any appointment or start on a foreign tour of study, generally finish
their education at one of these establishments, which, especially in the
harbour towns, are of a very high standard. Their usefulness and
superiority are also universally acknowledged. All classes of society,
regardless of creed, contribute to the maintenance of these schools. The
"Christian Brothers" at Pekin have quite lately erected a large college
on entirely modern principles, which supplies a long-felt want in the
capital.
In spite of all these reforms, it will be long before China acknowledges
the superiority of the West. Although public opinion is slowly and
gradually changing, this is not entirely because the people recognize
the superiority of Western culture, but rather because they are in
self-defence obliged to make reforms in order to ward off the dangers
which threaten on all sides.
To a Chinaman the ideal of happiness was quietness and peace; the object
of his civilization to conquer and subdue the brutishness of human
nature, and to combat all desire for violence. As a result of this
education and such a turn of mind which have been in force for more than
ten thousand years, militarism has not only been banished from their
social code of law, but died out of the upper social classes. From
generation to generation the Chinese are taught that the greatest of all
virtues is equanimity; can we therefore wonder that they do not yet
appreciate European civilization, which appears to teach the reverse? If
the Chinese have been at last compelled to relinquish their ancient
views of life and to accept ours, can we blame them if they do it
grudgingly?
After all, it is only a question of time: how long the Chinese can hold
out, and stick to their old civilization. It may be decades, it may be
hundreds of years. Time is a factor of only secondary importance where
it concerns the transformation of a whole race. But the day is coming,
must come, when not only China's four hundred millions, but the milliard
of the whole Tartar races shall, without exception, adopt the European
civilization, and all the advantages of it. And if in that remote future
the question of the Yellow Peril should arise, the consequences may
indeed be serious. For China would naturally remain hostile to the West,
and, in conjunction with Japan, be its most formidable foe, so long as
the two cultures of the West and the East do not learn to understand
each other. Little as we really know of the peoples of the East, still
less do they know of us. To remove the mutual misunderstanding should be
our earnest endeavour. And this, though not an easy task, considering
the prominence which has been given to the existing differences, is not
an impossible one; for does not the burden of it fall alike on both the
white and the yellow race?
When we shall have succeeded in dispersing the prejudices existing on
either side; when we shall have learnt to appreciate the virtues of the
yellow race, and they shall have recognized the nobler ideals which
animate us; then the two races, instead of opposing one another in the
battle-field, will, let us hope, offer one another the hand of good
fellowship, and the banner on the one side of the united brotherhood
will bear as a device, "Mutual Aid and Help" instead of "Aggression and
Oppression"; and on the other side, "Friendship and Confidence" instead
of "Violence and Mistrust."
Let us hope that the Chinese will benefit, not only by our military
equipments and material achievements, but that they will also share our
spiritual supremacy, and above all learn or recognize the fundamental
principles--the basis of all true civilization, the Christian virtues of
Faith, Hope, and Charity. XIV
CONCLUSION
The foregoing chapters were written on the eve of the war. Since that
time the situation is, to some degree, altered, though not so
essentially as might be imagined; and I even believe the general feeling
to be, to a certain extent, the same today as it was yesterday. Neither
party is entirely satisfied; the interests and aims of neither the one
nor the other seem to have been fully realized, and both appear to have
lost more than they have gained in the lengthy, costly, and cruel war.
On the one side, the Russians have had to renounce the most valuable
provinces of what they regarded as their former acquisitions, whilst the
Japanese have not been compensated, either by the definite annexation of
Korea or of Manchuria. The political situation is fundamentally
identical with that of yesterday, or rather with that of a decade ago.
The Peace of Portsmouth does not alter the _status quo_ much from what
it was after the Treaty of Simonosaki, still less from what it was
before the Alliance of Chifu.
The problem of the domination of Eastern Asia is not solved; the two
great races, the white and the yellow, with their conflicting interests,
are striving for the mastery as before.
The Peace of Portsmouth might more justly be called an armistice. A
truce has been concluded, and we hope that this truce may be of longer
duration than the last. And, above all, let us hope that it may really
tend to the well-being of the countries interested, and of cultural and
moral advantage for the nations concerned.
Though the Peace of Portsmouth may be unimportant, the moral influence
of its articles is all the more real from a purely material point of
view. Japan, in spite of her admirable self-restraint, has become one of
the Great Powers, and she shows her strength, her security, and her
power, more especially by her moderation and self-control. The
renunciation of certain points and the ratification of many conditions
required, undoubtedly, a self-control and a political foresight which
this young nation has lately proved she possesses. After an unexpected
succession of brilliant victories--when the fleet of her rival had been
annihilated, the forts of Port Arthur laid in ruins, the hostile armies
forced back step by step--it was hardly credible that Nippon would
refrain from insisting upon complete evacuation of Manchuria, annexation
of Saghalien, and at least a certain amount of war indemnity.
Was it not natural that Count Witte should inform his depressed
countrymen with satisfaction, that Russia is still as much a Great Power
in the Far East as she was before? Was it not pardonable if this piece
of news, and many others of a similar kind with regard to Russia's
diplomatic acquisitions, gave rise to tumult in the streets of Tokio,
and, at any rate among the lower classes of Japan, to loud expressions
of dissatisfaction? Such spontaneous manifestations of a people's
feelings are easily understood and cannot be taken amiss; but these
people, in spite of their dissension, will daily recognize more and more
what uncommon astuteness has been displayed by the envoys of the nation,
in their acceptance of the present and, to some extent, unsatisfactory
terms of peace.
Time will prove what were the motives which chiefly determined the
Japanese Government to desist from further prosecution of the war.
Certainly the role played by the leading Powers must have been an
important one. It seemed increasingly doubtful if the forms of future
loans would ensure the same interest for the groups concerned.
Anglo-American credit, which Japan apparently possessed to an unlimited
extent at the outbreak of the war, became circumspect and cautious to a
degree. Further financial undertakings, which, in consequence of the
unexpected and decisive defeat of Russia, might have resulted in
insolvency, could of course not be agreeable to the French and
Continental stockholders.
[Illustration: COUNT WITTE To face page 384]
From an international point of view it was desired that the situation,
at any rate as far as appearances went, should remain unchanged. What
was aimed at was equilibrium, not preponderance. Opinions which made
themselves heard, not only in Central Europe, but also in the English
and American newspapers, showed more and more plainly how critical the
situation would be if Japan alone possessed undisputed paramount power
in Eastern Asia. The leading papers, which at first had been so
enthusiastic and described with such unbounded admiration Japan's
gallant battles and unexpected victories, grew gradually reserved as the
question of how far Japan's ambitions might one day extend, became
doubtful.
Economic acquisitions were feared even more than the actual strategic
conquests. Already a portion of the commerce of the Far East has left
European hands and fallen to the share of Japan, and evidently this will
more and more be the case. The vicinity of the country, the cheap rate
of wages, the simplicity of social conditions and those of labour, even
at the present day, all contribute to give Japan the advantage in the
competition. What their Government chiefly covet, at any rate just
now, are new commercial spheres--safe markets--to profit by the great
wealth of neighbouring states. By adroit commercial treaties with China,
exploitation of the mineral riches of Manchuria and the Korean mines,
Japan may, in a very short time, not only make good her war expenditure,
but consolidate the economical condition of the empire and increase the
general well-being.
From a political point of view, it can no longer be denied that the
Pacific Ocean will be, at least on the eastern half, dominated by the
Japanese fleet. In short, it is this point which is the essential one.
As I have already stated, Japan's schemes of conquest, if she had any,
would be directed less towards the north than towards the south. Siberia
never seems to have had a great attraction for her, and I believe that
even Manchuria, together with the Amur Provinces, leaves her
indifferent. She intends to let the original possessor, China, reconquer
it one day. Her far-seeing policy seems to be governed by the assumption
that the Eastern Asiatic continent belongs to her neighbours, the
Chinese. For herself, she wants to secure the position of a great Sea
Power. Her island home, and more especially her sea-faring population,
tend to guide her in this direction. As factors to this end they have
not only subjective competency, but the greatest objective
possibilities. The Island Empire of the Pacific is still, to a great
extent, with all her wealth, a _terra incognita_. We may say the same of
the South Sea Islands, which are mostly only under the nominal dominion
of the white races. Honolulu and the Philippines might one day be
included in the dominions of this newly-arisen great Power; and her
sphere of action will possibly create a yet larger circle.
Australasia, even, might become the ultimate aim of Japanese Imperialism
and commercialism. The climatic conditions of the northern parts are
such that Europeans find it difficult to settle there, and in the
limitless sugar and coffee plantations the employment of white labour
has always been unsuccessful, in spite of every effort. The number of
the white inhabitants is still very small, although the continent was
first occupied over a hundred years ago. The original native tribes have
slowly died out; but the new settlers, over this whole extent of
enormous territory, do not number as many as the population of London.
Sparsely peopled, she stands there isolated and unfortified,
defenceless, so to speak, in the midst of the sea.
The actual guarantee for her independence is offered by the circumstance
that she forms part of the British Empire. This dominion is of course
nominal; still, it is enough, at any rate at present, to protect the
continent from foreign attack. But it is not hard to foresee what would
happen to Australia, with the adjacent islands, Tasmania and New
Zealand, should she be severed from Great Britain. Indeed, it is much to
be feared that if ever the present alliance between England and Japan
were to change into hostility, the former pupils and friends might be
obliged to turn their arms against their instructors and allies.
Now, however, a truce has been declared in Eastern Asia. The Peace of
Portsmouth has been concluded, and the consequences of this recent event
will undoubtedly be greater than the bloodiest battles of the past few
months, although it occasioned less noise. I must acknowledge that I am
somewhat astonished that the world which welcomed with such jubilation
Japan's victories at sea, seems to fail to understand her greatness in
the field of diplomacy. Yet nothing was harder than to find such a
solution of the various antagonistic problems as should ensure a free
path for progress in the future. After such glorious battles, after the
unchecked progress of an army intoxicated with success, it must have
been very hard to halt, and to utilize this interlude for future
strengthening and eventual expansion. Nothing could really have
hindered the march to Harbin or to the Baikal district. Even the
occupation of Vladivostok was merely a question of time. But, as has
already been stated, it was not to Japan's interest to press northwards,
and still less to carry the day by sowing the seeds of a yet greater
hatred, and exciting the conquered country to a policy of revenge.
That, probably, was the reason why the Japanese gave up the war
indemnity, and hope to refund it themselves from the agricultural wealth
of the strip of land annexed, instead of from the Russian coffers. Japan
did not desire either to increase the animosity of her enemy or to lose
the sympathy of her allies. Above all, she abstained from rousing
hostility and jealousy on too many sides before the definite attainment
of her goal.
The self-command evinced by the Japanese is the greatest feature that,
in the whole course of her history, we have had occasion to admire, it
is even greater than her bravery, and this same attribute was manifested
in a remarkable manner during the entire war. In the battles, whether in
their dealings with prisoners and wounded, in slight advantages, or in
important victories, they strove to manifest their moderation,
self-control, and humanity.
Komura's task was no easier than Oyama's or Togo's. To accept and carry
into execution the peace, in its present form, must have been all the
more distasteful in that the whole country was against it and expressed
its opinion in an exceedingly hostile manner.
Yet, had the populace been more deliberate in its judgment, they must
have appreciated the diplomacy of their statesmen no less than the
strategy of their generals. They may, moreover, rest assured that the
present peace, though it may appear somewhat unjust to them, will prove
to be of as great benefit and of as sure advantage as if better terms
had been arranged. Was it not so, in the case of past victorious wars,
especially as regards the terms of peace concluded with little glory and
renown at Simonosaki and Chifu, which yet contributed so much to
heighten the army's thirst for combat, and to develop the patriotism of
the nation? Undoubtedly Japan is reckoning upon future eventualities and
struggles in which she will demand yet more courage from her army and
even greater enthusiasm from her sons.
* * * * *
But for the moment, at least, we may look with confidence to the Peace,
and hope that Nippon, which has won the admiration of the whole world in
the late war, will show herself not less capable in time of peace. May
she assist the countries that have come within her sphere--especially
Korea--to a higher development! May she improve the conditions of
agriculture, industry, as well as of culture, and truly strengthen all
those moral, ethical, and spiritual aspirations which alone make for the
positive weal of mankind! In one word--may the Land of the Rising Sun
earnestly strive to cast rays of light on Eastern Asia!
INDEX
Agriculture, system of, in China, 119; in Korea, 218, 226
Alexandrovsky chateau, style, 4, 9; situation, 5, 9; garden, 5;
drawing-room, 9; study, 11
Altai range, 41
Amur district, incorporated into the Russian Empire, 59, 362
Angara river, 49
Anglo-Korean commercial agreement, 224
Annam, under French administration, 362
Annenkoff, General, 64
Art, character of Chinese, 182, 348-50; of Japanese, 278
Asia, 32
Atmolinsk, 36
Australasia, the future of, 386
Baikal Lake, crossing the, 51-3, 55; islands, 52; railway line, 52
Balagansk, 42
Baltic, the, 59
Baskir plateau, 32, 58; character and dress of the people, 32; climate,
33
Bikanir desert, 64
Black Sea, 59
Bokhara, 36
Boxer movement of 1900, 155
Buddhists, 58
Buriats, 43; their appearance, 58; dress, 58; religion, 58
"Bushido," establishment of, 316; definition of the word, 316; code of
moral principles, 317; origin, 317; unwritten laws, 320; principles of
justice, 320; courage, 321; honour, 322; "hara-kiri," or suicide, 323-6;
"kataki-ushi," or vengeance, 326-8
Butter, export of, 40
Calico, sale of, in Korea, 268
Cemetery, Portuguese, at Pekin, 167
Chan-chi-Tung, Viceroy, his characteristics, 136, 352; attempts at
reform, 136, 352; writings, 137; political views, 352; mercantile
spirit, 353; views on education, 353; extracts from his work on "China's
Only Hope," 353-5
Chefoo, Treaty of, 155
Chemulpo, 225, 229
Ch'ien-men, or Great Street, in Pekin, 168
Ch'ien-men San-tan Bridge, 168
Chilkoff, Prince, Minister of Railways, his characteristics, 20;
mechanical training, 21; his study, 21; management of the railway
transport during the war, 21_n._
Chin-Chan Mountain, 42
China, 41; method of agriculture, 119; suzerainty of Korea, 200; system
of education, 209; language, 211; outbreak of war in 1894 with Japan,
231; magnitude, 340; territorial losses, 362; payment of war
indemnities, 362; relations with Japan, 363-7; originality and
initiative, 364-7; delay in reorganization, 369; advocates of reform,
370
China, Emperor of, imprisoned, 161, 187; failure of his struggle for
freedom, 187
China, Dowager Empress of, her summer residence, 160; appearance and
dress, 183; character, 183; reception of the representatives of the
Powers, 184; interest in the ladies, 186; diplomatic ability, 186
"China's Only Hope," extracts from, 353-5
Chinampoo, 225
Chinese, relations with Russians, 94, 119; capacity for work, 127;
energy and industry, 176; character of their art, 182, 348-50;
characteristics, 341-3; superiority of the native servant, 342; labour
question, 344; virtues of the lower middle class, 344; honesty of
tradesmen, 345; guild or club houses, 346; musical and theatrical
entertainments, 347; intellectual capacity, 351, 371; ideal of
happiness, 369, 378; dress, 373; family affection, 373; their view of
Anglo-Saxons, 374; care of the poor, 375; number of Christians, 376;
schools, 377
Ching, Prince, Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, 177; his appearance,
177; characteristics, 178
Chitta, 59
Cholera, epidemic of, at Mukden, 105
Chopsticks, use of, 148
Chunchuses, band of, 82, 118
Clement V, Pope, appoints the first Bishop of Pekin, 376
Confucius, influence of his teaching, 159
Convicts, number of, 43
Cossacks, their characteristics, 54; escort of, 111; hilarity, 115;
steeplechase 115-18
Cryptomerea, avenue of, 302
Dalny, 123
_Datshas_, 3
Dogs of Korea, their character, 256-8; of Manchuria, 69
Dostoievsky, on the miseries of Omsk, 57
Earth, Temple of the, in Pekin, 172
Eastern Chinese Railway Co., 59, 63, 76, 125; system of construction,
64; festivities on the transfer to China, 129
Education method of, in Japan, 292; in Korea, 209, 234, 238, 272
Erbolinsk, 42
Formosa, 284
Funeral, torchlight procession in Seoul, 258-62
Funerals, style of, in Korea, 220
Fusan, 225, 229
Gardens, style of, in Japan, 310
Gen-San, 225
Genghis Khan, 61
Germany, trade with Korea, 226
_Gen-sen_ plant, value of, in Korea, 194, 227
Gobi desert, 59, 64
Goods train, travelling by, 65
Guild or club houses in China, 346
Halung-kiang, 75
Han river, 193, 229
Hang-Jang, 200
Hankau, club house at, 347
Hankau-chwang, 129, 131
"Hara-kiri," or suicide, 323-6
_Haras_, 69
Harbin, 59
Heaven, Temple of, in Pekin, 171; in Seoul, 252
Honolulu, 386
Hwang-ssu temple, 170
_Insatsu Kyoku_, or Printing Office in Tokio, 294
Irkutsk, 39, 42; characteristics, 42; inhabitants, 43, 50; railway
station, 44-6; impressions of, 48-50; attractions, 50; Imperial Opera
House, 50; Chinese colony, 50
Ivasaki, Baron, his articles on Japan, 290, 368
Jade Canal, 142
Japan trade with Korea, 225; outbreak of war in 1894 with China, 231;
administration of Korea, 232, 235; temples, 276; lacquer-work, 277;
monuments, 277; character of art, 278-81; Katsura-no-Rikyu Palace, 278;
tea ceremonies, 281, 322; construction of railways, 284; telegraph
lines, 285; telephones, 285; electricity, 286; steamship service, 286-8;
reorganization of the country, 289-91, 314, 332, 367; education, 292;
Tokio University, 292; character of the military equipment, 296, 316;
reception at the Yeddo Palace, 301-10; avenue of cryptomerea, 302; style
of gardens, 310; history, 315; system of vassalage, 315; the _Samurais_
military code, 316-23, 334; definition of the word "Bushido," 316;
origin, 317; "hara-kiri," or suicide, 323-6; "kataki-ushi," or
vengeance, 326-8; creed, 330; military discipline, 333; religion, 336-8;
Shintoism or nature-worship, 337; imitations and appropriations, 364-7;
development, 367; relations with China, 363-7; conclusion of peace with
Russia, 381; motives for desisting from war, 383-5; moderation and
self-control, 382, 388; policy, 385, 387-9
Japan, Emperor of, 305; audience with, 305-7; his interest in various
questions, 306
Japan, Empress of, audience with, 308-10; her dress, 308;
characteristics, 308
Japanese, their force of imagination, 280, 282; characteristics, 280-3,
289, 296, 311, 315, 341; gift of adaptation, 291, 315; causes of their
success, 315; faculty of assimilation, 315, 367; power of discipline,
315; courteousness, 322; conventional smile, 329; creed, 330; sword,
331; fondness for study, 335; religious views, 337
Jasper, waters of, 143
Kai-Teng, 200
Kalmuks, the, 43, 58
Kanks, 40
Kao-Li, 199
_Kasha_, 67
_Kataki-ushi_, or vengeance, 326-8
Katsura-no-Rikyu Palace, 278
Kharbin, 70-73
Ki-Tsze, founder of Korea, 197
Kiahta, 51
Kien-lung, Empress, 170
Kirghiz, steppes of the, 58
Kirin, 68, 75
Kirinsk, 42
Kinshiu railway, 284
Kobe, 284, 339
Koerber, Professor, 294
Korea, its origin, 189, 197; difference between ancient and modern, 190;
situation, 192; area, 192; mines, 192, 227; rivers, 193, 229; climate,
193; flora, 193; value of the _gen-sen_ plant, 194, 227; timber, 194;
animals, 195; minerals, 195; founder of the nation, 197; law forbidding
the writing of history, 198; diaries of court officials, 198; three
kingdoms, 199; history, 199-203; under the suzerainty of China, 200;
system of administration, 203-5; number of governorships, 204;
organization of the army, 204; corruption of officials, 205; system of
justice, 206; criminal cases, 207; practice of torture, 207; prisons,
207; methods of punishment, 208; education, 209, 234, 238, 272;
language, 211; Emperor Li Hsi, 211; revolution of 1895, 213; family
life, 214; condition of women, 215; rights of marriage, 216; wedding
ceremony, 217; methods of agriculture, 218, 226; work and recreations of
women, 219; amusements of men, 219; music, 220; funerals, 220; children,
221; schools, 221; houses, 222; food, 222; dress, 222; games, 223;
recitations, 223; relations with foreign Powers, 224; trade, 224-6;
means of transport, 227; the "Pedlars' Guild," 228; railways, 229;
harbours, 229; money, 230; independence, 231; under Japanese and Russian
influence, 232, 235; character of the people, 233, 237; college at Yong
Sang, 238; dogs, 256; governed by Japan, 362
Korea, Crown Prince of, 273
Korea, Emperor of, his attempts at reform, 212; intrigues and plots
against his life, 213; sons, 213; his power, 269; appearance, 270;
costume, 270; interest in the West, 270-2
Korea, Empress of, murdered, 267
Koreans, their origin, 195; physical characteristics, 196, 233, 237;
intellectual powers, 238; costume, 244, 248, 263; method of education,
252, 272
Krasnoyark, 40
Ku-hung-ming, extracts from his "Letters from a Viceroy's Residence,"
356-60
Kublai Khan, 376
Kunsan, 225
Kuropatkin, General, 124
Kwo-tsze-chien temple, 170
Kyoto, 284
Lacquer-work in Japan, 277
Lama of Lhassa, pilgrimages to, 59
Lama monastery in Pekin, 170
Legations in Pekin, 152
Lena, 41
"Letters from a Viceroy's Residence," extracts from, 355-60