FURTHER MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA,
AND THE BEGINNING OF THE END.
After the battle of Bentonville General Johnston retreated to
Smithfield, N. C., a distance of seventeen miles. Gen. Frank
Cheatham, with two thousand of the Army of Tennessee, joined him
there, and small squads of that army continued from time to time to
come up, marching on foot from Corinth, Miss. A lull took place in
the movements of the Federal army at this time. Generals Sherman and
Schofield had united their large armies, and were deliberating on
their next movement to encompass General Johnston and his army. The
Confederate recruits that had joined since the battle of Bentonville
about supplied the losses Johnston had sustained during his North
Carolina campaign.
During this lull in military movements General Johnston availed
himself of the opportunity to reorganize his much depleted army. Five
or six companies were consolidated into one, three or four regiments
into one, and so on through the list to that of divisions. This,
of course, retired many commissioned officers from the lowest rank
to that of major generals of divisions. I do not remember that any
lieutenant generals were interfered with, as I am of the opinion that
we did not have an oversupply of this grade on hand. But to the honor
of these retired officers, I did not hear of one who sulked in his
tent for this reason; but they patriotically became members of the
army again in some capacity, even down to enlisting, as many of them
had done at the beginning of the war, as privates in their company.
The infantry say to this day that most of them joined the cavalry.
I know that some twenty of them, the highest rank among them being
that of colonel, joined the Fourth Tennessee Cavalry and were paroled
with that regiment. I remember after the reorganization to have met
a soldier in the old Second Tennessee Infantry, and I asked him what
was the number of his regiment since the reorganization. He replied
that he did not know, as it was one of the questions that was past
finding out; that he knew of a company of a lieutenant and five men
that had been built up to the regulation limit of seventy-two men
by the consolidation of five other companies and the enlistment of
commissioned officers from the lowest rank to that of major general
to reach the required limit. Of course the soldier was romancing, but
really he was drawing a truthful picture of what the Confederate army
was then, after four years of campaigning and fighting the battles
that they had passed through.
Before General Johnston had left Smithfield he was officially
notified of the fact that General Lee had been forced to leave
Petersburg, Va., with his army on the 2d day of April, 1865.
Richmond, the Confederate capital, had been evacuated, and the
President and his Cabinet were then at some point in North Carolina,
of which Johnston was notified by telegram, summoning him to meet
them in conference. I do not suppose that any other officer of the
Army of Tennessee knew of this fact at the time, even the highest
ranking officers. While this conference was in session General Lee
notified President Davis of the surrender of his army at Appomattox.
I will be pardoned here for quoting liberally from Johnston’s
narrative for the purpose of showing what transpired at the interview
between General Johnston and Mr. Davis and his Cabinet. The army was
totally ignorant of all this, and the thought of a surrender had not
entered their minds:
The three corps of the Confederate army reached Raleigh,
N. C., on the evening of the 10th of April, 1865. In a
telegram dated Greensboro, N. C., 4:30 P.M., the President
directed me to leave the troops under Lieutenant General
Hardee’s command and report to him there. Taking the first
train, about midnight, I reached Greensboro about eight
o’clock on the 12th, and was General Beauregard’s guest. His
headquarters was a freight car near by and in sight of those
of the President. The General and myself were summoned to
the President’s office in an hour or two, and found Messrs.
Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan with him. We had supposed
that we were to be questioned concerning the military
resources of our department in connection with the question
of continuing or terminating the war. But the President’s
object seemed to be to give, not to obtain, information.
He said that in two or three weeks he would have a large
army in the field by bringing into the ranks those that
had abandoned them in less desperate circumstances, and by
calling out the enrolled men whom the conscript bureau with
its forces had been unable to bring into the army. It was
remarked by the military officers that men who had left the
army when our cause was not desperate, and those who under
the same circumstances could not be forced into it, would
scarcely in the present desperate condition of our affairs
enter the service upon mere invitation. Neither opinions nor
information was asked, and the conference ended.
General Breckenridge, as was expected, arrived that
afternoon and confirmed the report of the surrender of the
Army of Virginia. General Beauregard and myself, conversing
together after the intelligence of the great disaster,
reviewed the condition of our affairs, carefully compared
the resources of the belligerents, and agreed in the
opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown. In
conversation with General Breckenridge afterwards I repeated
this and said that the only power of government left in
the President’s hands was that of terminating the war, and
that this power should be exercised without more delay. I
also expressed my readiness to suggest to the President the
absolute necessity of such action, should an opportunity
to do so be given me. General Breckenridge promised to make
this opportunity. Mr. Mallory came to converse with me on
the subject. He showed great anxiety that negotiations to
end the war should be commenced, and urged that I was the
person who should suggest the measure to the President.
General Breckenridge and myself were summoned to the
President’s office an hour or two after the meeting of his
Cabinet the next morning. Being desired by the President to
do so, we compared the military forces of the two parties
to the war. Our force was an army of about 20,000 infantry
and artillery and 5,000 mounted troops. That of the United
States was three armies that could be combined against ours,
which was insignificant when compared with either: Grant’s
army of 180,000 men, Sherman’s army of at least 110,000,
and Canby’s army of 60,000--odds of seventeen or eighteen
to one, which in a few weeks could be more than doubled.
I represented that under such circumstances it would be
the greatest of human crimes for us to attempt to continue
the war, for, having neither credit, money, nor arms but
those in the hands of our soldiers, nor ammunition but that
in their cartridge boxes, nor shops for repairing arms or
making ammunition, the effect of our keeping the field would
be, not to harm the enemy, but to complete the devastation
of our country and the ruin of its people. I therefore urged
that the President should exercise at once the only function
of government still in his possession and open negotiations
of peace.
The President then desired the members of his Cabinet to
express their opinions on the important subject. General
Breckenridge, Mr. Mallory, and Mr. Reagan thought that
the war was decided against us, and that it was absolutely
necessary to make peace. Mr. Benjamin expressed the contrary
opinion, making a speech for war, much like that of
Sempronius in “Soldier’s Play.” The President said that it
was idle to suggest that he should attempt to negotiate when
it was certain from the attempt previously made that his
authority to treat would not be recognized, nor any terms
that he might offer would be considered by the government
of the United States. I reminded him that it had not been
unusual in such cases for military commanders to initiate
negotiations upon which treaties of peace were founded, and
proposed that he should allow me to address General Sherman
on the subject. After a few words in opposition to that
idea, Mr. Davis reverted to the first suggestion, that he
should offer terms to the government of the United States,
which he had put aside, and sketched a letter appropriate
to be sent by me to General Sherman, proposing a meeting
to arrange the terms of an armistice to enable the civil
authorities to agree upon terms of peace. The letter
prepared in that way was sent by me to Lieutenant General
Hampton, near Hillsboro, to be forwarded to General Sherman.
It was delivered to the latter the next day, April 14, and
was as follows:
“The result of the recent campaign in Virginia has changed
the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am
therefore induced to address you in this form the inquiry
whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood
and devastation of property, you are willing to make a
temporary suspension of active operations and to communicate
to Lieutenant General Grant, commanding the Army of the
United States, the request that he will take like action in
regard to the other armies, the object being to permit the
civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to
terminate the existing war.”
This note was promptly delivered to General Sherman, who agreed to
the proposition and fixed the time for a conference. When they met
for a secret interview, General Johnston asked that Gen. John C.
Breckenridge be admitted to their meeting, which was also granted.
On the 18th day of April, 1865, the two commanding officers of the
respective armies agreed in writing as follows:
Memorandum or basis of an agreement made the 18th day of
April, A.D. 1865, near Durham Station, in the State of North
Carolina, by and between Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commanding
the Confederate army, and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman,
commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina,
both present.
This agreement contained seven different items relating to the terms
of surrender, only one of which is necessary for our purpose to
repeat here:
The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and
conducted to their several State Capitols, there to deposit
their arms and public property in the State arsenal, and
each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to
cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State
and Federal authority, the number of arms and ammunitions
of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington
City, subject to the further action of the Congress of the
United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to
maintain peace and order within the borders of the States
respectively.
The seven articles of agreement close as follows:
Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to
fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge
ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority and
to carry out the above program.
Both of the commanding generals attached their names to this paper,
giving their official rank as commanders of their respective armies,
and an armistice was declared, pending the transmission of the
document to Washington City for the approval of the President of
the United States.