Mr. Smith. He would now proceed to state his objections to the clause
just read, (section 2, of article 1, clause 3.) His objections were
comprised under three heads: 1st, the rule of apportionment is unjust;
2d, there is no precise number fixed on, below which the house shall
not be reduced; 3d, it is inadequate. In the first place, the rule of
apportionment of the representatives is to be according to the whole
number of the white inhabitants, with three-fifths of all others; that
is, in plain English, each State is to send representatives in
proportion to the number of freemen, and three-fifths of the slaves it
contains. He could not see any rule by which slaves were to be
included in the ratio of representation;--the principle of a
representation being that every free agent should be concerned in
governing himself, it was absurd to give that power to a man who could
not exercise it--slaves have no will of their own: the very operation
of it was to give certain privileges to those people, who were so
wicked as to keep slaves. He knew it would be admitted, that this rule
of apportionment was founded on unjust principles, but that it was the
result of accommodation; which, he supposed, we should be under the
necessity of admitting, if we meant to be in union with the southern
States, though utterly repugnant to his feelings.
Mr. Hamilton. In order that the committee may understand clearly the
principles on which the General Convention acted, I think it necessary
to explain some preliminary circumstances.
Sir, the natural situation of this country seems to divide its
interests into different classes. There are navigating and
non-navigating States--the Northern are properly the navigating
States: the Southern appear to possess neither the means; nor the
spirit of navigation. This difference of situation naturally produces
a dissimilarity of interest and views respecting foreign commerce. It
was the interest of the Northern States that there should be no
restraints on their navigation, and that they should leave full power,
by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of
their own, and in restraint of the navigation of foreigners. The
Southern States wished to impose a restraint on the Northern, by
requiring that two-thirds in Congress should be requisite to pass an
act in regulation of commerce: they were apprehensive that the
restraints of a navigation law would discourage foreigners, and by
obliging them to employ the shipping of the Northern States would
probably enhance their freight. This being the case, they insisted
strenuously on having this provision engrafted in the constitution;
and the Northern States were as anxious in opposing it. On the other
hand, the small States seeing themselves embraced by the confederation
upon equal terms, wished to retain the advantages which they already
possessed: the large States, on the contrary, thought it improper that
Rhode Island and Delaware should enjoy an equal suffrage with
themselves: from these sources a delicate and difficult contest arose.
It became necessary, therefore, to compromise; or the Convention must
have dissolved without effecting any thing. Would it have been wise
and prudent in that body, in this critical situation, to have deserted
their country? No. Every man who hears me--every wise man in the
United States, would have condemned them. The Convention were obliged
to appoint a committee for accommodation. In this committee the
arrangement was formed as it now stands; and their report was
accepted. It was a delicate point; and it was necessary that all
parties should be indulged. Gentlemen will see, that if there had not
been a unanimity, nothing could have been done: for the Convention had
no power to establish, but only to recommend a government. Any other
system would have been impracticable. Let a Convention be called
to-morrow--let them meet twenty times; nay, twenty thousand times;
they will have the same difficulties to encounter; the same clashing
interests to reconcile.
But dismissing these reflections, let us consider how far the
arrangement is in itself entitled to the approbation of this body. We
will examine it upon its own merits.
The first thing objected to, is that clause which allows a
representation for three-fifths of the negroes. Much has been said of
the impropriety of representing men, who have no will of their own.
Whether this be reasoning or declamation, I will not presume to say.
It is the unfortunate situation of the southern states, to have a
great part of their population, as well as property, in blacks. The
regulations complained of was one result of the spirit of
accommodation, which governed the convention; and without this
indulgence, no union could possibly have been formed. But, sir,
considering some peculiar advantages which we derived from them, it is
entirely just that they should be gratified. The southern states
possess certain staples, tobacco, rice, indigo, &c., which must be
capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations; and the
advantage which they necessarily procure in these treaties will be
felt throughout all the states. But the justice of this plan will
appear in another view. The best writers on government have held that
representation should be compounded of persons and property. This rule
has been adopted, as far as it could be, in the Constitution of
New-York. It will, however, by no means, be admitted, that the slaves
are considered altogether as property. They are men, though degraded
to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal
laws of the states which they inhabit as well as to the laws of
nature. But representation and taxation go together--and one uniform
rule ought to apply to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves
in the assessment of taxes, and discard them from the estimate in the
apportionment of representatives? Would it be just to impose a
singular burthen, without conferring some adequate advantage?
Another circumstance ought to be considered. The rule we have been
speaking of is a general rule, and applies to all the states. Now, you
have a great number of people in your state, which are not represented
at all; and have no voice in your government; these will be included
in the enumeration--not two-fifths--nor three-fifths, but the whole.
This proves that the advantages of the plan are not confined to the
southern states, but extend to other parts of the Union.
Mr. M. Smith. I shall make no reply to the arguments offered by the
hon. gentleman to justify the rule of apportionment fixed by this
clause: for though I am confident they might be easily refuted, yet I
am persuaded we must yield this point, in accommodation to the
southern states. The amendment therefore proposes no alteration to
the clause in this respect.
Mr. Harrison. Among the objections, that, which has been made to the
mode of apportionment of representatives, has been relinquished. I
think this concession does honor to the gentleman who had stated the
objection. He has candidly acknowledged, that this apportionment was
the result of accommodation; without which no union could have been
formed.
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