KUT
[Sidenote: The Siege of Kut.]
On the 3rd the force moved into Kut-al-Amarah. Some sick and lightly
wounded men rejoined, bringing the strength up to about 333. The 30th
Brigade was detailed as reserve brigade and was allotted camping space in
gardens on the edge of the town.
Work was at once commenced on the defences and pushed on with the
greatest vigour possible. The Battalion was employed night and day
digging the second line and communication trenches to the front line.
On December 5th the enemy began to close round Kut and opened with
artillery fire and a few snipers. The Cavalry Brigade and greater portion
of land transport crossed the river on their way to Ali Gharbi on the
6th, on which day the last steamer also left, and Kut was isolated. Work
was continued on the defences to the limit of the men’s endurance. The
enemy strength increased daily and he gradually closed in on the front
line. Intense artillery bombardment was kept up for about two hours
morning and evening when the mirage disappeared and enabled observation
of fire to be made. On the 9th the enemy attacked the bridgehead on the
right bank and captured it. Under cover of fire from the left bank it was
temporarily reoccupied, but again captured by the Turks. After dark the
bridge was cut adrift, the right bank having been occupied in force by
the enemy.
The Turkish artillery fire had become so severe by the 10th that orders
were issued to discontinue working in the open in daylight.
The usual routine for the reserve brigade was to move out at dusk,
work till 1 a.m., when the units went into close reserve and support
to the front line till dawn. They then returned to bivouac dug-outs
on the outskirts of the town. After food, work was again commenced on
communications, improving roads, second line trenches, etc. Return to
bivouac for the evening meal preparatory to moving out again at dusk.
Piquets along the river bank, to prevent entry or egress of enemy agents,
were also found in turn by night and day by the reserve brigade.
On the afternoon of the 12th the Turks made a determined attack on the
north-west sector and succeeded in establishing themselves within a
hundred yards of the front-line trenches, although they failed to enter
them. The same night the 76th moved up in relief to the front line. This
relief of the 16th Brigade by the 30th Brigade, and vice versa, took
place weekly after this date.
The front line taken over was only of an average of two and a half feet
deep, with no sanitary arrangements, many dead being just thrown on the
parapet or parados, and no direct communication trenches. The enemy
was extremely active, pushing up his saps and opening new parallels.
At night he was particularly active, making many attempts on the wire.
These were all driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire and by bombs,
while his working parties were harassed by fire whenever possible. Our
men were kept employed to the utmost limit of their strength improving
the trenches, etc. During this first tour of duty in the front line the
Battalion lost severely, 2nd-Lieutenant Muirhead being mortally wounded,
Jemadar Ram Sarup killed, Subadar Sundar Singh wounded, and about fifty
men killed and wounded.
Throughout the siege casualties were of daily occurrence, there being no
place within the defences which was not under rifle fire. The majority of
the enemy artillery fire was directed at our artillery positions near
the brick kilns, and on the town itself. The front line received very
little artillery fire, and it was generally less strenuous in the front
line than in reserve, the latter entailing constant working parties day
and night, as well as having to be in close support on completion of the
night’s work. The men only had the clothes in which they stood up and two
blankets, and consequently soon became lousy, as there was practically
no opportunity of washing, all water having to be drawn from the river,
which was some distance away and subject to heavy sniping. On December
24th the enemy made a determined attack on the fort, which he entered,
and was only ejected after severe hand-to-hand fighting at 3 a.m. on the
25th. That evening the 76th, which was due for relief, received orders
to move into the fort during the night, where it took over the north and
west faces and repaired and improved the defences. It was again relieved
on the 28th and had twenty-fours’ much-needed rest.
[Sidenote: January, 1916.]
Rain commenced falling on January 6th and added much to the difficulty
of keeping the trenches and communications in good order, and to the
discomfort of the men. News of the relieving force was now received daily
and gave all ranks a feeling of optimism as to the early raising of the
siege. On January 21st the river overflowed into the enemy trenches,
which in turn overflowed into ours, and no amount of work could stop it.
A retirement was therefore ordered to the Middle Line, which had been
prepared for occupation in such an eventuality, but was already two or
three feet deep in mud and water. Ammunition, stores and kits were moved
with great difficulty owing to the depth of mud and water in the front
line and communication trenches, which was almost up to the men’s necks.
One havildar was drowned trying to rescue ammunition. The cold was also
extreme and the men, having no means of drying their clothes, suffered
heavily from exposure, 3 British officers and 50 men having to report
sick. The enemy to our front had been forced by the water to retire 1,500
yards and valuable firewood was retrieved from his trenches by parties
from the Battalion, after inflicting many casualties on him as he retired
across the open.
On the 29th horsemeat was first issued and all rations were much reduced.
[Sidenote: February.]
On February 16th a bund twenty feet thick was commenced all along the
trenches in order to keep out the floods that were expected in March, and
work on this continued nightly until it was finished.
Enemy aeroplanes also put in frequent appearances, but in only one case
did their bombs cause any damage. Several schemes for sorties were
prepared and the Battalion actually paraded for some, but they did not
eventually take place. Great difficulty was met with in getting the men
to eat horsemeat and they did not do so until very near the end of the
siege; they did, however, find many kinds of edible weeds and grass to
cook and supplement the scanty ration. The casualties in Kut up to the
end of February totalled 3,000.
[Sidenote: March.]
On March 8th and 9th the Battalion, with others, was held in readiness
to cross the river, and co-operate with the relief force, and great was
the disappointment when its failure was made known. On the 10th rations
were reduced to 10 ounces of barley and 4 ounces for parching, and all
surplus animals were killed. On the 15th the enemy was again flooded out
of his trenches. For some time past the whole British garrison had been
employed daily in making bricks and collecting materials, and nightly in
completing the flood bund. The flood arrived on the 16th and continued
rising until on the 27th Kut was an island. On the 28th rations were
reduced to 8 ounces, and the same day a new problem appeared in the
percolation of water through the ground into the trenches from the flood
outside. This gave serious anxiety and much hard work to counteract,
nearly to the end of the siege. The men now began to become very weak
and emaciated, but retained their spirits, in which all were much helped
by the constant and distinctly heard bombardments of the enemy trenches
by the relieving force, whose flashes and bursts could be easily seen at
night.
Casualties of the 76th from the commencement of the siege to the end of
March:—Officers: British—Died of wounds, 1; wounded, 2. Indian—Killed, 1;
wounded, 4. Rank and File—Killed, 32; died of wounds, 17; wounded, 90;
missing, 2; died of disease, 16. Followers—Killed, 2; died of wounds, 1;
wounded, 3; total, 171.
[Sidenote: April.]
On April 9th rations were reduced to 7 ounces, on the 10th to 5 ounces,
and on the 11th to 4 ounces, when the men at last overcame their
prejudices and commenced eating horsemeat. Our aeroplanes were now
dropping supplies daily, but were unable to carry sufficient to feed the
garrison. On the 24th the gallant attempt of the _Julnur_ was made to
run up river with supplies, and great was the disappointment to see her
ashore at Magasis the next morning. Surrender now appeared inevitable,
the reserve ration had been eaten and men were actually dying of
starvation. Sentries could no longer stand at their posts, but sat down,
and for about three weeks the Battalions in the trenches had not been
relieved as the men were too weak to move their equipment, bedding and
stores. It was indeed a pitiful sight to see the men weak and emaciated,
but one was proud that the men of the Battalion kept up their morale and
did their utmost to carry out any order given.
Owing to weakness everyone lay flat on his back whenever possible in
order to conserve his strength, and the line-sick were practically unable
to move.
On April 28th and 29th the last emergency ration was consumed, and on the
29th the garrison surrendered after a defence of 150 days. Thus ended
the siege of Kut, which had lasted for five months, a period of hardship
and discomfort seldom equalled in the history of the British Army. The
spirit, power of endurance and courage of the men of the Battalion in
the face of never-ending digging and repairing of trenches, long hours
of night duty, exposure to wet and bitter cold and starvation, is a
wonderful proof of their soldierly qualities and a fine example to those
who will follow them in the Battalion. The fact that the siege had ended
in capitulation was no fault of theirs and, by holding on to Kut, they
had prevented the Turkish Army from overrunning Lower Mesopotamia. The
Battalion proceeded by steamer to the Turkish Camp at Shumran, where
it bivouacked on the bank of the river. The men were in the last stage
of exhaustion and more than fifty per cent. were suffering from an
acute form of diarrhœa. Very little food was obtained in this camp, and
almost entirely consisted of hard Turkish emergency biscuits. Many men
of the garrison died of starvation or enteritis. Twenty-three men of
the Battalion were passed as unfit to march by the Turkish doctors. The
rest marched off for Baghdad on the 6th with the remainder of the Indian
garrison; the story of their hardships and suffering has been related
elsewhere. The following went into captivity and remained prisoners, with
the exception of a few who escaped, for two and a half years:—
Major N. V. L. Rybot, D.S.O.
Captain E. Milford.
Captain S. van B. Laing, M.C.
Captain & Adjutant G. V. R. Reyne.
2nd-Lieutenant O. G. Kiernander, I.A.R.O.
2nd-Lieutenant G. N. Rogers, I.A.R.O.
Captain F. T. Drake-Brockman, 7th Lancers, att.
Captain P. B. Bharucha, D.S.O., I.M.S. (was subsequently exchanged).
And about 240 Indian officers, non-commissioned officers and men.
Although the Battalion had only been actively engaged since April 12th,
1915, and had had several short periods of rest, the casualties from
enemy action and sickness (mostly fever), during the seven months to
November 5th, 1915, had necessitated the provision and absorption of
drafts totalling 1,600 men or nearly twice the original strength of the
Battalion.
For services during the siege two Distinguished Service Orders and nine
Indian Distinguished Service Medals were subsequently awarded to officers
and men of the Regiment.