All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said: but does it follow from
an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of
slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves
ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation?
Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought
therefore, to be comprehended in estimates of taxation, which are
founded on property, and to be excluded from representation, which is
regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection as I
understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in
stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. We
subscribe to the doctrine, might one of our Southern brethern observe,
that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation
more immediately to property; and we join in the application of this
distinction to the case of our slaves.
But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as
property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the
case is, that they partake of both these qualities, being considered
by our laws, in some respects as persons, and in other respects as
property.
In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in
being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject
at all times to be restrained in his liberty: and chastised in his
body by the capricious will of another; the slave may appear to be
degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational
animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being
protected, on the other hand, in his life, and in his limbs, against
the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his
liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed
against others; the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as
a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as
a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The Federal
constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of
our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and
property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character
bestowed on them by the laws under which they live, and it will not be
denied, that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under
the pretext, that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects
of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of
numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the
rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be
refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.
This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all
sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they
are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have
been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the
list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to be
calculated; and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of
contributions was to be adjusted?
Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur
in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when
burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same
light, when advantages were to be conferred?
Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the
Southern States with the, barbarous policy of considering as property
a part of their human brethern, should themselves contend, that the
government to which all the States are to be parties, ought to
consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light
of property, than the very laws of which they complain?
It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the
estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They
neither vote themselves, nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon
what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the Federal estimate
of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the constitution
would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been
appealed to as the proper guide.
This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a
fundamental principle of the proposed constitution, that as the
aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is
to be determined by a Federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of
inhabitants; so, the right of choosing this allotted number in each
State, is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants, as the
State itself may designate. The qualifications of which the right of
suffrage depends, are not perhaps the same in any two States. In some
of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a
certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the
constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which
the Federal constitution apportions the representatives. In this point
of view, the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting,
that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard
should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own
inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should
have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in
like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous
adherence, however, to this principle is waived by those who would be
gainers by it. All that they ask, is that equal moderation be shown on
the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in
truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the
constitution be annually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants,
but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants,
which regards the _slave_ as divested of two-fifths of the _man_.