The first object you mentioned was to alter the mode of settling

accounts, so far as the requisitions previous to 1781 are

concerned, and only to calculate the actual payments, or advances

by the States, with the interest, so that the whole, being formed

into one sum, may be afterwards apportioned among the States. To

which plan, among other objections, I look the liberty to state

the following. First, there is no evident necessity for taking

this step, and therefore it will be prudent to omit it; because in

such cases government risk every unforeseen danger that may

result, and always render their affairs more complicated.

Secondly, the measure may be misunderstood, and occasion clamors,

which will indispose some to adopt the other measures recommended

by Congress; which objection though it ought not to weigh in

competition with what is evidently _proper and right_, must

nevertheless be attended to in things of more doubtful complexion.

Thirdly, there would arise from it a degree of _irregularity_; for

the particular accounts being now all opened in the treasury

books, by the authority of the late Board of the Treasury, it

appears most natural to continue them in their present form, until

the final settlements. Fourthly, all the information necessary to

enable Congress to decide on the accounts when settled will then

be in their power; for the accounts will contain, on one side, the

compliances of the State with the requisitions, together with all

other advances which they have made for the public service, and on

the other side will be the amount of the various requisitions.

Whenever therefore Congress on such full view of the subject,

shall think proper to remit the whole, or any part of the

requisitions, entries will be made in the treasury books

accordingly. Fifthly, it would be rather premature to make the

decision proposed before (by a settlement of accounts) all the

proper materials are brought into view; and until the States have

adopted the proposed measures for funding the public debts.

Because, sixthly, it is conceived that the various requisitions

were adequate to the necessary service; and that although it may

perhaps be wise eventually to convert the whole expenditure of the

war into the form of a debt, in order thereby to prevent the

disputes which might arise on the apportionments, still it must be

remembered, that this step cannot be taken until funds are

obtained. Until that period, therefore, it is perhaps as well to

leave the requisitions; if it be only to show the States why they

are called on for revenues now, viz. because they would not or

could not furnish supplies before. But, lastly, it might prove

dangerous under present circumstances to take any step whatever

with these requisitions. Only partial compliances have been made.

Some States therefore adhere to some requisitions, and some to

others, according to the real or supposed situation of their

accounts. To go no farther, it would hardly be prudent to hazard a

dispute with Massachusetts, by relinquishing the requisitions of

March, 1780, or with some other States by a useless attempt to

enforce them.

The other object, Sir, which you appeared to have in view, is to

relinquish so much of the requisitions since 1781, as might leave

only the sum necessary for fulfilling present engagements. Now

although the resolution, which seems to have been in contemplation,

would not have had this effect, because the requisition for the

service of 1782 was made on estimates, yet I shall assign a few

objections to the plan. The reason urged in favor of it is, that the

demand was so much beyond the abilities of the States, and the

necessities of the service, that it must excite a despair of

compliance, and a diffidence in the prudence of those by whom it was

made. To which it may well be replied, that the ability of the States

is not so hastily to be decided on, because it has never been put to

the proof by prudent and vigorous taxation, because other countries

not so wealthy bear much heavier taxes without inconvenience, and

because these very States have borne it, though under another name;

for the depreciation of the paper money, which wiped away not less

than twelve millions annually, was in effect a tax to that amount.

But further, even admitting the supposed inability, still the

requisition, if not excessive as to its object, ought of necessity

to have been made. Because the States could by no other mode of

reasoning be convinced of the necessity of establishing that

credit, which can alone prevent such great efforts. And because if

such requisitions had not been made, some branch of service must

have been left unprovided for by Congress, on the very face of

their own measures, which would have been a palpable absurdity.

And this leads to the second point, viz. that the demand was

beyond the necessities of the service. Before this position is

assumed it must be considered, not only what expense was actually

paid, but also what was probable when the demand was made, and

what of the expense incurred still remains due. And first, as to

what was paid; we shall find that the military collections in the

Southern States went to a considerable sum, which is not yet

brought into the public accounts, as there was no money to defray

it, owing to the noncompliance of the States. Secondly, the

probable expense was far beyond the actual, because of the

misfortunes of our allies, which rendered it necessary lay aside

the proposed offensive measures, and which could not, if not laid

aside, have been carried into effect, by reason of the lamentable

deficiencies of the public revenue. And thirdly, a very

considerable part of the expense of 1782 is necessarily paid in

1783, and a far more considerable part remains unpaid. For

instance, almost the whole amount of the pay of the army; an army

by no means so numerous as that which the General had called for,

and Congress resolved on. And it would have been indeed very

strange, if Congress had asked only five millions from the States,

including therein every other article, but the pay of the army on

whose exertions everything depended.

Having said thus much on what has been assumed with respect to

these estimates, and which I can defend the more hardily, as by

accident they did not pass through my office, I proceed now to

state the objections against remitting them. And first, let it

always be kept in view, that the States not having granted the

funds necessary for securing to our army the interest of their

dues, that army has a just right to insist that the requisition

for the principal be not relinquished, until such grants be made.

Secondly, it must be remembered, that Congress have not yet any

standard for making a final apportionment, and therefore it must

be very useless now, to touch requisitions which must speedily be

retouched again. Thirdly, the States which have complied more

fully than others, would undoubtedly, in such cases, relax from,

and perhaps totally withhold their efforts; from the conviction

that deficient States would always be able to obtain from Congress

a vote favorable to themselves, and consequently unfavorable to

others; which idea, grounded too much on past experience, is one

great cause of that inattention which led us to the brink of

ruin. Fourthly, this mischief would not only arise among the

States, but it would exist also amidst and within them, for a

relaxation of the whole quota would naturally render new interior

apportionments necessary. Not to mention the delays and disputes

thereby occasioned, the remainder of what would then be to pay

would be thrown of course upon remote counties, where the powers

of government are weak, the collections languid, and the revenue

in every respect feeble and unproductive. Great deficiencies would

arise from these causes, both in the periods and the amount of

payments, and either would be sufficient to cause another national

bankruptcy. But, fifthly, there can be no reason for the measure

proposed; because it is much more simple to leave the present

demands for ten millions of dollars upon their present footing,

until the apportionment of that whole sum can be made _finally_ to

pay (from whatever is brought in) the amount of all existing

engagements, to go on (should collections be sufficient) and pay

off a part of our debts, and finally to make no new requisitions,

until these be completely complied with. By that period Congress

will be able to deride with accuracy on the sums necessary for

annual service; they will be able to apportion their demands

accordingly, and, what is of infinite importance, they will have

set an example of persisting regularly in a measure, until a full

and final compliance.

I am, Sir, respectfully, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

GEORGE WASHINGTON TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Rocky Hill, August 30th, 1783.

Sir,

I take the earliest opportunity of informing you, that Baron

Steuben has returned from Canada, without being able to accomplish

any part of the business he had in charge. In consequence of

which, and of the late season of the year, I have judged it

impossible to take possession of the western posts this fall, and

have ordered a stop to be put to the movement of troops and

stores, and to the preparations which were making for that

purpose; of which I have given notice to the Quarter Master

General, and to the contractors, and have taken every other

precaution in my power to prevent the accumulation of unnecessary

expenses.

I am, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

* * * * *

TO GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Office of Finance, September 2d, 1783.

Sir,

I received your Excellency's favor of the 25th and 30th of last

month. The latter was by far the more agreeable, for I confess to

you, Sir, that I beheld the attempt to garrison the western posts

with pain, and went into so much of it as concerns my department

with infinite reluctance. I persuade myself that the only

effectual means of getting a good American establishment of any

kind is, to be so long without it that a sense of the want shall

stimulate the States into the means of forming it. At present all

we can do is, to close the past scene, if possible, with

reputation.

I am, very sincerely, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

CIRCULAR TO THE COMMISSIONERS OF ACCOUNTS.

Office of Finance, September 4th, 1783.

Sir,

As the Commissioners, both on the Accounts of the Departments and

on those of the States, are now almost all appointed, and in the

execution of their respective offices, I shall take the liberty of

adding a little to their important employment. And this I do with

a view to the future service of the Union, under whatever hands

the administration may fall.

In the course of the business committed to your care, you will

have occasion to travel into different places, and therefore you

will have an opportunity to render an accurate account of many

particulars, which it is important to know. A well regulated

system of finance requires, that money be raised with ease to the

people, and expended with economy to the public. An intimate

acquaintance with the state and the resources of a country, is

alike essential to both of these objects.

The state of the country is either _geographical_, _moral_,

_political_, or _commercial_. The geographical state comprehends,

1st. The general extent, divisions, and subdivisions.

2dly. The mountains, rivers and roads, with their respective

courses and distances.

3dly. The kind and quality of the soil; and

4thly. The natural advantages or disadvantages for husbandry,

manufactures, or commerce, including therein, mines, minerals,

quarries, salines, and the like.

The moral state of the country comprehends,

1st. The population, whether numerous or, not, and whether by

natives or emigrants.

2dly. The manners; which include the mode of life and occupation

of the people, from those who live by hunting or grazing, to the

husbandman, and so on to the most perfect mechanics.

3dly. The husbandry; by which is meant the particular kinds which

may be practised, and the degree of improvement in each. The

various climates and productions of the States, as well as their

different periods of settlement and relative population, have

rendered this article extremely various.

4thly. The arts; by which is not so much intended the fine, as the

useful arts. It may, however, be not amiss to mention any peculiar

or remarkable excellence in the former. The useful, or mechanic

arts, being in some places considerably advanced, and in others

hardly established, and the wealth of the country depending much

upon them, it will be well to know the subject intimately.

5thly. The buildings; these may be either public or private. The

former may be noticed, but of the latter an accurate information

will be necessary, seeing that in general much information as to

the abilities of a people may be derived from a knowledge of the

houses they have built; whether these be of logs, for shelter of

the new and indigent cultivator; or of stone, for the accommodation

of the established and wealthy husbandman. So also, whether the

windows be glazed or not, the state of the several outhouses, &c. And,

6thly. The improvements; which will comprehend, of land, from the

first clearing of a forest, to the watering and dyking of meadows

and swamps; and of buildings, from a common saw mill, to all the

various furnaces, forges, mills, and machines, which may be met

with in the progress of your inquiries.

The political state of the country comprehends,

1st. The constitution of government; which is not merely the paper

form, but the practice under it; and that will depend much upon

the tendency of the people towards aristocratical or democratical

dispositions. The former may be expected, where large tracts of

territory are in the hands of a few, and the latter where a

considerable equality of fortunes is found in cities. But neither

of these circumstances, though forcible, is conclusive, and

therefore it is, that the knowledge collected on the spot by

conversation and observation, becomes useful.

2dly. The magistracy; by which is meant not only the mode of

appointment, the names, the powers, and the jurisdictions, but

what is far more important, the authority, which materially

depending upon the respect paid to the magistracy, must be much

influenced by the personal character of the magistrates; and by

that character is not so much intended the reputation of a few

individuals, as of the whole corps, and for a considerable space

of time.

3dly. The interior police; which is intimately connected with, and

mutually acted upon by the former. This differs widely in the

different States, and is the more necessary to be known, as

various branches of it may either facilitate or oppose the public

measures.

4thly. The revenue; and under this head is particularly to be

noted the modes of laying, levying, and collecting taxes, the time

and the expense which are employed, and the delays and the frauds

which happen. To these will be added, the amount brought into the

treasury, and, as far as may be, the quantum appropriated to

public uses; and,

5thly. The credit, both public and private; the former of which

has a close connexion with the revenue.

The commercial state of the country, comprehends,

1st. The produce; under which term is included not only the raw

material, but the ruder manufactures; such for instance, as flour

from wheat, iron from ore, and the like.

2dly. The roads and navigation to the several ports; on the

facility whereof must greatly depend the prices of things, and

even the practicability of obtaining them.

3dly. The imports and exports, with the places to and from which

the same are made; the former as precisely as possible, and the

latter in such general terms as may convey a tolerably just idea

of the principal branches and connexions of foreign commerce.

4thly. The value of lands; which though a result from various

heads already mentioned, has a more intimate connexion with

commerce; and,

5thly. The value of money; by which is not so much meant the

coins, as the rates of interest actually paid, and the facility of

obtaining money on interest.

The resources of a State are twofold, being either those which

exist and may be drawn forth and applied in peace, for the various

purposes which may then occur to meliorate or beautify the

country, such as the opening of interior navigation, mending of

roads, and erecting of buildings; or those, which can be exerted

for the purposes of war, either offensive or defensive. The

resources in peace will appear from due reflection on the

information already asked; as will indeed, in a great degree,

those for war, particularly offensive war. But still there remain

some particulars worthy of notice; such as,

1st. The number of men which may be brought into the public

service; being either seamen or soldiers; and consequently the

number of each should be distinguished.

2dly. The quantity of provisions and the kinds.

3dly. The forage of different kinds; and,

4thly. The various means of transportation, such as horses,

wagons, boats, &c.

Having thus, Sir, pointed out the principal objects on which I

wish for information, I must now request, that you will endeavor

to collect it as speedily and as perfectly as your means and

opportunities may permit, and that you will transmit it as fast as

it is obtained, but always in letters which contain no other

matter, and arranged regularly under the several titles which have

been mentioned; but as it is impossible to foresee the various

matters which may arise, and the occurrences which will impress

themselves on an intelligent and inquisitive mind, you will be

pleased under the head of _Miscellaneous Observations_, to

transmit any such things as you may think useful or important to

be known.

I am, Sir, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

TO JOHN ADAMS.

Office of Finance, September 20th, 1783.

Sir,

I have been duly honored with your Excellency's favors of the 5th,

10th, and 11th of July. I have taken the liberty to make some

extracts from the two latter, which are transmitted in a letter to

the Governor of Massachusetts, a copy whereof is enclosed. Permit

me, Sir, to give my feeble approbation and applause for those

sentiments of wisdom and integrity, which are as happily expressed

as they are forcibly conceived. The necessity of strengthening our

confederation, providing for our debts, and forming some federal

constitution, begins to be most seriously felt. But unfortunately

for America, the narrow and illiberal prejudices of some have

taken such deep root, that it must be difficult and may prove

impracticable to remove them.

I agree with you, Sir, in opinion, that the late peace was not,

all circumstances considered, a bad one for England. It is

undoubtedly a peace equally glorious to, and necessary for,

America. All ranks of men in this country feel, as well as

perceive, the benefits of it, and the fault finders (for such men

there always will be) are borne down by the general torrent of

applause.

I was happy to learn by the Washington packet, that you intended a

short trip to Amsterdam for the purpose of urging on the loan. I

hope you may have met with the success due to your zeal and

abilities; I shall ask no greater.

With perfect respect, I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

TO B. FRANKLIN.

Office of Finance, September 30th, 1783.

Sir,

I am to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of the 7th of March

and 27th of July. For both of them, accept my thanks. You express

an apprehension lest the union between France and America should

be diminished by accounts from your side of the water. This

apprehension does you equal honor as a statesman and as a man.

Every principle, which ought to actuate the councils of a nation,

requires from us an affectionate conduct towards France, and I

very sincerely lament those misapprehensions, which have

indisposed some worthy men towards that nation, whose treasure and

blood have been so freely expended for us.

I believe the truth, with respect to some, to be this. A warm

attachment to America has prevented them from making due

allowances in those cases where their country was concerned. Under

certain prepossessions it was natural for them to think, that the

French Ministry might do more for us, and it was quite as natural

for the Ministers to think, that we ought to have done more for

ourselves. The moment of treaty with England was of course the

moment of profession with English Ministers. I fear that the

impressions made by these were for a little while rather more deep

than was quite necessary. But the same love of America, which had

raised such strong irritability where her interests were

concerned, will of course stimulate it to an equal degree when

those interests are assailed from another quarter. I think I may

venture to assure you, that the esteem of this country for France

is not diminished, and that the late representations have not been

so unfavorable as you fear.

Our commerce is flowing very fast towards Great Britain, and that

from causes which must forever influence the commercial part of

society. Some articles are furnished by Britain cheaper, many as

cheap, and all on a long credit. Her merchants are attentive and

punctual. In her ports our vessels meet with despatch. I say

nothing of language and manners, because I do not think their

influence so strong on commerce as many people suppose, but what

is of no little importance is, that the English having formed our

taste, are more in a capacity to gratify that taste by the nature

and fashion of their manufactures. There is another circumstance,

also, which must not be forgotten. The great demand for French

manufactures during the war increased the price of many, and some

time will be required before it can, by a fair competition, be

discovered, which of the two countries, France or England, can

supply us cheapest. The delays in the public bills is a further

circumstance which militates (a momentary obstacle) against the

trade with France.

I must, therefore, mention to you, also, a matter which is of

great effect. Until we can navigate the Mediterranean in safety,

we cannot trade in our own bottoms with the ports of France or

Spain, which are on that sea. And we certainly will not trade

there in foreign bottoms, because we do not find the same

conveniences and advantage in so doing, as in our own vessels;

unless, indeed, it be on board of English ships. This may be a

disagreeable fact, but it is not the less a fact.

I believe that informations are transmitted hence to the Court,

which they ought not to rely on. Their servants doubtless do their

duty in transmitting such information, but I am persuaded that

they are themselves not well informed. Indeed it is quite natural,

that men should mistake when they examine and treat of a subject

with which they are unacquainted. And it cannot well be supposed,

that political characters are competent to decide on the

advantages and disadvantages of allowing to, or withholding from

us, a share in the carrying trade. On this subject I will make a

further observation, and you may rely on it, that I speak to you

with candor and sincerity, not with a view to making any

impressions on the Court. You may communicate or withhold what I

say, and they may or may not, apply it to their own purposes. If

anything will totally ruin the commerce of England with this

country, it is her blind attachment to her navigation act. This

act which never was the real foundation of her naval superiority,

may and perhaps will be the cause of its destruction. If France

possesses commercial wisdom, she will take care not to imitate the

conduct of her rival.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 12 · 第 28 / 34 段