OPINION OF THE ANCIENT WORLD ON SLAVERY.
Permanence of Slavery under all Revolutions--Ignorance of
Principle of Human Equality--Theory and Personal Experience of
Plato--Contentment of Slaves with their Condition--Occasional
Comfort and Happiness of Slaves--Absence of Revolts against
Slavery--Social and Political Rights ignored by Greeks and Romans.
Having, in the preceding chapters, shown how human slavery came into
the world, how it originated in the despotism of paternal power,
before laws or governments were known, and how, coeval with society
itself, it had grown up, flourished, and everywhere established
itself, as a _domestic_ institution, before any conventional act or
delegated authority of society came to consolidate it as a _social_
institution--having shown all this, and afterwards explained the
subsequent modifications, enlargements, and aggravations of slavery
made by positive legislation,--let us now ascertain why the diabolical
institution endured so long in the world; why it still endures in very
many countries; and, above all, why every attempt to get rid of it has
hitherto only had the effect of aggravating the evils of society, and
making the mass of mankind more miserable slaves, _without the name_,
than any that ever bore the name in ancient or modern times. Having
ascertained this, we shall then be prepared to comprehend the only just
and practicable means whereby slavery of every sort, and in every form
and degree, may be effectually and for ever banished from the world.
Had slavery, amongst the ancients, originated in, and been upheld by,
their laws and governments, it may be fairly presumed that some of
the revolutions which, at various epochs, swept away their laws and
governments would have swept away the institution of slavery amongst
the rest. Whatever is forced upon a decided majority of any people, by
the will of a minority, can be upheld only by fraud and coercion. Had
these been the conditions of slavery amongst the ancients, it is quite
certain that the moment a successful revolution, from within or from
without, came to break up the authority of rulers in any particular
country, the slaves or bondsmen would, that very moment, seize their
opportunity to emancipate themselves; and if it was the love of
equality or of social justice that made them rise, they would not lay
down their arms till they had established a just social order, based
upon the recognition of _equal rights and equal laws for all_.
Now, there is hardly any ancient state or country we could name
that has not had its revolutions, and that did not witness, at some
period or other, a complete subversion of its government, laws, and
institutes; yet do we find the institution of slavery survive in
all. In no one instance do we find the slaves of a revolutionalized
state avail themselves of such a crisis to establish _the rights of
man as man_. Intestine commotions, military insurrections, foreign
invasions, popular triumphs over kings and senates--these and all other
like incidents in the life of nations invariably passed away without
abolishing the curse of slavery. Why was this? How happened it? Why did
not the slaves of the old pagan world take advantage of some popular
insurrection, or of the overthrow of their rulers by some invader,
to vindicate the rights of humanity in their own persons, by at once
establishing a free government for all, and by abolishing slavery
altogether?
There is but one true and sufficient answer to these questions: it is
this:--The doctrine of human equality, of equality in rights, duties,
and responsibilities, was altogether unknown to the ancients: it was
denied in theory; it was unheard of in practice. With the solitary
exception before adverted to--that of the Essenes (of which more
by-and-by), there is no historical record or monument extant to show
that the slaves of antiquity, as a class, knew or cared anything
about theories of government, much less that they comprehended what a
Frenchman would understand by the words _république démocratique et
sociale_, or what a member of the National Reform League understands
by “the political and social rights of the people.” Nor does there
appear to have been a single writer, teacher, philosopher, legislator,
orator, or poet, amongst the whole heathen world, to inspire the
slave-class with any such notions. On the contrary, the idea that one
class were born to be slaves, and the other to be masters, was an idea
as sedulously inculcated by the educators of ancient society, as it
was implicitly believed in by the slaves themselves. The poet and the
two philosophers who, more than any others of their class, exercised
a moral influence upon the ancient world--to wit, Homer, Plato, and
Aristotle--agreed, to a hair, in considering mankind as naturally
divided into two classes--those made to command and those made to obey,
_alias_ masters and slaves. Homer tell us, formally, in the “Odyssey,”
that Jove gave to slaves but the half of a soul. Plato, when citing
this passage in his “Treatise on Laws,” substitutes the word _mind_
for the Homeric word _virtue_, and adds his authority to that of the
poet, to inculcate that the Father of the Gods bestowed _mind_ and
_virtue_ but by halves upon the children of slavery. Plato is still
more expressive elsewhere. In his dialogue entitled “Alcibiades,” he
makes Socrates teach the same doctrine after his favourite fashion
of question and answer. He makes him ask Alcibiades whether it is
“in the class of nobles or in the class of plebeians that natural
superiority is to be found;” to which the proficient pupil unhesitating
makes answer, “Undoubtedly, in the class of nobles,” or “in those
nobly born.” Aristotle is still more emphatic than Plato in laying
down the theory of human inequality. In one place he goes so far as
to call children “the animated tools of their parents,” signifying
by that, that children are by birth the natural slaves of their
fathers. In his “Treatise on Politics,” he tells us, roundly, that
at the very moment of their birth all created beings are naturally
fashioned, some to obey, and some to command--or, rather, some _to
be commanded_, and the others to command; for it is the same verb he
makes use of in both cases, using the _passive_ mood for the slaves
and the _active_ for the slave-owners. In the same treatise he tells
us, further on, that nature actually makes the bodies of freemen
(genteel folk) different from those of slaves; that the latter are
purposely made robust and hardy for the necessities of labour, whilst
those of gentlemen are made so slight and upright as to be unfit for
physical labour, but well qualified for the business of government.
In citing this passage, we have given an almost literal translation
of the Greek--a translation more expressive of the author’s sense
than a strictly verbal translation would be. The very terms made use
of by Aristotle show clearly his belief that slaves were made to be
slaves, and their masters to govern them. The words we have rendered
by the free translation, “qualified for the business of government,”
mean, “_literally_, availably useful for political life,” which, if
not so intelligible, is stronger and of wider signification than our
translation. At all events, there can be no doubt as to Aristotle’s
meaning. Like Homer and Plato, he was a firm believer in the _duality_
of human nature--that is to say, that slaves were born with one
nature, and their masters with another. Indeed, Plato carried this
creed so far, that he made slavery to consist in the moral and
mental man himself, and not in the servility of his condition as a
slave. A wise man, he contended, could not be made a slave of: the
natural superiority of such a man would rise superior to any, or all,
conditions that might be imposed upon him. Plato lived to have his
doctrine tried in his own person. Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, had
him sold for a slave by one Pollio, a Lacedemonian chief; but history
does not say whether Plato the slave held the same opinions on slavery
as Plato the freeman and philosopher. It was one of his maxims that
“a wise and just man could be as happy in a state of slavery as in a
state of freedom.” Dionysius took him at his word, and, tyrant though
he was, we think he served Plato right. The sage who believed in two
natures, one for slaves and another for freemen, and who taught that a
wise and just man could be as happy in slavery as in freedom, deserved
to have such doctrines tried and verified in his own person. Plato had
them tried in his; but, great philosopher as he was, we suspect he must
have found some little difference between slavery and freedom, when
we find him seizing the first opportunity to recover his liberty, and
preferring to live a freeman, in Athens, to living a slave at Ægina.
When such were the opinions of philosophers and poets (whose mission
and function it was to live for other generations and other times them
their own), what may we not expect from the vulgar herd who lived only
for themselves? Their ideas were just what we might expect. High and
low, gentle and simple, rich and poor, freemen and slaves--all, all
believed in the duality of human nature--in the divine origin of kings,
and in the no less divine origin of slavery. On these points the whole
of pagan antiquity appears to have been unanimous. The treatment of
their helots by the Spartans, who, in order to disgust their children
with drunkenness, used to exhibit those unfortunates in a state of
bestial intoxication, speaks volumes for the notions the ancients had
of slaves and slavery. Their occasional decimation of the helots by
wholesale and deliberate slaughter, for no other or better reason than
to thin their ranks and reduce their numbers for their own convenience,
is a still more glaring exemplification. It shows that a slave was a
mere thing--a chattel--a nobody--even a nuisance, if his master only
chose to think him so.
The Elder Cato, who was cried up for his goodness as a master to his
slaves, thought it not unworthy of himself, nor unjust to them, to
keep them always quarrelling with one another, by artfully fomenting
jealousies amongst them. Plutarch tells us, too, that when they got old
and broken down, Cato used to treat them as he (Plutarch) would not use
the ox or the horse that had served him faithfully. He used to sell
them, or dispose of them any way, when there was no more work to be got
out of them. Yet Cato was a model for the gentlemen slave-owners of his
day. He was the Benjamin Franklin of his republic; the Adam Smith of
the Roman political economy of his time. When _he_ behaved so to his
slaves, what must have been the opinions and behaviour of such masters
as were brutes by nature, tyrants by instinct and culture? Seneca
describes one of these worthies to us, under the name of Vedius Pollio,
who, if we are to believe that philosopher, was in the habit of feeding
the fish in his ponds with the flesh of his slaves! It is impossible to
conceive that slaves must not have been considered of a different and
inferior nature, when every description of masters, good and bad, are
found (however differing in their mode of treatment) to deal with them
as with beings having no rights of their own--no rights but what their
masters might choose to confer.
The slaves, on their side, appear to have been perfectly reconciled
to slavery as an institution. The writings of the ancients have left
us nothing to countervail this opinion, but, on the contrary, much
to confirm it. We can nowhere discover any evidence to show that the
slaves of antiquity regarded slavery in any other light than as an
institution natural in itself, and neither unjust nor unreasonable,
provided they (the slaves) were well treated. It is true they often
complained of their lot, and sometimes rebelled, too, in order
to change it; but, in so doing, it is to be observed, they never
complained of slavery _as an institution_, nor invoked the principle of
Equality as the end and object of their complaints or rebellions. Their
complaint was, not that slavery existed, but that they, themselves,
and not others, were the slaves. And when they rebelled, it was not
in order to put down slavery and establish liberty for all; it was to
exchange conditions with their masters, or else to secure their own
freedom at the price of taking away other people’s. The idea of making
common cause with other slaves, in order to emancipate all slaves,
never entered their heads. Principle, or love of equality, had nothing
whatever to do with their movements. The principle of _liberty for
all_ was too sublime an idea for them. Equality before God and the law
was still further beyond them. Slavery, _as a principle_, they had
no fault to find with; they complained only of the _accident_ that
made them slaves and others free. Even of this the vast majority never
complained, because the vast majority (there is reason to believe) were
content with their lot, and satisfied with their masters’ treatment of
them. Indeed, the whole tenour of what we read of in history respecting
slaves leads to this conclusion. The vast majority were content with
their condition. In general they were kindly treated; and as they knew
no other state, and saw nothing unjust or unreasonable in slavery, they
were attached to their masters as to benefactors (regarding them as the
authors of their comfort), and might, mayhap, as a general rule, be
pronounced happy.
The old classics are full of allusions and passages which go to show
the high state of domestic comfort enjoyed by certain descriptions of
slaves, and the free and familiar relations which subsisted between
them and their masters. A kindly and homely sort of intercourse was the
rule; harshness and ill-nature would appear to have been the exception.
Indeed, slaves were regarded so much in the light of mere animals by
masters, and masters so much as demi-gods, or superior beings, by
slaves, that no possible rivalry, jealousy, or misgivings could subsist
between them; but, on the contrary, that sort of mutual confidence,
fidelity, and fondness with which favourite horses and dogs reciprocate
the kindly treatment and caresses of their owners. Whenever we find
slaves breaking out into insurrection, we may be sure it is either
because they have harsh masters, or have been torn from distant homes,
or are being seduced by insurgent chiefs who promise them rapine and
freedom; or because they expect, through a successful insurrection,
to become pirates or robbers, which was the highest occupation of
honour and profit that a slave could aspire to in those days. In these
insurrections, as already observed, equality was never invoked. The
“rights of man” was a profound mystery in the womb of the future. The
insurgents thought of no slavery but their own; and of no other or
better advantages from liberty than the spoils of their masters, and
exchanging conditions with them.
Limiting ourselves, for the moment, to Roman history, we find some six
revolts of slaves recorded by Livy, and some three or four more made
mention of by Aulus Gellius, Tacitus, and others. Livy does not go
much into detail; but, from the little he says, he makes it manifest
that real liberty or equality had nothing to do with any of the six
revolts he treats of. The sixth revolt, which was headed by one Eunus,
a Syrian, is related at greater length by Diodorus of Sicily. And what
does Diodorus show? That Eunus was an impostor, who pretended a mission
from the Syrian Venus, and, ejecting flames from his mouth by means
of a hollow nut that he had filled with lighted sulphur, succeeded in
fanaticising some 2,000 slaves, and inducing them to break loose from
the work-houses. He had soon an army of some 60,000 men, gained several
actions in the course of a long and bloody war, made himself master of
the camps of four prætors; but at last, pressed by increasing numbers,
and forced to shut himself up in the city of Enna with his followers,
he and they, after defending themselves with courage and bravery amid
indescribable difficulties, were at last overpowered, and perished
all, by famine, pestilence, and the sword. This insurrection, which
took place in Sicily, was no sooner quelled than another broke out,
of a similar kind, and upon as large a scale, under the command of a
slave named Athenio, who, after assassinating his master, and causing
all the work-houses to rise in insurrection, had soon as large an army
under his command as Eunus had. Like Eunus, Athenio had some incipient
successes; he stormed and made himself master of two prætorian camps:
like Eunus, however, he had soon to succumb to the united force of
famine and the sword. He perished, with nearly all his followers. The
immediate cause of these two servile wars--which, next to the famous
one under Spartacus, appear to have been the most formidable of their
kind--was the alleged violation of the work-house regulations by the
masters. Indeed, Diodorus testifies, positively and clearly, that the
revolt headed by Athenio arose solely from the inability of the prætor
in Sicily to enforce the laws or regulations which had been made in
favour of the slaves, and which, like our modern factory lords, the
masters were continually seeking to evade. Plutarch lets it appear that
a similar cause provoked the revolt of Spartacus.
Those three revolts, which took place during the last sixty years of
the Republic--namely, the two under Eunus and Athenio, in Sicily,
and the third under Spartacus, in Italy--were the most serious and
destructive of the servile wars recorded of Rome. They had the ablest
commanders, and met with the largest measure of success. In these, if
in any wars of the kind, might we hope to find the dignity of human
nature vindicated by the insurgent bondsmen. There was nothing of the
sort. The harsh conduct of masters and the violation of work-house
rules were the motive powers of each revolt: no higher motive seems,
for a moment, to have actuated the revolters.
The conduct, too, of Eunus and Athenio, during their brief success,
showed how thoroughly undemocratic, and even aristocratic, were their
plans and objects. Instead of setting about the abolition of slavery
and the establishment of equality, they began forthwith to ape the pomp
and circumstance of their oppressors, and to deal with their followers
as though they were little kings, and not fellow-slaves in rebellion.
They wore purple robes and gold chains. Athenio carried a silver staff
in his hand, and had his brow wreathed with a diadem, like a monarch.
Indeed, Florus tells us that, while these adventurers assumed all
the state and airs of royalty, they imitated royalty no less in the
havoc, plunder, and devastations they spread around them. At first they
contented themselves with plundering and pulling down the castles,
villas, and mansions of the aristocrats and master-class; but, this
accomplished, they soon began to exact the same servility from their
followers that they had themselves kicked against. Liberty and equality
were out of the question. Had they succeeded, their wretched followers
would soon have found that they had but exchanged masters.
The revolt under Spartacus is the most horrible of all, because it was
a revolt of men who were gladiators as well as slaves. Liberty or the
rights of man had no more to do with this revolt than with any of the
others. It arose from brutal oppression on the part of one Lentulus
Batiatus, to whom a portion of the insurgents belonged: he was training
them, in fact, that they might combat one another to death in the arena
for his recreation. Neither in its origin, conduct, nor results did
this servile war differ from any of the others. Like all of them, it
originated in private wrongs, was purely personal in its antecedents,
and neither in its progress nor results did it exhibit a single
indication of democratic, philanthropic, or any other virtues than the
usual military ones common to all Romans at the time. In truth, what we
moderns understand by political and social rights (and without which
we know that real liberty cannot exist for any people) was an idea
altogether foreign to every class of Greeks and Romans, and, indeed, to
the whole of antiquity, with the solitary exception of the Essenes.
Thus, _public opinion_ conspired with law and custom to uphold direct
human slavery throughout the ancient world. This opinion must have
been all but universal, since not even slaves in revolt ever dreamt
of abolishing slavery as an institution. They warred against certain
incidents and accidents of slavery; never against the principle itself.
This universality of public opinion in its favour, coupled with the
fact that direct slavery is an evil of far lesser magnitude than
the indirect slavery of modern civilization, we take to be the true
explanation of the old pagan system having endured so long in the world.
[Illustration: Decoration]