the mixing of a few of them into these fracases
signifies nothing in so far as our general public is concerned."
Observers agreed with the mayor that the disturbances were not race
riots. In this connection his proclamation said:
Now it is a definitely ascertained fact that no adult Negro was
even remotely connected with the first stone-throwing; that
the colored people did not then retaliate and have not since
sought to retaliate in even the smallest measure; and that all
the episodes have consisted simply of an attack upon people
who have been as inoffensive throughout the entire affair as
they could well be. All of which I submit stamps this affair
as an example of disorderly conduct indeed, but not as a race
riot.
3. THE "ABYSSINIAN" AFFAIR
Sunday afternoon, June 20, 1920, a small group of Negroes styling
themselves "Abyssinians" ended a parade of their "order" in front of
a café at 209 East Thirty-fifth Street frequented by both whites and
Negroes. After a brief ceremony one of the leaders produced an American
flag and deliberately burned it. He then began to destroy a second flag
in the same manner. Two white policemen remonstrated with the men but
were intimidated by threats and a brandishing of revolvers. They left
immediately to notify police headquarters. Patrolman Owens, Negro,
arrived as a second flag was lighted. Rushing up to the leader who held
the burning flag in his hands and remonstrating with the group for their
disloyalty, he was immediately shot and wounded. Robert Lawson Rose, a
sailor on leave from the Great Lakes Naval Training Station, protested
against the destruction of the flag and he too was shot; he staggered
into the doorway of a cigar store at 207 East Thirty-fifth Street. Some
of the parade leaders got rifles from a closed automobile which had
followed the parade and was standing near by, and fired into the cigar
store. One of these bullets killed Joseph Hoyt, a clerk in the store.
The sailor, Rose, also died from his wound. In all about twenty-five
shots were fired during the fracas, and several persons were injured.
The men who did the shooting escaped but were arrested later. Crowds
attracted by the demonstration quickly dispersed when the shooting began,
and from then on there was virtually no disorder except for attacks at a
railroad station on three Negro ministers who were returning to the city
and knew nothing of the shooting. Nine Negroes were arrested and held to
the grand jury. One of them was Grover Cleveland Redding, thirty-seven
or thirty-eight years of age, who was the "prophet" of the "Abyssinian"
order in Chicago. Redding, who had admitted the shooting of Rose, was
held with Oscar McGavick for murder, and the others as accessories after
the fact.[11]
The exact reason for this flag-burning has not been disclosed, although
it was apparently intended to symbolize the feeling of the "Abyssinian"
followers that it was time to forswear allegiance to the American
government and consider themselves under allegiance to the Abyssinian
government.
The guns used in the shooting were found by the police in a garage,
together with the regalia of the "Abyssinians," and much of their printed
matter and other effects.[12]
The "Abyssinian" affair might easily have been turned into another great
outbreak such as that of July, 1919. But the police, profiting by their
experience of the previous year, were vigilant. They had organized an
emergency force which was quickly mobilized and put in service in the
district. Moreover, there was evident such a feeling of restraint on
the part of both whites and Negroes that they combined to hunt down the
offenders.
Indicative of this spirit of co-operation to prevent racial conflict,
and helpful to it, was the careful handling of the matter by the press.
Practically every newspaper gave prominence to the way in which the two
races worked together to this end, and all dwelt on the courageous action
of the Negro policeman. A picture printed in the _Herald-Examiner_ the
following morning showed people of the two races fraternizing after the
shooting. The _Daily News_ in reporting the affray said that only the
co-operation of the white and Negro merchants of the district stopped the
disturbance; that rowdies in the neighborhood were ready for a fight,
but that "the better class of whites and Negroes worked directly with
the police to stop any such trouble as a recurrence of the rioting last
summer, which occurred in the same neighborhood."
To understand the "Abyssinian" affair an acquaintance with other
characters, certain group propaganda and movements, is necessary. The
"Back to Africa" movement, which lent fervor and enthusiasm to the
development of lawlessness and wanton killing by this group of unlettered
Negroes, has been in progress for more than two years. The Black Star
Steamship Line and the Universal Improvement Association, headed by a
Negro, Marcus Garvey, a British subject, were organized to establish
commercial relations with Africa. To arouse interest and secure funds
for the enterprise, sentiment has been created among Negroes for the
developing of sections of Africa where they may govern themselves and
build up their own institutions and commerce. The movement has gained
thousands of adherents; although the language of its appeals has
frequently been extreme, it has engaged in no dangerous or unpatriotic
activities. Its connection with the tragic incident lies in the
implication that "Back to Africa" means away from the land of unfair
treatment, and thus suggests contempt for the United States.
[Illustration: PROPAGANDA LITERATURE USED BY "ABYSSINIANS" IN
RECRUITING FOLLOWERS]
The "Star Order of Ethiopia and Ethiopian Missionaries to Abyssinia"
appears to be an illegitimate offspring of the Universal Improvement
Association and the Black Star Steamship Line. The visit of the Abyssinian
Mission to this country a year ago to renew a treaty between their country
and the United States probably served as an added suggestion. The leaders
of the movement were Redding, secretary of the order; Joseph Fernon,
called the "Great Abyssinian," and his son, "The Prince." Together with
a "Dr." R. D. Jonas, a white man who for several years has engaged in
sundry activities among Negroes, they organized this movement among a
class of Negroes too ignorant to exercise restraint over their racial
resentments.
Emotionalism was aroused and a semi-religious twist was given through
their appeals, which played more or less injudiciously on the desire of
Negroes to improve their economic status and to escape from what some
of them regard as oppression, either in this or in other countries. One
or two other similar organizations are making such an appeal, not only
to Negroes in this country, but to other dark-skinned races throughout
the world. It is sought to weld them all together into a great nation.
Glittering promises are set before the illiterate element of the Negro
race, which has responded sufficiently to fatten the purses of some, at
least, of the "prophets."
Redding was one of these "prophets." He was influenced by the white man,
"Dr." R. D. Jonas, and had purchased from him the robe or toga which he
wore during the parade of June 20. According to those who knew both men,
he had first "stolen Jonas' thunder" and the following out of which the
"Star Order of Ethiopia" had been manufactured. Having lost this, Jonas
was willing to sell the regalia.
Jonas, it appears, had been promoting one movement after another among
illiterate Negroes for six or seven years. At one time he conducted a
co-operative store on State Street, in which he sold shares. He was often
an orator at street gatherings and had been arrested a number of times.
When Alexander Dowie of Zion City died, Jonas is said to have attempted
to put himself into the vacant position. After the East St. Louis riots
he appeared in Chicago in an express wagon with signs indicating that
he was collecting funds for the Negroes of East St. Louis.
During the afternoon of the shooting, Jonas had been the principal speaker
at a small, orderly meeting of Negroes in Johnson's Hall, 3516 South
State Street, at which he had launched a campaign for Mayor Thompson as
a third-party candidate for president of the United States. The Mayor,
he said, was the only man who could be trusted "to carry out Roosevelt's
work" and put through the treaty with Abyssinia which expired in 1917.
He also referred to the efforts of the Jews to return to Palestine and
of the Irish to free themselves from British domination, and suggested
the desirability of a coalition of the Negro, Jewish, and Irish races.
Redding's hold on many of the Negroes was partly due to the fact that
he is a Negro and claims to be a native of Abyssinia, whereas Jonas is
a white man.
Quite evidently the "Back to Abyssinia" movement was used as a means
for exploiting credulous Negroes. For one dollar they could purchase
an Abyssinian flag, a small pamphlet containing a prophecy relating to
the return of the black-skinned people to Africa, a copy of a so-called
treaty between the United States and Abyssinia, and a picture of the
"Prince of the Abyssinians." Likewise when the propaganda had begun
to take root, one might sign a blank form which would commit him to
return to "my motherland of Ethiopia" in order that he might fill any
one of forty-four positions, such as electrical engineer, mechanical
draftsman, civil engineer, architect, chemist, sign-painter, cartoonist,
illustrator, traffic manager, teacher, auto-repairing, agriculture, and
poultry-raising. The blank itself was headed:
STAR ORDER OF ETHIOPIA
AND
THE ETHIOPIAN MISSIONARY TO ABYSSINIA
"A Prince shall come out of Egypt. Ethiopia shall soon stretch
out her hands to God."--Ps. 68:31.
This is to certify that my name was given to Elder Grover Redding,
Missionary to Abyssinia, to show to my brothers in my motherland that
I am with them, heart and soul.
Oh, Wonderful Land, God remembers Thee. He shall deliver Thee from under
the heels of Thy Oppressors. He remembers when Asia condemned Him, and
Europe put Him to death, and it was Africa who haven him until King
Herod was dead. It was Africa's son who helped Bare his Cross up to
Calvary. There was Africa's son the Apostle Phillip met, and he carried
the Gospel to Thy land. It was Thee whose Queen came to King Solomon to
prove him with hard questions. Ethiopia, Thou was first on Earth; Thou
shall be last, for Jehova has spoken it. (See Scrip: Zeph. 3:8, 9, 10;
Isa. 18 Chap.; Ps. 68:30, 31.)
STAR ORDER OF ETHIOPIA
AND
ETHIOPIAN MISSIONARY TO ABYSSINIA
This is to certify that I have signed my name as an Ethiopian in
America in sympathy with our motherland Ethiopia. I henceforth
denounce the name of Negro which was given me by another race.
At this point the applicant declares himself ready at any time needed
to fill any of the positions in a list below, which he has checked
and which he is qualified to fill. Blank space appears then for name,
address, present occupation, city, state, and county. At the bottom
appears the name of George Gabriel, described as "Abyssinian" linguist and
native of Abyssinia, together with that of Grover C. Redding, secretary
and missionary. The applicant is requested to mail the blank to 1812
Thirteenth Street, Washington, D.C., in care of Mrs. Dabney, or 115 W.
138th Street, New York City, care of Charles Manson, or Joseph Goldberg,
Jaffa, Palestine.
The immediate inspiration of the Abyssinians, as previously suggested,
was a visit to this country, more than a year before, of a delegation
from Abyssinia, which had concerned itself with a renewal of the old
treaty. It is pointed out that the chief reason why Negroes should be
interested in this treaty is that they might use it to overthrow "Jim
Crow" laws in certain states. Under this treaty Abyssinians had been
guaranteed the right to travel at will in the United States under the
protection of the federal government. Men like Redding had evidently
interpreted this to mean that under such a treaty the United States
would be bound to interfere in behalf of Abyssinians, if they should be
discriminated against under a "Jim Crow" law.
Redding, however, had some sort of biblical interpretation for his
movement. He maintained that his mission was indicated in the Bible. He
quoted from the Scriptures these words: "So shall the King of Assyria
lead away the Egyptian prisoners, the Ethiopian captives, young and old,
to the shame of Egypt." Asserting that the Ethiopians do not belong here,
and that they should be taken back to their own country, he construed a
biblical passage as meaning that the time of their bondage in a foreign
country should be the expiration of a 300-year period. This period,
he said, began in 1619, when Negroes were first taken for purposes of
slavery from Africa to America. He said that the burning of the flag
was the symbol indicated to him through these biblical passages, and
the sign that Abyssinians should no longer stay in this country.
As to the flag of Abyssinia, he had interpreted it thus: "The red means
the blood of Christ; the green, the grass on which he knelt for you
and me; the yellow for the clay. The Ethiopian flag is better known as
'Calvary's flag.'"
Jonas, from whom Redding had obtained these ideas of a Negro Utopia in
Africa, claimed that he had introduced to President Wilson the Abyssinian
delegation which had come to this country. He claimed the credit for
having taken Redding into his home and cared for him several years ago
at the behest of Mrs. Jonas, who had told him that he was a "smart young
fellow."
The ceremonies and manifestations of the "Abyssinians" were marked by
such fanaticism that responsible Negroes repudiated them and condemned
the leaders along with other criminals and exploiters of the ignorant
Negroes. The _Negro World_, organ of the Universal Improvement Association
and Black Star Line, carried the following article.
Appalled by the violence aroused on Sunday night, when an
American flag was burned and two men were killed by the
Abyssinian zealots, colored leaders of the Middle West have
begun a systematic campaign to eliminate white exploitation
among the Negroes and to bring about better racial co-operation.
The Chicago police announced today that all the men wanted in
the case, except two, are under arrest. They also promised that
the career of Grover Cleveland Redding, self-styled "Prince of
Abyssinia," and identified as a ringleader in the affair, will
enter a new phase tomorrow when the frock-coated suspect is
formally charged with murder, accessory to murder and rioting.
Oscar McGavick, one of the men sought, was arrested in
Pittsburgh today. "Bill" Briggs and Frank Heans were taken
into custody here. This leaves the police list with only two
names, the Fernons, father and son. "Dr." R. D. Jonas, known
on the South Side as a professional agitator, was released
today, no evidence having been found of his direct connection
with the shooting. Federal officials are investigating him.
According to the opinions of some of the leaders among
Chicago Negroes the "Abyssinian movement," from which Sunday
night's trouble indirectly resulted, is a legitimate and
valid enterprise. It is but one of the manifestations of that
bubbling activity which today characterizes the colored people
of America in their struggle for race progression.
The trouble lies, they claim, in a group of exploiters and
mountebanks, who, unauthorized by real leaders in the movement,
have seized upon it as a medium for personal gain. In Chicago
two of these were Jonas and Redding, it is claimed.
Pertinent on this point also is the stand taken by the _Chicago Defender_,
among the most influential of the Negro publications, concerning the
Abyssinians, which said editorially:
We warn all agitators, whether they be white or black, that
this paper, standing as it does for law and order, for justice
to all men, for that brotherhood without which no country
can long prosper, and for the better element of our twelve
millions, that we condemn their disloyalty and will do all in
our power to aid the constituted authorities in crushing them.
The burning of the American flag by a group of self-styled
Abyssinians at 35th St. and Indiana Avenue last Sunday evening,
as a means of showing their contempt for the United States,
and the resultant murders that followed in the wake of this
demonstration, instead of accomplishing the end desired by these
malcontents, acted as a boomerang. Every black face portrayed
indignation. Every black arm was lifted to strike a blow at
these law-breakers. This is our home, our country, our flag,
for whose honor and protection we will give our last drop of
blood. With all our shortcomings it can never truthfully be
said that we are disloyal or unpatriotic.
The real problem indicated by the "Abyssinian" affair is how to prevent
self-seekers from playing upon the superstitions and emotions of ignorant
Negroes, to the harm of others and the disturbance of the peace.
4. THE BARRETT MURDER
The murder of a white man, Thomas J. Barrett, by a Negro on September
20, 1920, is not particularly significant in itself. But it was committed
in the heart of the district where some of the worst rioting took place
in 1919, it created a situation which might easily have developed into
another serious riot, and it affords an example of prompt and effective
police handling.
[Illustration: AFTER THE "ABYSSINIAN MURDERS"
Photograph taken at Thirty-fifth Street and Indiana Avenue, where both
races co-operated to maintain order.]
Forty-seventh and Halsted streets is the intersection of two main
thoroughfares used by Negroes returning home from work in the Stock
Yards. The neighborhood is one where gangs of hoodlums have attacked
Negroes, and is thickly settled with people who have shown considerable
antagonism toward Negroes.
Barrett, who was a motorman on the Chicago surface lines, was killed
shortly after seven o'clock in the evening. He had had his shoes shined
at the stand of William Sianis, 4720 South Halsted Street, and had
purchased a newspaper at Halsted and Forty-seventh streets at about 7:00
P.M. About the same time three Negroes came out of the yards of Ready &
Callaghan on Halsted Street between Forty-sixth and Forty-seventh, and
one of these Negroes went to the news stand seeking a newspaper in which
to roll up his overalls. In an encounter with these Negroes, Barrett
was fatally stabbed, dying before he reached a hospital. His head was
nearly severed from his body.
The Negroes, pursued by a rapidly increasing crowd of whites, ran north
nearly a block on Halsted Street. They turned into a vacant lot and went
through alleys until they emerged on Forty-fifth Street near Emerald
Avenue, evidently trying to work their way east to the main Negro
neighborhood. The crowd, however, had thickened so rapidly that they
took refuge in St. Gabriel's Catholic Church, just east of Lowe Avenue.
The mob was checked by the appearance and quieting remarks of Father
Thomas M. Burke, pastor of the church. He told them that the Negroes
had sought sanctuary, that there were laws to punish them, and that it
was not the province of a mob to wreak summary vengeance.
Meanwhile the police were already arriving. A patrol wagon had left
the Stock Yards station about seven o'clock, and followed the pursuing
crowd. Acting Lieutenant Bullard telephoned at once to Chief Garrity,
and extra police were quickly thrown into the neighborhood to control
the crowd.
Samuel C. Rank, lieutenant of police at the Thirteenth Precinct station,
Forty-seventh Place and Halsted Street, had received the alarm about
seven o'clock. He sent five detectives and followed shortly after to
the scene of the disturbance. He went into the church with Sergeant
Brown and three detectives. Lieutenant Rank forced a number of the mob
to leave the church and locked the doors. Captain Hogan, of the Tenth
Police Precinct, and Chief Garrity arrived about this time. The three
Negroes were taken through a rear entrance to a patrol wagon in the alley
and removed to the Hyde Park police station, a considerable distance away.
The crowd in front of the church had grown by this time to 3,000 or 4,000.
In order to quiet them they were again addressed by Father Burke, who
told them the Negroes had been removed from the church. They dispersed
about 10:30 P.M.
Profiting by the experience of 1919 Chief Garrity made prompt use of
prearranged plans to check all such disorders in their incipiency. He
immediately closed saloons and "clubs" in which young hoodlums were
accustomed to gather. He had the police patrol the streets by twos. He
drew a "dead line" to prevent Negroes from entering the district. With
his forces well organized and distributed, he set up headquarters at
the Stock Yards Precinct station and spent the night there, with Captain
Westbrook, commander of the second battalion of police, Captain Hogan,
and Lieutenant Ira McDonnell, of the Desplaines Street station. Street
cars and automobiles approaching the police "dead line" were stopped
and all Negro passengers warned off. Street gatherings were broken up
and people were searched for weapons. People were also kept moving in
the streets. This display of force undoubtedly had its quieting effect.
Nevertheless, a stray Negro was here and there attacked despite the
vigilance of the police.
During the five or six hours following the murder, racial street fights
occurred at Forty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue. A mob stormed a house
at 229 East Forty-fifth Street, attempted to burn it and did considerable
damage. Frank Gavin, a white man, 1509 Marquette Road, was shot in the
back during the mobbing of a Negro at Fifty-third Street and Racine
Avenue. Hoodlums pulled Negroes from street cars and beat them. A Negro
who had been dragged from a car at Thirty-ninth and Emerald Avenue, was
rescued by several white women after he had been severely beaten with
clubs. A man and a small boy, Negroes, were attacked by a gang at Fuller
Park, Forty-fifth Street and Shields Avenue. At Forty-seventh and Halsted
streets three Negroes were taken from a car and slugged, and two others
had a similar experience at Forty-seventh Street and Union Avenue. Frank
Stevens, a white man, 3738 Langley Avenue, was badly injured by a crowd
of Negroes at Thirty-ninth Street and Normal Avenue.
Precautions were continued next day for the protection of Negroes working
in the Stock Yards, and frequenting the district where the disorders had
occurred. This district ran as far west as Racine Avenue and as far east
as Prairie; as far north as Thirty-second Street and as far south as
Fifty-third Street. Negroes working at the Stock Yards had police escorts
to and from their work, and the car lines on Halsted and Forty-seventh
and Thirty-fifth streets, and on Racine Avenue, which are much used by
the Negroes, were especially guarded. Only one clash was recorded the
following day. By six o'clock Wednesday morning, thirty-seven hours
after the murder, the special police concentration was discontinued.
Nine persons in all were reported injured during this disturbance.
Nine men were arrested, including the three Negroes whom Barrett had
encountered. These three were: Samuel Hayes, forty years old, 519
East Thirty-fifth Street; Henry Snow, thirty-two years old, 517 East
Thirty-fifth Street; and Frank Gatewood, forty-three years old, 3446
Prairie Avenue.
Witnesses at the inquest differed as to whether there was any provocation
for the stabbing of Barrett. Only one of them testified that he heard
any of the four persons say anything. This was Carl Duwell, a printer,
466 West Twenty-fourth Place, who had just alighted from a Halsted Street
car. He said that Barrett was following the three colored men and seemed
to be threatening them, saying "You want to fight?" One of the Negroes
suddenly turned and struck at Barrett, slashing his throat. The Negroes
had been walking fast, with Barrett following a few feet behind them.
After he was struck, Barrett staggered a few feet to the curb and fell.
Barrett's widow said he was not in the habit of carrying weapons, but
it was current talk that he had been arrested a number of times for
street fights with Negroes. He had been a policeman in the service of
the South Park Commission, and was an ex-soldier. William Sianis, at
whose stand Barrett had his shoes shined just before the murder, said
that Barrett was apparently sober. Neighborhood gossip was to the effect
that Barrett had been drinking at McNally's saloon at Forty-seventh and
Halsted streets. Also Duwell's testimony indicated that Barrett had been
drinking.
According to Police Captain Hogan, when the Negroes were arrested in the
church, knives were found on the persons of two of them. One of these,
Sam Hayes, admitted to the police at that time that he had stabbed a
white man at Forty-seventh and Halsted streets. His story was that when
he asked the newsboy at the corner for a newspaper in which to wrap his
overalls, Barrett threatened him and then struck him, and the stabbing
followed.
During the night following the murder, Chief of Police Garrity issued a
statement which was published conspicuously in the morning newspapers, and
was most effectively worded to prevent misunderstanding of the incident
and avert use of it to inflame racial hostility. The statement began:
There has been no race riot. The killing at Forty-seventh and
Halsted streets was merely a street-corner fight. There was
grave danger that it would be followed by serious trouble.
Precautionary measures were taken at once to forestall the
recurrence of the riots, with the destruction of life and
property, of last summer.
This was followed by a detailed account of the special measures and
distribution of police to handle the situation.
II. THE SPRINGFIELD RIOT
August 14-15, 1908
The race riot at Springfield, Illinois, in August, 1908, which cost the
lives of two Negroes and four white men, is an outstanding example of the
racial bitterness and brutality that can be provoked by unsubstantiated
rumor or, as in this case, by deliberate falsehood. The two Negro victims
were innocent and unoffending. They were lynched under the shadow of
the capitol of Lincoln's state, within half a mile of the only home he
ever owned, and two miles from the monument which marks the grave of
the great emancipator.
A second fundamental factor in the Springfield riot situation was the
fertile field prepared by admittedly lax law enforcement and by tolerance
in the community of vicious conditions, the worst of which were permitted
to surround the Negro areas.
The spark which touched off the explosion was the old story of the
violation of a white woman by a Negro, and not until the damage had been
done was its falsity confessed by the woman who had told it.
On the night of Friday, August 14, 1908, according to her story, Mrs.
H----, wife of a street-railway conductor, was asleep in her room. She
was alone in the house. She declared that a Negro entered, dragged her
from her bed to the back yard, and there committed the crime. She said
she had attempted to scream but was choked by her assailant, who left
her lying unconscious in the garden.
A Negro, George Richardson, who had been at work on a neighboring lawn
the day before the attack, was accused by Mrs. H---- and was arrested
when he returned to work the next morning. He was placed in the county
jail and on August 19 he was indicted.
During inquiry by a special grand jury certain facts were disclosed
concerning Mrs. H--'s character, and she admitted that, though she had
been brutally beaten by a white man on the night indicated, Richardson
was not present and had no connection with the affair. She admitted that
she had not been raped. For reasons known only to herself, she wished
to keep the name of the real assailant a secret, and therefore she had
accused Richardson. She signed an affidavit exonerating him. Richardson
had no criminal record. He and two of his family were property owners
in Springfield.
While Richardson was in custody and before he was exonerated, feeling
against him was intensified because of the murder, three or four weeks
before, of Clergy A. Ballard, a white man, by Joe James, a Negro tramp,
who was a drug and whiskey addict. James had been taken from a freight
train and placed in jail for thirty days and had been released on the
night of the crime. He was charged with entering the room of Ballard's
daughter, Blanche, at night. Ballard grappled with him, but James broke
away and ran. In the struggle Ballard was mortally injured. James was
found asleep in a park near the Ballard home about noon the next day,
under the influence of a drug. He was tried and hanged, and his body
was taken back to Mississippi by his mother for interment. Rev. Mr.
Dawson, spiritual adviser of James, stated that James declared he had
no knowledge of the crime.
Springfield was, therefore, in a receptive mood when, on the morning
of Friday, August 15, it got the first rumors concerning the attack
on Mrs. H----. Richardson had been taken before her and partially
identified. In the afternoon, when it became known that he had been
arrested, crowds gathered about the jail. They seemed good-natured
rather than blood-thirsty. It was also known that James, accused of the
Ballard murder, occupied a cell in the jail. The sheriff preserved order
through the afternoon, no effort being made to disperse the crowd of
300 or 400 persons. About five o'clock Richardson and James were taken
in an automobile to Sherman, north of Springfield, and there they were
transferred by train to Bloomington.
About 7:00 P.M. leadership began to develop in the mob about the jail.
The leaders demanded the two Negroes, but were finally convinced by the
sheriff that they were not in the jail. Then the story spread that Harry
Loper, a restaurant keeper, had provided the automobile in which the men
had been removed. The crowd rushed to the restaurant five blocks away.
In response to the mob's hootings Loper appeared in the doorway with
a firearm in his hand. About 8:30 P.M. someone threw a brick through a
plate-glass window and in a few minutes the front of the restaurant had
been smashed out. Then followed the complete wrecking of the restaurant,
as well as the owner's automobile, which had been standing in front.
When the mob began to surge through the town the Fire Department was
called to disperse it, but the mob cut the hose. Control having been
lost by the sheriff and police, Governor Deneen called out the militia.
The mob, by this time very much excited, started for the Negro district
through Washington Street, along which a large number of Negroes lived
on upper floors. Raiding second-hand stores which belonged to white men,
the mob secured guns, axes, and other weapons with which it destroyed
places of business operated by Negroes and drove out all of the Negro
residents from Washington Street. Then it turned north into Ninth Street.
At the northeast corner of Ninth and Jefferson streets was the frame
barber shop of Scott Burton, a Negro. The mob set fire to this building.
From that point it went a block farther north to Madison Street and then
turned east and began firing all the shacks in which Negroes and whites
lived in that street.