The army wintered between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. There had
been a reduction and reconstruction of its corps,--an incorporation of
the First and Third with the Fifth and Sixth, with reinforcements added
to the Second. The Second was commanded by Major-General Hancock, the
Fifth by Major-General Warren, the Sixth by Major-General Sedgwick. No
definite statement of the number of men composing the army can be given,
for the campaign is not yet ended; and no aid or comfort, no information
of value to the enemy, can be tendered through the columns of the loyal
"Atlantic."
These three corps, with three divisions of cavalry commanded by General
Sheridan, composed the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-General
Meade. The Ninth Corps, commanded by Major-General Burnside, was added
when the army took up its line of march.
There was concentration everywhere. General Gillmore, with what troops
could be spared from the department of the South, joined his forces to
those already on the Peninsula and at Suffolk; Sigel had several
thousand in the Shenandoah; Crook and Averell had a small army in
Western Virginia; while at Chattanooga, under Sherman and Thomas, was
gathered a large army of Western troops.
The _dramatis personae_ were known to the public, but the part assigned
to each was kept profoundly secret. There was discussion and speculation
whether Burnside, from his encampment at Annapolis, would suddenly take
transports and go to Wilmington, or up the Rappahannock, or the James,
or the York, uniting his forces with Butler's. Would Meade move
directly across the Rapidan and attack Lee in front, with every passage,
every hill and ravine enfiladed by Rebel cannon? Or would he move his
right flank along the Blue Ridge, crowding Lee to the seaboard? Would he
not make, rather, a sudden change of base to Fredericksburg? None of the
wise men, military or civil, in their speculations, indicated the line
which General Grant adopted. The public accepted the disaster at
Chancellorsville and the failure at Mine Run as conclusive evidence that
a successful advance across the Rapidan by the middle fords was
impossible, or at least improbable. So well was the secret kept, that,
aside from the corps commanders, none in or out of the army, except the
President and Secretary of War, had information of the line of march
intended.
We know now how General Burnside marched to Washington, contrary to the
expectations of the public; how his troops passed in review before the
President,--a few veterans, with Roanoke, Newbern, all the seven days
before Richmond, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Vicksburg, and Knoxville on
their tattered ensigns; how they were cheered by the crowd; how,
following them, came a division for the first time shouldering a musket
for their country,--who till a year ago never had a country,--who even
now, although Americans, are not citizens,--disfranchised, yet fighting
for the flag,--beholding now for the first time the careworn, yet
benevolent face of their benefactor, and rending the air with their
hurrahs. There was swinging of hats, waving of handkerchiefs and
banners. They marched to victory or certain death. For them there was no
surrender, after the massacres of Milliken's Bend, Plymouth, and Fort
Pillow.
We know how Butler went up to White House, and then suddenly down the
York and up the James to Bermuda Hundred. We know of the movements of
Sigel and Crook and Averell,--minor, yet important in the general plan.
We have had the victorious march of Sherman, flanking and defeating
Johnston. All these movements were parts of the well-considered plan of
operations.
The expedition of General Banks up the Red River was in process of
execution when General Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the
forces in the field. He sent a messenger recalling it; but, through some
miscarriage or misconception of orders, or from some cause yet
unexplained, the expedition kept on its way, resulting in disaster. The
withdrawal of the gunboats which had been demonstrating off Mobile, and
the departure of troops from the Mississippi, enabled General Johnston
to gather all the forces of the Southwest in front of Sherman. General
Grant designed that General Banks, with troops and flotilla, should
suddenly fall upon Mobile, front and rear. If the works were carried by
assault, then gunboats and transports could appear at Montgomery,
flanking Johnston. It would be the thrusting of a probe deep into the
tenderest and sorest parts of the Confederate body-politic. It would
sever Alabama and Mississippi from the other Rebel States. Or, if
failing in the assault, it would at least compel Johnston to send back
the troops withdrawn, thus making it easy work for Sherman.
The failure of any part in a concerted movement affects all other parts.
General Banks not appearing at Mobile has retarded Sherman. The failure
of Butler to close the Southern portal, and the defeat of Sigel, who,
instead of knocking loudly at the back-door of the Rebel capital, was
himself knocked back, have enabled Lee to concentrate all his troops
against the Army of the Potomac. Finnegan's troops from Florida,
Beauregard's from Charleston, Pickett's from North Carolina, Buckner's
from Western Virginia, and Breckenridge's from the Shenandoah, at the
close of the month, are fighting against General Grant at Coal Harbor.
These are the general features of the campaign as a whole; but, separate
and distinct from the movements of all other armies and bodies of men,
are the operations of the Army of the Potomac, which has a campaign of
its own,--forever memorable!